r 


-JNER  K.  BYERS 

ATTORNEY 
■NTER-SOUTHERN   au,LD,NG 

Louisville.  Ky. 


AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  THE 
PEACE  TREATIES 


J 


THE  UNIVEBSITY  OF  OHIOAGO  PRESS 
CHICAGO.  ILLINOIS 


THE  BAKER  &.  TAYLOR  COMPANY 
lilW  yoBK 

THE  CAMBRIDGE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON 

THE  MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA 

TOKYO,  OSAKA|    EtOTO,   FUKUOKA,  SBNDAI 

THE  MISSION  BOOK  COMPANY 

SRANaHAl 


AN  INTRODUCTION  TO 
THE   PEACE  TREATIES 


B, 

ARTHUR  PEARSON  SCOTT 

Assistant  Professor  of  History  '  ' 
University  of  Chicago 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 
CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS 


Copyright  1920  By 
The  University  op  Chicago 


All  Rights  Reserved 


Published  May  1920 


Composed  and  Printed  By 

The  University  of  Chicago  Press 

Chicago,  Illinois,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

The  present  volume  does  not  purport  to  be  an 
exhaustive  or  scholarly  study  of  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence and  the  Treaties.  It  is  not  based  on  any 
inside  knowledge  of  what  went  on  at  Paris,  or  on 
any  unpublished  documentary  material.  It  is 
simply  the  outcome  of  my  attempt,  in  connection 
with  teaching  contemporary  history,  to  keep  in 
touch  with  some  of  the  principal  developments  in 
international  affairs.  Necessarily  I  must  rely 
largely  on  newspaper  and  magazine  material, 
which  in  many  respects  is  unsatisfactory.  The 
situation  has  been  constantly  changing  while  the 
book  was  being  written,  and  many  important 
questions  are  still  unsettled.  The  principal  Treat- 
ies, however,  are  completed  and,  except  for  the 
United  States,  are  now  effective,  I  hope  that  a 
preliminary  study  of  them  may  be  found  useful 
for  classes  interested  in  present-day  problems. 
I  also  hope  that  the  book  may  prove  of  interest  and 
value  to  anyone  trying  to  obtain  a  clearer  idea 
of  what  is  going  on  in  the  world. 

Within  the  last  six  years  the  average  American 
has  been  forcibly  reminded  of  the  connections 
between  his  affairs  and  those  of  the  rest  of  the 
world.     Regions  and  peoples  and  problems  that 


vi  Preface 

most  of  us  never  heard  of  until  recently  now 
figure  in  the  headlines  of  the  daily  papers  and  are 
hotly  debated  in  Congress.  It  is  not  at  all  im- 
probable that  the  question  of  the  ratification  of 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles  by  the  United  States 
will  become  one  of  the  principal  issues  of  the 
presidential  campaign  of  1920.  It  is  a  matter  of 
great  importance  therefore  that  those  who  wish 
to  vote  intelligently  on  this  issue  should  inform 
themselves  as  to  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  and 
should  try  to  weigh  the  consequences  to  this 
country  and  to  the  world  of  its  acceptance,  uncon- 
ditionally or  with  reservations,  or  of  its  rejection. 
I  have  tried  to  gather  and  summarize  material 
to  help  in  the  formation  of  such  a  judgment.  A 
considerable  part  of  the  book  is  taken  up  with  a 
detailed  summary  of  the  Treaty  with  Germany, 
including  more  or  less  extensive  explanatory 
comments  on  many  of  its  clauses.  I  have  not 
intended  either  to  attack  or  to  defend  the  Treaty. 
I  have  attempted  to  state  what  the  Treaty  says, 
and  to  indicate  the  reasons  which  appear  to  have 
guided  the  Conference  in  its  decisions.  In  the 
numerous  instances  where  there  has  been  and  is 
still  difference  of  opinion,  I  have  summarized  as 
fairly  as  I  could  the  arguments  on  both  sides. 
Personally,  I  should  prefer  a  prompt  ratification 
of  the  Treaty  with  only  such  explanatory  reserva- 


Preface  vii 

tions  as  those  advocated  by  Mr.  Taf t,  for  instance, 

and  a  cordial  entrance  into  the  League  of  Nations. 

I  should  then  hope  and  expect  that  the  influence 

of  the  United  States  would  be  exercised  to  secure 

a  modification  of  some  of  the  undesirable  and 

unworkable  parts  of  the  settlement.     I  have  not 

written,  however,  with  the  idea  of  persuading 

anyone  to  adopt  this  point  of  view;    I  wish  to 

present  material  on  which  the  reader  may  form 

his  own  conclusions. 

Arthur  P.  Scott 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  War  Causes  and  War  Aims i 

II.  Peace  Plans  and  Negotiations  During  the 

War i6 

III.  The  Peace  Conference 47 

IV.  The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  .  62 
V.  The  Treaty  of  Versailles 80 

Part        I.    The  Covenant  of  the  League   of 

Nations 80 

Part       II.  The  Boundaries  of  Germany     .      .      .  109 

Part     III.  Political  Clauses  for  Europe     ,      .      .  no 

Part      IV.  German  Rights  and  Interests  Outside 

Germany 128 

Part       V.  MiUtary,  Naval,  and  Air  Clauses  .      .  146 

Part      VI.  Prisoners  of  War  and  Graves    .     .      .  149 

Part    VII.  Penalties 150 

Part  VIII.  Reparation 160 

Part     IX,  Financial  Clauses 171 

Part       X,  Economic  Clauses 173 

Part     XI.  Aerial  Navigation 179 

Part    XII.  Ports,  Waterways,  and  Railways   .     .  179 

Part  XIII.  Labor 185 

Part  XIV.  Guarantees 192 

Part    XV.  Miscellaneous  Provisions     ....  193 

ix 


X  Contents 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

VI.  The  Supplementary  Treaties 197 

VII.  The  Austrian  Settlement 211 

VIII.  The  Bulgarian  Settlement 224 

IX.  Hungary 237 

X.  Elements  of  the  Near-Eastern  Settlement  246 

XI.  Italy,  the  South  Slavs,  and  the  Adriatic     .  270 

XII.  Public  Opinion  and  the  Settlement    .     .     .  279 

Index 289 


CHAPTER  I 

WAR  CAUSES  AND  WAR  AIMS 

During  the  Great  War  millions  were  inspired  in 
their  fighting  and  toiling  and  sacrifices  by  the  hope  and 
expectation  that  future  generations  would  be  spared 
the  experience  through  which  they  were  passing. 
Men  looked  for  a  peace  settlement  which  should 
remedy  as  far  as  possible  the  conditions  which  had 
led  to  the  Great  War,  and  they  charged  their  leaders 
with  the  responsibiUty  of  devising  rational  and  peace- 
ful means  for  the  equitable  settlement  of  future  diffi- 
culties and  the  prevention  of  future  wars.  All  peace 
treaties  have  professed  to  desire  these  ends,  and  for 
the  most  part  doubtless  sincerely;  but  hitherto  they 
have  failed.  Is  the  peace  settlement  of  1 919  so  differ- 
ent from  those  of  the  past  that  more  may  be  expected 
from  it  ?  This  is  the  question  which  overshadows  all 
others. 

I.      THE   CAUSES   OF   THE   WAR 

Before  deciding  whether  the  peace  treaties  have 
really  attempted  to  remedy  the  conditions  and  to  deal 
with  the  forces  which  led  to  the  Great  War,  one  should 
recall  what  these  conditions  and  forces  were.  In  part 
and  in  a  general  sense,  the  war  was  the  outcome  of  the 
whole  complex  of  modern  movements  and  develop- 
ments. In  particular,  and  directly,  it  was  forced  by 
the  aggressive  ambitions  of  the  Central  Powers. 


2  An  Introduction  to  iJte  Peace  Treaties 

It  is  almost  too  elementary  to  repeat  that  the 
Serbian  question  was  the  occasion,  not  the  cause,  of 
the  conflict;  but  the  time-honored  figure  of  the  spark 
in  the  powder  magazine  is  still  useful.  Any  one  of  a 
dozen  other  issues  might  conceivably  have  started 
the  war.  Of  the  great  underlying  causes  four  or 
five  deserve  particular  mention : 

One  of  the  most  conspicuous  and  significant  fea- 
tures of  modern  history,  and  particularly  the  history 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  has  been  the  growth  of  the 
spirit  of  nationalism^  and  the  organization  of  national 
states.  There  has  gradually  grown  up  the  conviction 
that  when  a  group  of  people  in  a  definite  geographical 
area  is  conscious  of  common  interests,  institutions, 
and  ideals,  typified  by  the  use  of  a  particular  language, 
and  based  on  a  supposed  community  of  race  or  on 
the  memory  of  a  historic  independence  now  perhaps 
lost,  it  is  justly  entitled  to  a  separate  political  exist- 
ence. One  of  the  facts  of  fundamental  importance 
in  the  present  situation  is  that  political  boundaries 
have  not  coincided  with  the  nationalistic  aspirations 
of  various  groups.  The  nineteenth  century  saw  a 
number  of  important  readjustments  of  the  map  of 
Europe,  most  of  them  in  the  direction  of  the  national- 
istic ideal.  But  the  Poles  and  Finns  in  Russia,  the 
Danes,  Poles,  and  Alsatians  in  Germany,  the  Poles, 
Czechs,  Rumanians,  Ruthenes,  Croatians,  Serbs, 
and  Magyars  in  Austria-Hungary,  the  Bulgarians 
in  Serbia,  the  Greeks  in  Bulgaria  and  Asia  Minor, 
the  Itahans  in  Trieste  and  the  Trentino,  have  let 


War  Causes  and  War  Aims  3 

it  be  known  in  no  doubtful  terms  that  many  ambi- 
tions were  yet  unsatisfied.  Home  Rule  for  Ireland, 
the  Zionist  movement  for  the  Jews,  Egypt  for 
the  Egyptians,  all  indicate  a  growing  national  self- 
consciousness.  Pan-Germanism,  Pan-Slavism,  Pan- 
Serbianism,  even  Pan-Islamism  and  the  more  recent 
"Ottoman"  pohcy  of  the  Young  Turks,  have  all 
attempted  to  take  advantage  of,  or  to  stimulate, 
a  consciousness  of  solidarity  in  groups  which  tran- 
scended existing  political  boundaries.  The  crux 
of  the  Macedonian  situation  for  years  has  been  the 
clash  of  Bulgarian,  Greek,  Serbian,  Albanian,  and 
Turkish  nationalistic  propagandas. 

There  are  enormous  practical  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  any  wholesale  realization  of  the  hopes  of 
all  these  groups.  Races,  languages,  religions,  are 
inextricably  mixed  in  the  same  geographical  areas. 
Race  groups  are  often  isolated  from  the  main  body. 
Again,  there  may  be  deep  divisions  of  sentiment 
between  kindred  groups;  or  conditions  of  geography 
or  economic  necessity  may  be  more  important  than 
racial  boundaries.  But  whether  or  not  these  nation- 
alistic hopes  can,  or  should,  be  realized,  the  fact 
remains  that  they  are  there,  and  a  tremendously 
disturbing  fact  it  has  proved. 

Another  of  the  great  movements  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  has  been  the  growth  of  liberalism,  of 
democracy,  of  constitutional  government.  Not  infre- 
quently this  has  been  closely  connected  with  ques- 
tions of  national  aspirations.    It  is  a  fair  supposition, 


4  An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

for  instance,  that  the  French  feeling  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine  was  kept  alive  in  part  at  least  by  the  failure 
to  include  the  Reichsland  as  a  genuine  constituent 
member  of  the  German  Empire.  It  is  quite  certain 
that  poUtical  oppression  of  the  various  Slav  minorities 
in  Austria  and  Hungary  has  done  much  to  make  them 
look  outside  the  boundaries  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
for  relief. 

Still  another  distinctive  feature  of  modern  history 
has  been  the  enormous  development  of  capitaUsm. 
Manufacturing,  trade,  and  commerce  have  increased 
tremendously.  Population  also  has  grown  steadily. 
The  world  has  been  made  smaller  by  vastly  improved 
means  of  communication.  All  this  has  resulted  in  an 
unprecedented  expansion  of  European  influence  to 
all  corners  of  the  globe,  accompanied  by  a  struggle  on 
the  part  of  the  nations  of  Europe  for  colonies,  pro- 
tectorates, spheres  of  influence.  Outlets  for  surplus 
population,  markets  for  home  manufactures,  sources 
of  raw  material,  fields  for  capitalistic  development 
and  exploitation — these  have  been  the  prizes  for 
which  rival  explorers,  commercial  travelers,  traders, 
political  agents,  colonizers,  financiers,  and  even  mis- 
sionaries, with  diplomatic  and  if  necessary  military 
support,  have  been  striving. 

The  movement  toward  national  unification  and 
commercial  and  colonial  expansion  has  been  accom- 
panied by  a  certain  amount  of  the  spirit  of  imperial- 
ism, a  desire  to  rule,  a  craving  for  aggrandizement,  a 
passion  for  more  square  miles  of  territory,  increased 


War  Causes  and  War  Aims  5 

thousands  of  subjects.  There  is  something  com- 
pelling and  fascinating  about  a  "far-flung  battle 
line,"  a  flag  on  which  the  sun  never  sets,  an  empire 
known  and  respected  by  all  men.  Not  only  have  the 
aspirations  of  the  stronger  European  nations  led  to 
the  disregard  of  the  nationaHstic  aspirations  of 
weaker  groups — Poles  and  Boers,  for  example— but 
there  has  been  a  clash  between  the  imperialistic^ 
ambitions  of  the  great  powers  themselves.  There 
has  been  a  regrettable  lack  of  unanimity  about 
"manifest"  destiny. 

Another  important  factor  leading  up  to  the 
Great  War  was  militarism — defined  not  as  the  mere 
possession  of  great  naval  or  military  strength  but 
as  undue  emphasis  on  force,  the  glorification  of 
war  and  of  the  principle  of  struggle,  the  prominence 
or  even  the  predominance  of  the  miUtary  class  in  the 
counsels  of  the  nation,  and  a  readiness  to  regard  an 
insult  to  an  officer  in  uniform  as  a  far  more  heinous 
offense  than  the  most  high-handed  interference  with 
the  civil  rights  of  an  ordinary  citizen. 

These  factors  of  nationalism,  liberalism,  com- 
mercialism, imperialism,  and  militarism,  present  all 
of  them,  though  in  varying  degrees  and  combinations, 
in  all  the  nations  of  Europe,  are  responsible  in  large 
part  for  having  created  such  a  tense  international 
situation  that  the  relatively  slight  pretext  of  the 
Serbian  quarrel  brought  about  a  tremendous  crash. 
Conflicting  ambitions  and  aspirations,  mutual  jeal- 
ousy, distrust  and  fear,  endless  quarrels  and  intrigues, 


6  An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

tariff  wars,  a  feverish  rivalry  in  armaments,  com- 
bined with  a  widespreading  network  of  loans,  alliances, 
and  diplomatic  understandings,  produced  a  situation 
which  had  long  been  recognized  as  dangerous. 

More  specifically,  Germany  felt  aggrieved  because 
it  had  not  a  more  satisfactory  "place  in  the  sun." 
Acutely  conscious  of  its  own  new-found  national 
strength,  fervent  in  the  belief  of  a  great  historic 
mission  in  the  world,  justly  proud  of  splendid  achieve- 
ments in  art,  science,  literature,  and  government, 
developing  in  wealth  and  population  with  startling 
rapidity,  Germany  desired  more  colonies,  a  greater 
share  in  the  exploitation  of  the  non-European  nations, 
a  more  important  voice  in  the  settling  of  the  afifairs  of 
world-politics,  a  wider  sphere  of  influence  for  German 
civiUzation.  Germany  professed  to  feel  hemmed  in 
by  powerful  and  jealous  neighbors,  who  waited  only 
for  an  opportune  moment  to  strike.  To  the  east, 
with  no  physical  rampart  of  sea  or  mountain  between, 
crouched  Russia,  a  half-Asiatic  despotism,  the  land  of 
the  knout  and  the  pogrom,  the  home  of  illiteracy  and 
superstition,  where  red  revolution  alternated  with 
benighted  repression.  Immensely  powerful,  insati- 
ably ambitious,  Russia  was  plotting  to  absorb  all  the 
outlying  Slavic  groups  in  one  mighty  political  union, 
after  which  Western  civilization  might  look  for 
nothing  less  than  extinction  under  the  Cossacks'  hoofs. 

The  outlook  to  the  west  through  German  spec- 
tacles was  almost  as  bad.  France,  a  decadent, 
unstable,  irreligious  nation,  whose  surface  urbanity 


War  Causes  and  War  Aims  7 

could  no  longer  conceal  the  frightful  ravages  of  race- 
suicide  and  immorality,  was  plotting  revenge.  Elsass- 
Lothringen,  violently  torn  from  the  empire  some 
centuries  back,  but  now  peacefully  and  contentedly, 
nay  joyfully,  reunited  to  the  Fatherland,  was  to  be 
dragged  again  under  the  shadow  of  the  tricolor.  In 
vain  had  been  the  forbearance  and  moderation  of 
Germany;  all  for  naught  had  been  her  kindly  help 
to  French  colonial  expansion;  the  statues  of  the  lost 
cities  in  the  Place  de  la  Concord  remained  draped  in 
mourning;  unquenchable  hate  burned  in  every  French 
heart. 

Across  the  channel  perfidious  England,  laden 
with  the  ill-gotten  gains  of  centuries  of  craft,  greed, 
fraud,  force,  chicanery,  and  sheer  luck,  was  watching 
with  the  jaundiced  eye  of  jealousy  the  rapid  growth 
of  Germany.  Conscious  at  heart  of  Germany's 
real  superiority,  raging  impotently  at  the  loss  of 
trade  to  her  abler  rival,  insanely  angered  to  find  her 
insolent  dogma  of  naval  and  commercial  supremacy 
threatened  by  the  peaceful  growth  of  Germany, 
England  was  eagerly  awaiting  a  chance  to  destroy  the 
German  fleet,  merchant  marine,  and  foreign  com- 
merce with  one  treacherous  blow.  To  that  end  the 
meshes  of  the  Triple  Entente  had  been  spun  and 
strengthened,  in  order  that  the  Fatherland  might  be 
isolated,  and  choked  within  the  iron  ring  of  foes. 
Russia  and  France  were  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the 
fighting;  crafty  England,  following  her  invariable 
custom,  would  contribute  money,  but  not  blood,  and 


8  An  Introduction  to  tlte  Peace  Treaties 

would  hope  nevertheless  to  carry  off  the  lion's  share 
of  spoil. 

Of  course  not  all  of  the  German  people  took  this 
hectic  view  of  their  neighbors;  but  such  impressions 
prevailed  pretty  widely,  and  they  were  quite  openly 
expressed  in  the  press. 

Naturally  to  the  other  powers  of  Europe  the  situa- 
tion looked  rather  different.  In  the  eyes  of  the 
Entente  powers,  Germany  was  flushed  by  new-found 
power,  genuinely  strong,  but  insufferably  arrogant, 
thoroughly  selfish,  and  overweeningly  ambitious. 
The  Kaiser,  though  at  times  honestly  striving  for 
peace,  somehow  managed  to  allow  Germany  to  remain 
the  trouble-maker  of  Europe.  Germany  was  striving 
by  a  mixture  of  blundering  diplomacy  and  saber- 
rattling  to  secure  the  overlordship  of  Europe,  if  not 
of  the  world.  A  Pan-Germanic  Confederation 
stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf 
would  threaten  India.  England  in  particular  regarded 
Germany's  rapidly  growing  navy  as  a  direct  challenge 
to  her  own  supremacy  on  the  sea,  a  supremacy  which 
was  the  cardinal  necessity  of  her  own  national  exist- 
ence. France,  doubtless  hoping  against  hope  to 
regain  the  lost  provinces,  feared  yet  another  assault, 
another  staggering  indemnity,  and  the  loss  of  more 
territory.  Russia  distrusted  the  tremendous  influ- 
ence which  Germany  was  building  up  at  Constanti- 
nople. 

To  recognize,  however,  that  the  war  can  be 
traced  in  part  to  great  underlying  causes  for  which  no 


War  Causes  and  War  Aims  g 

nation  is  alone  responsible,  or  to  admit  that  the  con- 
duct and  motives  of  the  AlHes  during  the  last  twenty 
years  have  not  been  entirely  blameless,  is  not  to  say 
that  both  sides  were  equally  guilty  of  bringing  about 
the  war.  There  have  been  those  who  have  contended, 
with  a  fine  appearance  of  impartiality  and  objectivity, 
that  czarism  and  kaiserism  were  all  the  same,  and 
that  to  differentiate  between  the  imperiahsm  of 
England  and  France  on  the  one  hand  and  the  ambition 
of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  on  the  other  was  as 
meaningless  as  the  attempt  to  distinguish  Tweedledee 
from  Tweedledum.  Now  that  the  war  is  over  this 
same  contention  is  repeated,  by  way  of  criticism  of 
the  Peace  Treaty.  It  is  important  therefore  to 
remember  that  the  war  which  began  the  last  week  in 
July,  1914,  was  directly,  deliberately,  and  solely  forced 
by  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  on  nations  which 
made  every  possible  effort  to  avoid  it.  Any  lingering 
doubts  on  this  point  must  be  dispelled  by  reading 
the  minutes  of  the  Austrian  Council  of  July  7,  1914,^ 
and  the  documents  pubHshed  in  Germany  since  the 
Revolution.  Without  firing  a  shot,  the  Central 
Powers  might  have  secured  the  redress  of  every  le- 
gitimate grievance,  and  the  satisfaction  of  every 
reasonable  ambition  by  accepting  the  offers  of  the 
Entente.  Instead  they  chose  to  strike  for  everything.  \ 
They  lost.  And  now  they  are  held  to  accountability.  ' 
In  estimating  the  peace  settlement  this  fact  should  , 
never  be  overlooked.  -^ 

I  New  York  Times'  Current  History,  December,  1919,  p.  455. 


lo         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

II.      WAR  AIMS   OF   THE   BELLIGERENTS 

In  order  to  follow  the  peace  negotiations  and  to 
understand  the  peace  terms,  it  is  helpful  to  recall 
briefly  the  objects  of  each  country  in  entering  the  war. 

Austria-Hungary  attacked  Serbia  in  order  to  end 
the  menace  of  a  Greater  Serbia.  A  successful  war 
was  expected  to  bring  about  a  greater  internal  con- 
soHdation  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  A  dominant 
position  in  the  Balkans  was  sought,  with  better 
access  to  the  Aegean  Sea. 

Germany  backed  her  ally  in  order  to  reassert 
her  own  hegemony  in  Europe  against  the  growing 
power  of  the  Triple  Entente.  She  desired  to  end  the 
"Slav  menace,"  and  to  crush  France  once  for  all. 
She  wished  to  consolidate  Middle  Europe,  and  secure 
complete  control  of  the  Berlin-Bagdad  stretch,  and 
on  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  She  intended  to  seize 
agricultural  territory  to  the  east  at  the  expense  of 
Russia,  besides  gaining  control  of  the  Baltic  provinces, 
the  Belgian  seacoast,  and  the  mineral  resources  of 
France.  She  looked  forward  to  ending  England's 
mastery  of  the  seas,  to  securing  great  colonial  gains, 
and  to  expansion  in  South  America.  All  these  pur- 
poses were  avowed  by  sober  and  responsible  leaders, 
and  they  are  clearly  implied  in  the  ofiicial  declarations 
during  the  war  that  Germany  must  secure  "guaranties 
against  future  attack,"  and  must  have  "legitimate 
fields  for  economic  expansion." 

The  group  who  forced  Turkey  into  the  war  looked 
for  a  revived  and  enlarged  Ottoman  Empire,  freed 


War  Causes  and  War  Aims  ii 

from  the  peril  of  Russia.  They  expected  to  regain 
territory  in  Asia  Minor,  to  oust  England  from  Egypt, 
and  perhaps  drive  Italy  from  Tripoli.  Having  crushed 
or  assimilated  the  subject  races,  and  having  shaken 
off  European  control  over  their  internal  affairs,  they 
hoped  to  rise  again  to  the  position  of  a  great  power. 

The  Bulgars  desired  to  secure  Macedonia  and  an 
extension  of  their  Aegean  seacoast,  and  perhaps  the 
Dobrudja  from  Rumania,  thus  assuring  the  local 
overlordship  of  the  Balkans.  After  negotiating  with 
both  sides,  they  decided  that  they  were  more  likely  to 
gain  their  ends  by  joining  the  Central  Powers. 

On  the  other  side,  Serbia  and  Montenegro  had 
the  war  thrust  upon  them  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
invasion.  They  fought  primarily  in  self-defense. 
Naturally  enough,  they  hoped  that  with  victory 
would  come  the  long-desired  union  of  the  South 
Slavs  in  one  state. 

Russia  entered  the  war  to  preserve  her  prestige  as 
the  protector  of  the  minor  Slav  groups,  and  to  pro- 
tect her  interests  in  the  Balkans.  In  addition,  the 
Russians  hoped  to  gain  Turkish  Armenia  and  Con- 
stantinople, and  to  unite  all  the  Poles  under  the 
suzerainty  of  the  Czar. 

France  was  drawn  into  the  maelstrom  primarily 
because  of  the  alliance  with  Russia,  and  to  defend 
herself  against  the  ever-present  menace  of  Germany. 
When  France  would  not  promise  neutrality,  Ger- 
many attacked.  There  is  no  evidence  that  France 
wished  war  in  order  to  try  to  regain  Alsace-Lorraine. 


12         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

The  chance  was  too  desperate.  But  once  the  war 
had  begun,  the  restoration  of  the  lost  provinces 
became  a  sacred  object  for  every  Frenchman.  Simi- 
larly, when  Turkey  entered  the  war,  after  the  Allies 
had  offered  to  guarantee  its  territorial  integrity, 
France  felt  disposed  to  press  old  claims  for  Syria, 

Great  Britain  declared  war  in  the  first  instance  to 
protect  Belgium,  and  to  prevent  the  menace  of  a 
German-controlled  Channel  coast.  Under  any  circum- 
stances, however,  the  entrance  of  England  was  inevi- 
table. The  EngHsh  were  bound  in  honor  to  stand 
by  their  friends.  Their  interests  demanded  that  they 
should  preserve  the  balance  of  power  against  the 
threat  of  German  hegemony.  To  preserve  the 
empire,  they  desired  to  end  the  menace  of  the  German 
fleet;  and  once  the  war  was  on  they  struck  at  the 
German  colonies  and  trade,  and  planned  to  extend 
their  poHtical  control  at  the  expense  of  Turkey. 

Belgium  fought,  rather  than  allow  the  Germans 
free  passage,  in  order  to  preserve  national  honor  and 
independence.  The  choice  was  a  hard  one,  and  the 
risks  tremendous,  but  Belgium  did  not  hesitate. 
Throughout  the  Belgian  people  sought  freedom  and 
restoration.  At  the  end  of  the  war  they  asked  for 
the  ending  of  the  regime  of  neutralization,  and  for 
some  territory  in  Prussia  and  Holland  which  they 
regarded  as  justly  theirs.  They  also  asked  for  the 
opening  of  the  Scheldt  River. 

In  August,  1 9 14,  Japan  deHvered  an  ultimatum 
demanding  that  Germany  leave  China,  and  followed 


War  Causes  and  War  Aims  13 

it  up  by  attacking  Kiau-chow.     This  action  at  the 
time  was   ascribed   to   the  working  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  AlHance.     It  is  more  likely,  however,  that 
Japan  was  moved  by  the  desire  to  expel  a  rival  from 
China,   and   to  extend  Japanese  interests,    political 
and  economic,  in  the  Far  East.     It  would  perhaps 
be  unduly  cynical  to  deny  the  Japanese  any  interest  \ 
in  the  destruction  of  militarism  and  the  making  of  the   / 
world  safe  for  democracy;    but  it  would  be  unduly  / 
trustful  to  regard  that  as  the  main  motive. 

As  the  war  progressed,  other  nations  were  drawn 
into  it.  Portugal  had  an  ancient  treaty  of  alHance 
with  England,  and  had  colonial  interests  in  Africa 
which  were  threatened  by  Germany.  It  is  also  pos- 
sible that  the  republican  government,  none  too  se- 
cure, felt  that  a  war  would  consoUdate  national  feeling. 

Italy  for  some  time  remained  neutral,  asserting 
that  the  war  had  been  forced  by  the  Central  Powers, 
and  that  therefore  the  Triple  Alliance  was  not  binding. 
While  hastening  military  preparations,  the  Italian 
leaders  negotiated  with  both  sides  to  secure  the  largest 
possible  realization  of  the  national  aspirations.  These 
included  the  regaining  from  Austria  of  "unredeemed" 
ItaUan  populations;  the  securing  of  strategic  frontiers 
against  Austria  in  the  Alps  and  naval  security  in  the 
Adriatic;  the  gaining  of  control  in  Albania  and  the 
extension  of  political  and  economic  influence  in 
the  Balkans;  and  the  extension  of  political  power 
and  trade  and  investment  opportunities  in  the  Aegean 
Islands,  Asia  Minor,  and  Africa.     When  they  became 


14         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

con\anced  that  the  Entente  powers  were  more 
likely  to  help  them  to  these  ends,  they  declared  war 
on  the  hereditary  enemy  Austria-Hungary,  and 
later  on  Germany. 

Rumania  desired  to  add  the  "unredeemed" 
brethren  in  Austria-Hungary  to  a  Greater  Rumania. 
When  Allied  victory  seemed  probable  the  promise 
of  these  territories  brought  the  Rumanians  into 
the  war.  Bessarabia  had  also  long  been  desired, 
but  until  the  unexpected  collapse  of  Russia  there 
had  been  no  hope  of  securing  it. 

When  the  Greeks  finally  entered  the  war  on  the 
side  of  the  Entente,  they  too  wished  to  bring  within 
a  Greater  Greece  the  brethren  under  Bulgarian 
and  Turkish  rule  in  Thrace,  the  Aegean  Islands,  and 
Asia  Minor.  They  cast  longing  but  none  too  hopeful 
glances  even  at  Constantinople. 

The  United  States,  after  long  hesitation,  entered 
the  war  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  in 
order  to  protect  the  national  honor,  rights,  and  inter- 
ests. They  were  moved  also  by  a  desire  to  help  in 
the  overthrow  of  the  power  that  threatened  democracy 
everywhere.  They  felt  it  prudent  to  forestall  the 
threatened  German  movement  against  South  America. 
Lastly,  they  desired  to  aid  in  the  estabhshment  of  a 
new  and  sounder  international  order. 

China  and  Siam  were  finally  induced  to  declare 
war,  partly  by  the  German  menace  to  their  rights 
and  independence,  partly  through  the  persuasion 
of  the  United  States,  but  principally  perhaps  with 


/ 


War  Causes  and  War  Aims  15 

the  hope  that  at  the  Peace  Conference  they  might 
secure  redress  for  long-standing  grievances,  not  only 
against  Germany,  but  also  against  some  of  the 
Allied  powers. 

Brazil,  with  a  large  German  element  in  its  popula- 
tion, feared  future  German  aggressions,  and  resented 
present  German  submarine  outrages  and  intrigues 
in  Brazihan  affairs.  There  was  also  a  desire  to  follow 
the  United  States,  thus  giving  expression  to  American 
solidarity.  Bolivia,  Cuba,  Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Hon- 
duras, Haiti,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Peru,  and 
Uruguay  simply  followed  the  example  and  yielded  to 
the  urging  of  the  United  States.^ 

It  is  evident  from  this  brief  review  that  the 
nations  arrayed  against  the  Central  Powers  entered 
the  war  from  a  variety  of  motives,  and  with  a  multi- 
plicity of  aims.  The  more  important  powers  felt 
that  the  war  had  been  forced  upon  them,  and  that 
they  were  fighting  in  self-defense.  Once  the  war 
had  begun,  they  determined  to  seize  the  opportunity 
to  change  conditions  which  they  had  long  regarded 
as  dangerous  to  their  security,  and  to  realize  as  far 
as  possible  their  national  aspirations.  Some  of  the 
AlKed  purposes  were  idealistic,  some  were  distinctly 
selfish.  In  many  cases  the  aims  of  two  or  more  of 
the  Allies  clashed  with  each  other.  It  is  no  wonder 
therefore  that  the  business  of  making  a  satisfactory 
peace  was  a  difficult  one. 

'  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Peru,  and  Uruguay  broke  diplomatic  rela- 
tions.   The  others  declared  war. 


CHAPTER  II 

PEACE  PLANS  AND  NEGOTIATIONS  DURING 

THE  WAR 

It  has  often  been  the  case  that  the  main  features 
of  a  peace  were  settled  long  in  advance  of  the  actual 
negotiations  between  the  belligerents.  This  was 
true  for  instance  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  In  time 
of  war  nations  prepare  for  peace,  partly  by  private 
negotiations  between  allies,  partly  by  informal  and 
indirect  attempts  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with 
the  enemy.  Nations  which  commit  themselves  to 
war  try  first  to  secure  from  their  alHes  an  agreement 
as  to  the  results  of  the  expected  victory.  Sometimes 
of  course  circumstances  prevent  the  hunters  from 
carrying  out  the  predetermined  division  of  the  bear- 
skin. Again,  in  the  moment  of  complete  victory, 
triumphant  associates  sometimes  fall  out  over  the 
division  of  the  spoils,  to  the  profit  of  their  enemies. 
Thus  in  1815  France  was  able  to  regain  an  influential 
place  in  the  councils  of  Europe  by  taking  advantage 
of  the  differences  between  Austria  and  England  on  the 
one  hand  and  Russia  and  Prussia  on  the  other  over 
the  settlement  of  the  Polish  and  Saxon  questions. 
Again  in  191 3  the  outbreak  of  the  second  Balkan 
War  gave  Turkey  an  opportunity  to  regain  Adri- 
anople.  In  some  of  these  respects  the  Great  War 
and  the  resulting  peace  settlement  showed  familiar 

16 


Negotiations  During  the  War  17 

developments.  On  both  sides  there  were  numerous 
secret  agreements  between  alhes.  Both  sides  put 
out  informal  peace  feelers,  and  endeavored  through 
various  roundabout  channels  to  ascertain  the  views 
of  the  enemy.  At  the  Peace  Conference,  however, 
although  there  were  grave  differences  of  opinion  and 
conflicts  of  interest  among  the  victors,  the  defeated 
powers  were  not  able  to  exploit  them  to  any  very 
great  advantage. 

i.    agreements  between  allies;    the  "secret 

treaties" 

In  September  of  19 14  the  Allies  concluded  an 
agreement  not  to  make  peace  separately,  and  as 
other  states  entered  the  war  in  the  next  two  years 
they  made  the  same  promise.  By  secret  treaties  or 
agreements  these  states  were  guaranteed  certain 
gains  in  the  event  of  victory.  In  addition  there  were 
numerous  understandings  between  the  Entente 
powers,  notably  as  to  territorial  changes  to  be  made 
after  the  war.  These  were  modified  from  time  to 
time.  They  took  the  form  not  so  much  of  formal 
treaties  as  exchanges  of  notes,  and  records  of  "gentle- 
men's agreements."  The  same  thing  was  true  as 
between  the  Central  Powers,  but  the  fortunes  of 
war  have  made  their  plans  of  purely  academic  inter- 
est. The  others,  however,  were  of  the  most  vital 
importance,  for  by  the  time  the  Peace  Conference 
met  in  Paris  it  had  become  known  that  many  of  the 
most  important  issues  had   been   settled,   at  least 


1 8         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

provisionally,  by  earlier  negotiations  between  the 
Allies.  Rumors  as  to  some  of  these  arrangements  had 
become  current,  but  the  world  at  large  is  indebted 
to  the  Bolsheviki  for  making  public  the  contem  of 
many  of  them.  Part  of  the  negotiations  as  to  Ciiina 
leaked  out  at  the  time,  but  some  of  them  were  not 
generally  known  until  the  Conference  was  actually 
in  session.  A  review  of  the  terms  of  these  treaties 
and  understandings  is  necessary  before  one  can  ap- 
preciate the  situation  when  the  plenipotentiaries  met. 

1.  April  26,  1915,  Russia,  Italy,  France,  and 
Great  Britain  signed  an  agreement  providing  for 
Italy's  immediate  entrance  into  the  war,  and  promis- 
ing that  "under  the  future  treaty  of  peace,  Italy 
shall  receive  the  district  of  Trentino;  the  entire 
southern  Tyrol  to  its  natural  geographic  boundary, 
the  Brenner";  Istria,  part  of  the  Dalmatian  coast, 
and  numerous  islands  along  the  eastern  Adriatic; 
Avlona  "in  full  right"  and  a  protectorate  over 
Albania;  the  Aegean  Islands  of  the  Dodecanese;  an 
"equal  share  in  the  division  of  Turkey  in  the  basin 
of  the  Mediterranean,  and  more  specifically,  in  that 
part  of  it  contiguous  to  the  province  of  Adalia";  and 
"compensation"  in  Africa  if  England  and  France 
increased  their  colonial  possessions  there. 

2.  November  22,  19 14,  and  in  the  winter  of  191 5, 
Greece  was  offered  southern  Albania  and  "important 
territorial  acquisitions  on  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor," 
if  she  would  enter  the  war.  Great  Britain  also  offered 
to  transfer  Cyprus  in  return  for  Greek  help.     Since 


Negotiations  During  the  War  19 

Greece  did  not  at  the  time  accept  the  offers,  they 
lapsed;  but  when  Venizelos  was  finally  returned  to 
power  he  undoubtedly  received  assurances  that  the 
interests  of  the  Hellenes  would  be  considered. 

3.  In  March,  191 5,  England  and  France  agreed 
that  Russia  might  annex  Constantinople  and  the 
Straits.  Russia  agreed  that  most  of  the  neutral 
zone  in  Persia  should  come  under  British  influence, 
and  that  there  should  be  an  independent  Arabia. 
Britain  expected  from  Russia  "a  benevolent  attitude 
....  to  the  poKtical  aims  of  England  in  other 
spheres." 

4.  In  the  spring  of  191 6  the  British,  French,  and 
Russian  governments  came  to  an  agreement  as  to 
their  "zones  of  influence  and  territorial  acquisitions 
in  Asiatic  Turkey,"  and  as  to  the  boundaries  of 
Arabia.  Russia  was  to  push  westward  past  Erzerum, 
Trebizond,  and  Van.  France  was  to  receive  the 
coast  strip  of  Syria  and  parts  of  Asia  Minor,  Britain 
was  to  get  southern  Mesopotamia  with  Bagdad,  and 
the  Syrian  ports  of  Haifa  and  Acre.  Palestine  was 
to  be  separated  from  Turkey,  and  its  status  deter- 
mined by  later  agreement. 

5.  At  the  same  time  (February,  1916)  Russia 
offered  to  let  England  and  France  fix  the  western 
boundary  of  Germany  in  return  for  "freedom  in 
fixing  our  boundaries  with  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary."  Poland  was  not  to  be  the  subject  of 
international  discussion.  Continuing  these  "con- 
versations" in  January,  191 7,  France  asked  Russian 


20         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

consent  for  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  control  of 
the  Saar  Basin,  and  the  separation  of  the  German 
provinces  west  of  the  Rhine,  "so  that  in  the  future 
the  River  Rhine  shall  be  a  secure  strategic  boundary 
against  German  aggression."  Russia  agreed  in  prin- 
ciple to  these  requests,  but  recalled  her  own  earlier  de- 
mand for  a  free  hand  in  fixing  the  eastern  boundary. 

6.  On  August  17,  191 6,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  and  Russia  guaranteed  to  Rumania  the  right  to 
annex  the  Bukowina  and  a  large  part  of  eastern  Hun- 
gary.    The  boundaries  are  specified  in  minute  detail.^ 

7.  Japan  entered  the  war  apparently  assured  of 
obtaining  the  German  holdings  in  the  Far  East. 
In  191 5  China  was  forced  to  agree  to  the  transfer  of 
Germany's  interests  to  Japan  at  the  peace  settlement. 
In  191 7  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Russia  agreed 
to  support  Japan  in  these  claims,  and  in  the  possession 
of  the  German  islands  north  of  the  equator. 

8.  The  Russian  Revolution  led  to  a  revisal  of  the 
agreements  as  to  Asia  Minor,  and  on  August  18,  191 7, 
Italy  was  promised  enlarged  concessions,  including 
Smyrna.^  This  was  subject  to  Russian  approval. 
The  arrangements  as  to  Turkey  in  Asia  were  still 
further  affected  by  agreements  with  the  Arabs  of 
the  Hedjaz  and  by  British  declarations  in  favor  of 
Zionist  aspirations  in  Palestine. 

9.  In  the  course  of  the  war  British  leaders  declared 
that   under   no   circumstances   would    the    German 

'  Text  in  New  York  Times^  Current  History,  May,  1919,  p.  346. 
'  Chicago  Daily  News,  February  7,  1920. 


Negotiations  During  the  War  21 

colonial  possessions  be  restored.  As  to  the  West 
African  territories,  the  English  and  French  reached 
a  provisional  agreement  as  to  their  occupation,  which 
foreshadowed  the  lines  of  a  permanent  division. 
Similarly  the  occupation  of  various  islands  in  the 
Pacific  by  Japanese,  British,  Australian,  and  New 
Zealand  forces  indicated  the  expectations  as  to  their 
ultimate  disposal,  as  did  the  conquest  of  German 
Southwest  Africa  by  the  Union  of  South  Africa. 

10.  There  may  well  have  been  other  secret  agree- 
ments which  have  not  as  yet  seen  the  light,  a  knowl- 
edge of  which  would  be  helpful  in  understanding 
the  peace  settlement.  It  is  obvious  that  some  of  the 
proposed  territorial  arrangements  did  violence  to  the 
principle  of  nationality,  and  some  of  them  are  hard 
to  reconcile  with  the  idealistic  professions  of  the 
Allied  spokesmen.  The  treaties  with  Italy  and 
Rumania  may  be  defended  on  the  ground  that  the 
military  situation  made  it  a  matter  of  the  most 
desperate  urgency  that  these  powers  should  be 
induced  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Allies,  and  that  it 
was  better  to  meet  their  terms  than  to  risk  the  failure 
of  the  whole  cause.  Similarly  the  aid  of  Japan  was 
vital  enough  to  justify  concessions  that  would  have 
been  refused  under  other  circumstances. 

11.  WAR  AIMS   AND  PEACE   PROPOSALS   DURING 

THE   WAR 

When  the  war  broke  out  there  was  a  widespread 
feehng  that  it  was  on  such  a  tremendous  scale  that 


22         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

it  could  not  possibly  last  very  long.  When  the 
Battle  of  the  Marne  showed  that  the  Germans  could 
not  win  the  speedy  victory  on  which  they  had  counted, 
talk  of  peace  began  to  be  heard.  This  was  renewed 
after  each  German  victory.  In  part  it  was  based  upon 
unfounded  rumors.  In  part  it  was  inspired  by 
Germany,  with  a  view  to  feehng  out  Allied  opinion. 
Similarly  reports  kept  appearing  that  Russia,  or 
Austria,  or  Turkey,  or  Bulgaria,  or  Belgium,  or  France 
was  contemplating  a  separate  peace.  In  some 
instances  the  wish  was  father  to  the  thought;  in 
others  there  may  have  been  some  basis  in  fact. 
Enough  has  come  out  to  make  it  certain  that  there 
were  numerous  indirect  efforts  to  ascertain  the 
exact  terms  on  which  peace  could  be  concluded. 
These  were  in  such  a  form  that  they  could  always 
be  denied  if  necessary.  Statesmen  on  both  sides 
were  constantly  rising  to  address  parliament,  or 
issuing  statements  to  the  press,  affirming  most  posi- 
tively that  they  had  never  made  or  received  any  such 
proposals,  had  never  heard  of  such  things,  in  fact 
had  never  given  the  matter  a  thought.  The  real 
inside  history  of  all  these  peace  moves  is  still  unknown. 
The  memoirs  of  the  German  and  Austrian  leaders 
which  are  appearing  will  probably  call  for  supple- 
mentary statements  from  their  opponents.  In  the 
meantime  it  is  enough  to  note  that  efforts  were  made 
and  that  they  came  to  nothing. 

It   is   possible,    however,    to   follow    the   public 
statements  of  the  war  aims  and  peace  terms  and 


Negotiations  During  the  War  23 

certain  open  moves  toward  peace.  Even  here  the 
real  significance  does  not  always  appear  on  the 
surface.  Both  sides  were  engaged  in  a  gigantic 
game  of  bluff,  and  every  statement  was  phrased 
and  every  peace  maneuver  timed  and  staged  with 
an  anxious  eye,  not  only  on  the  enemy,  but  on  the 
morale  at  home,  and  on  neutral  opinion. 

At  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  both  sides  declared 
that  they  had  been  attacked  by  ruthless  enemies 
and  they  were  fighting  only  to  protect  their  territorial 
integrity  and  independence,  that  they  aimed  only 
at  securing  guarantees  against  another  such  unpro- 
voked assault,  together  with  assurances  that  their 
legitimate  interests  would  be  safeguarded.  In  Eng- 
land, Premier  Asquith  spoke  of  restitutions,  repara- 
tion, guarantees;  of  establishing  the  sanctity  of 
treaties  and  international  law;  of  safeguarding  small 
nations;  of  destroying  the  power  of  Prussian  militar- 
ism. A  distinction  was  drawn  between  the  German 
government  and  the  German  people.  While  a 
democratized  Germany  was  regarded  as  highly 
desirable,  all  intention  of  dictating  how  Germany 
should  be  governed  was  disclaimed.  Later  Lloyd 
George  talked  of  a  "knock-out  fight"  with  Prussian- 
ism,  French  leaders  spoke  of  restoration,  restitution, 
and  guarantees  in  much  the  same  general  terms. 
Specifically  they  demanded  Alsace-Lorraine. 

The  German  official  spokesmen  were  equally 
vague,  though  concrete  enough  peace  terms  were  indi- 
cated by  more  or  less  representative  and  responsible 


24         Aft  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

groups  and  individuals.  These  were  so  sweeping  as  to 
harden  the  Allies  in  their  purpose  to  fight  to  the  end. 

In  December,  1916,  the  Central  Powers  made  the 
first  formal  offer  to  enter  into  peace  negotiations. 
They  had  just  gained  sweeping  military  successes 
over  Rumania,  and  with  much  reason  they  could 
assert  that  they  had  demonstrated  their  invincibihty. 
They  felt,  however,  that  the  sooner  they  could  make 
peace,  on  the  basis  of  the  war  map,  the  better  it  would 
be.  Time,  they  knew,  was  fighting  on  the  side  of 
the  AlHes.  Their  own  people  were  weary  of  war, 
but  they  hoped  their  enemies  were  even  more  so. 
If  negotiations  could  be  started,  they  were  confident 
of  securing  a  "good  German  peace."  If  their  offer 
was  rejected,  they  could  disclaim  responsibility.  In 
either  case  the  offer  would  result  in  benefit.  The 
only  possible  harm  was  in  having  it  interpreted  as  a 
sign  of  weakness. 

The  German,  Austrian,  Turkish,  and  Bulgarian 
notes,  transmitted  through  neutrals,  began  by 
asserting  that  the  war  had  been  forced  on  the  Central 
Powers.  These  powers  denied  wishing  to  shatter  or 
annihilate  their  opponents,  and  expressed  a  desire 
to  avert  the  threatened  ruin  of  Western  civilization 
by  a  peace  which  would  be  "a  guaranty  of  the 
existence  of  the  honor,  and  liberty  of  evolution  for 
their  nations."  They  proposed  therefore  "to  enter 
forthwith  into  peace  negotiations."  If  the  Allies 
rejected  this  offer,  theirs  was  the  responsibility  for 
continuing  the  struggle. 


Negotiations  During  the  War  25 

The  general  opinion  in  Allied  countries  was  that 
the  bid  was  insincere;  that  the  Central  Powers 
expected  it  to  be  refused;  and  that  their  only  purpose 
was  to  strengthen  the  morale  of  their  own  population 
by  fixing  on  their  opponents  the  blame  for  continuing 
the  war.  In  some  quarters  it  was  interpreted  as  indi- 
cating a  realization  that  the  game  was  up,  and  that 
defeat  was  impending.  France,  England,  Russia, 
and  Italy  promptly  refused  to  enter  into  negotiations 
at  that  time  and  in  that  fashion.  In  England, 
Lloyd  George  had  just  replaced  Asquith  as  Prime 
Minister — a  change  which  may  have  been  hastened 
by  the  knowledge  that  peace  proposals  were  immi- 
nent. On  December  19,  before  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, he  rejected  the  German  offer  as  showing  no 
inclination  to  heed  the  British  conditions  of  restitu- 
tion, restoration,  and  guarantees  against  repetition. 
In  their  official  reply  (December  20)  the  Allies 
repudiated  the  assertion  that  the  war  had  been 
forced  on  the  Central  Powers.  The  offer  of  peace 
was  denounced  as  a  sham,  designed  to  influence  public 
opinion,  and  it  was  rejected  as  "empty  and  insin- 
cere." No  peace  was  possible  which  did  not  secure 
"reparation  for  violated  rights,  the  recognition  of  the 
principle  of  nationality  and  of  the  free  existence  of  small 
states,"  and  did  not  "end,  once  for  all,  forces  which 
have  constituted  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  nations."^ 

In  the  meantime  President  Wilson,  who  had  been 
hoping  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  that  the  United 

'iVew  York  Times''  Current  History,  February,  191 7,  pp.  801-3. 


26         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

States  might  be  able  to  mediate  between  the  belliger- 
ents, addressed  a  note  to  all  the  nations  involved. 
He  denied  that  his  move  was  in  any  way  inspired  by 
or  connected  with  the  offer  of  the  Central  Powers. 
Calling  attention  to  the  obvious  fact  that  the  war  aims 
of  both  sides,  as  stated  in  general  terms,  seemed  to 
be  much  the  same,  he  asked  both  sides  to  state  specifi- 
cally the  "precise  objects  which  would,  if  attained, 
satisfy  them  and  their  people  that  the  war  had  been 
fought  out."  He  pointed  out  that  both  groups  were 
committed  in  principle  to  some  league  of  nations, 
in  which,  he  intimated,  the  United  States  would 
join.  In  view  of  the  unrestricted  submarine  warfare 
which  Germany  was  known  to  be  planning,  this 
move  by  the  President  was  a  final  move  to  hasten 
peace  before  the  United  States  should  inevitably  be 
drawn  into  the  conflict. 

The  note  was  at  first  widely  resented  in  Alhed 
countries  for  apparently  putting  the  war  aims  of 
both  sides  on  the  same  plane. 

The  Central  Powers  replied  (December  26)  that 
they  considered  a  direct  interchange  of  views  prefer- 
able to  a  public  statement  of  terms,  and  renewed 
their  proposals  for  negotiations  on  neutral  ground 
between  representatives  of  all  the  belligerent  nations. 
The  Entente  powers  answered  the  President  (Janu- 
ary 10)  agreeing  with  the  idea  of  a  league  of  nations, 
but  insisting  that  they  must  first  secure  restitution, 
reparation,  and  guarantees.  They  challenged  the 
comparison  drawn  between  their  aims  and  those  of 


Negotiations  During  the  War  27 

their  opponents,  and  reviewed  the  facts  as  to  German 
aggression  and  ruthlessness.  They  stated  that  their 
chief  objects  in  the  war  were  well  known.  Reserv- 
ing the  details  until  the  hour  of  the  negotiations, 
they  added: 

The  civilized  world  knows  that  they  imply  ....  the 
restoration  of  Belgium,  of  Serbia,  and  of  Montenegro,  and  the 
indemnities  which  are  due  them;  the  evacuation  of  the  invaded 
territories  of  France,  of  Russia,  and  of  Rumania,  with  just 
reparation;  the  reorganization  of  Europe,  guaranteed  by  a 
stable  settlement,  based  alike  upon  the  principle  of  nationaUties, 
on  the  right  which  all  peoples,  whether  small  or  great,  have  to 
the  enjoyment  of  full  security  and  free  economic  development, 
and  also  upon  territorial  agreements  and  international  arrange- 
ments so  framed  as  to  guarantee  land  and  sea  frontiers  against 
unjustified  attacks;  the  restitution  of  provinces  or  territories 
wrested  in  the  past  from  the  Allies  by  force  or  against  the  will 
of  their  populations;  the  liberation  of  Italians,  of  Slavs,  or 
Rumanians,  and  of  Czecho-Slovaks  from  foreign  domination; 
the  enfranchisement  of  populations  subject  to  the  bloody 
tyranny  of  the  Turks;  the  expulsion  from  Europe  of  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  decidedly  alien  to  Western  civihzation.' 

The  Emperor  of  Russia,  they  said,  had  already 
promised  a  united  and  autonomous  Poland.  In  a 
supplementary  note  of  January  13^  Balfour,  now 
British  Foreign  Secretary,  amplified  the  need  of 
reorganizing  the  Turkish  Empire.  The  three  condi- 
tions of  permanent  peace,  he  declared,  were  the 
removal  of  existing  causes  of  international  unrest; 
the   discrediting   among   their   own   peoples   of   the 

^  New  York  Times^  Current  History,  February,  191 7,  p.  784. 
» Ibid.,  p.  786. 


28         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

aggressive  aims  and  unscrupulous  methods  of  the 
Central  Powers;  and  the  devising  of  genuine  inter- 
national sanctions  for  international  law  and  treaties. 
These  statements  by  the  Allies  were  thus  far  the 
most  definite  that  had  been  made  on  either  side. 
They  are  repeated  and  amplified  in  President  Wilson's 
later  proposals. 

To  the  Allies,  Germany  in  behalf  of  the  Central 
Powers  retorted  that  they  themselves  had  achieved 
their  defensive  aims,  and  were  anxious  to  end  the 
war;  but  that  the  Allies  were  now  admittedly  fighting 
on  toward  "the  conquest  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
several  Prussian  provinces,  the  humiliation  and 
diminution  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  partition  of 
Turkey,  and  the  mutilation  of  Bulgaria."  They 
charged  their  enemies  with  repressing  small  nationali- 
ties, and  with  violating  international  law  by  their 
blockade  and  their  use  of  colored  troops.^ 

Continuing  his  efforts  to  pave  the  way  for  a  lasting 
peace  and  a  league  of  nations,  President  Wilson  on 
January  22  addressed  the  Senate,  outlining  the  kind 
of  peace  which  in  his  judgment  the  United  States 
could  join  in  guaranteeing,  with  a  view  to  preventing 
future  wars.  Such  a  peace  he  felt  should  be  negoti- 
ated by  equals  on  the  basis  of  justice  in  each  par- 
ticular and  should  not  be  dictated  by  a  victor. 
Specifically,  the  peace  should  recognize  equality  of 
rights  between  large  and  small  nations;  it  must 
"accept  the  principle   that  governments  derive  all 

^New  York  Times'  Current  History,  February,  191 7,  p.  789. 


Negotiations  During  the  War  29 

their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed 
and  that  no  right  anywhere  exists  to  hand  peoples 
about  from  sovereignty  to  sovereignty  as  if  they 
were  property."  Poland  should  be  "united,  inde- 
pendent, and  autonomous."  Minorities  should  have 
guarantees  of  "inviolable  security  of  life,  of  worship, 
and  of  industrial  and  social  development."  Great 
peoples  struggling  for  an  outlet  to  the  sea  should 
secure  it,  if  not  by  cession  of  territory,  then  by 
neutralization  of  rights  of  way.  The  seas  must  be 
free,  and  armaments  must  be  limited.  Allied  opinion 
in  general  resented  the  "peace  without  victory" 
suggestion;  but  the  new  submarine  warfare,  the  Rus- 
sian Revolution,  and  the  entrance  of  the  United  States 
into  the  war  soon  overshadowed  all  other  interests. 

There  has  been  much  discussion  as  to  the  possi- 
bility of  peace  in  the  winter  of  1916-17.  The  Allies 
have  been  criticized  for  not  taking  the  German  offer 
more  seriously.  The  correspondence  between  Ambas- 
sador von  Bernstorff  and  Berlin  shows  that  President 
Wilson  really  hoped  to  be  able  to  find  a  basis  of  agree- 
ment. Von  Bernstorff  urged  his  government  to 
postpone  the  submarine  warfare  which  he  said  would 
inevitably  lead  to  war  with  the  United  States.  He 
begged  for  an  explicit  statement  of  German  terms. 
The  Foreign  Office  replied  that  the  submarine  cam- 
paign could  not  be  stopped,  and  when  the  German 
terms  were  finally  sent  confidentially  for  the  Presi- 
dent's information,  it  was  too  late,^ 

^/&/^.,  March,  1920,  513-19. 


3©         An  Introduction  to  tJie  Peace  Treaties 

In  Germany  the  declaration  of  unrestricted  sub- 
marine warfare  marked  the  culmination  of  a  long 
struggle  between  the  political  and  military  leaders, 
the  former  striving  for  a  more  moderate  policy  and 
hoping  to  negotiate  a  satisfactory  peace,  the  latter 
confident  of  their  ability  to  starve  England  into 
complete  submission  before  the  United  States  could 
make  any  difference. 

President  Wilson's  war  message  (April  2,  191 7) 
was  widely  acclaimed  as  the  finest  statement  yet 
formulated  of  the  case  against  Germany  and  of  the 
aims  of  the  United  States  and  of  the  Allies.  Ger- 
many's specific  offense  in  violating  the  international 
law  of  warfare  at  sea  was  denounced  as  an  actual 
warfare  against  mankind  and  in  particular  against 
American  rights,  which  the  United  States  could  do 
no  less  than  resist.  While  we  had  no  quarrel  with 
the  German  people,  the  menace  of  autocratic  govern- 
ment and  free  institutions  everywhere  must  be  forever 
destroyed.  "The  world  must  be  made  safe  for 
democracy,"  and  future  peace  guaranteed  by  ''a 
partnership  of  democratic  nations."  In  subsequent 
addresses  these  aims  were  restated  and  emphasized. 
In  the  Flag  Day  address  (June  14,  191 7)  the  German 
ambition  for  world-overlordship  was  set  forth,  the 
German  eagerness  for  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  war 
map  was  explained,  and  the  necessity  for  the  defeat 
of  German  autocracy  was  explained. 

Meanwhile  Germany  was  trying  to  conclude  the 
separate  peace  with  Russia  which  had  been  almost 


Negotiations  During  the  War  31 

within  her  grasp  just  before  the  Russian  Revolution. 
Russia  was  tired  of  war,  was  willing  to  forego  Con- 
stantinople, and  proposed  a  general  peace  based  on 
the  principles  of  "no  forcible  annexations  and  no 
punitive  indemnities."  Liberal  Russian  leaders  hold- 
ing out  against  a  separate  peace  begged  the  Allies 
for  specific  statements  of  peace  terms  to  dispel  the 
suspicion  that  they  were  continuing  the  war  for 
imperialistic  ends. 

In  Germany  a  strong  undercurrent  in  favor  of  a 
moderate  peace  was  making  itself  felt.  The  govern- 
ment naturally  wished  to  secure  the  best  terms 
possible  under  the  guise  of  securing  "guaranties"  for 
future  security.  Bethmann-Hollweg,  trying  to  steer 
between  extremes,  pleased  neither  group,  and  finally 
resigned,  July  12.  Michaelis,  his  successor,  insisted 
that  the  policies  of  the  government  would  not  be 
changed.  No  peace  would  be  considered  "with  the 
enemy  demanding  the  cession  of  German  soil.""^ 
With  the  support  of  the  Catholic  CeAter  Party  the 
Reichstag  passed  a  resolution,  July  19,  accepting  in 
general  terms  the  formula  of  peace  without  annexa- 
tions or  indemnities,  and  demanding  a  "peace  of 
understanding  and  the  permanent  reconciliation  of 
the  people."^ 

The  first  of  August  the  Pope  addressed  a  note  to 
all  the  belligerents,  pleading  for  a  peace  of  reason  and 

'  New  York  Times'  Current  History,  August,  191 7,  pp.  196-97. 

'  Documents  and  Statements  Relating  to  Peace  Proposals  and  War 
Aims,  p.  44. 


32         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

justice  to  be  followed  by  a  reduction  of  armaments 
and  the  substitution  of  arbitration,  with  sanctions, 
for  warlike  methods  of  settling  difficulties.  In  par- 
ticular he  advocated  the  evacuation  of  Belgium  and 
the  restoration  of  complete  political,  mihtary,  and 
economic  independence,  and  the  restoration  of  occu- 
pied territories,  including  the  German  colonies.  The 
territorial  differences  between  Italy  and  Austria 
and  between  France  and  Germany  he  hoped  would 
be  examined  "in  a  conciliatory  spirit,"  with  due 
regard  to  the  aspirations  of  the  people  and  the  welfare 
of  humanity.  The  Balkan,  Armenian,  and  Polish 
questions  should  be  examined  in  the  same  spirit.' 

The  AlHes  however  refused  to  regard  peace  with 
an  unbeaten  and  unrepentant  Germany  as  possible  or 
desirable.  On  July  31  Lord  Robert  Cecil  declared 
that  Austria-Hungary  must  be  dismembered,  and 
Balfour  said  that  Germany  must  be  powerless  or 
free.  On  August  29  Wilson  replied  to  the  Pope's 
note,  declaring  that  there  could  be  no  return  to  the 
status  of  before  the  war,  and  asserting  that  no 
confidence  could  be  placed  in  the  word  of  the  existing 
German  government.  The  Central  Powers,  without 
specifically  stating  terms,  answered  the  Pope  sympa- 
thetically.'' In  October  Kuehlmann,  the  German 
Foreign  Secretary,  said  that  peace  rested  with  Ger- 
many's foes,  adding  later  that  Alsace-Lorraine  was 
the  only  bar  to  peace.     On  October  1 1  Lloyd  George 

'  Documents  and  Statements,  p.  47. 
=  Ibid.,  pp.  53,  55- 


Negotiations  During  the  War  33 

declared  that  Britain  would  fight  for  the  restoration 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France. 

By  this  time  the  matter  of  peace  with  Russia  was 
the  most  serious  question  of  the  hour.  Russia 
seemed  out  of  the  war.  German  and  Austrian 
troops  had  advanced  after  the  Russian  offensive  of 
July.  The  Provisional  Government  under  Kerensky 
was  having  enormous  difficulties  in  keeping  any  sort 
of  control  within,  and  in  carrying  on  a  war  on  the 
old  Front.  Much  talk  was  heard  that  the  Allies  in 
disgust  would  make  a  peace  with  Germany,  at  the 
expense  of  Russia,  rescuing  Belgium  and  Northern 
France,  and  in  return  giving  a  free  hand  to  the 
Central  Powers  to  exploit  their  gains  in  the  east. 
Those  who  understood  the  real  objects  of  the  war 
loudly  declared  that  such  a  policy  amounted  to 
an  admission  of  German  victory. 

On  November  6  the  Bolsheviki  came  into  power  in 
Petrograd.  Among  their  first  moves  were  the  publi- 
cation of  the  secret  treaties  by  which  the  Allies  had 
planned  the  division  of  the  spoils  and  the  negotiation 
of  an  armistice  with  the  Central  Powers.  The 
Central  Powers  now  strove  desperately  for  a  general 
peace  satisfactory  to  themselves.  Numerous  infor- 
mal suggestions  were  made,  refused,  denied,  and 
repudiated. 

The  Bolsheviki  proposed  a  general  peace  on  the 
basis  of  evacuation  of  all  occupied  territory;  restora- 
tion of  Belgium,  France,  Serbia,  Rumania,  East 
Prussia,    and    other    devastated    regions    from    an 


34         ^^^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

international  fund;  a  plebiscite  for  Alsace-Lorraine, 
Trieste,  the  Trentino,  and  contested  areas  in  the 
Balkans;  autonomy  for  Poland,  the  Baltic  provinces, 
and  Turkish  Armenia;  restoration  of  the  German 
colonies;  neutralization  of  all  straits;  renunciation 
of  indemnities  and  commercial  wars;  and  a  progres- 
sive general  disarmament. 

Count  Czernin,  for  the  Central  Powers,  agreed  to 
discuss  a  peace  on  these  principles,  if  all  the  AlHes 
would  take  part  in  the  negotiations.  All  intention 
was  denied  of  annexing  occupied  territory  or  of 
destroying  the  independence  of  any  nation  which 
had  lost  it  in  the  war.  The  question  of  the  subject 
nationalities,  however,  could  not  be  settled  between 
states,  "but  is,  if  required,  to  be  solved  by  each 
state  with  its  peoples  independently  in  a  constitu- 
tional manner."  As  a  general  principle,  it  was 
admitted  that  "protection  of  the  right  of  minorities 
forms  an  essential  component  of  the  constitutional 
right  of  peoples  to  self-determination,"  which  the 
Central  Powers  would  follow  "in  so  far  as  it  is 
practically  realizable."  Czernin  agreed  that  both 
sides  should  renounce  indemnities  for  war  costs 
and  damages.  Germany's  colonies  must  be  re- 
stored. 

The  Allies  refused  to  consider  entering  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  negotiations  on  these  terms.  The  Bolsheviki 
rejected  some  of  them,  denouncing  them  as  imperial- 
istic, and  hoping  for  a  proletarian  revolution  within 
Germany    and   Austria.     There    were    indeed    some 


Negotiations  During  the  War  35 

strikes  and  riots,  but  they  were  quickly  suppressed. 
Some  of  the  German  pohtical  leaders  advocated  a 
moderate  peace  with  Russia,  hoping  that  opinion  in 
the  Allied  countries  would  then  compel  a  negotiated 
peace  in  the  west  also.  The  military  leaders  however 
were  determined  to  exploit  to  the  utmost  their  advan- 
tages in  the  east.  On  February  9  a  separate  peace 
with  the  Ukraine  was  signed,  but  the  next  day  the 
Bolsheviki  broke  off  negotiations,  and  took  the  highly 
original  course  of  declaring  the  war  at  an  end  on  all 
fronts,  and  ordering  the  Russian  forces  demobilized. 

The  Central  Powers  advanced  into  Russian  terri- 
tory, and  in  March  the  Bolsheviki  were  compelled 
to  sign  terms  of  peace,  by  which  Russia  renounced 
sovereignty  over  Finland,  Poland,  the  Baltic  prov- 
inces, and  Russian  Armenia,  and  agreed  to  conclude 
peace  with  the  Ukraine.  In  this  western  territory 
"Russia  undertakes  to  refrain  from  all  interference 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  these  territories  and  to  let 
Germany  and  Austria  determine  the  future  fate  of 
these  territories  in  agreement  with  their  populations." 
In  addition  Russia  promised  sweeping  commercial 
concessions.  Later,  under  the  guise  of  reparation 
for  destruction  in  East  Prussia  a  large  cash  indemnity 
was  exacted. 

Rumania  was  similarly  compelled  to  sign  a  peace 
giving  up  strategic  territory  to  Austria  in  the  west, 
and  resigning  the  whole  of  the  Dobrudja,  together 
with  a  number  of  economic  concessions  that  amounted 
to  vassalage. 


36         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Triumphant  in  the  east,  Germany  transferred  all 
available  forces  to  the  west,  and  began  preparations 
for  the  terrific  offensives  that  were  designed  to  force 
the  discouraged  Allies  to  make  peace.  The  situation 
was  critical  for  both  sides.  Turks  and  Bulgars  were 
exhausted  and  anxious  for  peace.  Within  Austria- 
Hungary  economic  distress  and  growing  rebellion 
on  the  part  of  the  subject  peoples  made  it  certain 
that  nothing  but  a  speedy  peace  could  save  the  empire. 
Within  Germany  it  became  increasingly  difficult  to 
maintain  morale.  On  the  other  hand  the  submarines 
were  cutting  into  English  shipping  and  food  imports 
at  a  genuinely  menacing  rate.  American  troops  in 
France  were  still  relatively  unimportant.  In  the 
spring  and  summer  of  191 7  informal  discussions  were 
taking  place  between  Austrian  and  French  representa- 
tives. In  a  personal  letter  (March  31)  to  his  cousin 
Prince  Sixtus,  the  Emperor  Charles  said  he  would 
support  "the  just  claims  of  France  as  to  Alsace- 
Lorraine,"  using  his  personal  influence  with  his 
allies.  Belgian  sovereignty  and  colonial  possessions 
were  to  be  restored.  Serbia  was  to  be  re-established 
in  sovereignty  and  given  an  equitable  and  natural 
access  to  the  Adriatic  Sea  and  wide  economic  con- 
cessions, on  condition  that  groups  aiming  at  the 
disintegration  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  be  suppressed. 
These  proposals  were  to  be  secretly  and  unofficially 
laid  before  France  and  England.  Later  discussions 
between  French  and  Austrian  negotiators  in  Switzer- 
land came  to  nothing  because  France  would  not  yield 


Negotiations  During  the  War  37 

on  Alsace-Lorraine.  When  the  fact  of  these  negotia- 
tions became  known,  the  Austrian  government 
charged  that  the  text  of  these  letters  had  been  falsified, 
and  that  the  original  had  read,  "I  would  have  used 
all  my  personal  influence  in  favor  of  the  French  claims 
for  the  return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  if  these  claims  were 
just.     They  are  not,  however."^ 

It  was  at  one  time  reported  that  the  Emperor 
Charles  had  offered  to  make  territorial  concessions  on 
behalf  of  Austria,  if  Germany  would  concede  part 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  Allies  tried  desperately  to  induce  Austria 
to  agree  to  a  separate  peace.  But  however  anxious 
the  Austrians  might  be  to  end  the  war,  they  dared 
not  defy  Germany. 

Early  in  January  the  demand  for  a  restatement  of 
AlKed  war  aims  led  to  Lloyd  George's  speech  of 
January  5,  followed  on  January  8  by  President 
Wilson's  "Fourteen  Points"  address  to  the  Senate. 
It  was  evident  from  the  close  correspondence  of  the 
speeches  that  there  had  been  a  previous  agreement 
on  their  main  points.  These  fourteen  items  in  "the 
only  possible  program  of  the  world's  peace"  became 
so  important  that  in  spite  of  their  familiarity  they 
should  be  recalled: 

1.  "Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,"  with 
the  ending  of  private  international  understandings. 

2.  Freedom  of  navigation  in  peace  and  war  "except  as 
the  seas  may  be  closed  ....  by  international  action  for  the 
enforcement  of  international  covenants." 

^New  York  Times'  Current  History,  March,  1920,  pp.  519-24. 


;^S         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

3.  "The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic  barriers 
and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions  among 
all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating  them- 
selves for  its  maintenance." 

4.  "Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national 
armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with 
domestic  safety." 

5.  "A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjust- 
ment of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon"  the  interests  of  the 
populations  concerned  as  well  as  equitable  claims  of  the  gov- 
ernments, , 

6.  Evacuation  of  Russian  territory,  and  co-operation  in 
assuring  unhampered  determination  of  poHtical  development 
and  national  policy. 

7.  Evacuation  and  restoration  of  Belgium,  without  any 
limitation  on  sovereignty. 

8.  Evacuation  and  restoration  of  French  territory.  "The 
wrong  done  to  France  ....  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
should  be  righted." 

9.  "A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be 
effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality." 

10.  "The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among 
the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured,  should  be 
accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous  development." 

11.  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  to  be  evacuated 
and  restored;  "Serbia  accorded  free  and  secure  access  to  the 
sea";  Balkan  relations  "determined  by  friendly  counsel  along 
historically  established  lines  of  allegiance  and  nationaUty," 
with  international  guarantees  of  political  and  economic  inde- 
pendence and  territorial  integrity. 

12.  "The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman  Empire 
should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the  other  nationali- 
ties which  arc  now  under  Turkish  rule  should  be  assured  an 
undoubted  security  of  life  and  an  absolutely  unmolested  oppor- 
tunity of  autonomous  development,"  with  the  Dardanelles 
opened  under  international  guarantees. 


Negotiations  During  the  War  39 

13.  An  independent  Polish  state  to  "include  the  territories 
inhabited  by  indisputably  Polish  populations,  which  should 
be  assured  a  free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,"  with  inter- 
national guarantees  of  pohtical  and  economic  independence 
and  territorial  integrity. 

14.  "A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed  under 
specific  covenants  for  the  purpose  of  affording  mutual  guar- 
antees of  political  independence  and  territorial  integrity  to  great 
and  small  states  alike." 

These  statements  marked  an  important  stage  in 
the  development  of  peace  terms.  They  were  suffi- 
ciently specific  to  indicate  the  particular  changes 
sought  by  the  Allies,  yet  they  were  so  phrased  as  to 
allow  a  certain  degree  of  elasticity  in  their  application. 
Labor  groups  and  moderate  sociaHsts  expressed 
approval,  and  Allied  liberahsm  gave  them  hearty 
support.  Within  the  Central  Powers  the  moderates 
were  encouraged. 

In  succeeding  months  a  very  interesting  long-range 
discussion  of  terms  took  place  in  the  form  of  speeches 
by  leaders  on  both  sides.  More  and  more  President 
Wilson  became  the  spokesman  of  the  Allies.  His 
terms  were  discussed  in  the  Reichstag  and  the 
Austrian  Reichsrath,  and  the  positions  of  the  Central 
Powers  in  turn  were  criticized  by  Lloyd  George, 
Cecil,  Balfour,  Wilson,  Clemenceau,  and  others. 

The  German  chancellor,  Hertling  (January  24, 
1918),  agreed  to  open  diplomacy,  freedom  of  the  seas, 
limitation  of  armaments,  and  consideration  of  a  league 
of  nations.  Peace  with  Russia,  on  the  basis  of  self- 
determination  for  the  border  peoples,  was  declared  a 


40         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

matter  between  Russia  and  the  Central  Powers  alone. 
Evacuation  of  Belgium  and  Northern  France  was  to 
be  used  as  a  "valuable  pawn"  in  the  final  negotiations. 
Under  no  circumstances  would  Germany  agree  to 
give  up  Alsace-Lorraine  or  other  German  territory, 
including  colonies.  Germany  and  Austria  were  to 
determine  the  future  of  Poland.  Questions  covering 
Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  were  to  be 
decided  by  those  powers,  and  Germany  would  ener- 
getically back  any  positions  they  took.^ 

The  same  day  Count  Czernin  spoke  to  much  the 
same  effect,  though  with  perhaps  a  more  conciliatory 
tone.  Wilson's  statement  that  he  did  not  seek  the 
dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary  was  approved, 
but  any  "advice  as  to  our  internal  government"  was 
rejected.  Support  to  Austria's  allies  in  maintaining 
their  territorial  integrity  was  pledged.^ 

The  Supreme  War  Council  of  the  Allies  declared 
that  these  speeches  did  not  show  "any  real  approxima- 
tion to  the  moderate  conditions  laid  down  by  all  the 
Allied  governments."  On  February  ii  President 
Wilson  replied,  criticizing  Hertling's  desire  for  a  peace 
based  on  individual  bargains  between  the  several  bel- 
ligerents. He  professed  to  see  more  promise  in 
Czernin's  attitude.  He  took  the  occasion  to  restate 
the  four  principles  to  be  applied  to  a  peace  settlement: 

First,  that  each  part  of  the  final  settlement  must  be  based 
upon  the  essential  justice  of  that  particular  case  and  upon 

^  New  York  Times'  Current  History,  March,  191 7,  p.  389. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  396. 


Negotiations  During  the  War  41 

such  adjustments  as  are  most  likely  to  bring  a  peace  that  will 
be  permanent. 

Second,  that  peoples  and  provinces  are  not  to  be  bartered 
about  from  sovereignty  to  sovereignty  as  if  they  were  mere 
chattels  and  pawns  in  a  game,  even  the  great  game,  now  forever^ 
discredited,  of  the  Balance  of  Power;  but  that, 

Third,  every  territorial  settlement  involved  in  this  war 
must  be  made  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  popu- 
lations concerned,  and  not  as  a  part  of  any  mere  adjustment 
or  compromise  of  claims  among  rival  states. 

Fourth,  that  all  well-defined  national  aspirations  shall  be 
accorded  the  utmost  satisfaction  that  can  be  accorded  them 
without  introducing  new  or  perpetuating  old  elements  of 
discord  and  antagonism  that  would  be  likely  in  time  to  break 
the  peace  of  Europe,  and  consequently  of  the  world.' 

Lloyd  George  refused  (February  12)  to  see  any 
hope  in  an  attitude  v^^hich  made  no  provision  for  the 
oppressed  nationahties  of  Turkey  and  Austria- 
Hungary,  or  for  Belgium,  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  Serbia. 

Continuing  the  long-distance  debate,  Hertling 
said^  that,  while  Germany  would  not  retain  Belgium, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  provide  that  Belgium  should 
never  be  "an  object  or  jumping-off  ground  of  enemy 
machinations."  Turning  to  Wilson's  "four  prin- 
ciples," he  agreed  without  reservation  to  all  of  them, 
and  was  willing  to  discuss  peace  terms  on  that  basis, 
provided  they  were  recognized  by  all  nations,  and  the 
Allies  abandoned  their  plans  of  "conquest."  Entente 
leaders  concluded,  however,  from  the  remainder  of 

'  Documents  and  Statements,  p.  138. 

'  February  25,  Documents  and  Statements,  p.  152. 


42         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

the  speech,  and  still  more  from  actual  German  prac- 
tices, that  the  German  interpretation  of  these  four 
principles  would  differ  so  radically  from  theirs  that 
no  basis  satisfactory  to  them  could  be  reached. 
Within  Entente  countries,  however,  some  liberal  and 
labor  leaders  felt  that  a  peace  by  agreement  was 
possible,  and  Lord  Lansdowne  in  an  open  letter 
urged  private  preliminary  discussions.^ 

Presently  the  miHtary  leaders  of  Germany  made 
their  supreme  bid  for  victory  and  peace  by  the  offen- 
sives in  France  and  Belgium.  Czernin's  speeches 
continued  to  defend  the  B rest-Li tovsk  and  Bucharest 
treaties,  to  denounce  the  Czech  leaders  who  would 
break  up  the  monarchy,  and  to  express  willingness  for 
a  "just"  peace  which  would  guarantee  Austria- 
Hungary's  security.  Then  Austria-Hungary  could 
proceed  to  reform  its  own  constitution.^ 

From  this  time  there  was  little  progress  in  the 
formulation  of  specific  peace  terms.  Gigantic  efforts 
were  made  to  win  a  military  decision,  and  the  Allies 
strove  to  encourage  internal  disintegration  within 
Austria-Hungary.  President  Wilson  increasingly 
emphasized  the  need  for  the  overthrow  of  the  mili- 
tary masters  of  Germany,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
democratic  government,  before  any  negotiations 
could  be  opened. 

Within  Germany  the  conflict  of  points  of  view 
between  the  political  and  military  leaders  continued. 

'  November  28,  191 7,  Documents  and  Statements,  p.  84. 
*  Documents  and  Statements,  p.  183. 


Negotiations  During  the  War  43 

On  June  25,  Baron  Kuehlmann,  Foreign  Secretary, 
denied  that  Germany  sought  world-domination,  and 
went  back  to  the  early  German  contention  that 
Russia  desired  the  war,  France  instigated  it,  and 
England  encouraged  it.  The  aims  of  the  Central 
Powers  were  restated  as  territorial  integrity,  "a 
secure,  free,  strong,  and  independent  life,"  with  pos- 
sessions beyond  the  seas  "which  correspond  to  our 
greatness,  wealth,  and  proved  colonial  capacity," 
together  with  security  for  world-trade.  He  urged 
therefore  an  exchange  of  views,  and  closed  with  the 
admission  that  "an  absolute  end  can  hardly  be 
expected  through  military  decisions  alone,  without 
any  diplom^atic  negotiations."^  This  last  admission 
raised  such  a  storm  in  Germany  that  Kuehlmann 
resigned.  On  July  16  Count  Burian  declared  for 
Austria-Hungary  that  "the  sole  objects  that  really 
divide  the  belligerent  parties  are  those  of  a  territorial 
character."^ 

On  August  8,  in  the  course  of  an  important  speech 
in  the  House  of  Commons,  Balfour  declared  that 
German  colonies  would  not  be  given  back,  which  led 
Solf,  the  German  Colonial  Secretary,  to  insist  on  a 
"compromise  between  the  Colonial  Powers,"  on 
the  basis  of  their  economic  strength  and  ability  to 
protect  subject  races. 

Events  were  now  hastening  to  a  crisis.  The  mili- 
tary   successes    of    the    Allies,    together    with    the 

'  Ibid.,  p.  194. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  200. 


44         -4^^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

gathering  discontent  and  despair  in  Bulgaria,  Turkey, 
and  Austria-Hungary,  to  say  nothing  of  Germany, 
culminated  in  the  offensives  of  September  and 
November,  which  crushed  Bulgar  resistance  in 
Macedonia,  destroyed  the  Turkish  army  in  Palestine, 
overwhelmed  the  Austrian  army  in  Italy,  broke  the 
Hindenburg  line  in  France,  and  cut  the  main  German 
line  of  supply  at  Sedan. 

On  September  29  Bulgaria  surrendered  at  dis- 
cretion; October  31  Turkey  followed  suit.  Sep- 
tember 15  Austria  had  in  desperation  asked  the  AUies 
to  agree  at  once  to  "a  confidential  and  non-binding 
discussion  on  basic  principles  for  the  conclusion  of 
peace."  The  United  States  replied  briefly  that  its 
peace  terms  were  already  well  known,  and  in  his 
speech  of  September  27  President  Wilson  once  more 
stated  the  issues  and  the  general  principles  of  a  settle- 
ment. 

On  October  5  the  new  German  government,  which 
professed  to  be  responsible  to  the  Reichstag,  requested 
President  Wilson  to  initiate  peace  negotiations 
accepting  the  program  of  the  Fourteen  Points  speech 
and  later  speeches  as  a  basis.  The  President  asked 
whether  the  German  government  accepted  them  in 
the  sense  that  the  only  discussion  was  as  to  their 
practical  application.  He  also  asked  whether  the 
Chancellor  spoke  merely  for  the  old  masters  of  Ger- 
many or  for  the  people ;  and  he  stipulated  that  before 
peace  could  be  discussed  the  Germans  should  evacuate 
occupied  territory. 


Negotiations  During  the  War  45 

On  October  14  the  German  reply  was  received, 
accepting  the  Fourteen  Points  fully,  agreeing  to 
evacuations,  and  claiming  to  speak  for  government 
and  people  both.  The  President  replied  that  any 
armistice  must  be  arranged  by  the  military  leaders; 
that  submarine  warfare  must  stop;  and  that  the 
arbitrary  government  of  Germany  must  be  destroyed 
or  rendered  impotent. 

On  October  7  Austria  had  proposed  peace  on  the 
basis  of  Wilson's  terms,  and  had  been  informed  that 
the  later  recognition  of  the  claims  of  the  Czecho- 
slovaks and  the  Jugo-Slavs  no  longer  made  it  possible 
to  offer  peace  on  the  basis  of  "autonomy"  for  the 
subject  nationahties. 

On  October  20  the  German  government  agreed 
to  Wilson's  terms  and  gave  renewed  assurance  that 
it  was  responsible  to  the  people.  The  President 
then  transmitted  the  whole  correspondence  to  the 
Allies.  They  repHed  that  "subject  to  the  qualifica- 
tions which  follow,  they  declare  their  willingness  to 
make  peace  with  the  government  of  Germany  on  the 
terms  of  peace  laid  down  in  the  President's  address 
to  Congress  of  January  8,  1918,  and  the  principles  of 
settlement  enunciated  in  his  subsequent  addresses." 
They  reserved  "complete  freedom"  of  interpretation 
as  to  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  they  stated  that  by 
"restoration  of  invaded  territory  they  understood  that 
compensation  will  be  made  by  Germany  for  all 
damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allies 
and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of  Germany  by 


46         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

land,  by  sea,  and  from  the  air."  President  Wilson 
agreed  with  this  latter  interpretation.  On  the  basis 
of  this  correspondence,  the  armistice  of  November  11 
was  concluded. 

In  looking  back  over  these  two  years  of  discussion 
it  is  difficult  to  see  at  what  time  and  on  what  basis  a 
peace  might  have  been  concluded.  Each  side  had 
aims,  which  only  a  defeated  enemy  would  concede. 
If  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey  had  been  wilhng  to 
become  federalized,  if  Germany  had  been  willing 
to  restore  the  French-speaking  portion  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine,  if  all  had  agreed  to  a  united  and  independent 
Poland,  if  the  Allies  had  been  willing  to  restore  the 
German  colonies,  negotiations  might  have  been  pos- 
sible. But  in  view  of  the  attitudes  of  the  different 
groups  no  one  of  these  was  thinkable.  The  chief 
result  of  the  prolonged  discussion  of  war  aims  was  a 
fairly  complete  statement  of  Allied  principles  and 
objects.  The  public  statements,  however,  proved 
in  some  respects  to  be  less  significant  than  the  secret 
understandings. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  PEACE  CONFERENCE 

In  a  way  the  collapse  of  the  Central  Powers,  par- 
ticularly that  of  Germany,  came  as  a  surprise  to  the 
AlHes.  They  had  been  making  every  preparation  for 
a  campaign  extending  into  1919.  Consequently 
they  were  not  entirely  prepared  for  the  Peace  Con- 
ference, with  its  numerous  and  complicated  problems. 
During  the  war  public  discussion  of  peace  terms 
had  been  somewhat  discouraged  by  the  authorities, 
or  even  denounced  as  pacifistic  and  pro-German. 
Every  energy  was  bent  on  winning  the  war.  Until 
Germany  was  beaten  no  peace  was  possible. 

It  was  of  course  true  that  in  private  the  powers 
had  made  a  number  of  arrangements  among  them- 
selves. A  complicating  factor  arose,  however, 
through  the  general  agreement  to  make  peace  on 
the  basis  of  the  principles  formulated  by  President 
Wilson.  At  the  very  outset,  the  question  was  raised 
as  to  the  respective  status  of  the  secret  treaties 
and  the  Fourteen  Points.  The  Germans  took  the 
very  plausible  position,  in  which  they  were  supported 
by  many  liberals  among  their  enemies,  that  the 
Allies  by  consenting  to  a  Wilsonian  peace  thereby 
abandoned  their  own  private  plans,  at  least  so  far  as 
they  conflicted  with  the  President's  principles.  The 
Allies  maintained  that,  properly  interpreted,  there 

47 


48         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

was  no  necessary  conflict  between  the  two,  at  least 
in  essentials.  While  in  some  cases  they  agreed  to 
a  reconsideration,  they  did  not  at  all  admit  that  their 
treaties  with  each  other  had  automatically  become 
inoperative. 

In  the  autumn  of  191 7  the  President  had  author- 
ized the  collection  of  information  bearing  on  questions 
which  would  enter  into  the  peace  settlement.  Under 
the  direction  of  Colonel  E.  M.  House,  who  as  the 
President's  confidential  adviser  had  visited  Europe 
several  times  to  ascertain  the  views  of  the  different 
belligerents,  a  group  of  experts  was  assembled  in  New 
York  who  spent  the  next  year  in  an  intensive  study 
of  the  historical,  legal,  economic,  geographic,  and 
ethnographic  situation  in  the  areas  involved  in  the 
war.  Some  criticism  was  expressed  that  this  work 
was  not  put  more  directly  under  the  State  Depart- 
ment, but  the  general  idea  was  excellent.  Some- 
what similar  investigations  were  being  carried  on  in 
England  and  France.  Most  of  the  members  of  the 
House  "Inquiry"  accompanied  the  American  Peace 
Delegation  to  Paris,  where  by  common  consent  the 
Peace  Conference  was  to  meet. 

It  was,  however,  more  than  two  months  after  the 
armistice  before  it  formally  assembled.  The  delay 
was  caused  in  part  by  the  distance  which  some  of  the 
delegates  had  to  come,  in  part  by  the  large  number 
of  preliminary  details  which  had  to  be  worked  out. 
Furthermore,  the  leaders  were  anxious  to  arrive 
at    some    tentative    agreement    among    themselves, 


The  Peace  Conference  49 

in  order  that  the  work  of  the  Conference  might  pro- 
ceed as  smoothly  as  possible.  In  England,  Lloyd 
George  wished  to  wait  until  after  the  general  election 
in  December. 

On  December  4  President  Wilson  sailed  for 
France  as  the  head  of  the  American  delegation. 
With  him  there  went  a  large  number  of  technical 
advisers  and  experts  on  the  various  questions  involved 
in  the  settlement.  He  was  received  with  the  utmost 
popular  enthusiasm  in  France,  Italy,  and  England. 
The  tribute  represented  an  expression  of  gratitude  for 
the  share  taken  in  the  war  by  the  United  States,  and 
it  was  also  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  President 
personally  had  become  the  spokesman  of  the  idealistic 
aims  of  the  Allies,  and  the  most  prominent  and  dis- 
interested advocate  of  a  just  peace  to  be  guaranteed 
by  a  league  of  nations.  So  at  least  Mr.  Wilson 
interpreted  his  welcome.  These  were  the  points 
which  he  emphasized  in  his  public  addresses;  and  his 
wonderful  reception  encouraged  him  to  count  on  the 
support  of  public  opinion  in  Europe  and  the  United 
States  to  compel  the  Conference  to  make  a  peace  of 
justice.  "The  peoples  who  constitute  the  nations  of 
the  world,"  he  declared,  ''are  in  the  saddle  and  they 
are  going  to  see  to  it  that,  if  their  present  governments 
do  not  do  their  will,  some  other  governments  shall.  "^ 

These  visits  also  gave  the  President  an  opportunity 
to  have  informal  conferences  with  the  English, 
French,  and  Italian  leaders,  and  to  get  acquainted 

'Boston  speech,  February  24,  1919. 


50         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

with  his  colleagues.  It  was  announced  that  Wilson 
and  Lloyd  George  found  themselves  in  substantial 
agreement.  In  Italy  the  President  had  little  success 
in  persuading  the  Italian  government  to  modify  its 
aspirations.  Clemenceau  did  not  attempt  to  conceal 
the  fact  that  he  was  unable  to  agree  with  the  Amxnican 
President  in  many  important  particulars. 

As  the  world  read  of  the  gathering  of  the  leaders  of 
the  nations,  and  discussed  the  approach  of  the 
"Great  Peace,"  two  general  points  of  view  developed. 
Different  types  of  mind  had  different  conceptions  of 
the  task  before  the  Conference,  and  of  the  proper 
methods  for  it  to  pursue. 

The  "practical"  men  kept  insisting  that  human 
nature  never  changed;  that  there  always  had  been 
wars,  and  there  always  would  be  wars.  To  pursue 
Utopian  leagues  of  peace  would  only  lead  to  disappoint- 
ment and  disaster.  In  their  minds  the  immediate 
problem  was  the  punishment  of  Germany  and  her 
allies  for  their  atrocious  crimes  against  civilization; 
the  exaction  of  the  utmost  possible  by  way  of  repara- 
tion; the  reduction  of  the  Central  Powers  to  military 
impotence;  and  the  crippling  of  German  economic 
competition  for  the  future.  In  remaking  the  map  of 
Europe,  a  fundamental  consideration  should  be  the 
creation  of  an  impregnable  frontier  for  France,  the 
erection  of  powerful  barrier  states  to  the  south  and 
east  of  Germany  which  should  guard  against  a 
revival  of  German  aggression,  and  at  the  same  time 
oppose   the   spread   of   bolshevism.     As   to   Turkey 


The  Peace  Conference  51 

and  the  German  colonies,  the  territory  should  be 
divided  among  the  victors  and  added  to  their  existing 
colonial  empires. 

The  more  idealistic  liberals  and  radicals  started 
from  the  premise  that  this  peace  must  be  different 
in  kind  from  any  that  had  ever  been  made  in  the 
past;  that  it  must  be  based  upon  principles  of  fair- 
ness, moderation,  and  justice,  even  to  the  enemy. 
Old  wrongs  were  to  be  righted,  but  not  in  such  a 
fashion  as  to  cause  new  and  more  dangerous  con- 
flicts of  interest.  A  new  world-organization  must 
be  set  up  which  should  not  only  minimize  the  danger 
of  future  wars,  but  also  be  the  agent  in  time  of  peace 
for  an  increasing  international  co-operation  in  the 
beneficent  work  of  advancing  the  common  interests 
of  mankind.  The  subject  peoples  in  the  former 
German  colonies  and  in  the  Turkish  Empire  were  to 
receive  the  largest  possible  degree  of  independence, 
and  for  the  future  were  to  be  guided  and  helped, 
not  exploited  for  the  benefit  of  European  capi- 
tal and  industry.  Punitive  indemnities  were  to  be 
renounced,  and  economic  discrimination  even  against 
the  enemy  abandoned.  From  motives  of  expedi- 
ency, if  for  nothing  else,  the  Germans  were  to  be  per- 
mitted and  even  helped  to  revive  industrially,  and 
allowed  to  resume  their  place  in  the  family  of  nations. 
Otherwise  they  would  not  be  able  to  pay  the  debt 
assessed  against  them,  and  in  despair  might  turn  to 
bolshevism.  To  deprive  thetn  of  genuinely  German 
territory,  to  condemn  them  to  economic  servitude,  to 


52         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

continue  to  treat  them  as  an  outcast  nation,  would 
pave  the  way  for  future  world-unrest,  and  would  lead 
almost  certainly  to  a  new  world-war  which  would  be 
so  much  more  horrible  than  the  last  that  it  might 
well  mean  the  end  of  Western  civihzation. 

Few  perhaps  held  exclusively  to  either  of  these 
points  of  view.  The  practical  men  admitted  that  a 
league  of  nations  was  an  excellent  idea  and  that 
something  should  be  done  about  it,  provided  always 
that  adequate  guarantees  were  devised  which  would 
work  in  case  the  League  proved  a  failure — as  it 
probably  would.  The  liberals  admitted  that  Ger- 
many deserved  heavy  punishment,  and  that  for 
some  time  the  Germans  must  be  regarded  with 
suspicion.  They  had  confidence,  however,  that  the 
Revolution  had  made  a  genuine  change  in  Germany, 
and  that  the  moderate  elements  should  be  given 
every  encouragement  in  their  efforts  to  break  with 
the  past  and  establish  a  really  popular  government. 
Only  by  a  "heahng  peace,"  drawn  up  in  a  spirit  of 
fairness  and  even  generosity,  could  the  war-weary 
world  be  given  a  chance  to  enter  upon  a  new  era  of 
reconciliation  and  co-operation. 

In  each  country  these  two  points  of  view  were  in 
conflict,  and  the  clash  was  reflected  in  the  Conference 
itself,  in  each  delegation,  and  for  that  matter  in  the 
mind  of  each  member.  Each  country  tended  to 
support  idealistic  solutions  of  difficulties  where  its 
own  interests  were  not  immediately  affected.  But 
when  it  became  a  question  of  a  strategic  frontier,  or 


The  Peace  Conference  53 

an  indemnity,  or  a  colony  for  any  nation,  the  leaders 
of  that  nation  became  suddenly  practical.  It  was 
inevitable  that  many  decisions  should  take  the  form 
of  compromises  between  ideals  and  practical  con- 
siderations, or  between  the  conflicting  material 
claims  of  different  groups.  In  such  cases  nobody 
was  entirely  satisfied. 

Throughout  the  long  negotiations,  with  the  endless 
proposals  and  counter-proposals  and  discussions,  the 
central  ideas  of  the  leaders  of  the  different  delegations 
remained  fairly  consistent.  Clemenceau  entered  the 
Conference  inflexibly  determined  to  forward  the 
interests  of  France,  first,  last,  and  all  the  time. 
Alsace-Lorraine  must  be  recovered,  if  possible  with 
the  addition  of  the  Saar  Valley.  The  material 
damage  to  Northern  France  must  be  repaired,  and  as 
much  of  the  French  war  debt  as  possible  charged  to 
Germany.  Individuals  guilty  of  atrocities  must  be 
punished  in  all  cases  where  they  were  known.  France 
must  share  in  the  economic  opportunities  of  develop- 
ing parts  of  Turkey  and  the  former  German  colonies. 
In  Russia  bolshevism  must  be  crushed  to  prevent  its 
spread  and  to  open  the  way  for  the  recovery  of  the 
billions  due  to  French  investors.  In  Central  Europe 
a  strong  barrier  should  be  erected  to  check  both 
bolshevism  and  Prussianism.  But  supremely,  the 
German  menace  must  be  utterly  and  forever  ended. 
Under  that  shadow  France  had  lived  for  half  a 
century,  and  before  German  aggression  France 
had  all  but  succumbed.     It  was  all  very  well  for 


54         ^f^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

the  United  States,  across  the  Atlantic,  to  expect 
that  a  league  of  nations  would  curb  Germany  in 
the  future — perhaps  it  would;  then  again,  perhaps 
not.  But  France  lived  next  door  to  Germany,  and 
France  was  determined  to  be  safe  even  if  the  League 
failed  to  work.  Optimists  might  point  to  the  new 
German  Socialist  Republic,  and  insist  that  the  old 
aggressive  militarism  was  dead.  Perhaps.  Let  us 
hope  so,  though  there  were  few  signs  of  repentance 
visible.  But  Clemenceau  had  lived  too  near  the 
Germans,  for  too  long,  to  have  much  confidence  in 
the  change  of  heart.  For  France  he  insisted  that, 
no  matter  how  much  the  Germans  might  ever  wish 
to  renew  their  aggressions,  it  should  be  physically 
impossible  for  them  to  do  so  with  any  chance  of 
success.  France  must  have  an  unassailable  mihtary 
frontier,  and  Germany  must  be  permanently  dis- 
armed and  hemmed  in  and  guarded.  In  standing  for 
these  points  the  French  Premier  had  strong  support 
from  public  opinion,  and  from  the  French  Assembly. 
Only  a  few  socialists  counseled  moderation. 

The  British  point  of  view  was  somewhat  different. 
With  the  French  desire  for  security  British  opinion 
was  in  hearty  sympathy,  but  as  to  some  of  the  French 
proposals  for  detaching  the  Rhine  provinces  there  was 
hesitation.  In  dividing  up  the  spoils  outside  of 
Europe,  France  and  England  would  need  to  com- 
promise conflicting  claims  in  a  friendly  spirit.  The 
surrender  of  the  German  fleet  had  already  secured 
Great  Britain  in  that  supremacy  of  the  seas  which 


The  Peace  Conference  55 

formed  a  cardinal  principle  of  national  policy,  and  all 
that  remained  to  be  done  was  to  prevent  the  growth 
of  a  similar  menace,  and  to  refrain  from  agreeing  to 
any  form  of  disarmament  or  any  definition  of  "free- 
dom of  the  seas"  which  should  impair  the  superiority 
of  the  British  fleet.     The  German  merchant  marine 
had  been  disposed  of  in  large  part,  and  the  remainder 
could  be  claimed  by  way  of  reparation.     German 
foreign  commerce  had  been  for  the  time  extinguished. 
For  the  future,   German  economic  competition,   at 
least  in  its  "unfair"  forms,  was  to  be  prevented.    It 
was    unfortunate    that    in    his    campaign    speeches 
Lloyd  George  had  aroused  extravagant  expectations 
as  to  what  would  be  exacted  from  Germany.     The 
unreflecting  public  had  been  led  to  believe  that  the 
Kaiser  and  his  chief  aids  would  be  promptly  tried, 
and  quite  probably  hanged  in  a  row,  and  that  Ger- 
many would  be  forced  to  pay  the  entire  war  debt 
of  the  British  Empire.     One  of  Lloyd  George's  tasks 
at  the  Conference  was  therefore   to  secure  results 
which  would  not  fall  too  far  short  of  these  expecta- 
tions.    Another  of  his  difficulties  was  to  keep    the 
representatives  of  the  Dominions  in  line,  particularly 
as  to  the  disposition  of  the  German  colonial  posses- 
sions.    With   regard    to    these,    and    to    the   extra- 
European  situation  generally,  the  British  leaders  were 
determined  to  consolidate  and  protect  their  imperial 
interests  in  Africa  and  Asia,  and  to  secure  a   satis- 
factory share  in  new   commercial   and   investment 
opportunities. 


56         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

In  the  dark  days  of  191 7  much  concern  was  felt 
lest  Italy  should  consent  to  a  compromise  peace  with 
Austria-Hungary,  and  probably  many  ItaHans  at 
that  time  would  have  been  glad  to  get  out  with  the 
gains  promised  by  Austria  in  191 5,  or  even  with  no 
gains  at  all.  With  the  victories  of  1918,  and  the 
collapse  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  ItaHan  aspirations 
and  expectations  rose  with  a  bound.  For  some  years 
a  strong  and  expansive  nationalism  had  made  itself 
felt  in  the  peninsula.  Many  voices  were  heard  pro- 
claiming that  Italy  had  only  begun  the  great  work  of 
political,  economic,  and  cultural  expansion  for  which 
as  the  heirs  of  the  Roman  tradition  the  Italians  were 
fitted  and  destined.  The  secret  treaty  of  191 5  had 
revealed  concern  for  three  things :  the  recovery  of  the 
"unredeemed"  brethren  in  Austria;  a  desire  for 
strategic  security  on  the  north  and  in  the  Adriatic; 
and  a  determination  to  share  more  largely  in  the 
political  control  and  the  economic  exploitation  of 
Africa  and  Asia  Minor.  At  the  Conference  the 
Italian  representatives  asked  for  the  territories  and 
privileges  promised  in  the  treaty  of  London,  and  in 
addition  for  the  district  of  Fiume.  They  developed 
a  willingness  to  make  concessions  in  favor  of  Greece 
as  to  the  Aegean  Islands,  and  on  the  Dalmatian  coast 
in  favor  of  the  South  Slavs;  but  by  way  of  compensa- 
tion they  demanded  Fiume.  While  England  and 
France  were  willing  to  stand  by  their  agreement,  they 
were  not  particularly  enthusiastic  about  adding 
Fiume.     The  concessions  in  Asia  Minor  and  Africa 


The  Peace  Conference  57 

also  raised  some  difficulties.  It  was  understood  that 
Italy  opposed  the  scheme  of  a  Danubian  Federation, 
which  France  favored  as  a  bulwark  against  Germany. 
To  Italy  this  seemed  too  much  like  a  revival  of  the 
Hapsburg  menace. 

Japan's  position  throughout  the  Conference  was 
consistent  and  intelligible.  In  connection  with  the 
League  of  Nations  the  Japanese  stood  firmly  for  a 
declaration  in  favor  of  racial  equality.  While  on 
the  surface  this  was  largely  a  sentimental  matter,  in 
the  background  was  the  whole  question  of  discrimina- 
tion against  the  Japanese  by  the  United  States, 
Canada,  and  Australia.  In  practical  politics  Japan 
was  concerned  with  her  political  predominance  and 
economic  expansion  in  the  Far  East.  The  German 
possessions  and  privileges  in  that  area  must  pass  to 
Japan.  Under  pressure  Japan  agreed  to  accept  a 
mandate  for  the  islands  north  of  the  equator,  instead 
of  annexing  them,  but  the  difference  in  this  case  may 
prove  slight.  As  to  Shantung,  Japan  was  willing  to 
promise  to  restore  the  sovereignty  of  China,  retain- 
ing, however,  the  economic  concessions  which  had 
belonged  to  Germany.  "The  Japanese  delegates  were 
the  least  expressive  of  any  at  the  Conference;  they 
said  the  least;  but  they  were  the  firmest  of  any  in 
hewing  to  the  line  of  their  interests  and  their  agree- 
ments."* They  felt — and  Japanese  opinion  at  home 
was  strong  on  this  point — that  Japan  deserved  some 
reward  for  her  sacrifices  and  efforts. 

»R.  S.  Baker,  What  Wilson  Did  at  Paris. 


58         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

The  United  States  sought  no  territorial  gains,  or 
economic  special  privileges.  We  were  trying  in  a 
disinterested  fashion  to  bring  about  a  permanent  and 
satisfactory  settlement  based  on  the  best  possible 
solution  of  each  specific  problem.  But  the  interest 
of  America  in  such  a  peace  is  more  than  an  abstract 
and  idealistic  one.  It  is  perfectly  clear  that  another 
world-conflagration  will  almost  inevitably  involve 
the  United  States.  The  most  practical  and  selfish 
considerations  therefore  demand  that  we  should  use 
every  effort  to  prevent  conflicts  by  removing  their 
causes.  From  the  standpoint  of  trade  also  it  is 
obviously  to  our  advantage  to  see  the  various  Euro- 
pean groups  turn  from  quarreling  with  each  other 
over  boundaries  and  unredeemed  areas  and  devote 
their  energies  to  the  production  and  exchange  of 
goods.  President  Wilson  consequently  did  his  best 
to  secure  decisions  which  seemed  from  the  outside 
American  point  of  view  to  be  the  fairest  for  all  the 
mterested  groups. 

The  five  great  powers  dominated  the  Conference, 
and  made  the  final  settlements.  The  lesser  nations 
complained  indignantly  that  they  were  called  in 
merely  to  consent  to  decisions  made  in  secret  by  the 
Big  Five.  It  is  true  that  they  were  given  a  hearing 
when  their  interests  were  involved;  but  they  felt 
that  their  wishes  were  not  given  due  consideration, 
or  their  rights  sufficient  weight.  The  situation  was  of 
course  a  difficult  one.  In  many  instances  the  interests 
of  minor  powers  clashed  with  each  other,  or  with  those 


The  Peace  Conference  59 

of  some  great  power.  The  Allies  had  endeavored 
to  fix  provisional  boundaries,  with  neutral  zones  in 
some  cases  occupied  by  Allied  troops.  While  the 
understanding  was  that  these  arrangements  did  not 
prejudice  the  rights  of  either  party,  all  the  claimants 
for  territory  felt  that  possession  of  disputed  areas 
would  be  a  good  thing.  As  a  result  South  Slavs, 
Italians,  Poles,  Czecho-Slovaks,  Greeks,  and  Rumani- 
ans kept  large  forces  under  arms,  and  not  infrequently 
clashed  with  each  other  in  debatable  regions.  Thus 
the  Czecho-Slovak  Republic  and  the  Poles  fought 
over  Teschen.  The  South  Slav  kingdom  prepared  to 
fight  Italy  over  the  Adriatic  situation  and  Rumania 
over  the  division  of  the  Banat  in  Southern  Hungary. 
Internally  the  new  Kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats, 
and  Slovenes,  as  it  was  officially  called,  was  having 
difficulty.  Some  of  the  Croats  and  a  faction  of  the 
Montenegrins  were  holding  out  for  independence. 
During  the  course  of  the  Conference  the  powers  decided 
to  recognize  the  new  kingdom,  and  accordingly  they  re- 
fused Montenegro  a  separate  representative.  There  was 
tension  also  between  Greece  and  Italy,  and  the  Greek 
aspirations  in  Thrace  raised  perplexing  issues.  China 
had  a  grievance  against  Japan.  It  is  a  noteworthy 
fact  that  the  greatest  difficulties  encountered  in  mak- 
ing peace  were  concerned  not  so  much  with  the  terms 
to  be  imposed  on  the  Central  Powers  as  with  the  adjust- 
ment of  conflicts  between  the  victors.  The  Supreme 
Council  had  less  difficulty  in  coercing  Germany  than 
in  dealing  with  the  Rumanian  defiance  of  its  authority. 


6o  An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Among  the  smaller  combatants  Belgium  occupied 
a  special  position.  Belgium  was  anxious  to  secure 
four  things:  prompt  reparation  from  Germany,  so 
that  normal  economic  life  might  be  restored  as  soon 
as  possible;  the  addition  of  some  small  districts  from 
Prussia,  and  the  "rectification"  of  the  frontier  with 
Holland  by  the  annexation  of  Maastricht  and  the  left 
bank  of  the  Scheldt  River;  the  aboKtion  of  the  old 
status  of  neutralization;  and  an  extension  of  the 
Belgian  Congo  at  the  expense  of  German  East  Africa. 
Belgium  would  also  have  liked  to  have  the  Duchy  of 
Luxemburg  attached  to  it  in  some  fashion,  and  there 
was  a  strong  desire  to  have  the  seat  of  the  League  of 
Nations  at  Brussels.  Only  part  of  the  Belgian  claims 
were  granted,  and  at  one  time  Belgium  indicated 
an  intention  of  refusing  to  sign  the  Treaty  unless 
further  concessions  were  made.  In  particular,  Hol- 
land refused  to  cede  any  territory,  and  the  powers 
declined  to  bring  any  pressure  to  bear.  Holland 
however  agreed  to  discuss  a  number  of  long-standing 
difficulties  connected  with  Belgian  access  to  the  sea. 
In  matters  where  their  interests  were  concerned, 
neutral  powers  were  invited  to  present  their  views. 

In  addition  to  the  recognized  delegations  at  Paris 
there  were  present  numerous  other  more  or  less  author- 
ized spokesmen  for  various  struggling  de  facto  govern- 
ments seeking  recognition  and  assistance.  Such  were 
Finland,  the  Baltic  States,  and  the  Ukraine.  There 
were  also  representatives  of  different  anti-bolshevist 
groups  and  governments  in  Russia,  each  with  its  own 


The  Peace  Conference  6i 

policy  to  urge  for  the  settlement  of  affairs  in  Eastern 
Europe.  There  came,  too,  delegations  to  plead  the 
cause  of  dozens  of  minor  groups,  like  the  Armenians  and 
the  Lebanese,  pathetically  convinced  that  if  only  they 
could  obtain  a  hearing,  particularly  with  President 
Wilson,  their  ''nations"  would  be  made  free  and  their 
old  wrongs  righted.  The  Persians  came  to  ask  the 
relaxation  of  restrictions  on  their  independence  of 
action  and  the  restoration  of  territory  taken  from 
them  by  Russia.  Much  embarrassment  was  caused 
by  groups  who  came  to  urge  that  self-determination 
be  appUed  within  the  Allied  states.  Sinn  Feiners, 
Egyptians,  British  Indians,  Koreans,  and  others 
vociferated  their  appeals  to  the  Conference  for 
independence.  Naturally  the  great  powers  refused 
to  discuss  such  matters,  which  were  regarded  as  of 
purely  domestic  concern. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  Peace  Conference  was 
anything  but  a  simple  and  tranquil  affair.  With 
every  printing-press  in  Paris  working  to  turn  out 
propagandist  literature,  with  official  and  unofficial 
delegations  rushing  around,  pulling  wires,  and  trying 
to  make  private  agreements,  with  war  and  famine 
and  revolution  raging  in  half  of  Europe,  it  is  almost  a 
wonder  that  anything  at  all  was  accomphshed. 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE  FRAMING  OF  THE  TREATY  OF 
VERSAILLES 

I.      GENERAL  PRINCIPLES 

Nominally,  at  least,  the  great  general  principles  of 
the  peace  had  been  agreed  upon  in  advance,  and 
were  well  understood  by  all.  It  was  in  the  interpre- 
tation of  these  principles,  and  in  their  application  to 
specific  problems,  that  the  difficulties  arose. 

All  agreed  in  theory  that  the  supreme  purpose  of 
the  Conference  should  be  to  remake  the  map  and 
readjust  international  relations  in  such  fashion  as  to 
remove  as  many  as  possible  of  the  old  causes  of  fric- 
tion, without  causing  new  ones,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  provide  some  new  international  organization  for 
the  peaceful  settlement  of  future  difficulties.  More 
particularly  it  was  agreed:  (i)  that  the  Central 
Powers  must  make  good  the  damage  done  to  civilians 
through  their  acts  of  aggression  on  land,  on  sea,  and 
from  the  air.  (2)  In  determining  new  boundaries 
primary  consideration  must  be  given  to  the  wishes  of 
the  populations  concerned.  The  guiding  principle 
must  be  "  self-determination."  Nevertheless,  account 
must  also  be  taken  of  historical  claims,  of  geographic 
considerations  such  as  defensible  frontiers  and  access 
to  the  sea,  and  of  the  desirability  of  adequate  agri- 
cultural   resources   and   supplies   of   coal   and   iron. 

62 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  63 

(3)  Racial,  religious,  and  linguistic  minorities  neces- 
sarily placed  under  some  other  group  must  be  pro- 
tected in  their  rights.  (4)  Militarism  and  arbitrary 
power  likely  to  be  misused  must  be  destroyed  or  made 
impotent. 

The  principles  seemed  clear  enough,  but  in 
applying  them  there  were  a  number  of  difficulties: 

1.  Some  of  them  are  vague  and  capable  of  several 
interpretations.  This  is  particularly  true  of  "self- 
determination."  What,  for  instance,  is  to  be  the 
unit?  Should  Fiume,  for  instance,  vote  apart  from 
its  Slav  suburbs  ? 

2.  In  some  cases  two  or  more  principles  clash. 
For  instance,  in  the  case  of  PoKsh  access  to  the  sea: 
Poland's  natural  and  historic  port  is  Dantzig;  but 
Dantzig  is  purely  German;  and  to  reach  it,  many 
Germans  must  be  annexed;  and  the  German  district 
of  East  Prussia  is  thereby  completely  detached. 

Also  Fiume,  though  Italian,  is  claimed  as  the  only 
practicable  access  to  the  sea  for  the  South  Slavs. 
Should  the  same  kind  of  decision  be  made  as  in  the 
parallel  case  of  Dantzig?  Again,  giving  Italy  a 
"natural"  and  defensible  frontier  on  the  crest  of 
the  Alps  detaches  several  hundred  thousand  Germans 
from  the  southern  Tyrol. 

3.  The  Allies  have  various  conflicting  interests; 
naturally  each  interprets  general  principles  in  the 
way  most  favorable  to  itself, 

4.  A  great  many  points  about  the  peace  settle- 
ment were   decided   in   advance   by  secret   treaties 


64  An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

made  for  the  most  part  in  a  spirit  of  self-interest  and 
bargaining. 

5.  Old  enmities  and  distrusts  have  made  it  hard 
to  be  generous  or  even  fair  with  defeated  enemies 
whose  past  record  arouses  no  sympathy. 

II.      THE   NEGOTIATIONS 

The  first  plenary  session  of  the  Conference  was 
held  January  18,  1919.  One  of  the  earhest  problems 
had  been  to  decide  what  nations  were  entitled  to  a 
seat  at  the  peace  table.  The  old  Russian  Empire 
had  collapsed  and  no  stable  government  existed  which 
the  AlHes  would  recognize  as  having  the  right  to 
speak  in  the  name  of  the  Russian  people  as  a  whole. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  agreed  that  Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia, and  the  Arab  Kingdom  of  the  Hedjaz  were 
entitled  to  be  present  as  separate  states.  The  newly 
proclaimed  Kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes  had  not  as  yet  been  recognized  by  the  prin- 
cipal AlKes,  who  continued  to  regard  Serbia  and 
Montenegro  as  separate  states,  and  the  remainder 
of  the  South  Slav  areas  as  Austro-Hungarian  terri- 
tories, the  status  of  which  was  to  be  finally  settled 
by  the  Peace  Conference.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  British  Dominions  and  India  were  represented 
separately,  instead  of  being  included  in  a  panel  of 
delegates  for  the  empire  as  a  whole.  It  was  gener- 
ally agreed  that  the  enemy  powers  were  not  to  be 
summoned  until  the  treaty  was  ready  for  them  to 
sign. 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  65 

From  the  outset  France,  England,  the  United 
States,  Italy,  and  Japan  assumed  the  direction  of 
affairs.  As  Clemenceau  frankly  pointed  out,  they 
had  borne  the  greatest  burdens  of  the  war,  their 
armies  and  navies  had  largely  won  the  victories,  their 
stakes  in  the  world-settlement  were  greatest,  and 
on  them  would  fall  the  principal  responsibility  for 
seeing  that  the  terms  of  the  treaty  were  carried  out. 
Clemenceau  was  chosen  permanent  chairman.  It 
was  only  after  a  formal  protest  that  the  representa- 
tives of  the  press  had  been  admitted,  even  to  the 
formal  sessions,  and  throughout  the  Conference  there 
was  much  criticism  of  the  secrecy  maintained. 
"Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at"  had 
been  one  of  the  Fourteen  Points.  By  this  the  Presi- 
dent had  intended  to  denounce  secret  treaties  and 
understandings  between  statesmen,  which  might 
commit  governments  to  undertakings  of  which  the 
public  was  ignorant.  By  no  reasonable  interpreta- 
tion could  it  be  taken  as  a  pledge  never  to  thrash 
out  difficult  and  delicate  points  in  private.  Many, 
however,  felt  that  secrecy  was  being  greatly  overdone, 
and  that  negotiations  were  not  being  conducted  "in 
the  pubhc  view." 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  really  significant  decisions 
were  made  behind  closed  doors  by  the  representatives 
of  the  five  "Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers" 
— England,  France,  the  United  States,  Italy,  and 
Japan — and  in  the  last  resort  by  the  "Big  Three," 
Wilson,    Clemenceau,    and   Lloyd    George.     Official 


66         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

communications  for  the  press  were  issued  from  time 
to  time  as  matters  progressed.  The  newspaper 
correspondents  were  given  interviews  which  they 
were  not  allowed  to  quote.  In  one  way  or  another, 
however,  much  that  went  on  became  known.  Occa- 
sionally one  delegation  or  another  was  suspected 
of  allowing  information  to  reach  the  press  in  order 
to  influence  pending  decisions  by  arousing  public 
opinion. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  men  who  had 
the  final  responsibihty  for  the  decisions  were  obliged 
at  the  same  time  to  consider  two  other  sets  of  forces. 
As  the  executive  heads  of  their  nations  they  had  from 
day  to  day  to  decide  pressing  questions  of  immediate 
policy  connected  with  affairs  in  Europe.  The  Great 
War  was  supposedly  over,  but  a  dozen  little  wars 
were  still  going  on.  Everywhere  various  nationalist 
groups  were  attempting  to  anticipate  the  decision 
of  the  Conference  by  seizing  as  wide  an  area  of 
debatable  territory  as  possible.  A  supremely  impor- 
tant question  was  the  spread  of  bolshevism.  The 
fate  of  the  new  governments  in  Germany,  in  German 
Austria,  and  in  Hungary  was  also  a  matter  of  the 
gravest  concern.  Obviously  peace  could  be  made 
only  with  some  stable  government,  capable  of  carry- 
ing out  the  terms.  With  Spartacan  uprisings  in 
Berlin  and  Munich,  and  with  a  bolshevist  government 
in  Buda-Pesth  it  seemed  at  times  as  if  all  Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  was  relapsing  into  chaos.  These 
problems  were  dealt  with  by  the  leaders  partly  in 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  67 

their  capacity  as  peace  negotiators,  but  in  part  also 
as  members  of  the  Supreme  War  Council,  which 
since  early  in  1918  had  been  meeting  at  Versailles. 

But  in  addition  to  these  distracting  movements, 
each  leader  had  to  consider  public  opinion  and  political 
developments  at  home.  There  were  everywhere 
pressing  problems  of  demobilization  and  finance  and 
economic  readjustment,  to  say  nothing  of  the  exigen- 
cies of  party  politics.  Labor  unrest  in  some  places 
was  assuming  alarming  and  even  revolutionary 
aspects.  It  was  under  such  diflEiculties  that  the 
Conference  had  to  deliberate  on  and  decide  the  fate 
of  Europe. 

After  the  first  meeting  the  Conference  organized 
into  subcommittees  and  commissions  to  consider 
various  specific  questions.  The  Supreme  Council, 
consisting  at  first  of  two  representatives  of  each  of  the 
five  great  powers,  met  regularly  and  heard  representa- 
tions and  reports  on  various  subjects.  Later  the 
Council  was  reduced  to  the  five  leaders,  though 
Japan  refrained  from  a  decisive  part  in  purely 
European  questions. 

One  of  the  first  important  decisions  of  the  Council 
was  to  issue  a  call  to  all  the  Russian  factions  for  a 
conference  (January  22).  This  came  to  nothing, 
but  Russian  affairs  continued  to  take  up  much  time. 
Behind  the  scenes  during  the  early  weeks  two  interest- 
ing and  important  struggles  were  going  on,  as  to  the 
disposition  of  the  German  colonies  and  Turkey,  and 
as  to  the  League  of  Nations.    A  strong  tendency 


68         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

developed  in  favor  of  dividing  up  the  spoils,  making 
a  preliminary  treaty  which  should  penalize  and 
disarm  Germany  and  allow  the  world  to  return  to 
normal  as  quickly  as  possible,  leaving  the  question 
of  a  league  of  nations  for  the  future.  President 
Wilson,  however,  had  long  been  convinced  that  the 
League  of  Nations  should  be  established  as  an  integral 
part  of  the  new  international  order,  and  that  it  should 
have  general  oversight  of  the  former  German  colonies 
and  Turkey.  Premier  Hughes  of  AustraHa  was  at 
first  in  favor  of  a  poUcy  of  annexation  of  the  German 
colonies,  as  was  even  General  Smuts  of  South  Africa; 
Japan  also  was  disposed  to  insist  on  the  terms  of  the 
earlier  treaties.  At  the  second  plenary  session 
(January  25)  the  Conference  voted  that  a  league  of 
nations  as  "an  integral  part  of  the  general  treaty 
of  peace"  was  "essential,"  and  appointed  a  com- 
mittee to  draft  a  constitution.  Another  commission 
was  set  up  to  report  on  the  responsibility  and  possible 
trial  of  the  authors  of  the  war,  and  of  Germans  who 
had  broken  the  laws  and  customs  of  war.  Other 
commissions  on  reparations,  international  labor 
legislation,  and  international  control  of  ports,  water- 
ways, and  railways  were  also  provided  for,  and  from 
time  to  time  particular  questions  were  referred  by 
the  Council  to  special  commissions,  such  as  those  on 
Alsace-Lorraine,  Thrace,  and  Belgian-Dutch  relations. 
By  the  end  of  the  month,  owing  largely  to  the 
persistence  of  President  Wilson,  the  general  idea  of 
mandatories  for  the  German  colonies  and  Turkey 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  69 

was  accepted,  with  modifications,  which  secured  the 
assent  of  AustraHa,  South  Africa,  and  Japan. 

The  League  of  Nations  Commission  met  Febru- 
ary 3,  and  continued  to  hold  meetings  daily.  Very 
decided  differences  of  opinion  arose.  The  Japanese 
contended  for  a  "racial  equality"  clause;  the  French 
insisted  that  the  League  must  possess  adequate  mili- 
tary power  to  cope  with  Germany  in  particular.  Only 
by  making  the  armistice  terms  more  drastic,  and  by 
promising  a  special  defensive  treaty  by  which  Britain 
and  the  United  States  would  aid  France  in  case  of  a 
German  attack,  was  it  possible  to  secure  unanimous 
agreement.  At  the  plenary  session  of  February  14 
the  draft  of  the  League  Covenant  was  read.  The 
next  day  President  Wilson  sailed  for  the  United 
States.  On  February  19  Premier  Clemenceau  was 
shot,  but  fortunately  was  able  to  be  back  at  work  in  a 
short  time. 

For  a  while  the  chief  interest  centered  in  economic 
matters— the  amount  of  reparation  Germany  should 
make,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  should  be  assessed 
and  collected.  Territorial  questions  were  discussed, 
and  a  special  committee  appointed  to  co-ordinate  the 
reports  of  the  territorial  commissions.  The  dis- 
position of  the  surrendered  German  fleet  was  debated. 
On  March  i  Marshal  Foch  presented  a  report  on  the 
military  terms  of  the  Treaty. 

In  the  meantime  President  Wilson  was  endeavor- 
ing to  rouse  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  in 
favor  of  the  League  Covenant,  and  the  debate  on  the 


70         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

subject  in  the  Senate  was  becoming  extremely  bitter. 
As  soon  as  possible  after  the  close  of  the  session  of 
Congress,  the  President  returned  to  Paris.  He 
found  a  renewed  disposition  on  the  part  of  some  of  the 
Supreme  Council  to  make  a  preliminary  peace  with 
Germany  at  once,  leaving  the  League  of  Nations  to 
be  settled  later.'  This  the  President  refused  to  per- 
mit, and  in  view  of  the  complexity  of  the  settlement, 
and  the  necessity  for  some  organization  for  carrying 
out  its  terms,  the  AlHed  leaders  became  more  and 
more  sincerely  convinced  that  the  President  was 
right,  and  that  the  League  must  be  an  integral  and 
interwoven  element  in  the  Treaty.^  There  is  no 
ground  for  asserting  that  debate  over  the  League 
delayed  the  peace;  the  League  really  faciHtated  the 
Treaty. 

By  this  time  President  Wilson's  original  popu- 
larity had  somewhat  cooled.  The  opposition  in  the 
United  States  encouraged  those  in  Europe  who  had 
from  the  start  disHked  the  President  and  his  ideas. 
He  was  made  the  target  of  open  attacks  on  the  part 
of  the  press.  He  was  blamed  for  postponing  peace 
and  delivering  the  world  to  bolshevism,  war,  and 
starvation,  while  he  chased  rainbows.  To  some 
observers  it  seemed  as  if  the  President  had  reHed  too 
much  on  the  statement  of  general  principles  without 
having  worked  out  a  detailed  and  practicable  solution 
of  the  specific  problems  which  were  bound  to  come 

'  R.  S.  Baker,  op.  cit. 

'  Seymour,  Yale  Review,  October,  1918. 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  71 

up.  To  be  sure,  this  gave  him  the  advantage  of 
approaching  particular  questions  with  an  open  mind, 
but  too  often  it  put  him  in  the  ungracious  position 
of  a  critic  and  obstructionist  of  some  plan  carefully 
worked  out  by  one  or  other  of  the  powers. 

While  some  of  the  "practical"  men  were  denoun- 
cing President  Wilson  as  a  self-willed  visionary  utterly 
incapable  of  dealing  with  real  conditions,  others  of  the 
liberal  and  radical  wing  were  beginning  to  say,  partly 
in  sorrow,  partly  in  anger,  that  he  had  surrendered  to 
the  reactionary  crowd  and  was  helping  in  the  old 
secret  fashion  to  make  an  old-fashioned  imperialistic 
peace,  thinly  disguised  with  a  few  fine  phrases.  He 
was  accused  of  refusing  to  listen  to  expert  advisers. 
While  he  was  posing  as  the  friend  of  humanity  the 
"trained  diplomats  of  Europe"  were  privately  laugh- 
ing at  his  simpHcity,  and  were  manipulating  things  to 
suit  themselves.  Having  put  forward  extreme  claims 
with  no  real  expectation  of  gaining  them,  they  would 
make  a  special  point  of  yielding,  after  which  in 
decency  the  President  was  expected  to  concede 
something  to  them.^ 

Defenders  of  the  President  and  of  the  Conference 
generally,  many  of  whom  were  in  a  position  to  know,^ 
insisted  that  the  President  took  every  opportunity  of 
consulting  experts.  They  pictured  him  as  one  of  the 
dominant  figures  of  the  Conference,  respected  by  his 

'  Cf .  editorial  comment  in  the  Nation,  the  Dial,  the  New  Republic, 
etc. 

^  E.g.,  Ray  Stannard  Baker  Harry  Hansen,  comment  in  the 
Public,  the  Springfield  Republican  .etc. 


72  An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

associates,  regularly  appealed  to  for  a  clear  and  dis- 
passionate judgment  on  difficult  points.  Credit  was 
given  him  for  notable  idealistic  victories.  As  for 
the  charges  of  delay,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the 
Conference  was  acting  much  more  rapidly  than  the 
Congress  of  Vienna;  that  the  problems  were  of  tre- 
mendous complexity;  and  that  the  decisions  being 
made  were  of  such  tremendous  importance  for  the 
future  peace  of  the  world  that  every  effort  must  be 
made  to  arrive  at  the  best  possible  arrangements. 

During  the  latter  part  of  March,  with  this  feehng 
of  restlessness  growing,  the  leaders  of  the  Conference 
were  struggling  with  the  problems  of  the  amount  of 
reparation  to  be  demanded  from  Germany,  with  the 
question  of  the  Saar  Valley  and  of  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine.  The  American  delegation  favored  fixing  a 
definite  sum  for  which  Germany  was  to  be  held 
responsible.  They  objected  to  the  annexation  of 
the  Saar  Basin  to  France,  and  had  no  sympathy  with 
the  project  of  detaching  the  Rhine  provinces  from 
Germany.  Increasing  secrecy  marked  all  the  pro- 
ceedings of  the  Council,  now  narrowed  to  the  four 
leaders.  Differences  within  the  Council  were  intense. 
By  April  3  the  President's  physical  strength  gave 
way  and  he  was  forced  to  remain  in  bed;  but  he 
was  determined  not  to  yield  his  positions,  and  on 
April  7  he  ordered  the  "  George  Washington  "  to  sail 
at  once  for  France.  This  was  quite  correctly  inter- 
preted as  an  intimation  that  he  was  about  to  withdraw 
from  the  Conference.    Almost  immediately  compro- 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  73 

mise  solutions  were  proposed,  which  the  President 
felt  he  could  honorably  accept. 

On  April  11  the  Labor  Commission  submitted  a 
report,  and  April  28  the  revised  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  was  adopted  by  the  Plenary 
Conference.  By  this  time  the  treaty  was  regarded 
as  so  nearly  finished  that  the  German  delegation  was 
told  to  come  to  Versailles.  Before  they  arrived, 
however,  there  arose  two  further  crises  which  threat- 
ened again  to  disrupt  the  whole  Conference. 

First  the  Itahan  leaders,  who  had  urged  without 
success  that  their  claims  along  the  Adriatic  should  be 
settled  before  the  German  treaty  was  signed,  threat- 
ened to  withdraw  from  the  Conference.  The  central 
issue  was  the  disposition  of  the  city  of  Fiume  and 
parts  of  the  Dalmatian  coast.  President  Wilson  had 
been  opposed  to  all  claims  beyond  "the  clearly 
recognizable  limits  of  nationality."  He  had  been 
willing  to  consent,  though  with  some  reluctance, 
to  give  Italy  defensible  frontiers  at  the  expense  of  the 
Germans  in  the  Tyrol,  perhaps  not  reahzing  at  first 
the  extent  to  which  this  did  violence  to  national- 
istic principles.  On  April  23  the  President  took  the 
unusual  step  in  open  diplomacy  of  issuing  a  public 
statement  of  his  reasons  for  opposing  Italy's  claims 
to  Fiume  and  Dalmatia.  The  Italian  leaders  re- 
sented this  appeal  to  Italian  Hberal  sentiment, 
and  they  promptly  left  the  Conference  to  lay  their 
case  before  their  people.  Strengthened  by  the 
demonstrations    of    confidence,    they    accepted    the 


74         -^w  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

invitation  of  the  leaders  to  return  to  Paris  May  7. 
Meanwhile  it  had  been  necessary  to  placate  the 
Belgian  representatives,  who  felt  they  were  not  to 
receive  enough  of  the  indemnity  or  of  new  territory 
in  Africa. 

The  last  great  crisis  was  with  the  Japanese  over. 
Shantung.  The  final  decision  was  largely  in  favor 
of  Japan,  and  the  Chinese  delegation  decided  not  to 
sign  the  Treaty. 

On  the  seventh  of  May  (the  anniversary,  it  was 
remarked,  of  the  sinking  of  the  "  Lusitania")  the  com- 
pleted draft  of  the  Treaty  was  handed  to  the  German 
representatives.  Their  attitude  on  receiving  the 
terms  did  not  make  a  very  favorable  impression. 
The  powers  refused  the  Germans'  repeated  request 
for  oral  discussion  but  they  granted  fourteen  days 
in  which  to  submit  written  objections  or  counter- 
proposals. 

An  extensive  summary  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty 
was  made  pubhc,  but  the  text  was  withheld.  This 
decision,  though  technically  justified  on  the  ground 
that  modifications  were  still  possible,  caused  renewed 
criticism  of  the  methods  by  which  the  "open  cove- 
nants of  peace"  were  being  "openly  arrived  at." 
In  the  United  States  particularly  opponents  of  the 
administration  were  scathing  in  their  denunciations. 

Although  the  German  delegates  had  been  pre- 
pared in  advance  for  the  main  terms  of  the  Treaty, 
the  severity  of  the  document  as  a  whole  was  felt  with 
stunning  force.     As  soon  as  possible,   the   German 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  75 

representatives  sent  notes  to  the  Council  protesting 
against  particular  provisions.  The  Allies  replied 
to  the  separate  notes,  making  a  few  modifications, 
but  not  on  very  substantial  points.  On  May  17 
Count  von  Bronckdorf-Rantzau,  the  leader,  returned 
to  Germany  for  a  brief  conference  with  his  gov- 
ernment. On  May  20  a  week's  extension  of  time 
was  granted.  On  the  twenty-ninth  the  Germans 
submitted  their  counter-proposals,  together  with 
a  long  letter  explaining  their  point  of  view,  and 
summarizing  their  former  objections  to  the  various 
provisions  of  the  Treaty.  They  contended  that  the 
Treaty  was  unjust,  and  that  it  was  in  many  respects 
impossible  to  carry  out  its  terms.  They  recalled 
the  negotiations  preceding  the  armistice  and  the 
agreement  to  make  peace  on  the  basis  of  President 
Wilson's  Fourteen  Points,  and  subsequent  speeches, 
with  a  specific  interpretation  as  to  indemnities.  They 
complained  that  the  principle  of  self-determination 
was  violated  with  regard  to  West  Prussia,  Dantzig, 
Memel,  Upper  Silesia,  Eupen,  and  Malmedy,  and 
the  Saar  Basin.  The  agreement  on  indemnities 
had  been  without  warrant  stretched  to  include  an 
admission  in  principle  of  the  whole  cost  of  the  war, 
while  the  actual  payments  were  to  be  limited  only  by 
Germany's  power  to  pay  as  determined  by  a  Repara- 
tion Commission  whose  demands,  together  with  the 
loss  of  the  merchant  fleet  and  the  colonies,  would 
condemn  the  German  people  to  "perpetual  slave 
labor."    What  had   become   of   the   idea   that   the 


76         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Allies  were  fighting   the  old   German  government, 
and  not  the  German  people  ? 

Instead  of  the  terms  demanded,  Germany  pro- 
posed: to  disann  at  once,  if  admitted  to  the  League 
of  Nations;  to  renounce  Alsace-Lorraine  (with  a 
request  for  a  plebiscite)  and  most  of  Posen.  Poland 
would  be  given  access  to  the  sea  by  making  Dantzig, 
Konigsberg,  and  Memel  free  ports,  and  by  other 
special  arrangements.  They  offered  to  supply  France 
with  coal  from  the  Saar  mines  until  the  French  mines 
were  restored  and  to  submit  to  a  plebiscite  in  Northern 
Schleswig.  The  right  of  self-determination  for  the 
Germans  of  Austria  and  Bohemia  was  demanded. 
The  German  colonies  would  be  submitted  to  the 
League  of  Nations  if  Germany  was  made  the  manda- 
tory. In  the  matter  of  reparations,  Germany 
offered  to  pay  100,000,000,000  gold  marks,  one- 
fifth  by  May,  1926,  the  rest  in  annual  instalments 
without  interest.  Coal  would  be  delivered  to  France, 
Belgium,  and  Italy,  and  Germany  would  co-operate 
effectively  in  restoring  Northern  France  and  Belgium. 
A  world-pool  of  merchant  tonnage  was  proposed. 
A  neutral  commission  to  fix  responsibihty  for  the  war 
was  demanded.  The  trial  of  the  Kaiser  was  declared 
unjustified.  Instead  of  the  surrender  of  Germans 
accused  of  violations  of  the  laws  of  war,  Germany 
proposed  an  international  tribunal  of  competent 
neutrals  to  judge  \^olations  committed  by  subjects  of 
all  nations.  In  all  cases  of  a  transfer  of  sovereignty, 
Germany  insisted  that  the  Wilsonian  principles  of 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  yy 

self-determination  called  for  a  plebiscite  under  neutral 
supervision.  The  economic  restrictions  on  Germany 
were  denounced  as  designed  only  to  cripple  her  compe- 
tition, and  the  fifteen-year  period  of  military  occupa- 
tion was  said  to  be  unnecessary  and  wasteful.  The 
counter-proposals  closed  by  declaring  the  peaceful 
intentions  of  the  new  Germany,  demanding  a  place  in 
the  League  and  a  voice  in  international  labor  dis- 
cussions. 

The  Allies  replied  June  i6  in  a  letter  and  a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  counter-proposals.  Germany's  guilt 
in  forcing  the  war  and  the  atrocities  committed  during 
its  course  were  recalled ;  and  Germany  was  reminded 
that  justice  demanded  the  utmost  possible  reparation, 
from  which  they  could  not  escape  by  an  eleventh-hour 
change  to  a  republic. 

The  Allies  and  Associated  Powers  therefore  believe  that 
the  peace  they  have  proposed  is  fundamentally  a  peace  of 
justice.  They  are  no  less  certain  that  it  is  a  peace  of  right 
on  the  terms  agreed.' 

While  for  the  most  part  the  AlKes  insisted  on  the 
territorial  clauses  as  drawn,  they  agreed  to  a  plebis- 
cite in  upper  Silesia,  and  modified  the  arrangements 
as  to  Schleswig.  They  denied  that  it  was  their 
intention  to  strangle  Germany  economically.  They 
pointed  out  that  Germany  would  save  $400,000,000  a 
year  in  reduced  armaments,  and  would  have  the 
productive  efforts  of  the  600,000  men  no  longer  kept 
under  arms. 

^New  York  Times'  Current  History,  July,  1919,  p.  29. 


78         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Provided  that  she  abides  by  the  treaty  of  peace,  and 
provided  also  that  she  abandons  those  aggressive  and  exclusive 
traditions  which  have  been  apparent  in  her  business  no  less 
than  her  political  methods,  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
intend  that  Germany  shall  have  fair  treatment  in  the  purchase 
of  raw  materials  and  the  sale  of  goods,  subject  to  those  tempo- 
rary provisions  ....  in  the  interests  of  the  nations  ravaged 
and  artificially  weakened  by  Germany's  actions.  It  is  their 
desire  that  the  passions  engendered  by  the  war  should  die  as 
soon  as  possible,  and  that  all  nations  should  share  in  the  pros- 
perity which  comes  from  the  honest  supply  of  mutual  needs. 
They  wish  that  Germany  shall  enjoy  this  prosperity  Hke  the 
rest,  though  most  of  the  fruit  of  it  must  necessarily  go  for 
many  years  to  come  in  making  reparation  to  her  neighbors 
for  the  damage  she  has  done.' 

When  Germany  proved  her  fitness  to  join  the 
League,  the  Allies  would  admit  her.  The  Germans 
were  given  five  days  to  sign  the  Treaty  as  modi- 
fied. There  was  much  talk  in  Germany  of  refusing  to 
sign,  and  the  Allies  made  every  preparation  to  extend 
their  area  of  military  occupation  and  to  tighten  the 
blockade. 

The  Scheidemann  government  resigned  rather 
than  accept  the  humiliation  of  agreeing  to  the  Allied 
terms.  After  much  difficulty  an  emergency  govern- 
ment under  Gustav  Bauer  received  a  vote  of  confi- 
dence from  the  National  Assembly.  Bauer  then 
agreed  to  sign  the  Treaty  as  under  duress,  and  with 
reservations  and  protests,  and  with  the  understand- 
ing that  it  should  be  revised  by  the  League  of  Nations 
after  two  years.     The  Allies  refused  to  accept  any 

*New  York  Times'  Current  History,  July,  1919  p.  31. 


The  Framing  of  the  Treaty  79 

reservations,  or  to  extend  the  time  limit.  With 
bitterness  of  spirit,  protesting  that  they  yielded  only 
to  superior  force,  and  denouncing  the  "unheard-of 
injustice  of  the  peace  conditions,"  the  Germans  at 
last  yielded.  On  June  28,  five  years  to  a  day  after  the 
death  of  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand,  and  in  the 
Hall  at  Versailles  where  the  German  Empire  had  been 
proclaimed,  the  Kttle-known  German  delegates,  who 
had  consented  to  serve,  put  their  signatures  to  the 
Treaty  which  was  designed  to  end  forever  the  German 
menace.  China  refused  to  sign,  and  General  Smuts 
signed  with  a  separate  statement  that  he  considered 
the  document  in  many  respects  unsatisfactory.  The 
debate  on  the  Treaty  was  transferred  to  the  various 
legislative  bodies,  and  the  Conference  turned  to  other 
important  tasks. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  TREATY  OF  VERSAH^LES 

The  Preamble  of  the  Treaty  states  that  the 
United  States  of  America,  the  British  Empire, 
France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  which  powers  are  described 
as  "the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers," 
together  with  Belgium,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  China,  Cuba, 
Ecuador,  Greece,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  the  Hedjaz, 
Honduras,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Peru,  Poland, 
Portugal,  Rumania,  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State, 
Siam,  Czecho-Slovakia,  and  Uruguay,  of  the  one 
part,  and  Germany  of  the  other  part,  desiring  to  end 
the  war  originated  by  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany, 
in  order  to  replace  it  by  *'a  firm,  just,  and  durable 
peace,"  have  agreed  on  the  present  Treaty. 

PART  I 

THE  COVENANT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

At  the  forefront  of  the  Treaty  is  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  In  a  very  real  sense  this  repre- 
sents the  culmination  of  centuries  of  modern  history. 
It  is  true  that,  since  the  Middle  Ages,  Europe  and  the 
parts  of  the  world  under  European  influence  have 
increasingly  organized  into  national  states,  whose 
rivalries  have  tended  against  co-operation  and 
harmony.  On  the  other  hand  there  have  been  grow- 
ing indications  that  the  process  of  integration  which 

80 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  8i 

has  built  the  national  states  out  of  smaller  units, 
often  hostile  at  first,  might  in  time  lead  to  some  more 
inclusive  form  of  interstate  organization.  Similarly 
the  hope  has  grown  that  as  processes  of  law  have 
replaced  blood-feud  and  duel  and  private  war  within 
the  several  states,  so  there  might  be  substituted 
processes  of  law  and  reason  for  war  between  states. 

The  concert  of  Europe,  and  more  particularly 
the  concert  of  the  great  powers,  has  existed  in  a  more 
or  less  vague  form  for  over  a  century.  Its  object  has 
been  to  keep  the  peace,  and  to  provide  for  matters  of 
common  concern.  Although  it  has  been  nearly 
paralyzed  by  internal  conflicts  of  interest,  and  by  the 
working  of  the  antagonistic  balance-of-power  theory, 
it  has  at  times  exercised  a  real  influence,  particularly 
in  patching  up  Balkan  difficulties  and  in  settling 
African  questions.  Some  beginnings  were  made 
toward  joint  international  control  of  backward  regions 
and  matters  of  international  importance.  The  differ- 
ent nations  of  Europe,  joined  in  a  few  instances  by  the 
United  States  and  Japan,  have  attempted  to  deal 
unitedly  with  such  questions  as  Turkish,  Egyptian, 
Greek,  and  Chinese  finances,  the  navigation  of  the 
Danube,  Macedonian  reforms,  the  Cretan  and 
Albanian  questions,  the  Congo  Free  State,  the  Boxer 
RebelKon,  the  Act  of  Algegiras  as  to  Morocco,  control 
of  the  city  of  Tangier,  and  others.  Conferences  have 
been  held,  treaties  and  conventions  drawn  up,  com- 
missions of  inquiry  or  control  created,  joint  naval 
and  military  action  taken.     While  the  results  in  most 


82  An  Inlrodiiction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

cases  have  been  unsatisfactory,  valuable  experience 
has  been  gained,  and  the  need  of  some  more  workable 
form  of  co-operation  has  been  shown. 

The  whole  diplomatic  and  treaty-making  machin- 
ery, supplemented  by  congresses,  conferences,  and 
commissions,  has  resulted  in  numerous  international 
agreements,  which  added  to  a  large  body  of  precedents 
and  customs  make  up  an  international  law  to  which 
all  civilized  states  are  supposed  to  conform  their 
actions.  The  difficulty  has  been  that  there  have 
been  no  adequate  sanctions  for  this  law. 

In  such  matters  as  the  postal  union,  patents  and 
copyrights,  sugar  bounties,  extradition,  suppression 
of  the  slave  trade,  piracy,  traffic  in  women,  and  the 
opium  trade,  international  co-operation  has  long 
been  found  possible  and  valuable.  Before  the  war 
there  was  no  inconsiderable  amount  of  machinery 
already  in  existence  for  handhng  these  matters. 
Similarly  much  more  than  a  beginning  had  been 
made  in  submitting  international  disputes  to  arbi- 
tration and  commissions  of  conciliation.  To  a  greater 
degree  than  the  average  person  realizes  the  way  had 
been  prepared  for  a  more  definite  international  organi- 
zation. There  is  hardly  a  detail  in  the  Covenant  of 
the  League  of  Nations  that  has  not  a  suggestion  or  a 
precedent  in  some  existing  institution.  The  United 
States,  for  instance,  has  a  score  or  more  of  treaties 
with  individual  nations  by  which  we  bind  ourselves 
not  to  go  to  war  until  after  a  dispute  has  been  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration  or  concihation.     No  questions 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  83 

are  reserved.  We  have  a  disarmament  treaty  with 
Great  Britain  so  far  as  the  Canadian  border  and  the 
Great  Lakes  are  concerned.  We  are  bound  by  treaty 
to  defend  Panama  and  Cuba  against  external  aggres- 
sion. The  League  of  Nations,  then,  is  not  some- 
thing entirely  new ;  it  has  a  basis  in  experience.  But 
to  meet  new  situations  in  a  new  spirit  existing  insti- 
tutions must  be  expanded  and,  where  necessary, 
supplemented. 

The  modern  spirit  of  co-operation,  the  feeling  after 
a  larger  unity,  has  been  the  outcome  of  many  complex 
forces.  One  may  attribute  it  in  large  measure  to 
the  closer  knitting  together  of  the  different  parts 
of  the  world  through  the  great  process  of  the  expan- 
sion of  Europe,  particularly  as  a  result  of  the  vastly 
improved  means  of  communication  and  the  increased 
economic  interdependence  of  the  different  countries 
and  continents  which  followed  the  Industrial  Revolu- 
tion. Besides  the  expansion  of  trade  relationships 
there  has  been  a  diffusion  of  European  population, 
creating  close  bonds  between  the  most  distant  regions. 
In  the  last  four  centuries  Europeans  and  peoples  of 
European  stock  have  explored,  colonized,  and  con- 
quered nearly  three-quarters  of  the  earth,  and  their 
type  of  culture  has  profoundly  impressed  the  few 
countries  like  Japan  and  China  which  have  managed 
to  retain  political  independence.  Since  the  great 
age  of  discovery  enlarged  the  world,  it  has  been 
growing  steadily  smaller  again,  and  with  an  increas- 
ing number  of  common  interests.     In  1914  a  quarter 


84         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

of  the  human  race  was  already  in  the  great  league  of 
nations  called  the  British  Empire.  The  republics 
of  the  New  World  formed  another  group  with  a  grow- 
ing sense  of  soHdarity  and  a  developing  organization 
for  purposes  of  co-operation. 

Another  movement,  growing  also  in  large  part 
out  of  the  Industrial  Revolution,  has  been  the  rise  of 
sociaHsm  and  labor  organizations.     Socialism  in  par- 
ticular has  emphasized  the  community  of  interest 
between  the  proletariat  of  all  countries  as  against 
the  capitalistic  bourgeoisie.     "The  proletarians  have 
nothing  to  lose  but  their  chains.     They  have  a  world 
to  win.     Workingmen  of  all  countries,  unite!"     The 
famous  appeal  of  Marx  and  Engels  in  their  Communist 
Manifesto  of   1848   has  found  a  growing  response 
in   modern    industrialized    nations.     The    fact    that 
many  radicals  are  more  class-conscious   than    they 
are  patriotic  in  the  nationalist  sense  has  caused  many 
to  look  askance   at   the  whole  idea  of   a  league  of 
nations.      Those   who   advocate    the   League   must 
make  it  clear  that  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  devotion 
to  one's  own  country.     There  is  no  question  that 
nationalism  has  been  a  fruitful  and  valuable  element 
in  modern  life.     The  League  checks  nationaHsm  only 
when  it  assumes  an  aggressive  form  and  threatens  the 
national   existence  of  other  groups.     The  national 
life  of  a  group  will  be  much  freer  to  develop  along 
its  own  lines  if  the  fear  of  being  crushed  by  some 
stronger    neighbor    is    minimized.     Internationalism 
is  a  word  of  many  meanings.     The  internationalism 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  85 

of  the  League  has  little  or  nothing  in  common  with  the 
type  of  internationahsm  advocated  by  revolutionists. 
The  radicals  denounce  the  "Capitalists'  League" 
in  language  which  shows  that  they  have  quite  another 
ideal. 

Capital  as  well  as  labor  has  become  increasingly 
international  in  its  outlook.  The  whole  vast  machin- 
ery of  trade  and  banking  and  shipping  and  invest- 
ment was  one  of  the  forces  that  were  vainly  expected 
to  keep  the  peace.  It  is  of  course  true  on  the  other 
hand  that  rivalry  for  investment  and  exploitation 
opportunities  in  backward  regions  was  one  of  the 
"stakes  of  diplomacy"  which  contributed  to  inter- 
national tension.  The  framers  of  the  League  Cove- 
nant recognized  this  danger  and  tried  at  least  to 
minimize  it.  In  spite  of  everything,  however,  the 
internationalism  of  business  and  finance  has  some 
stabilizing  effect. 

The  widening  realization  that  there  is  a  community 
of  interests  among  national  groups  has  found  expres- 
sion in  the  organization  of  scores  of  international 
bodies,  some  of  them  semi-official,  others  entirely 
private  in  their  conception  and  management.  Sci- 
ence, scholarship,  and  Kterature  have  become  less 
provincial  with  every  decade.  The  educated  classes 
in  all  countries  have  become  better  acquainted,  and 
in  many  cases  the  result  has  been  the  removal  of  mis- 
understandings and  the  lessening  of  prejudices. 
Religion,  and  in  particular  Christianity,  has  always 
held  up  the  ideal  of  human  brotherhood;    and  in 


86         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

spite  of  shortcomings  and  unworthy  rivalries  religion 
has  acted  as  a  genuinely  uniting  force,  and  as  an 
influence  for  peace.  Outside  of  organized  religious 
circles,  individuals  and  societies  have  been  urging 
improved  international  relations,  especially  with  a 
view  to  preventing  war.  In  one  sense  these  efforts 
are  an  expression  of  the  spirit  of  the  time ;  in  another 
way  they  contribute  to  the  development  of  that 
spirit.  A  wide-reaching  propaganda  has  been  carried 
on  to  convince  the  nations  that  war  was  morally 
wrong;  that  it  was  irrational;  that  it  did  not  pay 
materially  even  for  the  victors;  and  that  it  could  be 
minimized  and  eventually  eliminated  by  an  inteUi- 
gent  and  united  effort  to  substitute  process  of  law  for 
the  arbitrament  of  arms. 

Before  1914  the  most  definite  attempt  at  organiz- 
ing the  world  for  peace  had  been  made  at  the  two 
Hague  Conferences.  Although  these  failed  to  do 
more  than  secure  certain  modifications  in  the  rules  of 
warfare,  and  to  provide  the  machinery  for  voluntary 
arbitration  and  conciHation,  the  Conferences  had  a 
real  value  in  arousing  interest  in  disarmament  and 
arbitration  and  common  action  in  world-affairs. 

As  is  always  the  case,  the  early  suggestions  for  a 
league  of  nations  may  be  traced  far  back."  But  down 
until  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  whole  idea  was 
usually  regarded  as  too  visionary  for  the  serious 
consideration  of  statesmen  called  upon  to  face  the 
facts  of  an  admittedly  imperfect  world.     It  was  only 

»  S.  P.  Duggan,  League  of  Nations,  chap.  ii. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  87 

under  the  overpowering  sense  of  impending  disaster 
that  Sir  Edward  Grey  telegraphed  Berlin,  July  30, 
1914: 

If  the  peace  of  Europe  can  be  preserved,  and  the  present 
crisis  safely  passed,  my  own  endeavour  will  be  to  promote  some 
arrangement  to  which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by  which 
she  could  be  assured  that  no  aggressive  or  hostile  policy  would 
be  pursued  against  her  or  her  allies  by  France,  Russia,  and 

ourselves,  jointly  or  separately The  idea  has  hitherto 

been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite  proposals,  but 
if  this  present  crisis,  so  much  more  acute  than  any  that  Europe 
has  gone  through  for  generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am  hope- 
ful that  the  relief  and  reaction  which  wiU  follow  may  make 
possible  some  more  definite  rapprochement  between  the  Powers 
than  has  been  possible  hitherto.' 

The  failure  of  the  old  balance-of-power  system,  the 
stupendous  suffering  and  loss  of  the  world-cataclysm, 
and  the  consequent  upsetting  of  all  the  old,  accepted 
habits  of  thought  and  action,  led  to  a  re-examination 
of  the  whole  question  of  international  relationships. 
In  every  country  men  found  to  their  surprise  that 
under  the  stimulus  of  a  great  common  purpose  the 
most  astonishing  transformations  of  social  organiza- 
tion were  possible.  Governments  took  over  rail- 
roads, controlled  all  industries,  fixed  prices,  managed 
all  exports  and  imports,  took  charge  of  shipping, 
enforced  food  rationing  and  prohibition,  granted 
woman  suffrage,  did  in  fact  everything  they  regarded 
as  necessary  whether  it  had  ever  been  regarded  as 
possible  or  not.     Under  the  stress  of  necessity  the 

'  British  White  Book,  No.  loi. 


88         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

nations  which  had  joined  forces  against  the  Central 
Powers  gradually  developed  a  machinery  for  co- 
ordinating their  efforts,  without  sacrificing  individual 
sovereignty.  Transport,  raw  materials,  munitions, 
war  purchases,  finance,  the  blockade,  all  were  handled 
by  interalhed  commissions.  The  Supreme  War 
Council  at  Versailles,  culminating  in  the  united  com- 
mand under  Marshal  Foch,  was  the  final  expression 
of  the  organization  of  common  effort. 

As  the  possibiHties  and  advantages  of  co-operation 
became  more  apparent,  as  the  senseless  horror  of 
war  impressed  itself  more  deeply,  there  came,  not 
only  from  former  advocates  of  internationalism  and 
friends  of  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  but  increasingly 
from  responsible  leaders  and  the  great  average  masses, 
the  demand  that  some  method  be  devised  for  ending 
wars  forever.  Men  had  learned  that  what  had  to  be 
done  could  be  done,  and  they  were  more  and  more 
convinced  that  war  had  to  be  abolished. 

The  whole  plan  of  a  league  of  nations  is  closely 
associated  with  the  name  of  Woodrow  Wilson,  and 
rightly.  It  is  not  that  he  originated  the  idea,  or 
was  the  first  to  realize  that  some  form  of  international 
reorganization  was  imperative  after  the  war.  Nor 
were  all  the  details,  or  even  the  main  outhnes  of  the 
plan  now  adopted,  his  work.  The  credit  is  his,  how- 
ever, for  recognizing  the  essential  facts  in  the  world- 
situation  and  for  stating  the  nature  of  the  remedy 
demanded.  His  official  position  commanded  atten- 
tion and  respect  for  what  he  said.     His  gift  of  lucid  • 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  89 

statement  and  his  steady,  earnest,  and  disinterested 
advocacy  of  a  league  of  nations  enabled  him  to 
become  the  spokesman  for  a  war-wearied  humanity. 
He  did  not  create  the  issues  or  invent  the  solution  any 
more  than  Lincoln  created  the  issues  of  union  and 
liberty;  but  in  a  crisis  of  the  world's  affairs  he  had  a 
vision  of  a  better  human  order,  and  he  formulated 
a  program  for  its  attainment  which  found  a  deep  and 
wide  response. 

By  the  time  the  Peace  Conference  assembled, 
the  leaders  of  all  the  nations  had  been  definitely 
committed  to  the  idea  of  some  form  of  a  league  of 
nations;  and  at  the  second  plenary  session  a  resolu- 
tion was  adopted  to  make  the  League  an  integral 
part  of  the  Treaty.  There  were  some  who  had  Httle 
faith  in  the  idea,  who  voted  for  it  only  to  humor  the 
fantastic  idealism  of  the  American  President  with  the 
one-track  mind,  and  as  a  concession  to  public  opinion. 
As  the  work  of  the  Conference  proceeded,  however, 
it  became  apparent  that  without  a  league  of  nations 
the  task  of  carrying  out  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  would 
be  almost  hopelessly  complicated.  First  its  con- 
venience, then  its  necessity,  was  recognized  by  many 
who  had  been  indifferent  or  hostile. 

In  drawing  up  the  Covenant  of  the  League  the 
special  commission  of  representatives  of  fourteen 
nations,  with  President  Wilson  as  chairman,  consid- 
ered several  tentative  drafts  and  numerous  suggestions 
from  many  sources.  A  noteworthy  document,  the 
influence    of   which    in    the  final  draft   is  obvious, 


Preamble 


90         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

was  the  memorandum  which  had   been  drawn  up 
by  General  Smuts,  the  former  Boer  leader  who  had 
become   a   member    of    the    British    Imperial   War 
Cabinet/    After  two  weeks  of  earnest  effort,  which 
was  arranged  so  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  other 
work  of  the  Conference,  a  preliminary  constitution 
for   the   proposed   League  was  unanimously   agreed 
upon,  and  made  pubKc.     As  a  result  of  the  criticism 
and  suggestions  which  were  invited,   a  number  of 
modifications  were  made,  chiefly  in  the  direction  of 
greater  explicitness  to  satisfy  some  sections  of  Ameri- 
can public  opinion.     Thus  it  was  provided  that  a 
nation  might  withdraw  on  two  years'  notice.     It  was 
made   clear   that   the   League   had   no   jurisdiction 
in   purely   internal   affairs.     The   Monroe   Doctrine 
was  recognized  by  name  as  unaffected  by  the  Cove- 
nant.    It  was  explained  that  a  mandate  could  not 
be  imposed  on  an  unwilKng  state.     The  approval 
of  each  nation  was  explicitly  required  before  it  was 
committed  to  any  program  for  reducing  its  armament. 
The  Preamble  of  the  Covenant  states  the  purpose 
of  the  League  to  be  the  promotion  of  international 
co-operation  and   the  achievement  of  international 
peace  and  security.     At  the  outset,  then,  it  is  appar- 
ent that  the  League  is  intended  to  be  more  than  a 
device  for  preventing  wars.    It  is  hoped  and  expected 
that  it  will  also  be  the  agency  for  common  action  in 
time  of  peace  for  handhng  affairs  of  common  concern 
and  for  promoting  the  common  interests  of  civiliza- 

'  Printed  in  the  Nation,  February  8,  1919,  p.  225. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  91 

tion.  These  ends  are  to  be  secured  "by  the  prescrip- 
tion of  open,  just,  and  honorable  relations  between 
nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  understand- 
ings of  international  law  as  the  actual  rule  of  conduct 
among  governments,  and  by  the  maintenance  of 
justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty  obliga- 
tions in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with  one 
another." 

The  Japanese  were  unable  to  secure  the  adoption, 
even  as  a  part  of  the  Preamble,  of  an  amendment  to 
the  effect  that  "the  equality  of  nations  being  a  basic 
principle  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  agree  to  accord,  as  soon  as  possible, 
to  all  aliens,  nationals  of  states  members  of  the 
League,  equal  and  just  treatment  in  every  respect, 
making  no  distinction,  either  in  law  or  in  fact,  on 
account  of  their  race  or  nationality."^  Even  when 
modified  to  mention  simply  "acceptance  of  the 
principle  of  the  equality  of  nations  and  the  just 
treatment  of  its  nationals"  it  could  not  gain  the 
assent  of  the  United  States  or  Great  Britain.  Al- 
though the  Japanese  amendment  was  carried  by 
a  decisive  majority  in  the  commission,  President 
Wilson  ruled  that  it  could  not  be  included  except 
by  unanimous  consent.  Although  harmless  enough 
in  appearance,  it  was  feared  that  this  clause  might 
lead  to  an  attack  on  the  citizenship,  immigration, 
and    land-ownership    laws    of    the    United    States, 

'  Hansen,  Adventures  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  p.  66;  Asia, 
September,  1919,  p.  896. 


92  An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Australia,  and  Canada,  which  discriminate  against 
Mongolians.  Although  it  was  pointed  out  to  the 
Japanese  that  their  presence  as  members  of  the 
Big  Five  was  a  recognition  of  their  equality,  they 
felt  keenly  disappointed  at  the  result  of  the  vote, 
and  they  declared  their  intention  of  reopening  the 
question  at  a  later  date. 

The  first  article  of  the  Covenant  provides  that 
membership  in  the  League  is  open  to  allied  and 
associated  nations  signing  the  Treaty.  Fifteen  neu- 
trals are  named  who  may  become  original  members 
by  acceding  to  the  Covenant  without  reservations 
within  two  months  of  its  coming  into  force.  By  a 
two-thirds  vote  of  the  Assembly  any  other  fully 
self-governing  state,  dominion,  or  colony  may  be 
admitted,  if  it  gives  effective  guarantees  of  its  good 
intentions,  and  accepts  the  regulations  of  the  League 
as  to  its  armaments.  It  is  notable  that  Canada 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  South  Africa,  and  India 
are  original  members,  as  well  as  the  British  Empire. 
The  inclusion  of  India  with  the  Dominions  is  signifi- 
cant of  a  new  constitutional  development  within  the 
British  Empire.  Germany  naturally  objected  to 
being  left  out  of  the  original  membership,  but  had  to 
be  satisfied  with  the  assurance  that  admission  to  the 
League  would  not  be  delayed  after  the  new  Germany 
showed  its  fitness.  Mexico  and  Costa  Rica,  par- 
ticularly the  former,  felt  aggrieved  at  their  pointed 
omission  from  the  list.  This  was  owing  to  the  dis- 
order and  uncertainty  in  those  republics,  the  revolu- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  93 

tionary  governments  of  which  were  not  regarded  as 
definitely  established.  The  more  suspicious  observers 
thought  that  Mexico  was  intentionally  left  out  of  the 
League  so  that  the  "inevitable"  intervention  by  the 
United  States  might  be  accomplished  with  less 
embarrassment,  perhaps  under  the  guise  of  manda- 
tory action.  Santo  Domingo,  Afghanistan,  and 
Abyssinia  were  the  only  other  independent  states  of 
any  size  which  were  not  invited  to  join.  Santo 
Domingo  is  practically  under  American  military 
occupation,  Afghanistan  is  distinctly  in  the  British 
sphere  of  influence,  and  Italy  still  claims  that  Abys- 
sinia is  within  its  sphere. 

Members  of  the  League  may  withdraw  on  two 
years'  notice,  provided  that  they  have  fulfilled  their 
international  obligations.  One  of  the  Lodge  Reserva- 
tions presented  in  the  United  States  Senate  seeks 
to  make  it  clear  that  in  case  of  withdrawal  the  United 
States  shall  be  the  sole  judge  of  whether  or  not  it  has 
fulfilled  its  obligations.  By  unanimous  vote  the 
Council  of  the  League  may  expel  a  member ;  and  if  a 
nation  declines  to  be  bound  by  an  amendment  to  the 
Covenant,  it  ceases  to  belong  to  the  League. 

The  League  acts  through  an  Assembly,  a  Council, 
and  a  permanent  Secretariat.  The  seat  of  the 
League  is  at  Geneva,  though  the  Council  may  change 
it.  All  positions  in  the  League  are  open  equally  to 
men  and  women. 

It  is  expressly  stated  that  the  Covenant  does  not 
"affect   the  validity  of  international  engagements, 


Art.  16 


Art.  21 


Art.  3 


Art.  21 


94         Ajt  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  regional  under- 
standings like  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  securing  the 
maintenance  of  peace."  Although  President  Wilson 
has  declared  that  there  are  no  hidden  implications  in 
this  language,  this  clause  has  been  attacked  as  inade- 
quate from  the  American  point  of  view,  and  even  as 
admitting  by  implication  a  sort  of  Japanese  "regional" 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  Eastern  Asia.  Accordingly 
the  Senate  favored  a  resolution  declaring  that  the 
United  States  would  not  submit  to  arbitration  or  to 
inquiry  by  the  Council  "any  questions  which  in  the 
judgment  of  the  United  States  depend  upon  or  relate 
to  ...  .  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  said  doctrine  is  to 
be  interpreted  by  the  United  States  alone  and  is 
hereby  declared  to  be  wholly  outside  the  jurisdiction 
of  said  League  of  Nations  and  entirely  unaffected 
by  any  provision"  of  the  Peace  Treaty.^ 
^^-  '5  It  is  also  specified  that  in  case  a  dispute  between 
members  "is  claimed  by  one  of  them,  and  is  found  by 
the  Council  to  arise  out  of  a  matter  which  by  inter- 
national law  is  solely  within  the  jurisdiction  of  that 
party,  the  Council  shall  so  report,  and  shall  make  no 
recommendation  as  to  its  settlement."  This  pro- 
vision was  intended  to  reassure  those  who  feared  that 
the  League  might  interfere  in  such  questions  as 
immigration  and  naturalization  requirements,  or 
tariffs.  It  was  not  thought  advisable  to  attempt  to 
specify  the  topics  reserved  for  the  exclusive  control 

'  Number  6  of  the  Lodge  Reservations,  adopted  in  November 
igiQ. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  95 

of  each  state.  The  Senate  approved  the  statement 
that  "the  United  States  reserves  to  itself  exclusively 
the  right  to  decide  what  questions  are  within  its 
domestic  jurisdiction,"  and  will  not  allow  them  to  be 
arbitrated  or  in  any  way  submitted  to  the  considera- 
tion of  the  League/ 

The  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  a 
treaty  between  the  members.  Like  every  treaty 
it  restricts  the  freedom  of  action  of  the  contracting 
parties.  While  any  treaty  is  in  effect  it  is  a  limitation 
on  sovereignty.  Such  limitations  are  accepted  for  the 
sake  of  more  important  advantages  which  are  gained. 
In  this  sense,  but  only  in  this  sense,  the  Covenant 
affects  the  sovereignty  of  the  independent  states  in  the 
League.  In  attempting  to  understand  the  obligations 
which  the  United  States  would  assume  by  joining  the 
League,  one  may  profitably  group  the  things  which 
the  members  of  the  League  pledge  themselves  to  do. 

1 .  The  members  agree  that  when  a  general  reduc- 
tion in  armaments  has  been  approved  by  the  indi- 
vidual governments  no  nation  will  thereafter  increase 
its  armaments  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Council 
of  the  League.  The  Senate  would  reserve  the  right 
to  increase  armaments  if  the  United  States  is  threat- 
ened with  invasion  or  engaged  in  war. 

2.  "The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to   ^^^■'■°j^ 
respect  and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression 
the  territorial  integrity  and  existing  poHtical  inde- 
pendence of  all  Members  of  the  League.     In  case  of 

'  Number  5  of  the  Lodge  Reservations. 


Art.  8 


•v 


96         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

any  such  aggression  or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger 
of  such  aggression  the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the 
means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled." 
Much  controversy  has  centered  around  this  provision. 
President  Wilson,  who  framed  the  statement  of  the 
principle,  is  convinced  that  it  is  the  most  essential 
article  in  the  Covenant.  Without  such  a  pledge,  and 
without  material  force  back  of  it,  the  League  would 
have  no  meaning.  The  Council  obviously  has  no 
power  under  this  clause  to  declare  war  in  the  name  of 
the  member  states.  It  has  no  armed  forces  at  its 
disposal.  It  can  only  recommend  a  course  of  action. 
Before  the  United  .States  could  become  involved,  its 
representative  on  the  Council  must  have  concurred 
in  the  recommendation.  If  the  recommendation 
involved  going  to  war  with  an  offending  state,  the 
consent  of  Congress  would  under  the  Constitution  be 
necessary.  If  it  involved  a  boycott  a  legislative  act 
would  be  required.  It  is  a  fair  presumption  that 
the  American  representative  on  the  Council,  acting 
under  instructions,  would  not  assent  to  a  proposal 
which  would  not  be  backed  by  American  opinion.  If 
Congress  should  decide  otherwise,  its  failure  to  ap- 
prove the  recommendation  would  block  any  partici- 
pation by  the  United  States  in  the  proposed  action. 
The  Senate  however  did  not  feel  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  action  of  the  United  States  was  suffi- 
ciently preserved.  It  voted  a  reservation  therefore 
declaring  that  "the  United  States  assumes  no  obliga- 
tion under  the  provisions  of  Article  10,  ...  .  unless 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  97 

in  any  particular  case  the  Congress,  which,  under  the 
Constitution,  has  the  sole  power  to  declare  war  .... 
shall  by  act  or  joint  resolution  so  provide."  The 
President  objects  to  this  reservation,  not  because  he 
has  any  doubt  that  the  consent  of  Congress  is  neces- 
sary to  a  declaration  of  war,  or  to  putting  in  motion 
an  economic  boycott,  but  because  of  the  ungracious 
and  suspicious  tone. 

From  quite  another  angle  this  article  has  been 
criticized  because  it  seems  to  guarantee  the  existing 
boundaries,  with  all  their  imperfections.  There  is 
nothing  in  the  Covenant,  however,  to  prevent  the 
readjustment  of  boundaries  by  mutual  agreement. 
Neither  does  the  Covenant  bind  the  members  to 
interfere  to  prevent  revolution  within  a  state.  The 
sole  object  of  the  article  is  to  prevent  one  nation  from 
making  a  sudden  attack  on  another,  and  to  provide 
that  if  a  nation  is  so  attacked  the  rest  of  the  world 
will  consider  at  once  how  it  may  be  protected. 

3.  Members  declare  that  any  threat  of  war  is  the 
concern  of  the  whole  League,  which  shall  thereupon 
"take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and 
effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations."  Any 
member  has  the  "friendly  right"  to  call  the  attention 
of  the  Council  or  the  Assembly  to  any  circumstance 
threatening  to  disturb  the  peace. 

4.  When   disputes   likely   to   lead   to   a   rupture  ^^^^'  ^^'  ^^ 
between    nations    arise    over    the    interpretation    of 
treaties,  or  involving  international  law,  the  members 

bind  themselves  to  submit  them  to  arbitration,  or  to 


Art.  II 


Art.  12 


98         An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  to  be 
^■^^  '4  created.     The  members  agree  to  carry  out  the  awards, 
and  not  to  make  war  on  a  state  complying  with  the 
<  award.     If  the  dispute  is  of  a  character  which  is  not 

suited  to  arbitration,  the  members  agree  to  submit 
it  for  conciliation  to  the  Council  of  the  League.  If 
the  Council  (apart  from  the  representatives  of  one 
or  more  parties  to  the  dispute)  makes  a  unanimous 
recommendation,  the  members  agree  not  to  make 
war  on  a  state  which  complies  with  it.  In  any  event, 
all  bind  themselves  not  to  go  to  war  until  at  least 
three  months  after  the  arbitration  award  or  the 
Council  report. 

These  articles  adopt  for  the  whole  world  the  policy 
to  which  the  United  States  is  already  committed 
by  the  Bryan  treaties  of  arbitration.  Older  treaties 
of  arbitration  did  not  apply  to  questions  where  "na- 
tional honor "  or  "vital  interests "  were  involved.  By 
binding  themselves  not  to  go  to  war  until  after  the 
disputed  issues  have  been  submitted  to  arbitration 
or  conciliation  the  nations  go  a  long  way  toward  mak- 
ing war  improbable.  There  can  be  Kttle  doubt  that 
a  delay  of  a  few  months  and  the  submission  of  the 
Austro-Serbian  quarrel  to  a  disinterested  inquiry 
would  have  avoided  the  Great  War. 

5.  In  case  a  member  of  the  League  goes  to  war 
contrary  to  its  agreements,  "it  shall  ipso  facto  be 
deemed  to  have  committed  an  act  of  war  against  all 
other  members  of  the  League,  which  hereby  under- 
take immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  severance  of 


Art.  16 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  99 

all  trade  or  financial  relations."  In  such  a  case, 
the  Council  is  to  recommend  what  armed  forces 
each  member  should  contribute  to  protect  the  League 
Covenant. 

The  Senate  wishes  to  reserve  the  right  to  permit 
intercourse  with  those  nationals  of  a  covenant- 
breaking  state  who  are  outside  the  covenant-breaking 
state.' 

6.  Members  agree  to  register  all  treaties  with  the  ^'^^-  '^'^° 
Secretary  of  the  League.     Without  this  no  treaty 

is  to  be  binding.  They  agree  that  all  treaties  or 
agreements  inconsistent  with  the  Covenant  are 
abrogated.  The  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time 
advise  the  reconsideration  of  treaties. 

7.  The  members  {a)  "will  endeavor  to  secure  and   ^'^•^•s 
maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions  of  labor  for  men, 
women,  and  children,  both  in  their  own  countries  and 

in  all  countries  to  which  their  commercial  and  in- 
dustrial relations  extend,  and  for  that  purpose 
will  establish  and  maintain  the  necessary  interna- 
tional organizations;  {h)  undertake  to  secure  just 
treatment  of  the  native  inhabitants  of  territories 
under  their  control;  (c)  will  intrust  the  League  with 
the  general  supervision  over  the  execution  of  agree- 
ments with  regard  to  the  traffic  in  women  and  chil- 
dren, and  the  traffic  in  opium  and  other  dangerous 
drugs;  {d)  will  intrust  the  League  with  the  general 
supervision  of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition 
with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic 
'  Reservation  12. 


lOo        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

is  necessary  in  the  common  interest;  {e)  will  make 
provision  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of  com- 
munications and  of  transit  and  equitable  treatment 
for  the  commerce  of  all  members  of  the  League  .  .  ,  .  ; 
(/)  will  endeavor  to  take  steps  in  matters  of  interna- 
tional concern  for  the  prevention  and  control  of 
disease." 
Art.  24  8.  If  all  the  members  agree,  all  international 
bureaus  already  established  by  general  treaties  will 
be  transferred  to  the  control  of  the  League.^ 

9.  In  Article  22  the  members  of  the  League  assert 
their  collective  responsibility  for  dealing  with  the 
former  German  colonial  possessions,  and  the  subject 
peoples  of  the  Turkish  Empire.  In  these  areas,  in 
so  far  as  they  "are  inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet 
able  to  stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous 
conditions  of  the  modern  world,  there  should  be 
applied  the  principle  that  the  well-being  and  develop- 
ment of  such  peoples  form  a  sacred  trust  of  civilization 
and  that  securities  for  the  performance  of  this  trust 
should  be  embodied  in  this  Covenant." 

This  article  represents  an  attempt  to  deal  with 
one  of  the  most  important  and  difficult  problems  of 
modern  times,  the  relationship  between  the  advanced 
peoples  of  Western  Europe,  and  the  backward 
peoples  of  other  parts  of  the  globe.  The  expansion 
of  Europe  has  resulted  in  bringing  practically  all  of 
Africa  and  most  of  Asia  under  the  pohtical  control 
of  some  European  power.     The   dominant  motives 

^  The  Postal  Union,  for  instance. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  loi 

have  been  the  desire  to  trade,  and  to  exploit  the 
natural  resources  with  native  labor  and  European 
capital  under  white  direction.  Where  this  tendency- 
has  been  unchecked,  exploitation  of  native  groups 
for  the  benefit  of  European  capital  has  been  the  rule, 
particularly  in  Africa.  There  has  usually  been  a 
professed  desire  to  educate,  to  uplift,  to  civilize,  to 
develop  the  native  races,  to  "take  up  the  white  man's 
burden."  In  many  instances  quite  sincere  efforts 
have  been  made  to  carry  out  the  professions,  in  some 
cases  with  genuinely  gratifying  results.  It  is  true 
nevertheless  that  all  too  frequently  profits  have  been 
more  considered  than  native  welfare  and  native  rights. 
It  has  also  been  true  that  international  rivalry  for 
these  exploitation  opportunities,  as  in  Morocco,  Asia 
Minor,  and  China,  has  been  an  important  element  in 
causing  international  friction,  and  in  leading  up  to 
the  Great  War. 

Since  the  Allies  were  agreed  that  Germany's 
colonial  possessions  were  not  to  be  restored,  and  that 
the  non-Turkish  peoples  must  be  freed  from  the 
Ottoman  yoke,  there  were  four  possible  courses  of 
action.  In  the  first  place,  all  the  territories  might  be 
divided  among  the  victors  and  added  as  colonies  or 
protectorates  to  their  existing  colonial  empires.  This 
was  the  plan  favored  by  many  in  France,  England,  and 
some  of  the  Dominions.  It  was  felt  however  that  such 
a  course  would  not  be  consistent  with  the  objects  for 
which  the  war  had  professedly  been  fought.  Further- 
more it  would  do  Httle  to  remove  the  old  causes  of 


I02        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

friction.  Another  possibility  was  the  placing  of  all 
these  territories  under  joint  international  control. 
The  earher  experiments  in  tliis  type  of  regime,  how- 
ever, had  not  been  encouraging.  In  such  cases  as 
Samoa,  Tangier,  and  Albania  it  had  led  to  misunder- 
standings and  hard  feehng,  and  the  populations 
concerned  had  suffered  from  a  very  inefhcient  gov- 
ernment. The  scheme  was  therefore  rejected  as  un- 
promising. A  third  possibihty  was  to  make  all 
these  areas  entirely  independent.  Most  of  them, 
however,  would  have  great  difficulty  in  standing 
alone.  Arabia  had  been  promised  independence; 
but  it  was  not  felt  that  the  other  regions  were  suffi- 
ciently advanced  for  self-government.  It  would  be 
for  their  own  good  to  have  European  supervision  of 
some  sort — at  least  so  the  Conference  decided.  The 
final  suggestion  was  to  place  different  groups  under 
the  guardianship  of  some  particular  nation  which  by 
reason  of  experience,  resources,  or  geographical  posi- 
tion can  best  undertake  the  responsibiHty.  Owing 
largely  to  President  Wilson's  insistence,  this  was  the 
method  finally  adopted. 

In  outlining  the  scheme  of  mandatories,  the 
Covenant  sets  forth  several  important  principles: 

a)  Mandatories  act  on  behalf  of  the  League,  and 
under  conditions  fixed  by  the  Council. 

b)  The  terms  of  the  mandate  will  vary,  some 
areas  in  Turkey  being  ready  for  provisional  inde- 
pendence, "subject  to  the  rendering  of  advice  and 
assistance  by  a  mandatory." 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  103 

c)  The  ultimate  purpose  of  the  system  is  to  pre- 
pare groups  to  stand  alone. 

d)  In  Central  Africa  the  mandatory  power  must 
secure  freedom  of  conscience,  prohibition  of  the  slave 
trade,  the  arms  traffic,  and  the  liquor  traffic,  and  must 
not  allow  the  mihtary  training  of  natives  for  other 
than  police  purposes.  There  must  also  be  "equal 
opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of  other 
members  of  the  League." 

e)  In  Southwest  Africa  and  some  of  the  Pacific 
Islands  the  mandatory  state  may  administer  the 
areas  as  "integral  portions  of  its  territory,  subject  to 
the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  interests  of  the 
indigenous  population."  The  reasons  given  are  that 
the  population  is  small,  or  remote,  or  contiguous  to 
the  mandatory,  and  so  on.  The  real  reason  doubtless 
was  to  persuade  Japan  and  the  Union  of  South  Africa 
to  agree  to  the  mandatory  scheme  at  all.  Adminis- 
tration as  an  integral  part  of  one's  territory  cannot 
prove  very  different  from  outright  annexation. 

/)  Mandatories  are  to  report  annually  to  the 
Council,  which  is  to  create  a  permanent  commission 
to  examine  the  reports  and  to  advise  the  Council. 
Presumably,  if  the  Council  should  so  decide,  a 
mandatory  might  be  changed.  With  all  the  great 
colonial  powers  represented  on  the  Council,  and  with 
a  requirement  of  unanimity,  this  seems  rather  remote. 

The  whole  scheme  has  been  denounced  as  thinly 
disguised  imperialistic  annexation.  The  fact  remains, 
however,   that  a  new  principle  has  been  formally 


104       -4'^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

announced  for  dealing  w-ith  backward  peoples,  and 
machinen-  has  been  pro\-ided  for  bringing  the  con- 
science of  the  world  to  bear  in  any  instance  of  mis- 
go  vemment  by  a  mandatory.  WTien  the  nations 
have  agreed  to  follow  a  disinterested  policy,  and 
when  pubHcity  is  given  to  the  manner  in  which  they 
are  carr}-ing  out  their  professions,  there  is  a  possi- 
bility^ of  a  gradual  improvement. 

In  order^to  satisfy  some  objectors  in  the  United 
States,  the  re\ised  Covenant  states  expHcitly  that 
a  mandator}'  must  be  willing  to  accept  the  responsi- 
bility; and  the  Senate  added  the  reservation  that 
the  United  States  should  not  accept  a  mandate 
except  with  the  approval  of  Congress. 

This  concludes  the  Kst  of  things  which  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  pledge  themselves  to  do,  or  refrain 
from  doing.  They  represent  an  advance  over  any 
existing  treaty  pledges,  but  along  lines  already  fore- 
shadowed by  prexdous  agreements. 

^luch  discussion  has  centered  around  the  organi- 
zation pro\-ided  for  carrying  on  the  work  of  the 
League.  It  is  important  therefore  to  re\'iew  the 
organization  and  the  powers  of  the  Council  and 
the  Assembly. 

The  Council  is  the  most  important  body  created 
^"-  *  by  the  Covenant.  It  consists  always  of  representa- 
tives of  the  "Big  Five,"  and  four  others,  selected  by 
the  Assembly.  With  the  consent  of  a  majority  of 
the  Assembly  the  Council  may  name  other  powers 
which  shall  always  be  represented,  and  may  increase 


TJie  Treaty  of  Versailles  105 

the  number  to  be  chosen  by  the  Assembly.  A  mem- 
ber not  represented  on  the  Comicil  is  to  have  a 
representative  present,  sitting  "as  a  member  at  any 
meeting  of  the  Council  during  the  consideration  of 
matters  specially  affecting  the  interests  of  that 
member."  Unless  other^^ise  specified,  all  decisions 
of  the  Council  must  be  unanimous. 

By  gi^Tng  the  great  powers  a  majority  on  the 
Council  the  fact  is  recognized  that  after  all  these 
powers  control  the  affairs  of  the  world,  and  that  their 
agreement  is  necessary  to  the  working  of  any  scheme 
of  international  co-operation. 

"The  Council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any 
matter  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League, 
or  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world."  More  specifi- 
cally, the  Council  is  empowered  and  directed:  (i)  to 
formulate  plans  for  the  reduction  of  armaments; 
but  such  plans  go  into  effect  only  when  approved 
by  the  indi\'idual  governments;  (2)  to  ad\dse  how 
the  e\dl  effects  of  the  private  manufacture  of  munitions 
may  be  avoided;  (3)  to  formulate  and  submit  for 
adoption  by  the  members  plans  for  a  permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice;  (4)  to  investigate 
and  to  act  as  a  body  of  conciliators  with  power  to 
refer  any  dispute  to  the  Assembly-;  (5)  to  recommend 
action  in  case  a  state  breaks  the  Covenant;  (6)  to 
investigate  and  recommend  action  even  in  cases  when 
one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  a  dispute  are  not  mem- 
bers of  the  League;  (7)  to  define  the  terms  on  which 
an  area  is  intrusted  to  a  mandatory. 


io6        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

In  the  Assembly  the  principle  of  the  equality  of  all 
sovereign  and  independent  states  is  recognized  by 
giving  one  vote  to  each  state,  large  or  small.  Except 
when  otherwise  provided,  all  decisions  must  be 
unanimous.  Objection  has  been  made  to  giving  the 
British  Dominions  and  India  separate  votes,  and  one 
of  the  Senate  reservations  declares  that  the  United 
States  assumes  no  obligation  to  be  bound  by  a  vote 
in  which  the  British  Empire^  as  a  whole  has  more  than 
one  vote.  As  it  stands  this  reservation  is  much  more 
^sweeping  than  is  necessary.  For  one  thing,  the 
United  States  has  more  control  over  the  votes  of 
Liberia,  Panama,  Cuba,  Haiti,  and  Nicaragua  than 
Great  Britain  has  over  the  votes  of  the  Dominions. 
For  another  thing,  the  single  vote  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Council  or  the  Assembly  can  prevent 
the  unanimous  agreement  which  is  necessary  for  most 
important  decisions.  The  only  reservation  necessary 
to  protect  the  United  States  from  any  possibility 
of  danger  would  be  one  providing  that  in  cases  where 
a  dispute  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
Empire  was  referred  to  the  Assembly,  the  Dominions 
and  India  should  be  excluded  from  voting  as  well  as 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
^''^■^  At  its  meetings  the  Assembly  may  deal  "with 

any  matter  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League 
or  affecting  the  peace  of  the  world."  The  specified 
powers  of  the  Assembly  are  not  numerous. 

'  Lenroot  Reservation.     The  British  Empire  is  not  mentioned, 
but  it  is  the  one  intended. 


J 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  107 

1.  By  a  two- thirds  vote  the  Assembly  admits  new  ^'''-  ' 
members  to  the  League. 

2 .  From  time  to  time  in  its  discretion  it  names  ^"^^  •* 
four  states  which  are  to  be  represented  on  the  Council. 

By  majority  vote  it  may  approve  recommendations 
of  the  Council  for  changing  representation  in  that 
body. 

3.  It  may  advise  the  reconsideration  of  any  exist-  ^^^-  '^ 
ing  treaties,  or  "the  consideration  of  international 
conditions  whose  continuance  might  endanger   the 
peace  of  the  world." 

4.  Disputes  may  be  referred  to  the  Assembly  by  ^^^-  '^ 
the  Council  for  investigation  and  recommendation; 

and  they  must  be  so  referred  if  either  party  to  the 
dispute  demands  it.  In  such  cases  decisions  of  the 
Assembly  have  the  force  of  decisions  of  the  Council, 
"if  concurred  in  by  the  representatives  of  those 
members  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council 
and  of  a  majority  of  the  other  members  of  the  League, 
exclusive  in  each  case  of  the  representatives  of  the 
parties  to  the  dispute." 

It  is  clear  that  in  framing  the  Covenant  the 
attempt  was  made  to  secure  an  organization  that 
would  be  strong  enough  to  accomplish  something 
definite,  without  at  the  same  time  creating  a  "super- 
state" which  would  limit  the  sovereignty  of  the 
members  in  any  dangerous  or  humiliating  fashion. 
Criticism  of  the  Covenant  has  come  from  two  curi- 
ously different  points  of  view.  To  some  the  League 
has  so  Httle  power  as  to  be  practically  useless.     Others 


io8       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

regard  it  as  trenching  dangerously  on  the  individual 
freedom  of  the  nations.  Some  liberals  would  prefer 
that  the  representatives  to  the  Assembly  should  be 
chosen  by  popular  vote,  or  at  least  by  the  lower 
house  of  the  national  legislatures.  The  United 
States  Senate  wishes  it  understood  that  any  Ameri- 
can representatives  and  council  members  and  other 
appointees  under  the  League  will  be  chosen  as  pro- 
vided for  by  an  act  of  Congress,  and  that  in  the 
meantime  no  appointment  will  be  made  without 
the  consent  of  the  Senate. 

The  provision  that  most  important  decisions  in  "N 
the  League  must  be  unanimous,  and  the  fact  that  the 
Council  can  only  "recommend"  action  in  such  mat- 
ters as  disarmament  and  breaches  of  the  Covenant, 
would  seem  to  safeguard  the  individual  sovereignty 
of  the  member  states.  It  would  be  out  of  the 
question  for  the  League  to  attempt  to  coerce  one  of  the 
great  powers  into  a  course  of  action  which  it  deemed 
unwise  or  unjust.  If  the  League  is  to  succeed  at  all 
it  must  be  through  a  genuine  willingness  to  co-operate 
for  common  purposes.  Given  this  spirit,  the  machin- 
ery provided  in  the  Covenant  can  be  of  vast  service 
to  the  world.  Any  defects  which  appear  can  be 
remedied.  Without  the  determination  to  make  the 
League  a  success  no  mere  machinery,  however  perfect 
theoretically,  can  succeed. 

The  opposition  to  the  Treaty  in  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States  centered  around  a  few  provisions  in  the 
League  of  Nations  Covenant.     The  Senate  was  not 


e 

I J 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  109 

only  within  its  rights  in  examining  the  Treaty  with 
the  utmost  care,  but  was  fulfilling  its  clear  duty. 
The  delay  in  ratification,  however,  had  an  extremely 
unfortunate  effect.  The  United  States,  which  had 
come  to  be  regarded  as  the  champion  of  a  new  world- 
order,  lagged  behind,  and  threatened  to  have  nothing 
further  to  do  with  the  movement  which  it  had  fought 
to  make  possible.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the 
President  attempted  to  force  the  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  exactly  as  it  stood;  that  he  did  not,  or  could 
not,  arrive  at  an  early  understanding  with  moderate 
Republican  Senators  in  framing  explanatory  reserva- 
tions which  would  have  made  clear  the  American 
attitude  on  certain  points.  He  overestimated  his 
ability  to  bring  a  compelling  pubUc  opinion  to  bear 
on  the  Senate.  With  the  injection  of  partisan 
political  considerations  into  the  debate  all  chance  of 
a  prompt  ratification  was  lost. 

PART  II 

THE   BOUNDARIES   OF   GERMANY 

Part  II  of  the  Treaty  fixes  in  detail  the  boundaries  ^'^^-  ^''~^° 
of  Germany.  On  all  sides  territory  is  lost  uncon- 
ditionally, and  in  other  territory  the  population  is  to 
decide  for  itself  by  plebiscite  whether  it  desires  to 
remain  German  or  to  become  PoKsh  or  Danish. 
Dantzig  and  part  of  the  Saar  Valley  are  put  under 
the  control  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Thus  the 
partition  of  Poland,  the  spoliation  of  Denmark  in 
1864,  and  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine  are  to 


no       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

be  redressed.  Altogether  the  Empire  is  certain  to 
lose  nearly  30,000  square  miles,  and  it  may  lose 
over  37,000  square  miles,'  out  of  a  former  area  of 
208,834  square  miles.  Thus  at  least  14  per  cent  and 
perhaps  18  per  cent  of  the  German  territory  will  be 
cut  off.  The  original  draft  of  the  Treaty  had  been 
modified  somewhat  as  a  result  of  the  German  protests. 
The  plebiscite  area  in  Schleswig  had  been  made  smaller 
principally  at  the  wish  of  the  Danes,  who  did  not 
desire  the  complications  which  would  result  from  a 
possible  addition  of  Germans  who  might  favor  joining 
Denmark  in  the  hope  of  escaping  the  burden  of 
reparations.  The  boundary  of  West  Prussia  had 
been  changed  slightly  in  favor  of  Germany;  and 
a  plebiscite  in  Upper  Silesia  was  conceded.  According 
to  the  German  delegation,  the  Empire  faced  a  loss 
of  territory  that  would  deprive  it  01  21  per  cent  of  its 
cereal  and  potato  crops,  almost  one-third  of  the  coal 
production,  and  nearly  three-fourths  of  the  mineral 
resources.  The  Allies  however  refused  any  sub- 
stantial change  in  the  boundaries  determined  upon. 

PART  III 
POLITICAL  CLAUSES  FOR  EUROPE 

Art.  31  Germany  agrees  to  the  abrogation  of  the  special 

Arts.  32-3S    neutralized    status    of    Belgium.     The    sovereignty 

of  Belgium  over  the  2  square  miles  of  contested  terri- 

'  The  official  summary  issued  May  7  gives  a  possible  total  of 
43,747.  The  Geographical  Review,  May,  1919,  p.  289,  corrects  this 
to  37,796,  from  which  should  be  deducted  895  for  the  Schleswig  zone 
omitted  from  the  revised  treaty. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  iii 

tory  of  "neutral"  Moresnet  is  recognized.  A  village 
in  Prussian  Moresnet  and  the  districts  of  Eupen  (68 
square  miles)  and  Malmedy  (314  square  miles)  are 
ceded  to  Belgium.  The  Belgian  claims  to  these  are 
in  part  historical,  in  part  based  on  the  fact  that  a 
considerable  proportion  of  the  inhabitants  are  Wal- 
loons, and  in  part  on  the  claim  to  reparation  in  kind 
for  the  destruction  of  Belgian  forests.  The  district 
of  Eupen  contains  some  coal.  The  Treaty  provides 
that  within  six  months  the  inhabitants  of  these  areas, 
who  are  not  very  numerous,  may  express  a  desire  to 
remain  German.  The  League  of  Nations  may  then 
readjust  the  boundary  in  accordance  with  this  vote. 

All  Belgian  archives  carried  off  during  the  war  are  ''^'^''  ^^ 
to  be  restored. 

With  regard  to  Luxemburg,  Germany  renounces  all  ^''^^-  '^°~^' 
privileges  acquired  by  various  treaties,  recognizes 
that  the  Grand  Duchy  ceased  to  be  part  of  the  Zoll- 
verein  as  of  January  i,  191 9,  gives  up  rights  as  to 
the  railways,  recognizes  the  termination  of  the  neu- 
tralized status,  and  "accepts  in  advance  all  inter- 
national arrangements  which  may  be  concluded  by 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  relating  to  the 
Grand  Duchy."  Germany  will  give  Luxemburg 
equal  treatment  with  regard  to  economic  questions, 
transport,  and  aerial  navigation.  In  most  parts  of  the 
Treaty,  the  Alhes  reserved  the  right  to  demand  in 
behalf  of  Luxemburg  the  privileges  accorded  to  them. 

These  provisions  were  necessary  in  order  to  remove 
Germany  from  a  position  of  economic  control  of  the 


112        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Grand  Duchy,  whose  position  as  a  neutralized  state 
had  been  fixed  by  international  agreement  in  1867. 
On  September  28,  19 19,  the  inhabitants  voted  to 
continue  as  an  independent  duchy  under  the  old 
line,  but  to  enter  into  an  economic  arrangement  with 
France. 

The  next  section,  dealing  with  the  left  bank  of 

Arts.  42-44  |-jjg  Rhine,  is  brief  but  very  important.  In  order  to 
guarantee  France  and  Belgium  against  another  attack, 
the  Treaty  forbids  Germany  to  maintain  or  construct 
any  fortifications  or  assemble  armed  forces  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine  or  for  a  distance  of  fifty  kilometers 
east  of  it.  Violation  of  this  provision  constitutes  a 
hostile  act.  As  a  supplementary  precaution,  mili- 
tary treaties  between  France  and  Great  Britain  and 
France  and  the  United  States  were  signed,  providing 
for  immediate  help  to  France  in  case  Germany  violated 
these  articles. 

Art.  4s  u^g   compensation   for    the   destruction   of    the 

coal-mines  in  the  north  of  France  and  as  part  payment 
towards  the  total  reparation  due  from  Germany  for 
the  damage  resulting  from  the  war,  Germany  cedes 
to  France  in  full  and  absolute  possession,  with 
exclusive  rights  of  exploitation,  unencumbered  and 
free  from  all  debts  and  charges  of  any  kind,  the 
coal-mines  situated  in  the  Saar  Basin." 

This  small  area  (784  square  miles)  is  important 
both  economically  and  strategically.  In  1766  it 
came  into  the  possession  of  France  as  part  of  Lorraine, 
and  in  1814  it  was  left  within  the  French  boundaries. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  113 

After  Napoleon's  return  and  Waterloo,  however,  it 
was  taken  away,  partly  because  it  contained  the 
fortress  of  Saarlouis,  partly  because  of  the  coal  mines 
which  were  even  then  recognized  as  valuable/  In 
the  course  of  the  recent  war  the  French  decided  if 
possible  to  secure  the  "re-annexation"  of  Lorraine 
with  the  "boundaries  of  18 14,"  which  would  restore 
this  important  coal  area  to  French  control/  The 
district  however  is  soHdly  German  in  character,  and 
its  annexation  by  France  would  have  violated  the 
principle  of  nationality.  Nevertheless  the  wanton 
destruction  of  the  French  coal  fields  around  Lens, 
accompHshed  not  so  much  for  mihtary  purposes  as 
with  the  idea  of  crippling  French  industry  after  the 
war,  gave  France  a  claim  to  some  compensation  in 
kind.  The  solution  devised  by  the  Peace  Conference 
is  a  compromise.  The  ownership  of  the  mines  JsAnnextoSeciv 
transferred  to  the  French  government,  leaving  it  to 
the  German  government  to  compensate  the  private 
owners.  To  permit  the  working  of  the  mines,  the 
area  is  withdrawn  from  the  poHtical  control  of  Ger- 
many; but  instead  of  intrusting  the  administration 
to  France,  the  district  is  placed  under  the  League  of 
Nations  "in  the  capacity  of  trustees."  The  League  is  Annex.chap.n 
to  appoint  a  council  of  five  (one  a  citizen  of  France, 
one  a  native  of  the  Saar  Basin,  and  three  others  not 
German  or  French),  with  complete  governing  powers. 
German  law  as  of  November  11,  1918,  continues  in 

^Geographical  Review,  August,  1918,  p.  112. 
2  Secret  Treaties,  and  above,  p.  20. 


114        Ajt  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

force,  with  the  existing  courts.  Modifications  in  the 
law  are  to  be  made  "after  consultation  with  the 
representatives  of  the  inhabitants  in  such  a  manner 
as  the  Commission  may  determine."  There  is  to 
be  no  compulsory  military  service.  The  area  is  to 
be  included  in  the  French  customs  regime.  For  five 
years  products  originating  in  the  Basin  may  enter 
Germany  duty-free,  and  German  products  for  local 
consumption  are  admitted  duty-free  for  the  same 
period.  French  money  may  circulate  in  the  Basin. 
Annex,  chap,  iii  After  fifteen  years  all  inhabitants  over  twenty, 
who  were  residents  when  this  treaty  was  signed,  are 
to  vote  on  the  question  of  their  future  government. 
In  accordance  with  the  results  of  this  vote,  the  League 
is  to  decide  whether  the  district  in  part  or  as  a  whole 
is  to  continue  under  league  control,  or  whether  all 
or  part  is  to  be  annexed  to  France  or  to  Germany. 
In  case  any  or  all  of  the  valley  returns  to  Germany, 
Germany  is  to  repurchase  the  mines  from  France  at 
a  price  in  gold  fixed  by  arbitrators. 

The  Germans  had  protested  vigorously  at  the 
whole  Saar  plan  as  an  invasion  of  national  rights. 
They  asserted  that  the  coal  in  the  Basin  was  worth 
a  hundred  times  the  French  coal  destroyed.  They 
feared  that  if  after  fifteen  years  the  district  should 
vote  to  rejoin  the  Fatherland,  Germany  would  be 
unable  to  make  prompt  payment  for  the  mines. 
Instead  of  the  whole  plan,  they  proposed  to  guarantee 
an  annual  amount  of  coal  to  France  until  the  French 
mines  were  restored.     The  Allies  replied  that  the 


Sec.  V, 
Arts.  51-79 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  115 

destruction  of  the  French  mines  called  for  some  con- 
spicuous reparation.  The  control  by  the  League,  with 
the  plebiscite,  did  no  violence  to  nationalism.  In  the 
revised  treaty  it  was  made  clear  that  if  the  district 
prefers  to  return  to  Germany,  the  Reparation  Com- 
mission will  facilitate  the  raising  of  the  money  by 
Germany. 

France  had  not  provoked  the  war  in  order  to 
regain  Alsace-Lorraine;  but  from  the  moment  the  Annex 
war  began,  every  Frenchman  was  determined  that 
the  old  ''open  wound"  in  the  side  of  France  must  be 
healed.  Although  during  the  war  there  had  been 
some  talk  among  outside  observers  of  a  possible 
division  of  Alsace-Lorraine  along  the  lines  of  the 
prevaihng  languages,  and  although  President  Wilson 
had  not  specified  just  how  "the  wrong  done  to 
France  in  1871 "  was  to  be  righted,  there  was  not  the 
slightest  doubt  after  the  armistice  that  Alsace- 
Lorraine  should  be  restored  entire  to  France.  The 
Germans  admitted  that  in  spite  cf  their  historic  and 
nationalistic  claims,  they  had,  according  to  present 
conceptions  of  right,  done  an  injustice  in  187 1  when 
they  had  not  consulted  the  people  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 
In  accordance  with  the  new  principle  of  self- 
determination,  however,  they  demanded  a  plebiscite, 
which  should  decide  whether  the  region  wished  to 
join  France  or  Germany  or  become  a  free  state.  This 
proposal  was  summarily  rejected.  It  was  felt  that 
restoration  to  France  was  necessary  to  redress  the 
injustice  of  187 1.     The  will  of  the  inhabitants  had 


ii6        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

been  shown  by  their  protests  at  that  time,  and  later. 
Practically,  a  fair  plebiscite  would  have  been  difficult 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  many  French  sympathizers 
had  left  after  187 1,  that  many  Germans  had  come  in 
since  then,  and  that  during  the  war  the  Germans 
had  treated  the  territory  as  enemy  country. 

The   treaty  therefore  restored   the  provinces   to 

Art.  2SS  France  with  the  frontiers  of  187 1.  Since  Germany 
had  refused  to  assume  any  share  of  the  French  debt 
in  187 1,  France  now  recovers  the  provinces  free  of 

Arts.  56, 256  obligations  as  to  the  German  national  debt.  Similarly 
German  state  property  including  railroads  is  trans- 
ferred without  payment  or  credit  on  Germany's 
reparation^account. 

Other  articles  fix  the  details  as  to  customs,  pen- 
sions, court  proceedings,  and  the  Hke.  For  five  years 
products  of  Alsace-Lorraine  are  to  enter  Germany 
duty-free,  up  to  the  average  amounts  of  1911-13. 
Germany  also  is  to  allow  free  export  and  reimport 
of  yarns  and  textile  products.  The  French  govern- 
ment has  the  right  to  exclude  German  capital  from 
pubHc  utiHties  and  mines,  and  it  also  reserves  the 
right  to  retain  and  Hquidate  the  property  of  German 
citizens  in  Alsace-Lorraine.  An  annex  provides  for 
the  restoration  to  French  citizenship  of  the  old  Alsace- 
Lorrainers  and  their  descendants,  with  some  excep- 
tions. Various  others  within  a  year  may  claim 
French  nationality,  though  in  individual  cases  the 
French  may  reject  the  claim.  Germans  born  or 
domiciled  in  Alsace-Lorraine  before  the  war  must  be 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  117 

naturalized,  a  period  of  three  years  from  November  i, 
1 9 18,  being  required. 

The  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is  doubly 
significant.  It  has  a  moral  and  sentimental  value,  as 
marking  the  failure  of  that  Prussian  policy  of  blood 
and  iron  which  seemed  so  triumphant  in  187 1.  For 
France,  the  stronger  frontier  and  the  added  popula- 
tion are  additional  safeguards.  But  still  more  impor- 
tant is  the  iron  of  Lorraine,  the  richest  field  in  Europe. 
From  it  Germany  drew  nearly  all  her  ore.^  With  it 
Germany  was  able  to  forge  her  industrial  and  military 
machine.  Without  it  Germany  will  be  helpless  for 
aggression,  and  dependent  for  her  industrial  develop- 
ment on  the  cultivation  of  friendly  economic  relations 
with  France. 

For  France  the  reacquisition  of  the  lost  provinces 
brings  not  only  renewed  strength  but  perplexing 
problems  and  responsibilities.  Germany  had  signally 
failed  to  win  the  affection  and  loyalty  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  On  the  other  hand,  the  German  connection 
had  brought  much  prosperity  to  the  provinces,  and 
by  no  means  all — perhaps  not  even  a  majority — of 
the  people  were  in  1914  anxious  to  return  to  France. 
In  191 8,  however,  the  French  were  welcomed  with  a 
heartiness  which  even  the  Germans  had  to  admit. 
The  problem  of  the  complete  reincorporation  of  the 
provinces  in  France  is  not  a  simple  one.  Great 
caution  will  have  to  be  exercised  in  applying  the 

'In  1913  Lorraine  produced  21,135,000  out  of  28,607,000  tons 
of  the  Empire's  iron  ore. 


Sec.  VI 


Art.  80 


118        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

French  laws  as  to  the  separation  oi  church  and  state, 
and  Hmiting  clerical  control  of  education.  If  Alsace- 
Lorraine  should  prove  less  prosperous  than  under 
German  rule,  or  if  the  anticlericalism  of  France  should 
offend  the  strong  Catholic  sentiment  of  the  people, 
grave  dissatisfaction  may  yet  arise.  It  is  to  be  hoped 
that  as  little  occasion  as  possible  will  be  given  for  the 
growth  of  a  new  irredentism,  and  that  the  historic 
wrong  of  187 1  may  have  found  its  final  solution. 

Continuing  its  survey  of  the  boundaries  of  Ger- 
many the  Treaty  next  deals  briefly  with  the  question 
of  German  Austria.  Germany  is  forced  to  recognize 
the  independence  of  Austria,  and  to  agree  that  "this 
independence  shall  be  inalienable,  except  with  the 
consent  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations." 
This  is  an  obvious  interference  with  the  right  of  self- 
determination,  for  both  the  German  Empire  and 
German  Austria  are  desirous  of  uniting.  There  are 
strong  reasons  of  policy  for  permitting  this,  moreover. 
German  Austria  cannot  exist  as  a  separate  economic 
unit,  and  obviously  must  gravitate  toward  Germany. 
The  addition  of  this  German  population  would  go  a 
long  way  toward  reconciling  Germany  for  the  forcible 
loss  of  so  much  of  its  territory.  It  would  strengthen 
the  more  moderate  South  German  elements  and  help 
to  balance  the  predominance  of  the  more  dangerous 
Prussian  elements.  In  the  interests  of  European 
peace,  a  contented  Germany  would  be  a  much  safer 
neighbor  than  a  Germany  smarting  under  a  sense  of 
injustice.     On  the  other  hand,  it  is  urged  that  Ger- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  119 

many  is  as  yet  unrepentant;  that  for  a  long  time  to 
come  plans  of  revenge  will  be  cherished,  and  an 
opportunity  sought  to  regain  the  overlordship  of 
Europe.  To  add  territory  and  population  would 
make  Germany  more  of  a  menace.  France  in  par- 
ticular, always  fearful  of  a  renewal  of  the  attack  from 
the  east,  has  stood  unyieldingly  against  allowing 
Austria  to  join  the  Empire.  When  the  new  German 
constitution  mentioned  the  possibility  of  members 
from  German  Austria  sitting  in  the  German  National 
Assembly,  the  Peace  Conference  at  once  protested, 
and  forced  the  elimination  of  that  section.  This 
action  still  further  excited  German  resentment. 

One  may  expect  in  the  course  of  time,  if  Germany 
proves  a  peaceful  and  reliable  neighbor,  that  this 
attitude  of  suspicion  may  be  relaxed,  and  France  may 
be  won  to  consenting  through  the  League  Council  to 
the  reunion  of  German  Austria  with  the  main  body 
of  the  German  people.  Until  Germany  demonstrates 
her  change  of  heart,  however,  precautions  are  perhaps 
justified. 

Germany  agrees  to  recognize  the  independence  of  ^^^  ^g"_gg 
the  Czecho-Slovak  state,  and  cedes  to  it  a  small 
frontier  district  in  Silesia.  Here  also  Germany 
objects  that  several  milhon  Germans  in  Bohemia  are 
not  allowed  a  chance  to  join  either  the  Empire  or 
German  Austria. 

The  boundaries  with  Poland  formed  one  of  the  ^^'^-  ^^^^ 
most  difficult  problems  with  which  the  Conference 
had   to   deal.    Ever   since   the   thirteenth   century 


120        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

when  the  Teutonic  knights  and  other  German  crusad- 
ing orders  had  pushed  eastward  the  relations  with  the 
Poles  had  been  productive  of  trouble.  East  and 
West  Prussia  were  conquered  from  the  heathen  Slavs 
and  to  a  considerable  degree  Germanized.  Then 
West  Prussia  including  the  old  Hansa  town  of  Dantzig 
came  directly  under  the  PoHsh  King,  who  became 
also  the  feudal  overlord  of  East  Prussia.  East  Prussia 
passed  to  the  Brandenburg  Hohenzollerns  in  the 
seventeenth  century  and  at  the  Jtime  of  the  first 
partition  of  Poland  in  1772  West  Prussia,  the  long- 
coveted  bridge  of  territory,  was  seized,  Hnking  up 
East  Prussia  with  Brandenburg.  Of  the  other  par- 
titions of  Poland,  Prussia  retained  after  181 5  Dantzig 
and  the  province  of  Posen.  The  Polish-speaking 
population  within  the  Empire  in  1900  was  over  three 
million.  Although  the  body  of  the  PoHsh  state  was 
thus  murdered,  the  spirit  of  Polish  national  feeHng 
survived. 

The  most  systematic  attempts  on  the  part  of 
Prussia  to  stamp  out  Polish  nationaHsm  failed.  At 
one  time  or  another  the  Prussians  tried  to  limit  the 
use  of  the  PoUsh  language  and  to  force  the  use  of 
German  in  the  schools  and  courts.  They  attempted 
to  check  the  passing  of  land  into  PoHsh  hands.  They 
passed  laws  for  the  forcible  expropriation  of  PoHsh 
landowners,  and  by  sending  German  colonists  into 
Polish  districts  they  attempted  to  break  up  PoHsh 
soHdarity.  In  Russia  similar  efforts  met  with  no 
greater  success.     In   GaHcia  the  Poles  were  better 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  121 

treated,  but  nevertheless  they  too  cherished  the 
hope  of  national  reunion  and  freedom. 

The  war  brought  the  long-aAyaited  opportunity. 
All  the  oppressors  of  the  Poles  announced  that  at 
last  Poland  was  to  be  free,  with  reservations.  Russia 
wished  to  add  Prussian  and  Austrian  Poland  to  an 
autonomous  state  of  which  the  Czar  was  to  be  head. 
Germany  and  Austria  wished  to  "free"  Russian 
Poland,  without  adding  their  own  Polish  provinces 
to  it. 

President  Wilson  announced  that  genuinely  Polish 
districts  must  be  made  free,  with  access  to  the  sea. 
The  language  used  is  capable  of  several  interpreta- 
tions, probably  by  intention. 

There  are  a  number  of  fundamental  difficulties  in 
fixing  the  boundaries  of  a  free  PoHsh  state: 

1.  Historically,  Poland  has  at  one  period  or 
another  ruled  over  an  enormous  stretch  of  territory 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.  Extreme  national- 
ists pressed  claims  to  practically  every  foot  of  this 
territory.  The  least  they  consider  are  the  boundaries 
of  1772. 

2.  Geographically,  except  toward  the  Bohemian 
mountains,  there  are  no  natural  boundaries  to  the 
PoHsh  area,  the  heart  of  which  is  the  Upper  Vistula 
Basin. 

3.  In  all  directions  the  PoHsh  population  merges 
gradually  with  non-PoHsh  groups,  which  in  past  times 
were  governed  by  the  Poles.  Toward  the  east  there 
is  a  minority  of  Polish   landowners  governing  an 


122        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

exploited  Slav  peasantry.  Westward  the  Poles  are 
peasants  under  German  overlords.  By  no  human 
possibility  can  all  the  Poles  be  brought  within  one 
state  without  the  inclusion  of  at  least  as  many  non- 
Poles,  most  of  whom  do  not  welcome  the  prospect. 

4.  The  natural  outlet  of  Poland  to  the  sea  is 
down  the  Vistula  to  Dantzig.  But  Dantzig  is  a 
purely  German  city,  and  the  "corridor"  down  through 
West  Prussia  along  the  Vistula  contains  a  large  num- 
ber of  Germans.  Furthermore,  to  give  Poland  sov- 
ereignty over  a  strip  to  the  sea  involves  the  entire 
detachment  of  East  Prussia  again,  and  the  creation 
of  a  permanent  grievance. 

Poland  had  a  seat  at  the  peace  table,  but  pending 
the  decisions  of  the  Peace  Conference  the  Poles 
attempted  to  occupy  and  defend  various  areas  which 
they  hoped  to  include  in  their  state.  This  led  to 
fighting  with  the  Germans,  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  the 
Ukrainians,  and  the  Bolsheviki.  The  Allies  had  to 
try  to  secure  a  suspension  of  hostilities  while  they 
sought  a  permanent  settlement. 

Nationalistic  principles  would  indicate  leaving 
Dantzig  to  Germany,  and  retaining  a  connection  with 
East  Prussia.  The  righting  of  historic  wrongs  and 
giving  a  great  inland  state  its  natural  economic  outlet 
to  the  sea  called  for  Polish  sovereignty  up  to  and 
including  Dantzig.  The  Peace  Conference  did  the 
best  it  could  with  a  naturally  tangled  problem.  The 
areas  of  Posen  which  in  the  judgment  of  its  experts 
were  "indisputably  Polish"  were  assigned  to  Poland, 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  123 

though  considerable  German  elements  necessarily 
went  with  them.  Inasmuch  as  some  of  these  repre- 
sented German  immigration  since  partition  it  was 
felt  that  the  historic  claims  of  Poland  should  not  be 
prejudiced  thereby.  The  Germans  complained  that 
purely  German  districts  were  included  for  strategic 
or  economic  reasons.  The  ''corridor"  through  West 
Prussia  contained  a  very  considerable  Polish  popula- 
tion— in  some  districts  60  to  80  per  cent,  in  others  only 
40  to  60  per  cent.  Here  again  historic  claims  were 
resolved  in  favor  of  the  Poles,  and  the  decision  was 
against  Prussia.  In  such  a  case  the  power  which 
had  partitioned  Poland  and  started  the  Great  War  was 
not  considered  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  doubt. 
Germany  is  guaranteed  free  right  of  transit  for  ^^^-  ^^ 
"persons,  goods,  vessels,  carriages,  wagons,  and 
mails  in  transit  between  East  Prussia  and  the  rest  of 
Germany  over  PoHsh  territory,  including  territorial 
waters." 

Premier  Paderewski  went  to  Paris  to  urge  the 
PoHsh  claims  to  Dantzig.  It  was  reported  that  the 
American  experts  favored  this,  but  that  Lloyd  George 
was  opposed.  The  final  solution  was  a  compromise, 
strongly  favorable,  however,  to  Poland.  Dantzig,  ^^"^  ^^' 
with  a  surrounding  area  of  729  square  miles,  was 
made  a  free  city  and  placed  under  the  protection  of 
the  League  of  Nations.  Representatives  of  the 
free  city,  in  agreement  with  a  High  Commissioner 
appointed  by  the  League,  are  to  draw  up  a  constitution 
which  shall  be  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  the 


124       ^^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 


League.  The  Commissioner  shall  deal  in  the  first 
instance  with  all  disputes  between  Poland  and  the 
free  city.  The  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
undertake  to  negotiate  a  treaty  between  the  free 
city  and  Poland  which  shall  effect  the  inclusion  of 
Dantzig  in  the  Polish  customs  frontiers,  give  Poland 
complete  access  to  wharves,  etc.,  with  the  right  of 
extending  them,  and  assure  Polish  control  of  the 
Vistula  and  of  all  railways.  Poland  is  to  conduct 
the  foreign  relations  of  the  free  city,  and  extend  diplo- 
matic protection  to  its  citizens  abroad. 

This  solution  has  been  denounced  as  thinly  veiled 
annexation  to  Poland,  and  considerable  sections  of 
liberal  opinion  have  not  been  enthusiastic  with  regard 
to  it.  Germany  has  naturally  protested,  insisting 
that  such  a  solution  was  not  within  the  ''secure  access 
of  the  sea"  of  President  Wilson's  Point  XIII.  In 
their  counter-proposals  Germany  offered  to  guarantee 
Poland  unimpeded  economic  rights  of  transit  to 
Dantzig,  Allenstein,  Memel,  and  Konigsberg  as  free 
ports.  The  AUies,  however,  refused  to  yield,  although 
such  a  solution  might  have  been  defended  as  a  sub- 
stantial fulfilment  of  their  pledges. 

The  two  remaining  boundaries  between  Germany 
and  the  new  Poland  were  fixed  subject  to  plebiscites. 
Upper  Silesia  has  a  considerable  Polish  population, 
but  has  not  been  under  Polish  sovereignty  since  1163. 
The  Germans  insisted  that  the  population  was  really 
German  in  sentiment,  and  they  ascribed  the  PoHsh 
eagerness  to  secure  the  region  to  the  fact  that  it  is  a 


Art. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  125 

very  important  mining  and  industrial  district.  To 
turn  it  over  to  Poland  would  not  only  cripple  Ger- 
many but  would  injure  the  material  interests  of  the 
inhabitants.  The  AlHes  yielded  their  original  demand 
for  unconditional  cession,  and  provided  for  a  plebiscite 
under  Allied  supervision,  to  be  held  not  less  than 
six  months  nor  more  than  eighteen  months  after  the 
Treaty  goes  into  effect.  The  vote  is  to  be  by  com- 
munes, and  the  Principal  AlHed  and  Associated  Powers 
are  then  to  determine  the  boundary,  paying  regard 
"to  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants  as  shown  by  the 
vote,  and  to  the  geographical  and  economic  conditions 
of  the  locality." 

In  the  southern  regions  of  East  Prussia  around  the  ^^*'  ^"^"^^ 
Mazurian  Lakes  there  is  also  to  be  a  plebiscite  under 
Allied  supervision.  The  vote  is  to  be  by  communes, 
and  the  Allies  are  then  to  fix  the  boundaries  in  accord- 
ance with  the  vote  and  with  regard  to  geographical 
and  economic  conditions.  Here  there  is  a  mixed 
population  of  Germans  and  PoKsh-speaking  Mazurs.^ 
The  latter  have  been  under  German  rule  since  the 
fourteenth  century,  and  have  absorbed  much  German 
culture.  They  are  also  Protestants.  It  will  be 
interesting  to  see  whether  the  language  bond  or  the 
bond  of  religion  and  long  historical  association  will 
prove  the  more  effective  element  in  determining 
national  consciousness.  Of  course  in  this  instance,  as 
in  Upper  Silesia  and  indeed  all  plebiscite  areas,  the 
economic  prospects,  with  perhaps  a  hope  of  escaping 

'  In  1900  the  census  showed  142,000  Mazurians. 


126        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

from  part  of  Germany's  reparation  burden,  will  have 
some  weight. 

The  remaining  boundaries  of  Poland  are  to  be 
fixed  when  the  Russian  situation  shows  some  signs 
of  settlement.  While  the  Conference  deliberated, 
the  Poles  and  the  Bolsheviki  carried  on  campaigns 
over  territory  where  the  Lithuanian  and  White 
Russian  peasantry  has  no  affection  for  either  side. 
In  preliminary  discussions  with  the  Bolsheviki,  the 
Poles  have  demanded  the  frontiers  of  1772. 

^^•^^  Germany  cedes  to  the  AUies  the  town  of  Memel 

with  an  adjoining  area  of  about  900  square  miles, 
and  agrees  to  any  disposition  which  they  may  make. 
The  Germans  objected  that  the  town  was  German 
in  sentiment;  that  in  the  district  there  are  68,000 
Germans  as  against  54,000  Lithuanians;  and  that 
the  Lithuanians  were  satisfied  with  German  rule. 
The  Allies,  however,  wished  to  be  in  a  position  to 
assure  to  a  possible  independent  Lithuanian  state  a 
direct  outlet  to  the  sea,  and  they  accordingly  insisted 
on  detaching  this  tip  of  East  Prussia,  which  they 
regarded  as  properly  Lithuanian. 

Arts.  109-14  On  the  north  the  Peace  Conference  reopened  a 
question  not  directly  involved  in  the  war,  the  bound- 
ary with  Denmark.  In  1864  Prussia  and  Austria 
had  detached  the  provinces  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein 
from  their  connection  with  the  Danish  crown,  and 
in  1866  Bismarck  had  utiHzed  them  in  his  larger 
scheme  of  forcing  a  quarrel  with  Austria.  As  a 
result  of  the  victory  in  the  Seven  Weeks  War,  both 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  127 

provinces  were  annexed  to  Prussia.  The  treaty  with 
Austria  provided  that  the  northern  areas  should  be 
allowed  to  vote  for  return  to  Denmark.  After 
lying  inoperative,  this  section  was  later  abrogated. 

The  Duchy  of  Holstein  was  purely  German,  and 
Prussia  had  some  excuse  for  its  annexation.  So  was 
the  southern  part  of  Schleswig.  The  northern  part, 
however,  was  strongly  Danish,  and  it  has  continued 
to  resent  its  forcible  separation  from  Denmark.  In 
spite  of  heavy-handed  attempts  at  Prussianization, 
the  Danish  population  has  continued  to  desire  reunion 
with  their  brethren.  Here  was  a  case  where  self- 
determination  might  be  practiced  to  advantage. 

Some  extremists  urged  the  restoration  to  Denmark 
of  all  the  territory  up  to  or  including  the  Kiel  Canal, 
so  that  Germany  might  not  be  able  to  use  that 
strategic  waterway  in  future  naval  operations. 
Having  decided  to  deprive  Germany  of  a  navy, 
the  AlHes  felt  that  the  Kiel  Canal  was  no  longer 
dangerous.  Their  first  plan  provided  for  plebiscites 
in  three  zones  of  territory,  voting  successively. 
The  Danes,  however— and  in  this  respect  they  were 
unique — did  not  desire  part  of  this  territory  under 
any  circumstances,  and  at  their  request  the  southern 
zone  was  left  unconditionally  to  Prussia.  The 
northern  zone,  delimited  to  contain  the  predominantly 
Danish  section,  is  to  vote  as  a  unit.^  The  next  area 
is  to  vote  later  by  communes.     Here  the  population 

'The  vote  was  taken  February  lo,  1920.  The  result  favored 
Denmark  by  75,023  to  25,087. 


128       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

is  mixed,  and  the  boundary  line  will  be  drawn  so 
far  as  possible  to  follow  local  preferences.^ 

Art.  IIS  Heligoland  is  to  be  completely  dismantled  as  a 

naval  base  and  harbor;  but  harbor  faciUties  for 
the  fishing  population  and  for  peaceful  navigation 
are  allowed  to  remain. 

Arts.  1 16-17  Germany  acknowledges  the  independence  of  all 
territories  which  were  part  of  Russia  in  August,  19 14. 
'  The  abrogation  of  the  Brest-Li  to  vsk  treaty  and  all 
other  agreements  entered  into  with  the  Bolsheviki  is 
recognized.  "The  AlHed  and  Associated  Powers 
foniially  reserve  the  rights  of  Russia  to  obtain  from 
Germany  restitution  and  reparation  based  on  the 
principles  of  the  present  treaty."  Finally  Germany 
agrees  in  advance  to  any  treaties  which  may  be  made 
with  states  formerly  part  of  Russia,  and  to  recognize 
the  frontiers  thereby  determined. 

PART  IV 
GERMAN    RIGHTS    AND    INTERESTS    OUTSIDE    GERMANY 

One  of  the  most  important  factors  in  arousing  the 
anxiety,  suspicion,  and  fear  of  the  other  nations  has 
been  the  development  of  an  aggressive  German 
program  in  world-politics.  In  the  eighties  the  newly 
unified  Empire  entered  the  scramble  for  colonies  in 
Africa  and  the  Far  East.  The  rapid  growth  of 
German  trade  and  the  increase  of  German  invest- 
ments in  various  backward  areas  led  in  the  twentieth 

■The  vote  in  the  second  zone  favored  Germany  by  48,000  to 
13,000. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  129 

century  to  the  building  of  a  fleet  which  it  was  hoped 
would  some  day  challenge  Britain  for  the  mastery 
of  the  seas.  At  every  point  outside  Europe — ^in 
China,  in  South  Africa,  in  Asia  Minor,  in  Morocco, 
in  South  America — German  merchants  and  German 
capitalists,  with  the  backing  of  their  government, 
were  seeking  for  trade  and  investment  opportunities, 
with  always  a  hope  of  extending  political  control. 
One  need  not  pretend  that  the  nations  like  Britain 
and  France,  whose  established  interests  were  threat- 
ened, were  particularly  pleased.  One  need  not  deny 
that  the  Entente  was  formed,  on  the  basis  of  set- 
tling the  differences  between  England  and  France 
and  between  England  and  Russia,  for  the  purpose  of 
watching  Germany.  It  remains  true  that  Germany 
set  the  pace,  forced  the  competition  particularly  with 
her  new  navy,  and  in  the  end  precipitated  a  war 
which  she  might  have  avoided  with  honor  and  profit. 
On  the  very  eve  of  the  struggle  Britain  had  made 
sweeping  concessions  as  to  the  Bagdad  railway, 
and  Germany's  ''place  in  the  sun"  was  never  more 
secure  than  in  1914.  There  was  not  the  slightest 
chance  of  an  unprovoked  attack.  Germany,  how- 
ever, was  not  satisfied  with  the  situation,  and  struck 
for  "world-power  or  ruin."  For  a  time  the  dream 
of  world-power  seemed  realized.  The  war  map 
showed  a  sohd  stretch  from  the  North  Sea  to  Bagdad 
and  from  the  Enghsh  Channel  to  the  Gulf  of  Finland 
and  the  Black  Sea.  And  then  the  dream  faded, 
the  structure  crumbled,  and  after  Brest-Li  to  vsk  came 


130        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Versailles.     During   the   course   of    the   war   all   of 
Germany's  possessions  beyond   the  seas  had   been 
occupied    by    her    enemies.     Japanese    and    British 
troops  held   Kiaochow;    New  Zealand,   AustraUan, 
and  Japanese  forces  took  the  Pacific  Islands;  French 
and  British  colonial  troops  captured  Togo  and  the 
Kameruns;    South  African  forces  conquered  South- 
west Africa   and   co-operated   with  British,  Indian, 
and  Belgian  forces  in  East  Africa.     German  com- 
merce vanished  from  the  seas,  and  a  large  part  of  the 
merchant  marine  was  captured.     In  enemy  countries 
German  property  was  sequestered  and  sold.     The 
amazing  extent  to  which  German  capital  had  secured 
a  hold  on  public  utiHties,  mining  and  manufacturing 
enterprises,    banks,    and   insurance    companies   was 
revealed,  and  in  England,  Australia,  Canada,  Italy, 
the  United  States,  and  Russia  the  governments  took 
vigorous  measures  to  tear  their  economic  life  free 
from  the  grip  of  German  financial  influences. 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  strikes  in  thoroughgoing 
fashion  at  German  interests  outside  of  Germany. 
One  motive  was  to  secure  reparation,  but  a  more 
important  aim  was  to  prevent  the  re-estabhshment  of 
^'^- "^  German  economic  and  financial  control.  "In  terri- 
tory outside  her  European  frontiers  ....  Germany 
renounces  all  rights,  titles  and  privileges  whatever 
in  or  over  territory  which  belonged  to  her  or  her 
^^-  "^  allies."  In  particular  ''Germany  renounces  in  favor 
of  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  all  her 
rights  and  titles  over  her  oversea  possessions."     Thus 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  131 

passes  Germany's  colonial  empire  of  over  a  million 
square  miles  in  Africa  and  the  islands  of  the  Far  East. 

Germany,  though  a  late  comer  in  the  race  for 
possessions  outside  of  Europe,  managed  to  secure 
control  of  considerable  areas  between  1880  and  1890, 
Most  of  them  are  tropical  and  unsuited  for  white 
settlement,  and  of  late  years  Germany  has  been 
anxiously  looking  for  better  fields  to  conquer  and 
exploit.  German  methods  of  colonial  administration 
were  not  particularly  successful.  The  officials  had 
too  much  of  the  Prussian  drill-sergeant  in  them,  and 
in  numerous  cases  the  natives  were  treated  with 
utterly  indefensible  brutaHty.  Since  1907,  however, 
there  has  been  an  improvement,  and  some  competent 
and  unprejudiced  outside  observers  were  wilhng  to 
admit  that  the  German  administration  compared  not 
unfavorably  with  that  of  other  powers.  The  Allies, 
however,  insisted  that  German  misgovernment  had 
been  so  bad  as  to  forfeit  all  claim  to  control  of  any 
backward  groups.  The  danger  of  these  possessions 
as  submarine  bases,  and  as  points  from  which  attacks 
could  be  launched  against  the  possessions  of  other 
powers,  was  pointed  out. 

The  Germans  protested  vigorously  that  to  deprive 
them  of  their  possessions  beyond  the  seas  without 
any  investigation  was  not  within  the  spirit  of  "a 
free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  adjust- 
ment of  all  colonial  claims."^    They  defended  their 

'  The  fifth  of  the  Fourteen  Points. 


Art.  122 


Sec.  II, 
Art.  128 


Sees.  Ill,  IV 


Sec.  V, 
Arts.  141-46 


132        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

administration,  and  pointed  to  the  loyalty  of  their 
native  troops  in  East  Africa  as  an  evidence  that  the 
natives  were  satisfied  with  German  rule.  The 
Germans  asked  at  least  to  be  appointed  mandatories 
for  their  possessions.  The  AlHes  retorted  briefly 
that  the  soldiers  were  a  specially  recruited  class,  and 
that  they  were  satisfied  that  native  opinion  was 
soHdly  against  being  placed  again  under  German 
rule  in  any  way.  They  contended  that  the  mandatory 
system  was  fair  to  all  concerned,  within  the  spirit  of 
President  Wilson's  declaration. 

German  government  property  in  the  overseas 
possessions  passes  to  the  mandatory  power,  which 
has  also  the  right  to  decide  whether  or  not  Germans 
may  remain  in  these  regions,  ''hold  property,  trade, 
or  exercise  a  profession  in  them." 

Germany  renounces  in  favor  of  China  the  unj^aid 
balance  of  the  Boxer  indemnity.  With  the  exception 
of  diplomatic  and  consular  residences  and  offices, 
the  German  concessions  at  Hankow  and  Tien-tsin 
are  ceded  back  to  China.  Among  other  minor  points 
Germany  agrees  to  restore  the  astronomical  instru- 
ments carried  off  in  1 900-1 901 

In  Siam,  Germany  renounces  the  right  of  extra- 
territorial jurisdiction,  and  in  Liberia  all  rights  and 
privileges  under  earlier  treaties. 

In  Morocco,  Germany  recognizes  the  French 
protectorate,  and  gives  up  various  privileges.  Ger- 
many's share  in  the  State  Bank  of  Morocco  is  credited 
to  the  reparation  account. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  133 

In  Egypt,  Germany  recognizes  the  British  pro-  '^^^^^l'  _ 
tectorate.     The  Egyptian  government  may  fix  the 
terms  under  which  Germans  are  permitted  to  estab- 
lish themselves  in  Egypt. 

Germany  agrees  to  recognize  any  arrangements  ^^t  y"' 
which  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  may  make 
with  Turkey  and  Bulgaria  as  to  German  rights  in 
those  countries.  The  most  important  concessions 
here  involved  are  those  connected  with  the  Bagdad 
railway. 

The  concluding  section  of  those  dealing  with  ^l^^l^^(^_  s 
German  rights  outside  of  Europe  is  concerned  with 
Shantung.  Around  this  question  raged  one  of  the 
most  bitter  controversies,  and  the  solution  finally 
adopted  is  among  the  most  widely  criticized.  The 
situation  is  extremely  compHcated,  and  very  powerful 
interests  are  involved. 

In  the  expansion  of  Europe  no  chapter  has  been 
more  interesting  and  significant  than  the  opening 
of  the  Far  East  to  Western  influences.  The  Japanese, 
after  a  brief  period  of  resistance,  determined  to  learn 
from  the  West  in  order  to  meet  the  West  at  its  own 
game,  and  thereby  to  preserve  their  own  poHtical 
independence  and  safeguard  their  own  type  of  civiliza- 
tion. The  great  empire  of  China,  however,  for  long 
resisted.  Conservative  and  proud  of  its  ancient 
culture,  it  jdelded  only  to  the  superior  military  force 
of  the  West.  Until  1894  Russia,  England,  and  France 
loomed  the  largest  in  the  poHtics  of  the  Far  East. 
Russia  from  the  north  had  been  steadily  preparing 


134        ^w  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties   - 

for  the  final  drive  southward  into  Korea  and  Man- 
churia, which  should  give  the  coveted  warm-water 
port  on  the  open  sea.     England  had  a  "sphere  of 
influence"  in  the  great  Yangtsi  Valley;   and  France 
in  the  south  claimed  a  smaller  sphere.     In  1894-95 
Japan  decisively  defeated  China  in  a  war  over  Korea, 
only  to  be  deprived  of  the  chief  prize  of  victory — 
the  control  of  Port  Arthur— by  the  action  of  Germany, 
Russia,   and   France.     During   the   next   few   years 
events  moved   rapidly.     The   outstanding   develop- 
ments were  the  addition  of  Germany  and  Japan  as 
formidable  contenders  for  power  in  the  Far  East,  the 
loss  of  important  territorial  and  economic  concessions 
by  China,  and  the  growth  in  China  of  a  new  spirit. 
At  the  time  of  the  Boxer  outbreak  in  1900,  it  seemed 
as  if  the  partition  of  China  was  imminent;  but  under 
the  guidance  of  the  United  States  the  powers  were 
led  to  agree  to  the  principles  of  the  integrity  of  China 
and  the  open  door  of  equal  economic  opportunities  for 
outside  nations.     The  Russo-Japanese  War  checked 
Russian  expansion,  and  established  Japanese  control 
in  Korea  and  Southern  Manchuria.     China,  however, 
did  not  profit  much,  for  the  former  rivals  soon  estab- 
lished a  working  agreement  and  proceeded  to  tighten 
their  grip  on  Manchuria  and  Mongolia. 

In  the  meantime  Germany,  the  new  arrival  in  the 
expansion  race,  had  secured  a  strong  position.  Hav- 
ing reached  a  previous  understanding  with  Russia, 
Germany  selected  the  port  of  Tsingtao  as  the  most 
desirable  spot.     By  great  good  luck,  in  November, 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  135 

1897,  two  German  missionaries  were  killed  in  some 
local  riots  in  Shantung  Province.  German  warships 
at  once  proceeded  to  Tsingtao,  already  marked  out 
as  the  desired  port.  China  was  forced  to  pay  heavy 
indemnities  for  the  loss  of  Hfe  and  property,  and  to 
punish  severely  various  persons  connected  with  the 
riots.  Then  in  1898  the  Chinese  government  was 
coerced  into  giving  a  "special  proof  of  their  grateful 
appreciation  of  the  friendship  shown  to  them  by 
Germany"  by  granting  a  ninety-nine-year  lease  on 
the  harbor  of  Kiaochow  and  the  city  of  Tsingtao. 
The  treaty  provided  that  the  Emperor  of  China,  while 
reserving  "all  rights  of  sovereignty  in  a  zone  of  50 
kilometers  surrounding  the  Bay,"  agreed  to  allow  the 
movement  of  German  troops  in  that  zone,  and  himself 
to  "abstain  from  exercising  rights  of  sovereignty  in 
the  ceded  territory."  In  addition  the  Germans  were 
allowed  to  build  two  lines  of  railway,  and  to  work  all 
mines  within  some  ten  miles  of  the  Unes.  Provision 
was  made  for  the  possibihty  of  some  Chinese  capital 
participating  in  these  enterprises.  In  case  any  foreign 
assistance  "in  persons,  capital,  or  material"  was 
needed  in  Shantung  Province,  China  engaged  to  turn 
first  to  Germans.  Germany  specifically  disclaimed  any 
"treacherous  intentions"  of  seizing  land  unlawfully. 

These  economic  concessions  were  later  extended 
and  modified  in  detail.  Russia  immediately  secured 
a  lease  on  Port  Arthur,  and  England  and  France 
demanded  and  obtained  "compensation"  at  Wei- 
Hai-Wei  and  Kwang-Chou-Wan. 


136        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Germany  proceeded  to  fortify  the  harbor  of 
Kiaochow,  to  build  a  modern  city  at  Tsingtao,  and, 
through  private  corporations,  to  construct  a  railroad 
to  Tsinanfu  and  to  develop  the  important  mines  of 
coal  and  iron.  At  the  same  time  every  effort  was 
made  to  stimulate  import  and  export  trade  through 
Tsingtao. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  August,  1914,  when  the 
Central   Powers   precipitated    the   world-war.     Not 
much  is  known  of  the  discussions   between  Tokyo 
and  London  at  that  tune.     Under   the  treaty  be- 
tween England  and  Japan,  the  latter  power' was  not 
necessarily  called  upon   to  enter  the  war.'     It  was 
obvious,  however,  that  the  chance  to  ehminate  Ger- 
many, and  to  consoHdate  the  position  of  Japan  in  the 
Far  East  could  not  be  overlooked.     On  August  15 
therefore  Japan  delivered  an  ultimatum  to  Germany, 
the  preamble  of  which  closely  followed  the  wording  of 
the  poUtely  insulting  note  of  1895  in  which  Germany, 
Russia,  and  France  had  "advised"  Japan  to  with- 
draw from  Port  Arthur  in  the  interests  of  peace. 
Germany  was  "advised"  to  withdraw  or  disarm  her 
war  vessels,  and  to  deliver  to  Japan  "the  entire 
leased  territory  of   Kiaochow,  with  a  view  to  the 
eventual  restoration  of  the  same  to  China."     Natu- 
rally Germany  paid  no  attention  to  the  ultimatum. 
Although  the  territory  could  not  be  held  for  long, 
the  German  government  counted  on  ultimate  victory 
m  the  great  contest.     It  might  have  been  a  wise  move 
'  Speech  at  Boston  by  Viscount  Ishii,  July  4,  191 7- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  137 

if  Germany  had  at  once  restored  the  territory  to 
China,  for  the  lease  provided  that  this  might  be  done 
at  any  time,  in  which  case  China  had  promised  to 
grant  a  lease  on  some  other  port ;  but  the  opportunity 
was  lost.  China  had  tried  without  success  to  secure 
an  agreement  to  exclude  all  the  leased  territories 
from  the  field  of  hostilities.'  President  Yuan-Shi-Kai 
then  desired  to  join  the  Allies  in  taking  Kiaochow, 
but  was  not  permitted  to  do  so,  chiefly  it  is  under- 
stood because  of  Japanese  opposition.  In  September 
Japan  landed  troops  in  purely  Chinese  territory 
and  proceeded  to  besiege  Kiaochow.  A  small  British 
force  co-operated,  but  only  within  the  leased  zone. 
The  Japanese  also  sent  troops  to  occupy  all  the 
stations  on  the  railroad  and  also  the  mining  proper- 
ties. The  city  surrendered  November  7,  and  the 
Chinese  authorities  requested  the  Japanese  to  with- 
draw within  the  leased  area.  Instead  of  this,  the 
Japanese  Cabinet  prepared  to  seize  the  opportunity 
while  the  rest  of  the  world  was  critically  busy  else- 
where, "for  strengthening  Japan's  position  in  Eastern 
Asia."  Accordingly,  January  18,  191 5,  the  famous 
"Twenty-one  Demands"  were  secretly  handed  to 
President  Yuan-Shi-Kai.  The  inevitable  result  of 
their  acceptance  would  have  been  to  place  China  in  a 
position  of  vassalage,  and  the  most  strenuous  objec- 
tions were  made  by  China. ^  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  when  they  learned  the  nature  of  the 

^  Asia,  September,  1919,  p.  937. 

2  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  Hearings,  p.  456. 


138       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

demands  are  understood  to  have  protested.  Reluc- 
tantly Japan  reserved  Group  V  of  the  demands  deal- 
ing with  Japanese  administrative  control  for  future 
settlement;  but  acceptance  of  the  others  was  forced, 
May,  191 5,  by  a  threat  of  war.  With  the  clauses 
strengthening  the  Japanese  grip  on  Manchuria  and 
Inner  Mongolia,  and  forbidding  China  to  lease  terri- 
tory to  any  third  power,  we  are  not  concerned  in 
this  connection.  The  first  article  of  the  first  group, 
however,  provided  that  "the  Chinese  government 
engages  to  recognize  all  matters  that  may  be  agreed 
upon  between  the  Japanese  government  and  the 
German  government  respecting  the  disposition  of  all 
the  rights,  interests,  and  concessions  which,  in  virtue 
of  treaties  or  otherwise,  Germany  possesses  vis-a-vis 
China  in  relation  to  the  Province  of  Shantung." 
Japan  at  the  same  time  promised  to  restore  the  said 
leased  territory  to  China  under  the  following  condi- 
tions: (i)  The  whole  of  Kiaochow  Bay  to  be  opened 
as  a  commercial  port.  (2)  A  concession  under  the 
exclusive  jurisdiction  of  Japan  to  be  established  at  a 
place  designated  by  the  Japanese  government.  (3)  If 
the  foreign  powers  desire  it,  an  international  con- 
cession may  be  estabhshed.  (4)  China  and  Japan 
are  to  agree  on  the  disposal  of  German  government 
buildings  and  property. 

The  United  States  formally  stated  that  it  would 
not  recognize  any  agreement  impairing  our  treaty 
rights,  "the  poHtical  or  territorial  integrity  of  China, 
or  the  ....  Open  Door  Policy."    As  reinsurance 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  139 

against  interference  by  the  United  States,  Japan 
and  Russia  made  a  secret  treaty  in  1916/  Meanwhile 
Japan  was  estabhshing  control  of  Shantung  Province 
far  more  effectively  than  Germany  had  ever  done. 

In  February,  191 7,  Germany  began  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare.  England  called  on  Japan  for 
additional  naval  assistance.  The  United  States 
broke  relations  with  Germany,  and  urged  China  to  do 
likewise.  Japan  feared  that  if  China  entered  the  war 
her  own  interests  in  Shantung  might  suffer.  Great 
Britain,  France,  Russia,  and  Italy  were  therefore 
asked  to  agree  to  support  at  the  Peace  Conference 
"the  claims  of!  Japan  in  regard  to  the  disposal  of 
Germany's  rights  ia  Shantung  and  possessions  in  the 
islands  north  of  the  equator."  Great  Britain  agreed 
on  condition  that  the  Japanese  would  "treat  in  the 
same  spirit  Great  Britain's  claims  to  the  German 
islands  south  of  the  equator."  France  also  agreed 
on  condition  that  Japan  should  urge  China  to  break 
relations  with  Germany.  Russia  and  Italy  also 
acquiesced.  These  assurances  were  not  known  to 
China  or  the  United  States,  except  by  rumor,  until 
1919,  at  the  Peace  Conference.  On  March  14  China 
broke  relations,  with  Germany,  and  on  August  14, 
after  a  Cabinet  crisis,  declared  war. 

In  November,  Secretary  Lansing  for  the  United 
States  and  Viscount  Ishii  for  Japan  came  to  an  agree- 
ment which  was  made  public.  The  governments 
"recognize  that  territorial  propinquity  creates  special 

'  Senate  Hearings,  p.  456. 


140        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

relations  between  countries,  and  consequently  the 
government  of  the  United  States  recognizes  that 
Japan  has  special  interests  in  China."  The  two 
nations  agree  in  reaffirming  the  principles  of  the 
independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  China,  and 
the  open  door  of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and 
industry.  Japan  attempted  to  interpret  "special 
interests"  as  equal  to  " paramountcy . "  Secretary 
Lansing,  however,  had  expressly  told  the  Viscount 
that  he  would  not  admit  Japan's  "paramount  inter- 
est."^ During  the  next  year  Japan  continued  to 
extend  control  over  Shantung,  and  the  presence  of 
Japanese  troops  caused  increasing  friction.  In  Sep- 
tember, 1918,  in  return  for  permission  to  finance  two 
new  railroads,  Japan  agreed  to  withdraw  troops  to 
Tsingtao.  The  Chinese  government  was  to  police 
the  railroad,  with  the  Japanese  at  the  head  of  the 
force  and  at  the  principal  railway  stations.  This 
agreement  was  never  confirmed  by  the  Chinese 
government,  however.^ 

The  Chinese  had  entered  the  war  hoping  to  secure 
from  the  Peace  Conference  some  support  in  their  con- 
test with  Japan.  The  whole  situation,  however,  is 
greatly  complicated  by  the  interference  of  Japan  in  the 
internal  affairs  of  China.  It  is  openly  charged  that 
Japan  is  interested  in  promoting  dissension  between 
North  and  South.  There  is  no  doubt  that  through 
granting  or  withholding  loans  much  pressure  has  been 

'  Asia,  September,  1919,  p.  944;  Senate  Hearings,  pp.  445  and  224. 
=>  Ibid.,  pp.  444-45- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  141 

exerted  on  Pekin;  and  a  number  of  the  members  of  the 
government  have  been  pro-Japanese  in  their  poKcy. 
The  Chinese  people,  however,  have  steadily  grown 
more  resentful,  and  by  protests  and  boycotts  of 
Japanese  goods  and  occasional  riots  have  expressed 
their  dissatisfaction. 

At  Paris  the  Chinese  delegation  made  a  very 
favorable  impression.  They  were  well  advised,  and 
most  of  the  newspaper  correspondents  gave  them 
friendly  publicity.^  President  Wilson  was  decidedly 
sympathetic.  He  found  himself  however  tremen- 
dously handicapped  by  the  firm  attitude  of  Japan 
and  by  the  decision  of  England  and  France  that 
they  must  adhere  to  their  agreements  of  191 7.  In 
effect  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George  said  they 
would  be  delighted  if  the  President  could  persuade 
Baron  Makino  to  modify  the  Japanese  demands; 
but  if  he  could  not,  they  felt  bound  to  support  Japan. 

Great  Britain  and  France,  with  immense  Asiatic 
interests,  had  to  reach  an  agreement  with  Japan,  a 
fighting  power  with  a  definite  policy.  The  United 
States  has  had  no  consistent  Far  Eastern  policy  which 
it  was  prepared  to  back  with  force,  and  its  influence 
has  been  correspondingly  slight.  Logically  the  Shan- 
tung question  forms  a  part  of  the  whole  question  of 
the  relations  of  China  with  foreign  powers,  and  since 
the  Peace  Conference  did  not  propose  to  go  into  the 
entire  matter,  Japan  could  demand  that  no  new  prin- 
ciples should  be  applied  to  its  disadvantage. 

'  Hansen,  Adventures  of  the  Fourteen  Points,  chap.  vi. 


142        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

The  Chinese  representatives  demanded  that  all 
Germany's  holdings  and  concessions  in  Shantung 
should  be  restored  directly  to  China.  Their  argu- 
ments may  be  summarized  as  follows: 

1.  China  entered  the  Great  War  because  it  was 
avowedly  fought  for  great  principles  of  international 
justice,  in  particular  the  safeguarding  of  weaker 
nations,  the  right  of  self-determination,  and  to  "make 
the  world  safe  for  democracy."  To  hand  over  control 
of  one  of  the  wealthiest  provinces  of  China,  sacred  as 
the  birthplace  of  Confucius,  with  nearly  forty  millions 
of  Chinese,  to  the  control  of  an  ahen  power,  violated 
every  ideal  for  which  the  war  was  fought.  Strategi- 
cally it  placed  the  Chinese  capital  in  an  indefensible 
position.  Japan  was  a  much  more  dangerous  tenant 
than  far-off  Germany.  Economically  it  interfered 
with  the  development  of  the  Chinese  railway  system, 
and  deprived  China  of  the  control  of  its  most  valuable 
coal  and  iron  resources. 

2.  The  treaty  of  1898  with  Germany  had  been 
secured  under  duress,  and  represented  an  injustice 
which  should  be  righted.  Furthermore,  by  the  very 
treaty  Germany  was  not  allowed  to  transfer  its  rights 
to  a  third  party. 

3.  By  China's  declaration  of  war  on  Germany  all 
treaties  were  abrogated,  and  automatically  China 
became  repossessed  of  all  territory  and  concessions 
granted  to  Germany. 

4.  The  treaty  with  Japan  in  191 5  had  been  ob- 
tained under  duress,  and  was  therefore  legally  invahd. 


The  Treaty  oj  Versailles  143 

5.  The  treatment  of  China  in  the  past  had  been 
notoriously  unjust.  At  the  opening  of  a  new  era  a 
new  policy  should  be  inaugurated, 

6.  In  the  interests  of  peace,  Japan's  militaristic 
and  imperialistic  scheme  for  building  up  an  overlord- 
ship  on  the  basis  of  an  exploited  China  should  be 
checked. 

The  Japanese  argued  that  the  war  was  fought  on 
the  theory  that  international  treaties  were  not  "scraps 
of  paper,"  and  they  stood  pat  on  their  treaties. 

1.  They  pointed  out  that  the  treaty  of  1898  has 
been  universally  recognized  as  valid  for  twenty  years. 

2.  They  professed  surprise  that  the  Chinese,  with- 
out any  formal  denunciation  of  the  treaty  of  1915, 
which  in  form  was  perfectly  binding,  should  now 
appeal  to  the  Peace  Conference  to  disregard  it. 
Japan  served  notice  that  it  insisted  on  China's 
carrying  out  its  promise  to  agree  to  the  transfer 
of  the  German  concessions.  It  also  demanded  the 
support  of  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  as  pledged  in 
1917. 

3.  By  right  of  conquest,  Japan  was  entitled  to 
take  territory  and  concessions  which  were  legally 
German  in  1914.  Furthermore,  Japan's  undoubted 
services  to  the  Allies  during  the  war,  and  her  sacrifices 
of  blood  and  treasure,  deserved  some  reward. 

4.  The  transfer  of  the  German  interests  to  Japan 
made  no  difference  to  China.  China  would  be 
better  off  than  before  the  war,  for  Japan  was  pre- 
pared to  restore  China's  sovereignty  over  the  leased 


144        ^^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

areas,  retaining  only  the  economic  concessions.  Other 
foreign  powers  had  such  concessions;  why  should 
Japan,  admittedly  the  most  closely  interested  in 
Chinese  affairs,  be  refused  them  ? 

5.  Japan,  with  rapidly  growing  population,  was 
compelled  to  live  as  an  industrial  nation,  and  must 
depend  on  coal  and  iron  from  China.  But  the 
development  of  these  resources  and  the  increase 
of  trade  relations  with  Japan  would  be  for  the  benefit 
of  China  also. 

From  this  position  the  Japanese  refused  to  recede. 
To  allow  the  transfer  from  Germany  to  China  would 
cast  discredit  on  the  good  faith  of  their  promise  to 
restore  Kiaochow  to  China.  They  were  willing  to 
agree  to  an  international  concession  in  Tsingtao 
and  give  up  the  exclusively  Japanese  concession. 
They  would  take  up  with  China  the  question  of  with- 
drawing Japanese  troops  from  the  railway.  But  first 
they  must  receive  the  title  to  all  that  had  been  Ger- 
many's. President  Wilson  was  compelled,  though 
reluctantly,  to  yield  the  point.  Without  the  help 
of  England  and  France  he  could  not  compel  Japan 
to  change.  He  may  have  feared  that  Japan  would 
withdraw  from  the  Conference  and  wreck  the  League 
of  Nations.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  clear  that  the 
United  States  would  not  go  to  war  to  eject  Japan  from 
Shantung.  Short  of  withdrawing  altogether  from 
the  Peace  Conference,  or  driving  Japan  to  withdraw, 
there  seemed  nothing  else  for  the  President  to  do. 
China   was   bitterly   disappointed,    and,   not    being 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  145 

allowed  to  sign  the  Treaty  with  reservations,  refused 
to  sign  at  all.  The  Chinese  government  later 
declared  that  the  state  of  war  with  Germany  was 
at  an  end. 

Few  of  the  decisions  of  the  Conference  have  been 
more  hotly  criticized,  and  these  sections  are  undoubt- 
edly among  the  most  unsatisfactory  in  the  Treaty. 
The  United  States  Senate,  however,  cannot  mend  the 
matter  by  refusing  to  ratify  the  Treaty,  or  by  with- 
holding its  assent  to  these  clauses.  The  real  hope 
for  a  satisfactory  solution  lies  in  the  development  of 
China  into  a  state  able  to  take  care  of  its  own  internal 
affairs.  In  time  the  whole  question  of  territorial 
concessions  and  economic  concessions  and  extra- 
territorial jurisdiction  and  control  of  the  Chinese 
customs  revenue  should  be  reopened.  Not  only 
Japan,  but  England,  France,  and  other  powers  should 
co-operate  in  this.  The  obvious  agency  for  carrying 
out  these  readjustments  peaceably  is  the  League  of 
Nations.  Much  of  the  discussion  of  the  question 
ignores  the  fact  that  China  is  to  have  rights  of  sover- 
eignty over  Shantung,  and  that  those  rights  will  be 
guaranteed  by  the  League  Covenant.  It  is  perfectly 
proper  to  note  that  nominal  sovereignty  may  be 
valueless,  as  in  Manchuria,  and  that  control  of  rail- 
ways and  mines  may  involve  real  subjection.  There 
is  this  danger  in  Shantung.  Nevertheless  Japan  has 
given  explicit  assurances  on  these  points,  and,  through 
the  League  of  Nations,  China  may  insist  that  they  be 
kept. 


146        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

PART  V 

MILITARY,   NAVAL,   AND   AIR   CLAUSES 

Germany  had  set  the  pace  for  the  European  com- 
petition in  armament  which  had  been  so  ruinous 
economically  and  so  ineffective  in  keeping  a  general 
peace.  The  victorious  Allies  were  determined  to 
prevent  Germany  from  again  threatening  the  con- 
quest of  Europe.  With  Germany  disarmed  the  rest 
of  the  world  might  proceed  to  reduce  armaments. 

Arts.  160-72  'pj^e  Treaty  therefore  provides  for  the  reduction  of 
the  German  army  first  to  200,000,  and  then,  not  later 
than  March  31,  1920,  to  not  over  100,000.  The 
Great  General  Staff  is  abolished,  the  number  of  units 
is  fixed,  and  the  maximum  equipment  for  each 
branch  is  stated.  Supplies  above  this  are  to  be 
surrendered  to  the  Allies.  Manufacture  of  munitions 
is  to  be  restricted  by  the  Allies.  Import  of  munitions, 
or  the  manufacture  or  import  of  gas,  armored  cars, 
and  tanks  is  forbidden.  The  number  of  customs 
officials,  guards,  gendarmes,  and  police  may  not  be 
larger  in  proportion  to  the  population  than  in  19 13. 

After  Jena,  Napoleon  had  limited  the  size  of  the 
Prussian  army.  By  increasing  the  proportion  of 
officers,  however,  and  by  giving  intensive  training  to 
successive  batches  of  recruits  the  Prussians  succeeded 
in  evading  the  restrictions,  and  in  18 13  they  had  a 
trained  force  several  times  as  large  as  they  were  sup- 
posed to  possess.     With  this  precedent  in  mind,  the 

Art.  173       Allies  demanded   that  "universal  compulsory  mili- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  147 

tary  service  shall  be  abolished  in  Germany.  The 
German  army  may  only  be  constituted  and  recruited 
by  means  of  voluntary  enlistment."  The  men  must  ^■'^^  '''"^"'^ 
enlist  for  twelve  years,  and  officers  for  twenty-five. 
The  military  academies  are  reduced.  Military  train- 
ing in  schools  or  societies  is  forbidden. 

While  the  fortifications  on  the  west  are  to  be  ^"^  ^^° 
destroyed,    those   on   the  south   and   east  may  be 
retained. 

The  chief  criticisms  of  this  general  plan  are  that 
it  introduces  a  professional  army  which  may  become 
a  sort  of  Pretorian  Guard,  dangerous  to  the  liberties 
of  the  people,  and  that  it  may  be  made  into  a  training 
school  for  officers  in  case  of  another  war.  It  is  under- 
stood that  Lloyd  George  was  particularly  insistent 
on  the  small  long-term  professional  army.  If  the 
terms  are  carried  out,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  Germany 
can  again  be  a  menace.  The  German  negotiators 
objected  not  so  much  to  their  disarmament  as  to  the 
fact  that  their  enemies  reserved  their  own  disarma- 
ment for  future  discussion  within  the  League  of 
Nations.  Since  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  the 
Allies  have  agreed  to  extend  the  time  for  carrying  out 
the  reductions  in  the  army.  The  present  German 
government  needs  a  considerable  force  to  maintain 
itself  against  a  more  radical  revolution. 

By  the  Treaty  Germany  surrenders  practically  all  ^^*^- " 
its  fleet,  including  submarines,  to  the  Principal  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers.     Just  before  the  Treaty  was 
signed  the  ships  which  had  been  interned  at  the  time 


148        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

of  the  armistice  were  sunk  at  Scapa  Flow  by  their 
crews.  For  this  violation  of  the  armistice  the  Allies 
later  exacted  damages  in  the  form  of  shipping,  docks, 
dredges,  etc.,  although  the  German  government 
tried  to  disclaim  responsibility.  This  was  felt  to  be 
rather  severe,  inasmuch  as  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  had  been  in  favor  of  taking  the  German 
Main  Fleet  out  and  sinking  it  anyhow.  The  reasons 
for  so  doing  were  that  Allied  naval  supremacy  was 
secure  and  that  the  German  fleet  was  so  different  in 
construction  that  it  could  not  profitably  have  been 
assimilated  to  the  other  units.  France,  however,  had 
wished  to  replace  its  naval  losses  with  German  ships. 
'"'■  '^'  The  German  navy  is  to  consist  of  not  more  than  six 

small  battleships,  six  hght  cruisers,  twelve  destroyers, 
and  twelve  torpedo  boats.     No  submarines  may  be 

Arts.  162-96  constructed  even  for  commercial  purposes.  As  in  the 
army,  recruiting  is  to  be  voluntary,  and  enhstment 
of  men  and  officers  is  to  be  for  twelve  and  twenty-five 
years  respectively.  Fortifications  commanding  the 
routes  between  the  North  Sea  and  the  Baltic  are 
to  be  destroyed.  Other  existing  coast  fortifications 
may  be  retained,  but  not  extended  or  strengthened. 
Reserves  of  munitions  are  limited. 

Art,  197  Yox  three  months  after  the  Treaty  comes  in  force 

Germany  may  not  use  the  high-power  wireless  for 
the  "transmission  of  messages  concerning  naval, 
military,  or  poHtical  questions  of  interest  to  Germany  " 
or  the  Central  Powers  without  the  consent  of  the 
Allies. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  149 

"The  armed  forces  of  Germany  must  not  include  ^'^'-^^^ 
any  military  or  naval  air  forces."  Up  to  October, 
191 9,  seaplanes  might  be  used  to  search  for  submarine 
mines.  Until  Allied  forces  completely  evacuate 
Germany,  their  aircraft  are  to  enjoy  freedom  of  flying 
and  landing  in  Germany.  For  six  months  after  the 
Treaty  comes  in  force,  Germany  may  not  manufac- 
ture or  import  aircraft  or  parts.  When  the  Treaty 
becomes  effective,  all  military  and  naval  aircraft  and 
material  must  be  surrendered. 

"  All  the  military,  naval  and  air  clauses  contained  in  '^'''-  ^°^ 
the  present  Treaty,  for  the  execution  of  which  a  time- 
limit  is  prescribed,  shall  be  executed  by  Germany 
under  the  control  of  Inter-allied  Commissions  specially 
appointed  for  this  purpose  by  the  Principal  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers."  This  Commission  is  given 
full  power  to  investigate  and  give  directions,  and  the 
German  government  is  to  give  all  necessary  informa- 
tion and  co-operation. 

PART  VI 

PRISONERS   OF   WAR   AND    GRAVES 

The  repatriation  of  prisoners  of  war  and  interned  ^'^''-  "^'^"^ 
civilians  is  to  take  place  as  soon  as  possible  after. the 
Treaty  comes  into  force.  The  Allied  and  American 
prisoners  had  been  released  by  Germany  under  the 
terms  of  the  armistice.  The  Germans  had  constantly 
pressed  for  the  release  of  their  prisoners,  but  they 
had  met  with  only  partial  success.  The  prisoners 
held  by  the  Americans  had  been  sent  back,  and  the 


Arts.  225-56 


150       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

English  also,  as  a  favor  and  not  as  a  right,  did  the 
same.  The  French,  partly  because  they  wished  to 
utiUze  the  labor  of  the  prisoners,  and  partly  to  be 
able  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  on  the  German  govern- 
ment, refused  to  anticipate  the  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions. German  public  opinion  regarded  the  retention 
of  the  prisoners  as  an  unnecessary  hardship.  There 
had  been  some  talk  of  retaining  German  prisoners 
for  labor  in  restoring  the  devasted  areas  of  France 
and  Belgium,  but  it  was  realized  that  this  would  be 
impracticable.  By  international  usage  nations  may 
ask  for  the  cost  of  maintaining  prisoners,  but  in  this 
case  both  sides  waived  their  claims.  Germany, 
however,  had  to  repay  the  amounts  the  Allies  had 
expended  in  sending  supplies  to  their  own  prisoners 
in  Germany. 

The  graves  of  the  dead  are  to  be  respected  and 
maintained,  and,  so  far  as  possible  under  existing 
laws  and  health  regulations,  bodies  may  be  trans- 
ferred to  their  own  country.  Information  as  to  the 
dead  and  missing  is  to  be  exchanged. 

PART  VII 

PENALTIES 

Public  opinion  in  the  Allied  nations  was  practically 
unanimous  in  blaming  the  Central  Powers  for  deliber- 
ately forcing  the  war  on  the  world.  From  the 
beginning  the  chief  responsibility  was  placed  on  the 
German  Kaiser  and  the  Prussian  Junker  military 
caste,    and    the   determination   grew   to   hold    them 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  151 

personally  responsible  for  the  misery  and  loss  occa- 
sioned by  their  actions.  The  instinctive  resent- 
ment of  the  masses  led  them  to  cry  "Hang  the 
Kaiser!"  and  responsible  leaders  were  not  far  behind 
in  the  vigor  of  their  denunciations.  In  particular, 
Lloyd  George,  in  the  election  of  December,  1918, 
and  Clemenceau,  in  his  addresses,  had  practically 
pledged  their  governments  to  secure  the  punishment 
of  William  II. 

But  besides  the  all-inclusive  crime  of  precipitating 
the  war,  and  the  treaty  violations  involved  in  the 
invasion  of  Belgium  and  Luxemburg,  there  were  the 
countless  enemy  actions  so  contrary  to  all  the  laws 
and  usages  of  war  that  they  were  unanimously 
called  "atrocities."  Day  by  day  and  month  by 
month  the  list  mounted,  and  with  each  new  outrage 
the  resolve  of  the  Allies  to  bring  the  perpetrators  to 
justice  grew  more  determined.  With  the  long- 
deferred  day  of  victory  came  the  opportunity  for  the 
punishment  of  the  guilty. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  Conference  (Janu- 
ary 25,  19 19)  was  the  appointment  of  a  Commission 
"  to  inquire  into  and  report  upon  the  following  points: 

"  I.  The  responsibihty  of  the  authors  of  the  war. 

"2.  The  facts  as  to  breaches  of  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  war  committed  by  the  forces  of  the  German 
Empire  and  their  allies,  on  land,  on  sea,  and  in  the  air 
during  the  present  war. 

"3.  The  degree  of  responsibility  for  these  offences 
attaching  to  particular  members  of  the  enemy  forces, 


152        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

including  members  of  the  General  Staffs,  and  other 
individuals,  however  highly  placed. 

"  4.  The  constitution  and  procedure  of  a  tribunal 
appropriate  for  the  trial  of  these  offences."^ 

The  Commission  had  no  difficulty  in  agreeing  that 
"the  war  was  premeditated  by  the  Central  Powers 
together  with  their  allies,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  and 
was  the  result  of  acts  deliberately  committed  in  order 
to  make  it  unavoidable,"  and  that  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg  was  "deliberately  violated." 
There  was  also  no  doubt  that  "the  war  was  carried 
on  by  the  Central  Empires  together  with  their  allies, 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  by  barbarous  and  illegitimate 
methods  in  violation  of  the  estabhshed  laws  and 
customs  of  war  and  the  elementary  laws  of  humanity." 
Thirty-two  separate  classes  of  these  offenses  were 
indicated.  The  Commission  report  proceeded  to 
state  that  "all  persons  belonging  to  enemy  countries, 
however  high  their  position  may  have  been,  without 
distinction  of  rank,  including  Chiefs  of  States,  who 
have  been  guilty  of  offences  against  the  laws  and 
customs  of  war  or  the  laws  of  humanity,  are  Uable  to 
criminal  prosecution."  As  to  trial  for  all  these 
offenses  before  an  appropriate  tribunal,  the  Com- 
mission felt  that  "the  acts  which  brought  about  the 
war  should  not  be  charged  against  their  authors  or 
made  the  subject  of  proceedings  before  a  tribunal." 
However,  in  view  particularly  of  the  violation  of 
Belgium,  "it  would  be  right  for  the  Peace  Conference, 

'Senate  Hearings,  p.  313. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  153 

in  a  matter  so  unprecedented,  to  adopt  special 
measures,  and  even  to  create  a  special  organ  in  order 
to  deal  as  they  deserve  with  the  authors  of  such  acts." 
These  two  declarations  the  American  delegates 
regarded  as  inconsistent  with  each  other.  For  the 
future,  it  was  recommended  that  penalties  should  be 
provided  for  violations  of  international  law.  For  the 
trial  of  violators  of  the  "Laws  and  Customs  of  War 
and  of  the  Laws  of  Humanity,"  the  Commission  pro- 
posed a  joint  inter-allied  High  Tribunal.  The  Joint 
Tribunal  was  necessary  because  many  of  the  offenses 
had  been  against  two  or  more  Alhed  nations.  They 
suggested  that  Germany  be  required  in  the  Treaty  to 
surrender  any  persons  for  trial  whom  the  AlHes 
might  demand,  together  with  all  relevant  documentary 
material. 

To  some  of  these  conclusions  and  recommendations 
the  representatives  of  the  United  States,  one  of  whom 
was  Secretary  Lansing ,  took  exception,  as  did  also  the 
Japanese  Commissioners.  They  objected  that  under 
international  law  Chiefs  of  States  could  not  be  held 
responsible  for  their  official  acts,  except  to  the  political 
authorities  of  their  own  countries.  Furthermore, 
they  should  be  punished  only  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  in  force  at  the  time  of  the  offense. 

The  Commission  had  considered  violations  of  the 
"law  of  humanity"  as  calling  for  criminal  prosecu- 
tion. This  the  Americans  regarded  as  unwarranted. 
Finally  they  objected  to  the  criminal  prosecution  of 
persons   "however  high   their  position"   who  with 


154       ^w  Introduction  to  tJte  Peace  Treaties 

knowledge  of  the  violation  of  the  laws  of  war,  "and 
with  power  to  intervene,"  abstained  from  preventing 
"or  repressing  violations  of  the  laws  or  customs  of 
war."  The  Japanese  representatives  expressed  simi- 
lar doubts  in  somewhat  less  positive  terms. 

The  clauses  as  finally  incorporated  in  the  Treaty 
are  based  on  this  report,  with  some  modifications  in 
the  direction  of  the  American  position.  In  order  to 
satisfy  public  opinion,  something  had  to  be  said  about 
the  Kaiser.  It  was  agreed  that  international  law 
Art.  227  provided  no  precedents  for  trying  him.  Therefore  it 
was  declared  that  "the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
publicly  arraign  WilHam  II  of  Hohenzollern,  formerly 
German  Emperor,  for  a  supreme  offense  against 
international  morality  and  the  sanctity  of  treaties. 
A  special  tribunal  will  be  constituted  to  try  the 
accused,  thereby  assuring  hun  the  guarantees  essential 
to  the  right  of  defense."  The  United  States,  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan  will  each  appoint 
a  judge.  "In  its  decision  the  tribunal  will  be  guided 
by  the  highest  motives  of  international  policy,  with 
a  view  to  vindicating  the  solemn  obligations 
of  international  undertakings  and  the  validity 
of  international  morahty.  It  will  be  its  duty  to 
fix  the  punishment  which  it  considers  should  be 
imposed, 

"The  Alhed  and  Associated  Powers  will  address  a 
request  to  the  government  of  the  Netherlands  for 
the  surrender  to  them  of  the  ex-Emperor  in  order  that 
he  may  be  put  on  trial." 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  155 

The  German  delegates  objected  vigorously  to 
this  article,  but  without  avail.  In  neutral  and  Allied 
countries  opinion  was  divided.  Some  were  impressed 
with  the  doubtful  legality  of  placing  the  whole  blame 
on  one  individual,  and  of  trying  him  before  a  court  of 
his  enemies  for  an  act  which,  however  immoral,  was 
not  punishable  under  international  law  at  the  time  it 
was  committed.  Others  felt  the  inadvisability  of 
making  a  martyr  of  the  Kaiser,  and  thus  risking  his 
rehabilitation  in  the  affections  of  the  German  people. 
Others  insisted  that  in  the  interests  of  future  peace 
the  dead  past  should  be  forgotten  and  forgiven  as  soon 
as  possible.  On  the  other  hand  warnings  were  heard 
against  sentimental  softening  which  should  weakly 
overlook  the  German  crimes.  In  the  name  of 
Louvain  and  the  "Lusitania"  and  the  Armenians, 
in  the  name  of  every  soldier  who  had  died  to  save 
civilization,  the  protest  was  raised  against  extending 
an  unsought  forgiveness  to  the  unrepentant  author 
of  the  greatest  crime  of  history. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  prospect  of  the  actual 
trial  of  the  Kaiser  was  somewhat  of  an  embarrassment. 
The  request  was  duly  made  on  the  Netherlands  for  his 
surrender,  and  promptly  refused  as  unwarranted  by 
international  law.  If  the  matter  rests  there,  the 
AlHes  will  probably  be  secretly  relieved.  It  would 
have  been  simple  to  have  provided  in  the  Treaty 
that  Germany  should  request  the  extradition  of  the  ex- 
Kaiser,  and  then  deliver  him  to  the  Allies.  The  fact 
that  Germany  was  spared  this  supreme  humiUation 


Art.  228 


156       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

may  indicate  that  the  Allies  were  wilHng  to  pass 
the  responsibility  to  Holland,  with  the  expectation  of 
thus  escaping  from  the  whole  situation.  An  assur- 
ance from  Holland  that  the  Kaiser  will  be  interned 
will  probably  be  accepted. 

The  question  of  tr}'ing  those  guilty  of  atrocities 
rests  on  a  different  plane.  The  German  government 
is  forced  to  recognize  "the  right  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  to  bring  before  mihtary  tribunals 
persons  accused  of  having  committed  acts  in  violation 
of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war."  Violations  of  the 
"law  of  humanity"  are  not  mentioned,  nor  is  the 
phrase  "however  highly  placed"  inserted,  though  it 
is  of  course  impHed.  "Such  persons  shall,  if  found 
guilty,  be  sentenced  to  punishments  laid  down  by 
law.  This  provision  will  apply  notwithstanding 
any  proceedings  or  prosecution  before  a  tribunal  in 
Gerrpany  or  in  the  territory  of  her  Allies. 

The  German  government  is  required  to  "  hand  over 
to  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  or  to  such  one 
of  them  as  shall  so  request,  all  persons  accused  of 
having  committed  an  act  in  violation  of  the  laws  and 
customs  of  war,  who  are  specified  either  by  name  or  by 
the  rank,  office  or  employment  which  they  held  under 
the  German  authorities." 
Art.  229  "Persons  guilty  of  criminal  acts  against  the 
nationals  of  one  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
will  be  brought  before  the  military  tribunals  of  that 
Power.  Persons  guilty  of  criminal  acts  against 
the  nationals  of  more  than  one  of  the  Allied  and 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  157 

Associated  Powers  will  be  brought  before  military 
tribunals  composed  of  members  of  the  military 
tribunals  of  the  Powers  concerned.  In  every  case 
the  accused  will  be  entitled  to  name  his  own  counsel." 
The  German  government  must  co-operate  in  furnish-  ^^-  ^^° 
ing  information  and  evidence. 

The  plan  of  the  Joint  Tribunal  was  given  up,  and 
the  accused  are  to  be  tried  as  they  would  have  been 
tried  if  they  had  been  captured.  Some  Germans 
indeed,  who  had  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Allies, 
had  already  been  tried  before  military  courts. 

During  the  discussions,  the  German  delegates  had 
protested  against  delivering  their  nationals  for  trial 
by  their  enemies.  No  attempt  was  made  to  deny  that 
some  Germans  had  committed  crimes  for  which  they 
deserved  punishment.  They  contended,  however, 
that  the  German  government  was  ready  and  willing  to 
proceed  to  the  trial  of  such  persons  and  the  infliction  of 
suitable  penalties .  The  German  criminal  code  forbade 
their  surrender  for  trial  by  foreigners.  They  pointed 
out  that  proceedings  had  already  been  begun  against 
certain  persons.  The  Allies,  however,  were  unwilling 
to  trust  the  German  courts  to  do  justice  to  high  and 
low  for  all  the  acts  of  "f rightfulness,"  and  would  not 
yield.  ''The  powers  cannot  intrust  the  trial  of  those 
responsible  to  ...  .  their  accomplices."  They  even 
insisted  that  action  by  the  German  Courts  should  not 
affect  the  question  of  surrender  to  the  Allies.  The  Ger- 
mans also  had  their  grievances  against  certain  Allied 
officers   and  men,  and  asked  that  the  preliminary 


158       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

question  whether  offenses  against  international  law 
had  been  committed  "should  be  submitted  to  an 
international  tribunal  of  competent  neutrals  to 
judge  all  violations  by  subjects  of  all  the  signatories, 
Germany  to  have  her  share  in  the  formation  of  this 
tribunal,  and  the  meting  out  of  punishment  to  be 
left  to  the  national  courts."^  The  Allies  refused  to 
admit  the  participation  of  powers  which  had  taken  no 
part  in  the  war.  They  promised  the  German  delega- 
tion, however,  to  submit  within  a  month  after  the 
Treaty  came  into  eft'ect  a  final  list  of  those  who  would 
be  tried. 

These  clauses  were  particularly  hard  for  the 
German  pride  to  accept,  and  they  were  denounced  by 
the  German  press  with  especial  bitterness.  On  no 
point  however  has  Allied  opinion  been  more  settled 
than  on  the  necessity  for  punishing  the  individual 
authors  of  atrocities,  whenever  they  can  be  identified. 
The  only  differences  have  been  as  to  the  degree  to 
which  a  subordinate,  for  instance  a  submarine  com- 
mander, would  be  excused  by  the  fact  that  he  acted 
under  orders,  and  the  exact  manner  in  which  respon- 
sibility could  be  fastened  on  those  higher  up  for  the 
consequences  of  general  policies  which  they  initiated. 

Even  after  the  Treaty  was  signed,  the  German 
press  and  the  government  continued  to  ask  for  some 
relaxation  of  these  penalty  clauses.  One  proposal 
was  that  the  Allies  should  appoint  associate  justices 
to  sit  in  the  German  tribunals  to  try  those  accused 

'  New  York  Times'  Current  History,  July,  1919,  p.  25. 


The  Treaty  oj  Versailles  159 

of  crimes  against  the  laws  and  customs  of  war.  The 
German  government  professed  to  be  afraid  that  the 
surrender  of  a  large  number  of  persons,  including  a 
number  of  popular  heroes,  would  provoke  widespread 
disorder  which  they  would  be  powerless  to  repress. 
The  Allies,  however,  went  ahead  with  the  gathering 
of  evidence  and  the  preparation  of  their  list.  Mean- 
while many  who  suspected  that  their  surrender  would 
be  called  for  took  refuge  in  neutral  countries. 

The  list  as  finally  submitted  early  in  February, 
1920,  contained  896  names.  The  inclusion  of 
Bethmann-Hollweg,  von  Hindenburg,  von  Ludendorf , 
von  Mackenzen,  the  Crown  Prince,  Crown  Prince 
Rupprecht  of  Bavaria,  and  Admiral  von  Tirpitz 
showed  that  the  Allies  were  determined  to  bring  home 
to  the  civil  and  military  heads  of  the  old  German 
government  the  responsibility  for  such  general 
policies  as  deportations,  submarine  warfare,  requisi- 
tions, devastation  of  property,  and  the  like.  The 
list  was  submitted  as  a  whole,  with  separate  lists 
showing  the  demands  of  each  of  the  Allied  govern- 
ments. The  offenses  for  which  each  individual  is  to 
be  tried  are  specified. 

The  presentation  of  the  list  caused  a  grave  crisis. 
The  German  representative  in  Paris  resigned  rather 
than  transmit  it  to  Berlin.  All  sections  of  German 
opinion  solidly  opposed  the  surrender.  On  all  sides 
it  was  declared  that  the  Allies  would  have  to  come 
and  get  their  victims.  It  became  evident  that  to 
press  the  demands  would  result  in  the  fall  of   the 


i6o        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

German  government,  causing  a  period  of  confusion 
which  might  have  the  most  disastrous  consequences. 
The  AlUes  therefore  decided  to  allow  the  German 
government  to  proceed  with  the  trials  in  the  first 
instance,  reserving  the  right  to  demand  revision  in 
cases  where  justice  does  not  seem  to  be  done. 

This  represents  a  distinct  victory  for  the  German 
point  of  view.  In  various  sections  of  the  Allied 
press  the  warning  is  uttered  that  if  the  Allies  yield  on 
this  first  test  case  the  Germans  will  be  encouraged  to 
repudiate  other  obligations  under  the  Treaty.  In 
France  particularly  various  papers  urged  that  if 
Germany  was  not  going  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  the 
Treaty,  France  would  be  justified  in  retaining  a  hold 
on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine.  ^ 

PART  VIII 

REPARATION 

The  German  people  entered  upon  the  war  with 
enthusiasm  and  subscribed  to  the  early  war  loans 
willingly  with  the  expectation  that  the  cost  of  the 
war  would  be  assessed  on  their  defeated  foes.  This 
belief  was  encouraged  by  the  leaders;  and  as  the  war 
dragged  on,  and  the  burden  of  debt  became  more 
staggering,  it  was  felt  increasingly  that  Germany 
must  win,  or  face  bankruptcy.  There  is  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  a  completely  victorious  Germany 
would  have  exacted  the  last  possible  farthing  of 
indemnity  for  their  expenses  incurred  in  defending 
themselves  against  "the  unprovoked  attacks  of  their 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  i6i 

jealous  enemies."  Frequent  references  were  made  to 
the  mistake  that  had  been  made  in  1871  in  not  "bleed- 
ing France  white." 

Allied  leaders  declared  early  and  emphatically 
that  they  would  fight  until  Germany  was  compelled 
to  make  restitution  for  the  damage  done  Belgium, 
France,  and  Serbia.  The  British  also  were  deter- 
mined to  secure  compensation  for  the  merchant 
ships  destroyed,  and  "ton  for  ton"  became  a  popular 
slogan.  The  United  States  also  was  preparing  claims 
for  lives  and  property  lost  in  the  submarine  campaign. 

The  Russian  Revolution  gave  a  new  turn  to  the 
discussion,  and  the  formula  "no  forcible  annexations 
and  no  punitive  indemnities"  soon  became  famous. 
The  Russian  radicals  took  up  and  urged  the  sug- 
gestion that  all  the  belhgerents  should  contribute 
to  a  fund  for  the  restoration  of  Belgium,  East  Prussia, 
Poland,  and  other  devastated  districts.  The  Reichs- 
tag resolutions  of  July  19,  191 7,  gave  a  qualified 
assent  to  the  principle  of  "no  indemnities,"  and 
in  their  reply  to  the  Bolsheviki  at  Brest-Litovsk, 
December  25,  191 7,  the  delegates  of  the  Central 
Powers  declared  their  willingness  to  renounce  indem- 
nification for  war  costs  and  war  damages.'  The 
treaties  of  Brest-Litovsk  and  Bucharest,  however, 
showed  how  enormous  advantages  might  be  exacted 
without  using  the  unpleasant  word  "indemnity." 

In  the  Fourteen  Points  of  President  Wilson,  the 
"restoration"    of    Belgium,    France,    Serbia,    and 

'  Documents  and  Proposals,  p.  102. 


1 62        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Rumania  was  mentioned.  When  the  Germans  de- 
clared their  willingness  to  make  peace  on  the  basis 
of  the  Wilson  program,  the  Allies  qualified  their 
acceptance  by  giving  their  interpretation  of  "restora- 
tion." "  By  it  they  understand  that  compensation  will 
be  made  by  Germany  for  all  damage  done  to  the  civilian 
population  of  the  Allies  and  their  property  by  the 
aggression  of  Germany  by  land,  by  sea,  and  from  the 
air."   President  Wilson  agreed  with  this  interpretation. 

In  the  preliminary  discussions  over  the  drafting 
of  the  Treaty,  it  soon  became  evident  that  a  powerful 
group  was  strongly  in  favor  of  stretching  these 
general  phrases  to  the  utmost.  Many  of  the  unthink- 
ing public  in  England  and  France  had  been  led  by 
incautious  statements  of  their  leaders  to  expect  that 
the  entire  cost  of  the  war  to  the  Allies  could  be 
transferred  to  Germany.  The  French  press  talked 
of  demanding  the  repayment  with  interest  of  the 
indemnity  of  187 1,  and  even  that  of  181 5.  Lloyd 
George  and  Clemenceau  had  to  make  as  good  a 
showing  as  possible  toward  meeting  these  extrava- 
gant expectations.  President  Wilson  attempted  to 
moderate  the  claims,  but  without  much  success. 

The  most  elementary  thinking  on  the  subject  soon 
made  it  clear  that  the  entire  national  wealth  of  Ger- 
many would  not  begin  to  pay  the  whole  cost  of  the 
war.  The  Allied  policy  therefore  came  to  be,  first, 
to  fix  the  German  responsibility  in  as  broad  terms 
as  possible,  and  then  to  make  the  Germans  pay  as 
large  an  amount  as  they  were  physically  able  to  do. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  163 

The  American  representatives  throughout,  without 
any  feeling  of  leniency  toward  the  Germans,  were 
impressed  with  the  practical  undesirabihty  of  impos- 
ing such  a  crushing  burden  that  the  Germans  would 
become  bankrupt,  or  be  driven  to  bolshevism,  to  the 
loss  of  their  creditors.  They  wished  to  fix  a  definite 
total  sum  for  Germany  to  pay,  in  order  to  end  uncer- 
tainty and  hasten  the  restoration  of  more  normal 
world-conditions.  The  Allies  recognized  the  theoreti- 
cal validity  of  this  position;  but  they  looked  across 
at  the  undevastated  fields  of  the  Fatherland,  and 
saw  the  factories  with  their  machinery  intact,  and 
contrasted  the  situation  there  with  the  ruined  areas 
of  France  and  Belgium,  and  they  refused  to  take 
any  chances  of  letting  Germany  off  too  easily. 

At  the  forefront  of  the  general  provisions  in  the 
section  on  reparation  the  Allies  inserted  the  clause 
"the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  affirm  and 
Germany  accepts  the  responsibihty  of  Germany  and 
her  allies  for  causing  all  the  loss  and  damage  to  which 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  and  their 
nationals  have  been  subjected  as  a  consequence  of 
the  war  imposed  upon  them  by  the  aggression  of 
Germany  and  her  allies."  The  Germans  naturally 
objected  to  admitting  in  principle  their  responsibihty 
for  the  entire  cost  of  the  war  to  their  enemies.  In 
their  note  of  May  13,  they  declared  "the  obligation 
to  make  reparation  has  been  accepted  by  Germany 
by  virtue  of  the  note  from  Secretary  of  State  Lansing 
of  November  5,  191 8,  independently  of  the  question 


Art.  231 


164       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

,  of  responsibility  for  the  war."  They  went  on  to 
disclaim  responsibility  for  the  faults  of  the  old 
German  Government.  The  latter  contention  was  of 
course  of  no  weight  in  international  law,  and  it  was 
demolished  by  Clemenceau's  reply  of  May  20.  The 
statement,  however,  that  by  faiHng  to  protest  against 
the  phrase  "Germany's  aggression  by  land,  sea, 
and  air"  the  German  government  therefore  ''recog- 
nized in  1918,  impHcitly  but  clearly,  both  the  aggres- 
sion and  the  responsibility"  seems  far-fetched. 
Certainly  the  German  government  had  no  such 
understanding  or  intention.  The  fact  would  appear 
to  be  that  the  clause  was  inserted  in  the  Treaty 
in  an  attempt  to  satisfy  pubUc  opinion. 

Having  fixed  the  complete  responsibihty  of  Ger- 
Art.  232  jY^any  for  all  costs  and  damages,  the  Allied  and  Associ- 
ated Governments  go  on  to  say  that  they  recognize 
that  the  resources  of  the  reduced  Germany  will  not  be 
adequate  to  make  complete  reparation.  They  there- 
fore require  Germany  to  undertake  to  make  reparation 
for  damage  done  to  civilians. 

In  the  first  place,  they  interpret  Germany's 
pledges  as  to  the  complete  restoration  of  Belgium  in 
such  a  way  as  to  require  the  reimbursement  of  the 
Allies  for  all  the  sums  loaned  to  Belgium  for  the  pur- 
pose of  defending  herself  against  the  violation  of  the 
treaty  of  1839.  For  this  purpose  Germany  is  to 
turn  over  5  per  cent  gold  bonds  payable  in  1926.  The 
amount  will  be  about  a  billion  dollars."  Morally  of 
course  Germany  is  responsible  for  these  payments, 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  165 

and  in  a  sense  this  burden  of  debt  incurred  by  the 
Belgian  people  is  a  damage  to  the  civiHan  population. 
Furthermore  Belgium  was  peculiarly  wronged,  and 
has  a  just  claim  to  special  consideration.  Neverthe- 
less it  has  seemed  to  many  who  cannot  be  accused 
of  pro-German  sympathies  that  this  clause  cannot 
be  justified  by  any  reasonable  interpretation  of  the 
agreements  preceding  the  armistice. 

Germany  is  required  to  make  an  immediate  ^'^'^-  ^^^ 
payment,  before  May,  192 1,  of  the  equivalent  of 
20,000,000,000  gold  marks,  in  gold,  commodities, 
ships,  and  otherwise.  After  deducting  the  expenses 
of  the  army  of  occupation,  and  the  cost  of  food  and 
raw  materials  supplied  to  Germany,  the  balance  will 
be  credited  to  the  reparation  account. 

The  Annex  which  describes  the  different  categories 
under  which  Germany  must  make  reparation  to  the 
Allied  civilians  again  stretches  "damage  done  to  the 
civilian  population"  to  the  utmost.  Of  the  ten 
classes  of  injuries,  some  are  obviously  fair.  Thus 
compensation  is  claimed  for  death  or  injury  of 
civilians  and  injury  to  their  property  due  to  all  acts 
of  war.  Damage  caused  by  acts  of  cruelty,  violence, 
or  maltreatment,  including  deportation,  forced  labor, 
exposure  in  small  boats,  is  to  be  made  good  so  far  as 
possible  to  the  victims  or  their  surviving  dependents. 
Damage  caused  by  maltreatment  of  prisoners  of 
war  may  fairly  enough  be  exacted.  More  doubtful 
is  the  cost  of  assistance  to  Allied  prisoners  of  war  and 
their  dependents. 


1 66        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

The  Treaty  further  classifies  as  "damage  caused 
to  the  peoples  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers" 
all  pensions  to  wounded  and  disabled  soldiers  and 
sailors  and  their  dependents,  and  all  separation 
allowances  paid  to  the  families  of  men  in  the  service. 
The  American  delegation  strongly  opposed  these 
provisions,  partly  as  a  breach  of  the  understanding 
on  which  the  Germans  surrendered,  partly  because 
it  would  be  utterly  impossible  for  Germany  to  pay 
over  as  required  a  capital  sum  the  interest  on  which 
would  pay  the  pensions  "on  the  basis  of  the  scales  in 
force  in  France."  The  argument  in  favor  of  includ- 
ing these  claims  seemed  to  be  in  brief  that  Germany 
had  it  coming;  that  Germany  had  to  accept  any 
terms  the  Allies  chose  to  impose;  that  the  Allies  had 
been  led  to  expect  that  Germany  would  pay  the  bills; 
that  the  Allies  needed  the  money;  and  that  it  was 
possible  that  Germany  might  turn  out  to  be  able 
to  pay  all,  or  at  least  part,  of  the  sums  demanded. 
Liberal  opinion  has  quite  generally  condemned  these 
exactions  as  unwarranted  and  ill  advised. 
Annex  III  Germany  further  recognizes  the  right  of  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  to  the  replacement  "  ton  for  ton 
and  class  for  class"  of  all  merchant  ships  or  fishing 
boats  lost  or  damaged  in  the  war.  Since  the  whole 
German  merchant  marine  would  be  inadequate,  the 
Alhes  will  accept  all  ships  over  sixteen  hundred  tons, 
half  the  ships  between  one  thousand  and  sixteen 
hundred  tons,  and  a  quarter  of  the  trawlers  and  fishing 
boats.     In  addition,  Germany  is  for  five  years  to  build 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  167 

and  turn  over  as  directed  by  the  Reparation  Com- 
mission not  to  exceed  200,000  tons  of  shipping  a  year. 

Naturally  enough,  the  return  of  cash,  animals,  ^^^-  ^■'^ 
machinery,  and  property  of  all  kinds  carried  off  by 
the  Germans  is  required.  In  this  connection  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  several  armistice  agreements 
had  provided  for  this,  and  that  ever  since  November, 
19 18,  this  particular  form  of  restoration  had  been 
going  on  steadily. 

As  a  direct  contribution  to  the  rebuilding  of 
France  and  Belgium,  Germany  "agrees  to  the  direct  ^^^^^^^^v 
appHcation  of  her  economic  resources  to  reparation." 
These  are  to  include  animals,  building  material, 
machinery,  and  tools.  Their  value  is  to  be  credited  to 
Germany  in  the  reparation  account.  The  Allies, 
however,  are  to  consider  the  domestic  requirements 
of  Germany,  and  "the  maintenance  of  Germany's 
social  and  economic  Kfe."  In  particular  the  German 
government  is  to  deliver  within  three  months  after  the 
Treaty  comes  in  force  specified  quantities  of  Hve  stock.^ 

In  addition,  Germany  grants  to  France,  Belgium,  A"°«^v 
and  Italy  the  option  of  purchasing  coal,  benzol, 
dyestuffs,  and  chemicals  in  specified  quantities  for 
a  number  of  years.  For  ten  years  France  is  to 
have  the  right  to  buy  7,000,000  tons  of  coal  a  year, 
besides  enough  to  make  up  the  deficiency  in  the 

'To  France:  500  stallions;  30,000  fillies  and  mares;  2,000  bulls; 
90,000  milch  cows;  1,000  rams;  100,000  sheep;  10,000  goats.  To 
Belgium:  200  stallions;  5,000  mares;  5,000  fillies;  2,000  bulls; 
50,000  milch  cows;  40,000  heifers;  200  rams;  20,000  sheep;  15,000 
sows. 


1 68        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

output  of  the  wrecked  mines  of  the  north.  Belgium 
may  purchase  8,000,000  tons  for  ten  years,  and  for 
the  same  period  Italy  may  take  amounts  increasing 
from  4,500,000  to  8,500,000  tons.  The  options  are 
to  be  exercised  through  the  Reparation  Commission, 
which  may  postpone  or  cancel  deliveries  if  they 
"would  unduly  interfere  with  the  industrial  require- 
ments of  Germany." 

Annex  VI  -pj^g  Reparation  Commission  is  given  an  option  on 

half  the  German  stock  of  dyestuffs  and  chemicals  at 
the  time  the  Treaty  comes  into  force,  and  on  a  quarter 
of  the  stock  each  year  until  1925. 

Annex  VII  j^  addition  to  all  these  provisions,  Germany  is 
compelled  to  give  up  most  of  the  submarine  cables. 
There  was  a  great  deal  of  discussion  as  to  whether 
cables  are  properly  "spoils  of  war,"  to  be  taken  by 
the  victors.  As  usual,  the  decision  went  against 
Germany,  and  credit  in  the  reparation  account  was 
given  only  for  the  portions  privately  owned. 

Sec.  II,  ^g  special  provisions  of  the  reparation  settlement. 

Art.  245  1   •  1/1 

Germany  is  required  to  restore  trophies  and  Hags 
taken  in  1870-71.  When  this  requirement  became 
known,  a  number  of  these  flags  were  burned  by  a 
mob  in  the  streets  of  Berlin,  a  proceeding  which  only 
confirmed  the  world's  belief  that  the  Germans  are 
poor  losers.  Certain  documents  also  are  to  be  re- 
turned, which  are  interesting  historically  because 
they  are  supposed  to  contain  the  correspondence  of 
Napoleon  III  with  the  South  German  states  before 
the  Franco-Prussian  War.     Through   their  capture 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  169 

in  1870  Bismarck  gained  information  which  is  said 
to  have  helped  greatly  in  forcing  the  South  German 
states  to  join  the  new  Empire. 

To  the  King  of  Hedjaz  is  to  be  restored  the  Koran  ^"^^  ^46 
of  the  Caliph  Othman,  given  to  WilHam  II  by  the 
Turks.  To  the  British  is  to  be  handed  over  the 
skull  of  the  Sultan  Mkwawa,  taken  from  East  Africa. 
The  Sultan  was  an  object  of  reverence  in  East  Africa, 
and  the  British  as  prospective  mandatories  will  un- 
doubtedly gain  local  approbation  by  restoring  the  skull. 

Finally,   Germany  is  to  give  to  the  library  at  ^^-  ^^^ 
Louvain  books  and  manuscripts  corresponding  in  num- 
ber and  value  to  those  burned,  and  is  to  give  to  Bel- 
gium the  portions  to  complete  two  famous  paintings. 

In  order  to  see  that  all  these  provisions  are  carried  ^'"'^''  ^^ 
out,  there  is  created  by  the  Treaty  a  Reparation 
Commission,  consisting  of  delegates  of  the  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  Japan,  Belgium, 
and  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State.  The  first  four 
vote  on  all  questions,  and  a  fifth  vote  is  cast  by  one  of 
the  others  on  matters  in  which  his  country  is  directly 
interested.  "The  Commission  shall  in  general  have 
wide  latitude  as  to  its  control  and  handling  of  the 
whole  reparation  problem  as  dealt  with  in  this  part 
of  the  present  Treaty  and  shall  have  authority  to  inter- ' 
pret  its  provisions."  For  whatever  part  of  the  total 
proved  claims  as  is  not  paid  in  gold,  ships,  securities,  or 
commodities,  Germany  is  to  issue  bonds.  Germany's 
taxation  must  always  be  as  heavy  proportionately  as 
that  in  any  country  represented  on  the  Commission. 


170       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

A  first  issue  of  bonds  amounting  to  20,000,000,000 
gold  marks  is  to  run  without  interest  to  May  i,  192 1. 
The  balance  remaining  to  Germany's  credit  from  the 
payments  required  by  Article  235  will  retire  a  corre- 
sponding amount  of  these  bonds  when  due.  Bonds 
not  retired  are  to  be  exchanged  for  new  interest- 
bearing  bonds. 

Another  immediate  issue  of  bonds  to  the  amount  of 
40,000,000,000  gold  marks  bears  interest  of  2^  per  cent 
from  1921  to  1926,  and  5  per  cent,  with  an  additional 
I  per  cent  for  amortization,  after  1926.  In  addition, 
a  written  agreement  is  to  be  deposited  with  the 
Commission  to  issue  another  40,000,000,000  marks 
worth  of  bonds,  bearing  5  per  cent  "when,  but  not 
until,  the  Commission  is  satisfied  that  Germany 
can  meet  such  interest  and  sinking  fund  obligations." 
Still  other  issues  "by  way  of  acknowledgment  and 
security"  may  be  demanded  by  the  Commission 
from  time  to  time. 

The  German  delegation,  and  German  public 
opinion,  read  into  the  reparations  provisions  the 
intention  to  condemn  the  German  people  to  "per- 
petual slave  labor."  They  offered  instead  to  pay  a 
maximum  of  one  hundred  bilUon  gold  marks,  twenty 
billion  by  1926,  the  rest  in  annual  instalments  with- 
out interest.  They  offered  up  to  20,000,000  tons  of 
coal  annually  for  five  years,  and  up  to  80,000,000  for 
the  next  five  years.  They  offered  to  place  their 
merchant  tonnage  in  a  world-pool,  part  of  their 
freight  space  constituting  part  of  their  reparation, 


The  Treaty  oj  Versailles  171 

and  to  build  for  a  series  of  years  more  tonnage  than 
demanded  of  them  in  the  Treaty.  The  Allies  replied 
that  they  had  not  exceeded  the  armistice  agreement, 
and  that  the  Reparation  Commission  had  no  power 
to  interfere  in  Germany's  internal  life.  Germany  is 
invited  to  create  a  co-operating  commission.  How- 
ever, in  order  to  facilitate  a  definite  settlement, 
Germany  may  within  four  months  of  the  signature 
of  the  Treaty  submit  any  desired  proposals.  "In 
particular,  she  may  offer  a  lump  sum  for  all  or  part  of 
her  liability,  undertake  to  reconstruct  all  or  part  of  a 
damaged  district,  offer  labor,  technical  service  or 
materials  for  reconstruction,  or,  in  short,  suggest 
any  feasible  plan  to  simplify  the  assessment  of  damage, 
eliminate  any  question  from  the  scope  of  the  inquiry, 
promote  the  performance  of  the  work  or  accelerate 
the  definition  of  the  ultimate  amount  to  be  paid. 
....  Within  two  months  thereafter  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers  will  return  their  answer  to  any 
such  proposals,  which  they  agree  to  consider  seriously 
and  fairly,  for  the  reason  that  no  one  would  be  better 
pleased  than  they  at  a  speedy  and  practical  settle- 
ment."^    With  this  offer  the  Germans  had  to  content 

themselves. 

PART  IX 

FINANCIAL  CLAUSES 

Subject   to   exceptions   approved  by   the    Com-  Art.  248 
mission,  the  reparation  payments  are  made  a  first 
charge  on  the  German  revenues.     Until  May  i,  1921, 

^New  York  Times'  Current  History,  July,  1919,  p.  35. 


172        An  Introduction  to  tJie  Peace  Treaties 

Germany  may  not  export  gold  without  permission. 

^^-  ^"^^  Germany  is  to  pay  all  costs  of  the  army  of  occupa- 

Art.  250  tion.     Germany  confirms  the  surrender  of  all  material 

handed  over  under  the  armistice  agreements,  receiv- 
ing credit  for  such  of  it  as  the  Commission  judges  of 
non-military  value. 

^^-  ^54  Following  the  general  custom,  it  is  provided  that 

the  powers  to  which  German  territory  is  ceded  shall 
assume  a  proportional  part  of  the  imperial  and  state 

■'^- ^^^  debt  as  it  stood  on  August  i,  1914.     Since  in  1871 

Germany  refused  to  assume  any  part  of  the  French 
debt  with  Alsace-Lorraine,  France  now  assumes  no 
part  of  the  German  debt.  Poland  need  not  pay  any 
portion  of  the  debt  contracted  for  the  German 
colonization  of  Posen.  Belgium  also  assumes  no 
part  of  the  German  debt.  The  AlHes  flatly  refused 
to  consider  assigning  any  part  of  the  actual  war  debt  to 
the  Uberated  territories,  since  most  of  the  inhabitants 
had  opposed  the  war,  and  since  one  of  Germany's 
objects  in  the  war  had  been  to  keep  them  in  subjection. 

Arts.  256, 257  German  public  property,  including  private  prop- 

erty of  former  rulers,  passes  to  the  powers  to  which 
territory  is  ceded.  Except  in  Alsace-Lorraine  and 
the  colonial  possessions,  the  value  of  this  property  is 
credited  to  the  reparation  account. 

^"^^^  ^58  The  remaining  clauses  require  Germany  to  give 

up  representation  on  international  bodies  operating 
in  allied  countries,  Austria,  Hungary,  Turkey,  Bul- 
garia, or  Russia.  The  Reparation  Commission  may 
within  a  year  demand  that  the  German  government 


Art.  260 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  173 

buy  up  from  German  subjects  and  turn  over  to  the 
Commission  their  interests  in  any  public  utility  or 
concession  in  Russia,  China,  Turkey,  Austria,  Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria,  or  any  territory  administered  by  a 
mandatory.  The  value  of  these  interests  will  be 
credited  to  the  reparation  account. 

PARTX 

ECONOMIC   CLAUSES 

This  part  of  the  Treaty  is  the  longest  and  most 
complicated.  It  provides  for  the  resumption  of 
commercial  relations,  for  the  revival  of  various 
treaties,  for  the  payment  of  private  debts  and  the 
carrying  out  of  contracts  suspended  by  the  war,  and 
for  the  disposition  to  be  made  of  enemy  private 
property.  The  clauses  seem  to  have  been  drawn 
with  the  following  objects  principally  in  view: 

1 .  The  protection  of  allied  and  associated  nationals 
and  their  economic  interests  against  discriminating 
German  legislation  or  action  for  at  least  five  years. 

2.  Special  provision  for  the  economic  interests  of 
those  portions  of  the  German  Empire  which  are 
transferred  to  other  states  during  the  period  of  re- 
adjustment. 

3.  The  uprooting  of  all  German  economic  interests 
and  control  in  allied  and  associated  countries,  in  the 
territory  of  Germany's  allies,  and  in  Asia  and  Africa. 

4.  The  revival  of  such  pre-war  treaties  and  inter- 
national conventions  as  the  victors  desire  to  have 
continued  with  Germany  as  a  party. 


174       -4w  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Chaps,  i,  ii,  iv  Germany  undertakes  not  to  discriminate  in  any- 
way whatever  against  import  or  export  trade  with 
aUied  or  associated  states,  or  against  their  shipping, 
or  against  their  nationals  resident  in  Germany. 
Germany  undertakes  to  protect  the  manufactured 

Art.  274  goods  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  "from  all 

forms  of  unfair  competition  in  commercial  transac- 
tions." 

For  five  years  natural  and  manufactured  products 

Art.  268  of    Alsace-Lorraine,    up    to    the    pre-war    average 

amounts,  are  to  be  admitted  to  Germany  free  of 
duty.  Textiles  sent  from  Germany  to  be  finished  in 
Alsace-Lorraine  are  for  this  period  to  be  exported 
from  Germany  and  reimported  without  duty.  For 
three  years  natural  and  manufactured  products  of 
the  parts  of  Poland  formerly  German  are  to  be 
admitted  to  Germany  without  duty. 

For  six  months  after  the  Treaty  comes  into  force, 
Germany  may  not  increase  the  1914  tariff  rates, 
and  for  thirty  months  longer  certain  schedules  may 
not  be  raised.  A  special  customs  regime  may  be 
appUed  by  the  Allies  to  the  occupied  Rhine  provinces 
if  thought  necessary  to  safeguard  the  economic 
interests  of  these  territories. 

The  Germans  comment  with  bitterness  upon  the 
fact  that  their  enemies  do  not  promise  not  to  dis- 
criminate against  German  trade  or  shipping  or 
nationals  resident  in  their  countries.  What,  it  is 
asked,  has  become  of  the  third  of  the  Fourteen 
Points,  ''the  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  eco- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  175 

nomic  barriers  and  the  estabKshment  of  an  equality 
of  trade  conditions  among  all  the  nations  consenting 
to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its  main- 
tenance" ?  It  is  true  that  the  Germans  are  not  to  be 
allowed  to  join  the  League  of  Nations  as  yet,  but 
that  is  only  an  added  grievance. 

The  second  section  lists  numerous  international 
treaties  and  conventions,  such  as  those  deahng  with 
the  Postal  Union,  the  suppression  of  the  white-slave 
traffic,  and  the  like.  These,  and  no  others,  are  to  be 
revived.  Each  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
may  decide  which  of  the  treaties  between  itself  and 
Germany  is  to  be  revived,  so  far  as  they  do  not  con- 
flict with  the  present  Treaty.  German  treaties  with 
Turkey,  Austria,  Hungary,  or  Bulgaria  since  August  i, 
1914,  are  abrogated,  and  all  treaties  whatever  with 
Rumania  and  with  the  Russian  Empire  or  states 
formed  from  it  are  also  abrogated.  In  part  these 
provisions  are  intended  to  bring  about  the  resumption 
of  normal  international  intercourse;  in  part  however 
they  are  designed  to  deprive  Germany  of  all  pohtical 
and  economic  control  in  the  territory  of  her  former 
allies  and  in  Russia. 

For  the  settlement  of  debts  between  the  citizens  of  ^"-  ^" 
opposing  powers,  the  payment  of  which  was  suspended 
by  the  war,  two  plans  are  outlined.  Any  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers  within  a  month  after  its 
ratification  of  the  Treaty  may  give  notice  that  it  will 
settle  such  debts  through  clearing-houses,  one  estab- 
lished by  itself,  and  one  in  Germany.    In  this  case 


176       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

each  of  the  opposing  powers  guarantees  the  payment 
of  debts  due  from  its  nationals  to  the  subjects  of  the 

Art.  296  (c)  Qti^gj.  state.  "  The  sums  due  to  the  nationals  of  one  of 
the  high  contracting  parties  by  the  nationals  of  an  op- 
posing state  will  be  debited  to  the  clearing  office  of 
the  country  of  the  debtor,  and  paid  to  the  creditor 
by  the  clearing  office  of  the  creditor." 

The  representatives  of  the  United  States  did 
not  wish  to  adopt  this  plan,  so  that  it  was  made 
optional.^ 

Section  IV  deals  in  the  most  sweeping  fashion  with 
private  property,  rights,  and  interests  in  an  enemy 
country.  In  the  first  place,  the  property  of  allied 
and  associated  nationals  which  has  been  affected  by 
exceptional  war  measures  in  Germany,  such  as 
sequestration  or  liquidation,  is  to  be  restored  to  the 
owners,  with  damages  for  any  injuries.  On  the  other 
hand,  all  such  exceptional  measures  against  German 
property  are  confirmed,  and  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  reserve  the  right  to  complete  the  liquidation 

Art. 298,  Qf  German  interests.  ''All  property,  rights,  and 
interests  of  German  nationals  within  the  territory 
of  any  AlKed  or  Associated  Power  and  the  net  pro- 
ceeds of  their  sale,  liquidation  or  other  dealing  there- 
with may  be  charged  by  that  ....  Power  in  the 
first  place  with  payment  of  amounts  due  in  respect 
of  claims  by  the  nationals  of  that  ....  Power  with 
regard  to  their  property,  rights,  and  interests,  in- 
cluding companies   and   associations  in  which  they 

'  Senate  Hearings,  pp.  14  ff. 


/ 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  177 

are  interested  in  German  territory,  or  debts  owing 
to  them  by  German  nationals,  and  with  payment  of 
claims  growing  out  of  acts  committed  by  the  German 
government  or  by  any  German  authorities  since 
July  31,  1 9 14,  and  before  that  Allied  or  Associated 
Power  entered  into  the  war."  These  amounts  may 
also  be  used  to  satisfy  claims  as  to  private  property 
in  other  enemy  territory  not  otherwise  satisfied. 
This  latter  provision  makes  German  private  prop- 
erty available  to  compensate  for  allied  and  associated 
losses  of  private  property  in  Austria,  Hungary, 
Turkey,  and  Bulgaria.  So  far  as  the  United  States 
is  concerned  these  provisions  validate  the  action 
taken  under  the  Trading  with  the  Enemy  Act  by  the 
Alien  Property  Custodian.  The  proceeds  of  German- 
owned  property  in  this  country  can  be  used,  if 
Congress  so  desires,  and  provides  for  paying  damages 
to  American-owned  property  in  Germany,  or  to  pay 
amounts  owed  to  Americans  by  Germans,  or  to  settle 
such  claims  as  those  arising  from  the  sinking  of  the 
"Lusitania." 

The  owners  of  all  this  German  private  property  ^'^-  ^^^  ^'^ 
are  referred  to  their  own  government,  which  under- 
takes to  compensate  them. 

'■  ,  Sec.  V, 

•  Contracts  between  enemies  are  to  be  regarded  Art.  299 
as  dissolved  as  from  the  time  when  they  became 
enemies;  but  the  Allies  reserve  the  right  to  make 
exceptions  within  six  months.  This  article,  together 
with  the  Annex  covering  special  forms  of  contract, 
such  as  insurance,  is  not  to  apply  to  the  United  States, 


178        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Brazil,  or  Japan,  where  the  constitution  and  laws 
do  not  permit  the  impairment  of  contracts. 

Disputed  matters  as  to  debts  and  claims  to 
property  rights  are  to  be  referred  to  a  Mixed  Arbitral 
Tribunal  which  each  power  is  to  establish  with 
Germany.  Of  the  three  members,  each  government 
chooses  one;  the  president  is  chosen  by  agreement, 
or  appointed  from  some  neutral  nation  by  the  Council 
of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Sec.  vn  Unless  otherwise  provided  in   the  Treaty,   and 

subject  to  special  measures  taken  during  the  war, 
"rights  of  industrial,  literary,  and  artistic  property" 
are  restored  to  all  their  owners.  Nevertheless,  the 
AlUed  and  Associated  Powers  reserve  the  right,  except 
as  to  trade-marks,  to  impose  such  limitations  and 
conditions  on  the  working  or  control  of  German  rights 
of  this  character  "as  may  be  considered  necessary 
for  national  defense,  or  in  the  public  interest,  or  for 
assuring  the  fair  treatment  by  Germany  of  the  rights 
of  industrial,  literary,  and  artistic  property  held  in 
German  territory  by  its  nationals,  or  for  securing  the 
due  fulfilment  of  all  the  obHgations  undertaken  by 
Germany  in  the  present  Treaty." 

Sec.  vni  Germany  agrees  to  transfer  to  any  power  to  which 
territory  is  ceded,  or  given  as  a  mandatory,  a  pro- 
portional part  of  the  reserves  accumulated  for  the 
payment'  of  social  or  state  insurance  in  such  ter- 
ritory. These  funds  must  be  used  for  this  purpose 
only. 


The  Treaty  oj  Versailles  179 

PART  XI 

AERIAL  NAVIGATION 

The  aircraft  of  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  are 
to  have  full  liberty  of  passage  and  landing  in  Germany, 
but  subject  to  any  regulations  governing  Gernian 
aircraft.  These  obligations  remain  in  force  until 
1923,  unless  Germany  is  sooner  admitted  to  the 
League,  or  allowed  to  adhere  to  the  Aerial  Navigation 
Convention  concluded  between  the  Allied  and  Associ- 
ated Powers. 

PART  XII 

PORTS,   WATERWAYS,   AND   RAILWAYS 

Germany  is  required  in  general  terms  to  grant  ^^"^-^ 
freedom  of  transit,  without  discrimination  in  charges 
or  service  or  otherwise,  to  persons,  goods,  vessels, 
railway  carriages,  freight  cars,  and  mails  going 
between  any  Allied  and  Associated  Powers.  Germany 
agrees  not  to  favor  by  surtax  or  bounties  imports 
or  exports  through  German  ports. 

"  The  nationals  of  any  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  An.  327 
Powers  as  well  as  their  vessels  and  property  shall 
enjoy  in  all  German  ports  and  on  the  inland  naviga- 
tion routes  of  Germany  the  same  treatment  in  all 
respects  as  German  nationals,  vessels  and  property." 
Here  again  the  chief  grievance  is  the  lack  of  reci- 
procity. 

Germany  is  required  to  continue  the  free  zones  ^'^•^^^ 
in  her  ports,  in  which  goods  may  be  landed  and  re- 
exported without  going  through  the  German  customs. 


i8o       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Since  Germany  had  established  these  before  the  war 
for  her  own  convenience,  there  can  be  no  objection 
to  continuing  them. 

Chapters  iii  and  iv  deahng  with  waterways  are  of 
great  interest  and  importance.  Four  great  rivers, 
with  all  navigable  parts  of  the  systems  which  natu- 
rally provide  more  than  one  state  with  access  to 
the  sea,  are  declared  international.  These  are  the 
Elbe  from  its  confluence  with  the  Moldau;  the 
Moldau  from  Prague;  the  Oder  from  its  confluence 
with  the  Oppa;  the  Niemen  from  Grodno;  and  the 
Danube  from  Ulm.  On  these  waterways,  including 
parallel  canals,  and  a  Rhine-Danube  canal  if  one  is 
built,  "the  nationals,  property,  and  flags  of  all 
powers  shall  be  treated  on  a  footing  of  perfect  equal- 
ity." No  dues  may  be  levied  except  reasonable  port 
charges.  A  convention  is  to  be  drawn  up  by  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  and  approved  by  the 
League  of  Nations,  fixing  the  details  of  administration. 
To  this  Germany  promises  assent.  Germany  is  to 
cede  to  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  a  portion  of 
her  tugs  and  vessels  on  the  rivers,  the  number  to 
be  determined  by  arbitrators  appointed  by  the  United 
States,  "due  regard  being  had  to  the  legitimate  needs 
of  the  parties  concerned."  The  Elbe  is  to  be  under  a 
Commission  comprising  four  representatives  of  the 
German  states  bordering  on  the  river,  two  representa- 
tives of  the  Czecho-Slovak  State,  and  one  each  repre- 
senting Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium. 
The  Oder  Commission  is  to  be  made  up  of  three 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  i8i 

Prussian  representatives,  and  one  each  from  Poland, 
the  Czecho-Slovak  State,  Great  Britain,  France,  Art.342 
Denmark,  and  Sweden.  On  a  request  to  the  League 
of  Nations  from  any  riparian  state,  the  Niemen  is  to 
be  placed  under  a  Commission  composed  of  one 
representative  of  each  riparian  state,  and  three 
representatives  of  other  states  specified  by  the 
League, 

The  Danube  Commission  reassumes  its  powers, 
although  "as  a  provisional  measure,  only  representa- 
tives of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Rumania  ^"347 
shall  constitute  this  Commission."  For  the  Upper 
Danube,  beyond  the  point  where  the  existing  Com- 
mission has  control,  a  new  Commission  is  created, 
made  up  of  two  representatives  of  each  German 
riparian  state,  one  from  each  of  the  other  riparian 
states,  and  one  representative  of  each  non-riparian 
state  in  future  represented  on  the  Danube  Com- 
mission. 

For  the  Rhine  and  the  Moselle,  the  Convention 
of  Mannheim  of  1868  is  revived  with  modifications. 
In  particular  the  Central  Commission  is  enlarged  to 
consist  of  two  representatives  each  from  the  Nether- 
lands, Switzerland,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  and  Belgium, 
four  representatives  of  the  German  riparian  states,  and 
four  of  France,  who  in  addition  nominates  the  presi- 
dent. Germany  cedes  to  France  a  number  of  tugs  and 
vessels  and  the  German  port  faciUties  in  Rotterdam, 
their  value  to  be  credited  as  reparation,  Germany 
paying   the   owners.     France  receives   the   right  to 


i82        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

take  water  from  the  Rhine  for  canals,  and  the  exclu- 
sive right  to  power  derived  from  "works  of  regula- 
.  tion"  on  the  river,  on  paying  Germany  half  the  value 
of  the  power.  In  neither  case  is  navigabihty  to 
be  interfered  with.  Germany  will  not  object  if  the 
Commission  extends  its  jurisdiction,  subject  to  the 
consent  of  Switzerland  and  Luxemburg. 
Chap.  V  ajj^  ^Yie  ports  of  Hamburg  and  Stettin,  Germany 
shall  lease  to  the  Czecho-Slovak  State,  for  a  period  of 
ninety-nine  years,  areas  which  shall  be  placed  under 
the  general  regime  of  free  zones  and  shall  be  used  for 
the  direct  transit  of  goods  coming  from  or  going  to 
that  state."  This  is  to  facilitate  access  to  the  sea  for 
independent  Bohemia. 

At  first  sight  the  provisions  dealing  with  the  rivers 
seem  to  some  to  be  very  radical,  and  an  unwarranted 
interference  with  German  sovereignty.  There  are, 
however,  excellent  reasons  for  them,  and  they  by  no 
means  represent  an  entirely  new  departure. 

Traffic  on  European  rivers  is  much  more  important 
relatively  than  in  the  United  States.  Where  rivers 
flow  through,  or  between,  several  states  it  long  ago 
became  apparent  that  practical  and  equitable  con- 
siderations demanded  some  modification  of  doctrines 
of  territorial  sovereignty  over  such  navigable  water- 
ways. By  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  1815,  it  was  pro- 
vided that  navigation  on  all  such  rivers  "from  the 
point  where  each  of  them  becomes  navigable  to  its 
mouth  shall  be  entirely  free,  and  shall  not,  in  respect 
to  commerce,  be  prohibited  to  anyone;   it  is  under- 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  183 

stood,  however,  that  one  will  conform  to  the  regula- 
tions relative  to  the  police  of  this  navigation.  These 
regulations  shall  be  uniform  for  all  and  as  favor- 
able as  possible  to  the  commerce  of  all  nations."^ 
Numerous  conventions  have  been  drawn  up,  and  com- 
missions created,  to  regulate  commerce  on  the  great 
international  rivers,  notably  the  Rhine.  The  com- 
missions, however,  have  represented  only  the  states 
bordering  on  the  river,  and  their  acts  have  been 
subject  to  confirmation  by  the  different  states. 

After  the  Crimean  War,  the  Treaty  of  Paris  applied 
the  principle  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  to  the  Lower 
Danube,  and  set  up  a  European  Commission  to 
improve  the  navigability  of  the  river  and  to  regulate 
commerce.  The  Commission  was  made  up  of  one 
representative  from  Great  Britain,  France,  Austria, 
Prussia,  Russia,  Sardinia,  and  Turkey.  It  was  expected 
that  later  a  commission  composed  entirely  of  repre- 
sentatives of  the  riparian  states  would  succeed  it,  but 
it  was  found  necessary  to  continue  the  original  plan. 
Subsequent  conventions  and  treaties  extended  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  Commission,  and  a  Rumanian  repre- 
sentative was  added.  The  work  of  this  Commission 
has  been  a  decided  success,  and  it  undoubtedly  fur- 
nished the  suggestion  for  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

The  essential  difference  between  the  Danube 
Commission  and  the  old  Rhine  Commission  is  that 
the  former  contained  representatives  of   the  great 

'  Article  109;  quoted  in  Sayre,  Experiments  in  International 
Administration,  p.  400. 


184       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

powers  whose  territory  is  not  touched  by  the  river, 
while  the  latter  did  not.  All  that  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  does,  therefore,  is  to  change  the  type  of 
commission  controlling  the  Rhine  by  the  addition 
of  members  representing  Great  Britain,  Belgium, 
and  Italy.  France,  by  regaining  Alsace-Lorraine, 
becomes  again  a  riparian  state  on  the  Rhine.  In 
view  of  the  success  of  the  Danube  Commission,  and 
looking  forward  to  increased  international  co- 
operation through  a  League  of  Nations,  the  plan 
seems  reasonable  and  promising. 

sec.m  'pj^g  ^-]jjj(j  section  deals  with  railway  traffic,  and 
amplifies  the  general  provisions  for  equahty  of  treat- 
ment for  traffic  going  into  or  through  Germany. 
The  various  Berne  conventions  covering  through- 
freight  traffic  are  revived,  but  Germany  agrees  to 
accept  a  new  convention  if  it  is  concluded  within  five 
years.  Germany  agrees  to  co-operate  in  establishing 
through-ticket  services  and  through  express  trains. 

Disputes  under  any  of  the  articles  on  ports,  water- 
ways, and  railways  are  to  be  settled  as  provided  by  the 
League  of  Nations.  The  League  may  recommend  the 
revision  of  any  articles  relating  to  a  permanent  admin- 
istrative regime,  and  after  five  years  the  Council  of  the 
League  may  modify  a  number  of  the  general  provisions. 

Sec.  VI         'pijg  j^jgi  Canal  is  to  be  open  to  merchant  and  war 

vessels  of  all  nations  at  peace  with  Germany  on  equal 

terms,  without  discrimination  in  favor  of  German 

ships.     Tolls  may  be  levied  only  for  the  maintenance 

-  of  the  canal.     The  decision  to  leave  the  canal  under 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  185 

German  control  was  reached  only  after  some  hesita- 
tion. There  were  various  suggestions  for  inter- 
nationalizing the  canal,  or  for  making  it  the  boundary 
between  Germany  and  Denmark.  Since  Denmark 
did  not  wish  this,  and  since  the  limitation  of  the 
German  navy  and  the  destruction  of  the  neighboring 
fortifications  on  the  Baltic  made  the  canal  of  little 
value  from  a  strategic  point  of  view,  the  Allies  felt 
that  it  was  unnecessary  and  unwise  to  take  it  over — 
one  instance,  at  least,  of  moderation. 

PART  XIII 
LABOR 

The  part  of  the  Treaty  dealing  with  labor  and  its 
conditions  and  providing  for  an  international  labor 
conference  is  in  its  possibilities  one  of  the  most  impor- 
tant. At  a  time  when  the  foundations  of  the  whole 
existing  order  were  being  shaken  by  bolshevism,  when 
in  every  Alhed  country  and  the  United  States  eco- 
nomic unrest  was  causing  the  gravest  anxiety,  the 
Conference  could  not  avoid  taking  some  action  in- 
tended to  conciliate  labor  and  looking  forward  to  the 
removal  of  the  causes  of  discontent.  Although  the 
radical  groups  had  little  or  no  faith  that  anything 
good  could  come  out  of  Versailles,  the  representatives 
of  the  organized  labor  unions  were  deeply  interested. 
The  Peace  Conference  appointed  a  commission  to 
consider  a  labor  program.  In  addition  to  the  five 
great  powers,  Belgium,  Cuba,  Poland,  and  the 
Czecho-Slovak  Republic  were  represented.     Samuel 


1 86       A71  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Gompers  was  chairman,  the  other  American  delegate 
being  A.  N.  Hurley.  One  of  the  British  representa- 
tives was  G.  N.  Barnes,  the  labor  member  of  the 
War  Cabinet.  The  Commission  agreed  on  a  general 
declaration  of  principles  regarding  the  rights  of 
workers  and  on  a  plan  of  organization  which  included 
an  International  Labor  Conference  and  a  permanent 
International  Labor  Office.  Their  report  is  incor- 
porated in  this  part  of  the  Treaty. 

In  drawing  up  the  provisions  for  the  Labor 
Conference,  two  points  in  particular  caused  much 
discussion,  the  number  and  voting  power  of  the  dele- 
gates and  the  method  by  which  their  decisions  should 
be  given  effect  in  the  various  countries.  It  was 
agreed  that  the  governments,  the  workers,  and  the 
employers  should  be  represented  by  delegates.  The 
French,  American,  ItaHan,  and  Cuban  members  of 
the  Commission  were  in  favor  of  giving  the  three 
parties  equal  voting  power.  On  the  other  hand  it 
was  urged  that  unless  the  government  delegates  agreed 
to  any  measure,  it  would  have  a  poor  chance  of  being 

Art.  389  approved  and  carried  out  by  the  several  states.^  It 
was  finally  agreed  that  each  state  should  appoint 
four  delegates,  two  to  represent  the  government, 
one  to  represent  labor,   and  one  to  represent  the 

Art.  390  employers.  The  representatives  vote  as  individuals. 
This  is  a  departure  from  the  accepted  rule  in  inter- 
national conferences,  the  object  being  to  allow  the 

'  Introduction  to  the  Commission  Report,  in  New  York  Times' 
Current  History,  June,  1919,  p.  516. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  187 

labor  representatives  of  the  different  delegations, 
as  well  as  the  employers,  to  vote  together.  There 
is  a  chance  therefore  for  divisions  along  group  as  well 
as  national  lines. 

While  the  Commission  hoped  that  in  the  course  of 
time  the  Labor  Conference  might  develop  into  "a 
truly  legislative  international  assembly,"  they  realized 
that  at  the  present  this  was  impossible.  At  first  it  was 
suggested  that  conventions  approved  by  two-thirds  of 
the  Conference  should  be  binding  on  each  state  unless 
the  national  legislature  within  a  year  expressed  its 
disapproval.  The  French  and  Italian  members  of  the 
Commission  wished  to  have  each  state  bound  whether 
its  legislature  approved  or  not,  subject  to  an  appeal 
to  the  Council  of  the  League.  It  was  realized,  how- 
ever, that  any  infringement  on  the  sovereign  right  of 
each  state  to  legislate  for  its  own  labor  conditions 
would  only  result  in  wrecking  the  whole  plan,  and 
perhaps  the  League  itself.  The  compromise  finally 
incorporated  in  the  Treaty  provides  that  draft 
conventions,  or  recommendations,  passed  by  a  two- 
thirds  vote  of  the  Labor  Conference  must  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  legislatures  of  the  member  states  for 
action  within  a  year.  In  the  case  of  federal  states, 
where  the  power  of  the  federal  government  to  enter 
into  labor  conventions  is  limited,  all  actions  have 
merely  the  force  of  recommendations.  In  the  case 
of  the  United  States,  our  obligations  under  the 
Treaty  would  be  first  to  submit  to  Congress  for  its 
action   any   proposed   international   convention,   or 


1 88       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

recommendation,  which  under  our  Constitution  it  is 
empowered  to  deal  with.  Any  proposals  which  con- 
cern matters  reserved  to  the  states  must  be  referred 
to  the  state  legislatures,  which  are  entirely  free  to 
accept,  modify,  or  reject  them. 

There  is  no  possible  way  of  compelling  a  govern- 
ment, federal  or  state,  to  enact  into  law  any  measure 
of  the  Conference.  In  case,  however,  that  a  nation 
has  formally  ratified  a  convention  and  then  does  not 
carry  out  its  undertakings,  complaint  may  be  made  to 
the  governing  body  of  the  Labor  OflEice,  which  may 
ask  the  offending  government  to  explain,  and  may 
pubhsh  all  the  correspondence.  It  is  expected  that 
this  appeal  to  public  opinion  will  be  effective.  In 
case  one  member  government  complains  that  another 
member  is  not  carrying  out  its  agreements,  the 
governing  body  of  the  Labor  Ofl&ce  may  appoint  a 
Commission  of  Inquiry  which  is  to  report  with  recom- 
mendations, including  an  indication  of  economic 
measures  which  other  governments  would  be  justified 
in  taking  toward  the  offending  state.  The  matter 
may  still  be  taken  before  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice  for  a  decision  and  recommen- 
dations. These  provisions  are  somewhat  elaborate, 
and  it  is  not  expected  that  they  will  be  often  invoked. 
They  detract  nothing  from  the  sovereignty  of  any 
member  state  and  expose  it  to  no  more  danger  of 
economic  reprisals  than  at  present,  when  any  govern- 
ment may  take  action  against  a  state  which  it  feels 
is  injuring  it  by  not  carrying  out  its  agreements. 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  189 

The  Conference  is  to  meet  at  least  once  a  year, 
ordinarily  at  the  seat  of  the  League.  It  decides  for 
itself  what  subjects  it  is  to  consider. 

There  is  to  be  estabUshed  as  a  part  of  the  organi- 
zation of  the  League  an  International  Labor  Office, 
under  a  governing  body  of  twenty-four.  Twelve  mem- 
bers are  appointed  by  governments,  eight  appointed  by 
the  members  which  are  "of  chief  industrial  impor- 
tance," four  by  the  delegates  at  the  Conference  of 
the  other  governments.  The  employers'  delegates  at 
the  Conference  nominate  six  members  of  the  govern- 
ing body,  and  the  labor  delegates  the  remaining  six. 
The  Labor  Office  has  a  staff,  and  concerns  itself  chiefly 
with  collecting  and  distributing  information  on  sub- 
jects connected  with  industrial  life  and  labor,  and  such 
other  subjects  as  the  Conference  may  refer  to  it. 

The  general  principles  included  in  this  part  of  the 
Treaty  are  of  such  importance  that  they  should  be 
quoted : 

The  League  of  Nations  has  for  its  object  the  establishment   Preamble 
of   universal   peace   and   such   a   peace  can  be  established 

only  if  it  is  based  upon  social  justice Conditions  of 

labor  exist  involving  such  injustice,  hardship  and  privation  to 
large  numbers  of  people  as  to  produce  unrest  so  great  that  the 
peace  and  harmony  of  the  world  are  imperilled 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  recognizing  that  the  well-  ^^^-  4^7 
being,  physical,  moral  and  intellectual,  of  industrial  wage- 
earners  is  of  supreme  international  importance,  have  framed, 
in  order  to  further  this  great  end,  the  permanent  machinery 
provided  for  in  Section  I  and  associated  with  that  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  They  recognise  that  differences  of  climate, 
habits  and  customs,  of  economic  opportunity  and  industrial 


190       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

tradition,  make  strict  uniformity  in  the  conditions  of  labour 
difficult  of  immediate  attainment.  But,  holding  as  they  do, 
that  labour  should  not  be  regarded  merely  as  an  article  of 
commerce,  they  think  that  there  are  methods  and  principles 
for  regulating  labour  conditions  which  all  industrial  communi- 
ties should  endeavour  to  apply,  so  far  as  their  special  circum- 
stances will  permit.  Among  these  methods  and  principles, 
the  following  seem  to  the  High  Contracting  Parties  to  be  of 
special  and  urgent  importance:  First — The  guiding  principle 
above  enunciated  that  labour  should  not  be  regarded  merely 
as  a  commodity  or  article  of  commerce.  Second — The  right 
of  association  for  aU  lawful  purposes  by  the  employed  as  well 
as  by  the  employers.  Third — The  payment  to  the  employed  of 
a  wage  adequate  to  maintain  a  reasonable  standard  of  life  as 
this  is  understood  in  their  time  and  country.  Fourth — The 
adoption  of  an  eight  hours  day  or  a  forty-eight  hours  week  as 
the  standard  to  be  aimed  at  where  it  has  not  already  been 
attained.  Fifth — 'The  adoption  of  a  weekly  rest  of  at  least 
twenty-four  hours,  which  should  include  Sunday  wherever 
practicable.  Sixth — ^The  aboUtion  of  child  labour  and  the 
imposition  of  such  limitations  on  the  labour  of  yoimg  persons 
as  shall  permit  the  continuation  of  their  education  and  assure 
their  proper  physical  development.  Seventh — The  principle  that 
men  and  women  shoidd  receive  equal  remuneration  for  work 
of  equal  value.  Eighth — The  standard  Scc  by  law  in  each 
country  with  respect  to  the  conditions  of  labour  should  have 
due  regard  to  the  equitable  economic  treatment  of  all  workers 
lawfully  resident  therein.  Ninth — Each  State  should  make 
provision  for  a  system  of  inspection  in  which  women  should 
take  part,  in  order  to  ensure  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  and 
regulations  for  the  protection  of  the  employed. 

Without  claiming  that  these  methods  and  principles  are 
either  complete  or  final,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  are  of 
opinion  that  they  are  well  fitted  to  guide  the  poUcy  of  the 
League  of  Nations;  and  that,  if  adopted  by  the  industrial 
communities  who  are  members  of  the  League,  and  safeguarded 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  191 

in  practice  by  an  adequate  system  of  such  inspection,  they 
will  confer  lasting  benefits  upon  the  wage-earners  of  the 
world. 

As  usual,  the  radicals  scoff  at  these  provisions  in 
the  Treaty,  professing  to  believe  that  the  declarations 
are  empty  generalities  which  will  not  be  followed  by 
the  governments  concerned.  Many  employers  rather 
hope  they  are  right.  Many  moderate  labor  leaders 
and  most  hberals  rather  hope  that  much  good  will 
result,  and  that  these  principles  may  more  and  more 
be  embodied  in  adequate  legislation. 

In  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  Treaty,  the 
first  International  Labor  Conference  met  in  Wash- 
ington from  October  29  to  November  29,  1919. 
The  United  States  could  be  represented  only  in- 
formally. German  and  Austrian  delegates  were  ap- 
pointed but  did  not  arrive.  It  was  the  feehng  of 
the  Conference,  however,  that  they  should  be  admitted 
to  the  next  meeting,  and  that  Germany  should  be  one 
of  the  eight  industrial  powers  entitled  to  representa- 
tion on  the  governing  body  of  the  Labor  Office.  The 
meetings  of  the  Conference  attracted  comparatively 
little  attention.  They  drew  up  six  draft  conventions 
and  six  recommendations,  dealing  with  hours  of  work, 
night  work  for  women,  employment  of  children,  and 
occupational  poisoning  and  diseases. 

The  Senate  of  the  United  States  voted  to  with- 
hold assent  from  the  entire  Labor  section  of  the 
Treaty  and  to  take  no  part  whatever  in  the  Inter- 
national Labor  Conference.' 

^  McCumber  Reservation,  November  18,  1919. 


192       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

PART  XIV 

GUARANTEES 

Arts.  428-32  ^g  ^  guarantee  for  the  execution  of  the  Treaty  by 
Germany,  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  will  con- 
tinue for  fifteen  years  to  occupy  the  territory  west 
of  the  Rhine  and  the  bridgeheads  as  provided  by  the 
armistice.  If  the  conditions  are  carried  out  by 
Germany,  part  of  the  territory  will  be  evacuated  after 
five  years,  more  at  the  end  of  ten.  If  Germany  com- 
pletely complies  with  all  the  terms  of  the  Treaty, 
the  evacuation  will  take  place  immediately.  The 
German  peace  delegates  protested  against  this  occupa- 
tion as  unnecessary,  and  as  detrimental  to  the  eco- 
nomic recovery  of  Germany.  While  the  AlHes  would 
not  change  the  Treaty,  they  assured  the  Germans 
that  a  genuine  and  prompt  compliance  with  the  other 
provisions  would  result  in  a  voluntary  modification 
of  the  terms  of  occupation. 

The  Baltic  provinces  of  Russia,  which  had  been 
occupied  by  German  troops,  were  to  be  evacuated 
when  the  Allies  required  it.  The  situation  in  these 
regions  was  very  confused,  with  Lettish  and  Esthonian 
forces  trying  to  maintain  independence,  Bolsheviki 
attacking,  anti-soviet  armies  operating  supposedly 
in  the  interest  of  a  constitutional  United  States  of 
Russia,  German  forces  renouncing  the  control  of 
Berlin  and  operating  independently.  Allied  com- 
missions trying  to  counteract  German  influences  and 
to  organize  an  attack  on  Petrograd,  and  the  British 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  193 

navy  bombarding  the  Bolshevik  warships  and  forts 
in  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  When  the  Allies  finally 
required  Berlin  to  withdraw  the  remaining  German 
troops  considerable  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
bringing  this  about. 

PART  XV 

MISCELLANEOUS  PROVISIONS 

The  most  important  of  the  miscellaneous  pro-  ^'434 
visions  which  conclude  the  Treaty  is  the  article 
requiring  Germany  to  agree  in  advance  to  any 
treaties  or  conventions  which  the  AlHed  and  Associated 
Powers  may  conc;lude  with  Germany's  former  allies. 
In  particular  Germany  is  to  recognize  the  territorial 
arrangements.  Other  clauses  concern  matters  to  be 
taken  up  with  Switzerland. 

Where  German  religious  missions  were  operating  in  ^^^-  ^^^ 
Allied  territory,  or  territory  to  be  under  Allied  control, 
the  property  is  to  continue  to  be  devoted  to  mis- 
sionary purposes.  It  is,  however,  to  be  handed 
over  to  trustees  appointed  by  the  respective  Allied 
governments.  The  Allies,  "while  continuing  to  main- 
tain full  control  as  to  the  individuals  by  whom  the 
missions  are  conducted,  will  safeguard  the  interests 
of  such  missions."  This  clause  was  regarded  as  neces- 
sary in  view  of  the  transfer  of  the  German  colonial 
possessions,  in  which  there  were  numerous  missionary 
enterprises.  It  was  felt  that  these  must  not  be  in  a 
position  to  stir  up  political  agitation  among  the 
native  population. 


194       -4^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

The  last  article  of  the  Treaty  forces  Germany  to 
recognize  all  decrees  of  allied  and  associated  prize 
courts,  but  gives  the  right  to  the  Allies  to  examine 
the  proceedings  of  German  prize  courts. 

The  Treaty  becomes  effective  when  Germany 
and  three  of  the  principal  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  exchange  ratifications.  ''In  other  respects 
the  Treaty  will  enter  into  force  for  each  Power  at 
the  date  of  the  deposit  of  its  ratification." 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  signed  by  plenipo- 
tentiaries in  behalf  of  the  various  governments;  but 
before  it  could  come  into  operation  it  had  to  be  ratified, 
and  the  ratifications  had  to  be  formally  exchanged. 

Under  the  British  Constitution,  the  consent  of 
Parhament  is  not  required  for  treaties  with  foreign 
powers.  In  order  to  carry  out  some  of  the  terms  of 
the  Treaty  with  Germany,  however,  an  act  of  Parlia- 
ment was  necessary,  and  a  bill  was  accordingly 
introduced.  In  effect  this  meant  that  the  whole 
Treaty  was  before  the  representatives  of  the  people, 
and  it  is  probable  that  in  the  future  this  precedent 
will  be  followed,  and  that  Parhament  will  thereby 
gain  a  greater  degree  of  control  over  foreign  poUcy. 
While  the  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons  brought 
out  some  opposition  to  the  Treaty,  chiefly  from  the 
Labor  and  Independent  Liberal  members,  it  was 
ratified  by  a  large  majority  July  21.  By  another 
constitutional  departure  the  Treaty  was  also  laid 
before  the  legislatures  of  the  four  Dominions  which 
had  signed  it,  and  was  ratified  by  all  of  them  by  the 


The  Treaty  of  Versailles  195 

middle  of  September.  On  October  10  the  King- 
Emperor  signed  the  act  of  ratification  for  the  British 
Empire. 

In  France,  after  a  somewhat  more  prolonged 
debate,  both  houses  of  the  Assembly  ratified  the 
Treaty,  and  the  act  was  signed  by  the  President  Octo- 
ber 14.  In  Italy  and  Japan  the  treaty-making  power 
is  by  the  constitution  vested  in  the  sovereign,  and 
the  necessity  of  submitting  it  to  the  legislature  was 
thus  avoided.  Both  these  rulers  ratified  the  Treaty 
in  October.  Poland  had  ratified  on  July  21,  and 
Belgium  in  August.  On  July  9  the  German  National 
Assembly  at  Weimar  had  ratified  the  Treaty  by  a 
vote  of  208  to  115.  A  number  of  the  lesser  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  also  ratified  before  the  end  of 
the  year. 

Although  the  Treaty  might  have  been  put  in 
operation  in  October,  the  exchange  of  ratifications 
with  the  Germans  was  delayed  in  the  hope  that  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  would  agree  before  long. 
When  on  November  19  the  Senate  voted  55  to  39  to 
reject  the  resolution  of  ratification  with  the  Lodge 
amendments,^  and  53  to  38  to  reject  unconditional 
ratification,  it  was  decided  to  proceed  without  wait- 
ing for  the  United  States.  There  was,  however,  a 
further  delay  caused  by  the  demand  that  the  Ger- 
mans sign  an  additional  protocol  covering  violations 
of  the  armistice  terms.  The  Germans  objected  to 
surrendering  400,000  tons  of  dredges,  floating  docks, 

'That  is,  the  55  votes  for  ratification  fell  short  of  the  necessary 
two-thirds. 


196       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

etc.,  as  reparation  for  the  sinking  of  their  fleet  in 
Scapa  Flow.  They  also  refused  to  admit  the  right 
of  the  AUies  to  enforce  the  Treaty  by  mihtary  action. 
Finally  the  Allies  agreed  to  reduce  their  demands  to 
275,000  tons,  and  to  eliminate  mention  of  enforcing 
the  Treaty  except  as  provided  in  the  Treaty  itself. 
Ratifications  were  accordingly  exchanged  on  Janu- 
ary 10  at  Paris.  On  January  16  the  League  of 
Nations  was  formally  inaugurated.  The  Great  War 
was  at  last  over,  except  for  the  United  States. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  SUPPLEMENTARY  TREATIES 

I.   THE  TREATY  WITH  POLAND 

When  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  was  divided  up 
between  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria  toward  the  end 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  Polish  national  sentiment 
did  not  die.  On  the  contrary,  the  attempts  to 
stamp  it  out  during  the  nineteenth  century  made  it 
stronger  and  more  united  than  ever,  and  in  all  the 
real  essentials  of  nationality  the  Poles  became  more 
of  a  nation  after  they  had  lost  political  independence 
than  they  had  been  before.  In  spite  of  official  denials 
that  there  was  any  longer  a  "Polish  question"  it 
refused  to  be  settled.  One  of  the  bonds  between  the 
autocracies  of  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  St.  Petersburg 
was  fear  of  a  resurrected  Poland.  At  the  outbreak 
of  the  Great  War,  Russia  announced  that  with  vic- 
tory Prussian  Posen  and  Austrian  Galicia  would  be 
added  to  Russian  Poland  to  form  a  united  and 
autonomous  kingdom,  but  with  the  Czar  as  its  head. 
But  in  the  meantime  no  move  was  made  to  grant 
autonomy  to  Russian  Poland,  with  the  result  that 
many  Poles  put  no  confidence  in  the  Czar's  promises. 
In  times  past  the  Czar  had  been  lavish  with  promises 
in  emergencies  and  callous  in  breaking  them  when 
the  danger  was  over.  The  Central  Powers  made  their 
bid  for  Polish  support  by  promising  an  independent 

197 


198       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Poland,  and  after  the  conquest  of  Russian  Poland 
they  even  proclaimed  the  revival  of  an  independent 
kingdom.  Their  immediate  purpose  was  to  raise  a 
Polish  army  to  light  on  their  side.  It  was  evident, 
however,  that  in  some  form  or  other  they  intended  to 
maintain  control.  It  was  further  clear  that  Prussia 
was  not  going  to  permit  Posen  to  be  made  a  part  of 
the  new  state;  there  was  even  talk  of  "rectification" 
of  the  frontiers  which  would  have  increased  Prussian 
territory.  The  Austrians  were  unwilling  to  promise 
that  GaHcia  should  be  incorporated  until  they  could 
be  assured  that  Austria  would  have  some  control 
over  the  new  state.  No  final  settlement  of  the  ques- 
tion had  been  reached  between  Berlin  and  Vienna 
when  revolution  and  the  fortune  of  war  removed  the 
matter  from  their  control. 

The  Allies  had  been  in  favor  of  a  reunited  Poland, 
though  until  191 7  they  had  been  compelled  to 
acquiesce  in  the  Russian  proposals  that  it  should  be 
under  the  suzerainty  of  the  Czar.  In  this  they  were 
moved  not  only  by  the  abstract  desire  to  see  an 
ancient  wrong  redressed,  but  also  by  the  practical 
advantage  to  be  gained  by  the  erection  of  a  new 
barrier  against  German  and  Austrian  ambition. 

When  the  unbelievable  had  actually  happened, 
when  the  Russian,  Prussian,  and  Austrian  empires 
lay  helpless,  the  Polish  people,  after  some  confusion, 
united  to  form  a  provisional  government.  There 
were  sharp  party  differences  to  adjust,  and  diver- 
gencies of  policy  to  reconcile;   but  enough  harmony 


The  Supplementary  Treaties  199 

and  order  were  established  to  permit  the  recognition 
of  the  new  Poland  and  its  admission  to  the  Peace 
Conference. 

In  addition  to  the  urgent  economic  problems  of 
the  reform  of  the  land  system  and  the  reorganization 
of  industry,  Poland  was  at  once  involved  in  a  number 
of  border  wars,  and  in  difficulties  with  dissatisfied  mi- 
norities within.  The  government,  backed  by  an  influen- 
tial and  aggressive  element  of  pubKc  opinion,  tried  to 
secure  immediate  possession  of  as  much  of  the  terri- 
tory of  the  old  kingdom  as  possible .  There  was  fighting 
with  the  Prussians  in  Posen,  and  with  the  Czecho- 
slovaks over  the  coal  fields  of  Teschen.  There  was  a 
fierce  little  war  with  the  Ruthenians  over  eastern 
Galicia.  On  the  east  Lithuanian  and  White  Russian 
territory  was  claimed,  decidedly  against  the  wishes  of 
a  considerable  portion  of  the  population.  And  in 
this  area  the  Polish  forces  clashed  with  the  Red  Army 
of  bolshevist  Russia. 

The  Peace  Conference  assumed  the  right  to  fijt  all 
the  boundaries  of  Poland.  Those  with  Germany  are 
settled  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  On  the  south 
the  old  boundary  of  Galicia  will  remain,  with  the 
area  around  Teschen  still  unsettled.  This  little  dis- 
trict, which  Lloyd  George  admitted  he  had  never 
heard  of  until  Poles  and  Bohemians  went  to  war  over 
it,  furnishes  one  of  the  most  puzzling  problems  in 
Central  Europe.  Historically  it  belongs  to  Bohemia, 
and  its  coal  fields  are  claimed  as  relatively  more 
important  to  Bohemia  than  to  Poland.     It  is  needed 


200       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

to  keep  an  important  railroad  connection  with  the 
Slovak  portion  of  the  new  state.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  considerable  portion  of  the  inhabitants  are 
Polish-speaking,  or  Germans.  The  Conference  super- 
vised the  production  and  distribution  of  the  coal, 
leaving  the  political  settlement  until  later. 

On  the  east  there  arises  the  question  of  Galicia^ 
and  the  boundary  toward  the  former  Russian  Empire. 
In  this  direction  nothing  could  be  settled  until  some 
order  emerged  from  the  Russian  chaos.  While  the 
Allies,  and  particularly  France,  favored  a  strong 
Poland  as  a  barrier  against  bolshevism  and  against 
Germany,  they  also  feared  lest  the  imperialism  which 
entered  into  the  Polish  aspirations  might  lead  to  the 
inclusion  of  border  provinces  which  were  not  properly 
Polish  in  sentiment.  This  they  desired  to  avoid  in 
the  interest  of  future  peace. 
Art.  87  gy  signing  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  Poland  agreed 
that  "the  boundaries  of  Poland  not  laid  down  in  the 
present  Treaty  will  be  subsequently  determined  by 
the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers."  Poland 
also  agreed  to  incorporate  in  a  Treaty  with  these 
powers  "  such  provisions  as  may  be  deemed  neces- 
sary by  the  said  Powers  to  protect  the  interests 
of  the  inhabitants  of  Poland  who  differ  from  the 
majority  of  the  population  in  race,  language,  or 
religion,"  and  provisions  as  to  commerce. 

This  Treaty  with  Poland  was  signed  at  the  same 
time  as  that  with  Germany.     Its  terms  had  been  dis- 

'  See  below,  p.  215. 


The  Supplementary  Treaties  201 

cussed  for  some  months,  and  Poland  had  been  given 
an  opportunity  to  make  suggestions.  In  a  long 
letter"^  transmitting  the  text  to  the  Polish  govern- 
ment, June  24,  Premier  Cletnenceau  in  behalf  of  the 
Conference  explained  its  purpose.  He  pointed  out 
that  it  did  not  constitute  a  new  departure.  "It  has 
for  long  been  the  established  procedure  of  the  public 
law  of  Europe  that  when  a  state  is  created,  or  even 
when  large  accessions  of  territory  are  made  to  an 
established  state,  the  joint  and  formal  recognition 
by  the  great  powers  should  be  accompanied  by  the 
requirement  that  such  state  should,  in  the  form  of  a 
binding  international  convention,  undertake  to  com- 
ply with  certain  principles  of  government."  In 
particular  the  Balkan  states  in  1878  had  been  required 
to  recognize  the  principle  of  religious  liberty.  The 
powers  feel  it  is  their  duty  not  to  depart  from  this 
precedent.  They  also  feel  it  is  their  right  to  do  so, 
since  it  was  through  their  efforts  in  the  war,  and 
their  good  will  at  the  Conference,  that  Poland  has 
recovered  its  liberty  at  all.  The  new  international 
regime  of  the  League  of  Nations  makes  it  possible 
and  desirable  to  place  these  guarantees  under  a  new 
sanction.  The  particular  circumstances  attending 
the  creation  of  the  new  Poland  make  it  necessary  to 
frame  the  guarantees  in  somewhat  different  terms 
from  those  of  earlier  conventions,  but  the  principle 
involved  is  the  same.  Nothing  is  asked  of  Poland 
which  is  not  supposed  to  be  elementary  in  a  modern 

^  New  York  Times'  Current  History,  August,  1919,  p.  275. 


202        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

free  state,  and  it  is  recognized  that  Poland  has 
already  freely  expressed  the  intention  of  following 
these  cardinal  principles.  Nevertheless  it  is  hoped 
that  their  formal  statement  will  go  far  toward  recon- 
ciling minorities  to  their  new  status. 

The  Treaty  between  Poland  and  the  five  great 
powers  represents  the  attempt  to  settle  one  of  the 
most  disturbing  questions  in  Europe,  that  of  racial, 
linguistic,  religious,  or  nationalistic  minorities  within 
a  state.  The  solution  proposed  is  the  incorporation 
of  minimum  guarantees  in  the  fundamental  law  of 
individual  states,  with  the  League  of  Nations  em- 
powered to  see  that  they  are  observed.  Since  the 
Polish  Treaty  was  designed  as  a  model  to  be  followed 
for  Austria,  Czecho-Slovakia,  the  Balkan  states,  and 
presumably  the  new  states  that  arise  from  the  former 
Russian  Empire,  its  terms  are  of  great  interest  and 
importance. 

^■■^  ^  Poland  agrees  that  seven  articles  of  the  Treaty 
shall  be  recognized  as  fundamental,  not  to  be  affected 
by  any  Polish  law  or  action.     In   the  first  place, 

Art.  2  "Poland  undertakes  to  assure  full  and  complete  pro- 
tection of  life  and  liberty  to  all  inhabitants  of  Poland, 
without  distinction  of  birth,  nationality,  language, 
race,  or  religion.  All  inhabitants  of  Poland  shall  be 
entitled  to  the  free  exercise,  whether  public  or  private, 
of  any  creed,  religion,  or  belief  whose  practices  are 
not  inconsistent  with  public  order  or  public  morals." 
This  is  as  far  as  any  state  goes.  There  is  of 
course  room  for  differences  of  opinion  as  to  what  does 


The  Supplementary  Treaties  203 

endanger  public  order  and  morals.  We  ourselves 
suppress  Mormon  polygamy  and  do  not  allow  be- 
lievers in  mental  healing  to  handle  our  smallpox 
epidemics.  Poland  must  have  liberty  to  determine 
in  the  first  instance  what  practices  it  will  not  permit 
under  the  guise  of  religion. 

All  persons  habitually  resident  within  the  bounda-  Arts.  3-6 
lies  of  the  new  Poland  become  Polish  nationals.  Per- 
sons over  eighteen  may  choose  any  other  nationality 
which  may  be  open  to  them;  but  within  a  year  they 
must  remove  to  the  country  of  which  they  have  chosen 
to  become  citizens.  They  may  retain  ownership  of 
their  immovable  property  and  carry  with  them  with- 
out export  duty  their  movable  property.  Persons  of 
German,  Austrian,  Hungarian,  or  Russian  nationality 
born  in  territory  now  Polish,  of  parents  habitually 
resident  there,  become  Polish  citizens  even  if  they  are 
not  now  residents.  Within  two  years  they  may 
declare  that  they  abandon  this  Polish  nationality. 
Persons  born  in  Poland  who  are  not  born  nationals 
of  another  state  become  Polish. 

All  subjects  of  Poland  are  to  be  equal  before  the  Art.  7 
law.  Race,  language,  or  religion  shall  not  affect  civil 
or  political  rights,  or  admission  to  public  employ- 
ments, functions,  or  honors,  or  the  exercise  of  pro- 
fessions or  industries.  "No  restriction  shall  be 
imposed  on  the  free  use  by  any  Polish  national  of 
any  language  in  private  intercourse,  in  commerce,  in 
the  press,  or  in  publications  of  any  kind,  or  at  public 
meetings.     Notwithstanding    any   establishment   by 


Art.  8 


204        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

the  Polish  government  of  an  official  language,  ade- 
quate facilities  shall  be  given  to  Polish  nationals  of 
non-Polish  speech  for  the  use  of  their  language,  either 
orally  or  in  writing,  before  the  courts." 

Racial,  language,  and  religious  minorities  are  to 
enjoy  equal  treatment  and  security  in  law  with  the 
majority,  in  particular  having  the  right  to  estabhsh 
at  their  own  expense  schools  and  other  institutions, 
using  their  own  language  and  exercising  their  own 
religion  therein. 

The  foregoing  provisions,  which  are  the  ones  to  be 
regarded  as  fundamental,  were  framed  in  the  light  of 
actual  experience  under  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria,  and 
Hungary.  They  are  intended  to  forestall  the  numer- 
ous ingenious  methods  by  which  the  attempt  was 
made  to  coerce  minorities,  and  to  assimilate  them  to 
the  dominant  group.  To  persons  in  the  United 
States  or  France  or  England  these  rights  seem  elemen- 
tary, and  their  denial  would  be  an  outrage  on  the 
liberty  of  the  individual.  It  might  be  expected  that 
the  Poles,  having  suffered  from  attempts  to  German- 
ize or  Russianize  them,  would  be  the  first  to  recognize 
not  only  the  injustice  but  the  futihty  of  such  efforts, 
and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  such  will  prove  to  be  the 
case.  If  the  Poles,  as  they  assert,  have  no  intention 
of  coercing  their  minorities,  these  restrictions  cannot 
prove  irksome.  If,  however,  in  their  zeal  to  consoli- 
date Polish  national  sentiment  they  attempt  unduly  to 
hasten  the  natural  processes  of  assimilation  they  may 
profitably  be  reminded  of  these  solemn  agreements. 


The  Supplementary  Treaties  205 

Two  additional  articles  deal  with  the  vexed  ques- 
tion of  education.  It  is  provided  that  in  districts  Art.  g 
where  a  considerable  proportion  use  some  other  than 
the  PoKsh  language  there  shall  be  adequate  faciHties 
for  primary  instruction  in  that  other  language. 
''This  provision  shall  not  prevent  the  Polish  govern- 
ment from  making  the  teaching  of  the  Polish  language 
obligatory  in  the  said  schools."  Where  there  are 
considerable  racial,  religious,  or  linguistic  minorities, 
"these  minorities  shall  be  assured  an  equitable  share 
in  the  enjoyment  and  application  of  the  sums  which 
may  be  provided  out  of  public  funds  under  the  state, 
municipal,  or  other  budgets,  for  educational,  reli- 
gious, or  charitable  purposes."  So  far  as  Germans  are 
concerned,  these  provisions  apply  only  in  the  districts 
which  were  German  in  1914.  Jewish  committees.  Art.  10 
subject  to  the  general  control  of  the  state,  will  provide 
for  the  distribution  of  the  proportional  share  of  public 
funds  set  aside  for  Jewish  schools. 

These  educational  arrangements  are  on  a  some- 
what different  status  from  the  others.  In  so  far  as 
they  provide  for  the  support  of  private  schools  out  of 
public  funds  they  do  not  at  first  appeal  to  American 
opinion.  While  we  permit  any  privately  supported 
schools,  notably  the  Roman  Catholic  parochial  sys- 
tem, to  teach  any  religion,  in  any  language,  we  are 
opposed  on  principle  to  giving  them  any  support  from 
public  funds.  In  some  country  districts  a  consider- 
able part  of  the  instruction  in  the  elementary  public 
schools   was   given   in   some   other    language    than 


2o6       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

English.  When  the  war  brought  this  fact  to  the 
attention  of  the  public,  it  was  regarded  with  distinct 
disfavor.  Our  point  of  view  is  that  we  do  not  want 
permanent  communities  in  this  country  that  are  not 
able  and  willing  to  speak  our  language. 

But,  it  is  objected,  the  Poles  do  not  desire  such 
minorities  either.  Why  should  they  be  forced  to 
make  concessions  to  them  which  we  will  not  make  ? 
The  answer  is  comparatively  simple.  The  minority 
groups  came  to  this  country  voluntarily,  presumably 
knowing  what  our  institutions  are,  and  by  impHca- 
tion  accepting  them.  If  they  find  them  unsatis- 
factory, they  may  go  elsewhere.  In  Central  Europe, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  minorities  are  in  few  instances 
recent  and  voluntary  immigrants.  They  have  been 
settled  in  their  districts  for  centuries.  Many  of  them 
have  been  detached  from  the  main  body  of  their 
feUows  by  political  events  which  they  could  not  con- 
trol. By  the  present  Treaty  many  of  them  are  given 
a  citizenship  which  they  do  not  desire.  In  order  to 
reconcile  them  to  the  situation  it  is  necessary,  as  a 
measure  of  practical  statesmanship,  to  grant  them  priv- 
ileges which  are  entirely  unnecessary  in  the  United 
States.  In  the  course  of  time  it  may  be  possible  to 
modify  the  arrangements.  But  in  the  interest  of  good 
feeling  the  minorities  should  be  treated  generously. 

One  of  the  most  difficult  minority  problems  in 
Poland  is  that  connected  with  the  Jews.  Here  as 
elsewhere  in  Europe  their  unpopularity  is  due  not  so 
much   to   genuinely   religious   considerations   as   to 


The  Supplementary  Treaties  207 

their  resistance  to  the  various  nationahzing  processes, 
and  to  their  economic  activities.  Of  late  they  have 
all  suffered  because  of  the  bolshevistic  tendencies  of  a 
few  of  them.  During  the  last  year  there  have  been 
disquieting  reports  of  massacres  and  persecutions  of 
the  Jews  in  Poland.  Influential  Jews  in  England, 
France,  and  the  United  States  have  appealed  to  the 
Conference  to  protect  the  three  million  Jews  of 
Poland.  While  the  stories  of  outrages  have  proved 
somewhat  exaggerated,  it  is  still  true  that  the  Jews 
need  some  special  guarantees.  Properly  enough,  the 
Poles  have  refused  to  recognize  the  Jewish  popula- 
tion as  constituting  a  state  within  the  state  and 
have  rejected  the  demand  made  by  some  that  they 
be  allowed  to  organize  their  own  militia  for  self- 
defense.  But  to  the  general  guarantees  for  all  the 
minorities  one  other  was  added,  providing  that  Jews 
should  not  be  compelled  to  violate  their  Sabbath  Art.  n 
except  as  incidental  to  military  service.  No  elections 
or  registrations  are  to  be  held  on  Saturday. 

Poland  is  reported  to  have  placed  the  Jews  under 
a  disadvantage  by  enforcing  a  Sunday  closing  law. 
Since  they  cannot  work  on  Saturday,  their  competi- 
tors have  a  day's  advantage.  Nothing  in  the 
Treaty  forbids  this,  and  a  great  many  of  our  own 
state  laws  do  the  same  thing. 

"Poland  agrees  that  the  stipulations  in  the  fore- 
going articles,  so  far  as  they  affect  persons  belonging 
to  racial,  religious,  or  linguistic  minorities,  constitute 
obligations  of  international   concern,   and   shall  be 


2o8        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

placed  under  the  guarantee  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
They  shall  not  be  modified  without  the  consent  of  a 
majority  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations . ' '  No 
one  of  the  five  great  powers  will  withhold  assent  to 
modifications  approved  by  the  majority  of  the  Council. 

Poland  agrees  that  any  member  of  the  League 
may  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Council  an  infrac- 
tion, or  threatened  infraction,  of  these  obhgations, 
whereupon  the  Council  may  take  any  action  it  thinks 
effective  and  proper. 

Differences  between  Poland  and  any  member  of 
the  League  arising  out  of  these  articles  are  to  be 
settled  as  provided  by  the  Covenant  of  the  League. 

The  second  part  of  the  Treaty  deals  with  the 
estabUshment  of  diplomatic  relations,  equality  of 
treatment  for  commerce,  freedom  of  transit,  and 
Poland's  adherence  to  various  international  conven- 
tions. Poland  agrees  to  apply  to  the  Vistula  River 
and  its  main  tributaries  the  regime  applicable  to 
international  waterways  set  forth  in  the  Treaty  with 
Germany.  Most  of  the  provisions  as  to  commerce 
and  transit  are  reciprocal  as  between  Poland  and 
the  other  signatories.  In  conclusion,  Poland  agrees 
to  assume  such  portion  of  the  Russian  debt  as  may 
be  assigned  under  a  special  convention  to  be  drawn 
up  later.  The  obhgation  is  not  limited  to  the  pre- 
war debt. 

II.      THE   DEFENSIVE   ALLIANCES 

At  the  same  time  with  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
and  the  PoHsh  Treaty,  there  were  signed  two  other 


The  Supplementary  Treaties  209 

treaties  of  great  importance.  These  were  the  defen- 
sive alliances  between  France  and  England  and 
between  France  and  the  United  States.  In  settling 
the  status  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  in  dis- 
cussing the  form  of  the  League  of  Nations,  France 
had  been  desperately  anxious  to  provide  against  any 
possibility  of  another  German  attack.  In  view  of 
the  disarmament  of  Germany,  the  demilitarization 
of  the  Rhine  frontier,  and  the  presence  of  the  Allied 
Army  of  Occupation,  the  other  nations  did  not 
regard  this  danger  as  very  great.  They  were  unwill- 
ing to  agree  either  to  the  detachment  of  the  Rhine 
provinces,  or  their  permanent  occupation  by  France. 
Neither  was  it  regarded  as  feasible  to  have  the 
League  of  Nations  provided  with  a  standing  army 
and  a  general  staff.  They  sympathized,  however, 
with  the  French  feeling  on  the  subject,  and  in  order 
to  persuade  the  French  representatives  to  recede 
from  some  of  their  extreme  positions  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  agreed  to  sign  defensive 
treaties  with  the  French  Republic.  These  treaties 
must  be  submitted  to  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations  for  approval  as  not  inconsistent  with  the 
Covenant.  The  terms  are  simple.  The  articles  of 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles  dealing  with  the  fortification 
of  the  Rhine  zone  are  set  forth,  and  it  is  provided 
that  *'in  case  these  stipulations  should  not  assure 
immediately  to  France  appropriate  security,  the 
United  States  of  America  shall  be  bound  to  come 
immediately  to  her  aid  in  case  of  any  unprovoked 


2IO       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

act  of  aggression  directed  against  her  by  Germany." 
The  British  Treaty  is  abnost  identical  in  terms, 
except  that  "agrees"  is  used  instead  of  ''shall  be 
bound."  The  British  Dominions  are  not  bound  to 
send  assistance  to  France  unless  their  legislatures 
accept  the  Treaty.  Here  again  is  an  indication  of 
the  new  constitutional  procedure  in  the  British 
Empire  b}^  which  the  Dominions  attain  a  real  voice 
in  the  control  of  foreign  policy.  Equally  significant 
is  the  provision  that  "the  present  Treaty  shall,  be- 
fore ratification  by  his  majesty,  be  submitted  to  par- 
liament for  approval."  Liberal  opinion  welcomed  this 
as  an  indication  that  in  the  future  the  House  of 
Commons  is  to  have  a  more  genuine  control  over 
foreign  affairs  than  has  been  exercised  in  the  past. 

Parliament  ratified  the  Treaty  without  difficulty. 
Neither  treaty  becomes  effective,  however,  until 
both  have  been  ratified,  and  the  United  States 
Senate  did  not  consider  it  at  all  while  the  Treaty 
with  Germany  was  under  discussion.  The  whole 
idea  of  these  treaties  has  been  criticized  as  exhibiting 
distrust  of  the  efficacy  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  as  tending  to  draw  the  United  States  into  Euro- 
pean entanglements.  President  Wilson  defends  the 
treaties,  saying  that  they  simply  imply  that  "two 
governments  who  wish  to  be  members  of  the  League 
of  Nations  ask  leave  of  the  Council  of  the  League  to 
be  permitted  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  a  friend  whose 
situation  has  been  found  to  be  one  of  peculiar  peril, 
without  awaiting  the  advice  of  the  League  to  act."' 

'  The  text  of  these  Supplementary  Treaties  is  given  in  New  York 
Times'  Current  History,  August,  19 19. 


CHAPTER  Vn 
THE  AUSTRIAN  SETTLEMENT 

The  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  seemed  to 
many  to  have  ended  the  war.  Tension  relaxed. 
President  Wilson  sailed  for  home,  and  in  every 
country  more  attention  was  given  to  pressing  internal 
problems.  Nevertheless  some  of  the  most  important 
and  perplexing  tasks  of  the  Conference  still  remained 
to  be  accomplished.  Peace  had  yet  to  be  made  with 
Austria,  Hungary,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey. 

The  preliminary  draft  of  the  Austrian  Treaty  had 
been  presented  to  the  enemy  delegates  on  June  2. 
The  terms  were  regarded  in  Vienna  as  a  "death 
sentence,"  and  the  government  strove  desperately  to 
secure  some  amelioration.  The  remnant  of  the 
Austrian  Empire,  however,  which  constituted  the 
republic  with  which  the  AlHes  were  dealing  was 
bankrupt,  starving,  and  threatened  with  revolution, 
and  it  was  in  no  position  to  resist.  The  attitude  of 
the  Austrian  negotiators  was  more  conciliatory  than 
that  of  the  Germans  had  been,  and  as  a  result  of  the 
exchange  of  notes  during  July  and  August  some  con- 
cessions were  made  by  the  Allies.  France,  however, 
remained  firm  in  refusing  to  permit  a  union  with 
Germany. 

The  Allies  pointed  out  to  the  Austrian  Germans 
their  responsibility  in  forcing  the  war,  and  insisted 
that  the  plight  in  which  they  now  found  themselves 

211 


212        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

was  the  natural  and  inevitable  outcome  of  their  pro- 
longed "poHcy  of  ascendancy"  within  the  old  empire. 
With  bitterness  of  spirit  the  Austrian  Assembly 
bowed  to  the  inevitable,  and  voted  to  accept  the 
Treaty,  though  they  protested  particularly  at  the  de- 
tachment of  the  Germans  of  Bohemia  and  the  Tyrol, 
and  at  the  prohibition  of  union  with  Germany,  which 
they  asserted  violated  the  terms  of  the  armistice. 
They  also  declared  that  the  reparation  clauses  were 
impossible  of  fulfilment.  On  September  lo  the  Treaty 
was  signed  at  St.  Germain. 

By  joining  in  this  act,  China  became  a  member  of 
the  League  of  Nations.  Rumania  refused  at  the 
time  to  sign  the  Treaty,  because  of  its  references  to 
future  agreements  guaranteeing  the  rights  of  minori- 
ties. On  December  9,  after  considerable  discussion, 
Rumania  agreed  to  the  wishes  of  the  Allies  and  the 
next  day  signed  the  Treaties  with  Austria  and  Bul- 
garia, and  the  special  treaty  deaHng  with  minorities 
within  Rumania.  The  Jugo-Slavs  also  withheld  their 
signature  from  the  Treaty  with  Austria. 

THE    TREATY   OF    ST.    GERMAIN 

The  Treaty  of  St.  Germain  with  the  RepubHc  of 
Austria  is  modeled  on  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  with 
only  such  changes  as  circumstances  made  necessarv. 
Clauses,  sections,  and  even  whole  parts  are  repeated 
without  changing  a  word.  The  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  is  made  Part  I.  Like  Germany, 
Austria  is  for  the  present  excluded  from  the  League, 
and  admission  is  made  conditional  on  good  behavior. 


The  Austrian  Settlement  213 

Part  II  fixes  in  detail"  the  boundaries  of  the  new 
state.  With  Switzerland  and  Germany  they  are 
unchanged,  but  losses  to  the  north  and  south  reduce 
its  area  from  over  115,000  square  miles  to  about  6,000 
and  its  population  from  30,000,000  to  something 
over  6,000,000.  Broadly  speaking  there  remains 
the  German-speaking  central  district  of  the  former 
empire,  with  three  exceptions. 

1.  On  the  east  the  Odenburg  region  of  Hungary, 
with  several  hundred  thousand  Germans,  is  added. 

2.  On  the  south  about  a  quarter  of  a  million 
German-speaking  people  are  ceded  to  Italy  with  the 
southern  Tyrol.  This  is  in  order  to  give  Italy  a 
strategic  frontier.  On  the  basis  of  self-determination 
it  is  utterly  unwarranted,  and  it  is  only  because  of 
the  Treaty  of  London,  which  brought  Italy  into  the 
war,  that  it  was  granted.  The  frontier  farther  south 
which  Italy  demanded  of  Austria  in  19 15  would  be 
greatly  preferable,  since  it  included  very  few  Ger- 
mans. While  not  so  strong  as  the  Brenner  Pass  line, 
it  is  much  stronger  than  the  frontier  which  Italy 
managed  to  hold  during  the  war  against  Austria- 
Hungary.  Since  Austria-Hungary  no  longer  menaces 
anyone,  it  ought  to  be  safe  enough  for  Italy,  even 
apart  from  the  protection  promised  by  a  general 
reduction  in  armaments  and  by  the  League  of 
Nations. 

3.  Austria  complained  most  bitterly  over  the 
inclusion  in  the  Czecho-Slovak  Republic  of  the 
3,500,000  Germans  of  Bohemia.     In  many  respects  it 


214        -^f^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

must  be  admitted  that  this  is  unfortunate,  not  least 
in  view  of  the  difficulties  it  may  involve  for  Bohemia. 
There  are,  however,  excellent  reasons  for  the  decision. 
The  mountain  square  of  Bohemia  forms  a  natural 
geographic  unit,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Bohemia 
is  exposed  to  attack  on  three  sides  from  Germany, 
strategic  considerations  of  defense  should  have  some 
weight  in  fixing  the  frontier.  Furthermore,  the 
regions  toward  the  mountains,  which  form  the  Ger- 
man fringe,  contain  the  coal  and  iron  and  industrial 
districts  which  are  necessary  for  the  economic  wel- 
fare of  the  Czecho-Slovak  State.  For  centuries 
Bohemia  was  an  independent  kingdom,  and  only 
through  force  and  fraud  was  it  reduced  to  the  level 
of  a  Hapsburg  province.  The  boundaries  which  it 
now  claims  are  those  which  have  been  recognized  as 
Bohemian  for  nearly  a  thousand  years.  Finally,  the 
inclusion  of  the  German-speaking  inhabitants  of 
Bohemia  in  German  Austria  is  geographically  imprac- 
ticable since  the  three  most  important  groups  are 
separated  from  each  other  and  from  Austria  by  inter- 
vening Czech  districts.  ''The  sole  practicable  alter- 
native would  be  the  union  of  the  single  sections  with 
Bavaria  (on  west).  Saxony  (on  north),  Silesia  (on 
north-east),  and  Austria  (on  south);  and  as  this 
would  at  one  and  the  same  time  mean  economic  ruin 
for  themselves,  and  render  the  independent  existence 
of  Czecho-Slovakia  impossible,  it  cannot  be  seriously 
entertained   by   anyone."'     The   old   boundaries   of 

•  R.  W.  Seton-Watson,  in  The  New  Europe  (September  i8,  1919), 
p.  227. 


The  Austrian  Settlement  215 

Bohemia  have  been  slightly  extended  to  include  a 
few  Czechs,  and  a  bridgehead  opposite  Pressburg 
has  been  granted,  to  include  a  necessary  railway 
junction.     It  is  not  to  be  fortified.  Art.  56 

On  the  south,  toward  the  new  Serb-Croat-Slovene  Art.  49 
State,  the  area  around  Klagenfurt  where  the  popula- 
tion is  mixed  is  to  decide  its  future  by  a  plebiscite 
under  Allied  supervision.  A  southern  zone  votes 
first.  If  it  decides  to  join  the  South  Slavs,  the 
northern  zone  then  votes.  If  the  southern  part 
decides  to  join  Austria,  both  districts  remain  Austrian, 

The  third  part  of  the  Treaty  settles  details  as  to 
the  territory  ceded  to  Italy,  Czecho-Slovakia,  the 
Serb-Croat-Slovene  State,  and  Rumania.^  Austria 
renounces  in  favor  of  the  Principal  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Powers  all  territory  outside  its  new  boundaries 
not  at  present  assigned  to  any  state.  This  is  to 
enable  the  Allies  to  adjust  the  question  of  the  Ruthe- 
nian  parts  of  Galicia.  In  this  area  the  peasant  major- 
ity is  Ruthenian,  and  thus  somewhat  inclined  to  join 
the  Ukraine.  Historically  it  formed  part  of  Poland, 
and  the  Polish  minority  controlling  the  land  and  pre- 
dominating in  some  of  the  cities  has  always  been 
the  ruling  class.  Its  oil  fields  make  it  particularly 
valuable.  After  the  armistice  the  Poles  proceeded  to 
occupy  eastern  Galicia,  and  a  great  deal  of  irregular 
fighting  with  the  Little  Russians  ensued.  The  dis- 
position of  the  Peace  Conference  seems  to  be  to  create 

'  Rumania  is  to  receive  part  of  Bukovina,  extending  south  from 
Galicia. 


2i6       An  Inlroduclion  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

an  autonomous  East  Galida  with  Poland  as  manda- 
tory for  twenty  years.  This  does  not  entirely  satisfy 
the  Poles.  It  is  hoi)ed  that  the  arrangement  will 
stimulate  them  to  an  effort  to  conciliate  the  Ruthe- 
nians  and  7)repare  the  way  for  eventual  union.  Much 
will  dei)end  also  on  what  happens  across  the  border 
in  the  Ukraine  in  the  course  of  the  next  few  years. 
If  the  Little  Russian  national  consciousness  becomes 
solidified,  and  if  the  Ukraine  becomes  a  prosperous 
inde])endent  state,  or  even  an  autonomous  part  of  a 
free  federal  Russia,  it  may  exercise  a  strong  attraction 
for  the  kinrlred  grouj)s  in  Galicia. 

Two  of  the  most  disturbing  questions  in  Central 
and  JOasterii  l'Airoj)e  have  been  the  land  question  and 
the  rights  of  minorities.  The  first  of  these  the  Treaty 
leaves  to  be  settled  by  the  individual  states,  but  a 
definite  attemi)t  is  made  to  settle  the  other.  With 
the  best  will  in  the  world,  it  is  impossible  to  draw 
political  boundaries  which  will  not  detach  minorities 
from  the  main  body  of  their  fellows.  Experience  has 
shown  that  there  is  a  tendency  for  dominant  groups 
lo  aUenipl  lo  iin])ose  their  language,  religion,  and 
type  of  national  culture  on  all  under  their  rule. 
This  atlemi)t,  though  usually  unsuccessful,  has 
resulted  in  much  bitterness  of  feeling,  and  it  was  one 
factor  in  causing  the  tension  which  prepared  the  way 
for  the  Oreat  War.  Groujis  which  had  themselves 
suffered  persecution  for  nationality's  sake  learned 
no  lesson  of  tolerance,  and  when  the  opportunity  was 
oiTered  they  used  against  their  own  minorities  the 


The  Atistrian  Settlement  217 

methods  to  which  they  had  objected.  The  Peace 
Conference  desired  to  guard  against  this  as  much  as 
possible.  The  Treaty  with  Austria  therefore  con-  Arts.  62-69 
tains  the  provisions  which  were  incorporated  in  the 
Treaty  with  Poland  on  this  subject.'  PoHtical  and 
religious  equality,  free  use  of  any  language,  adequate 
educational  opportunities — these  are  to  be  guaranteed 
by  fundamental  and  unchangeable  law.  The  League 
of  Nations  may  investigate  complaints. 

The  new  Austria  will  have  relatively  few  non-  Arts,  si,  57. 60 
Germans.  But  the  Treaty  provides  also  that  these 
guarantees  are  to  be  incorporated  in  separate  treaties 
with  Czecho-Slovakia,  Rumania,  and  the  South  Slav 
Kingdom.  The  Czecho-Slovaks  signed  the  Treaty 
readily;  and  there  is  reason  to  expect  that  they  will 
treat  the  large  German  groups  with  fairness  and 
good  judgment.  President  Masaryk  in  particular 
realizes  the  importance  of  the  problem,  and  has 
liberal  and  statesmanlike  views  on  the  subject.  At 
the  eastern  end  of  the  Slovak  territory  is  a  group  of 
Ruthenians,  separated  by  the  mountain  barrier  of 
the  Carpathians  from  the  main  body  of  Little  Rus- 
sians. They  are  to  be  made  an  autonomous  province 
of  the  Czecho-Slovak  Republic. 

The  South  Slavs  and  the  Rumanians  objected 
seriously  to  being  compelled  to  agree  to  these  minor- 
ity guarantees  on  the  ground  that  they  limited  their 
sovereignty  over  their  internal  affairs.  They  refused 
for  some  time  to  sign  the  Austrian  Treaty.  Finally, 
however,  they  expressed  a  willingness  to  sign  if  the 

'  Except  as  to  the  Jews. 


2i8        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

implications  of  the  guarantees  were  more  clearly 
expressed. 

The  necessity  for  effective  guarantees  of  the 
rights  of  minorities  with  international  sanctions  in 
the  background  is  emphasized  by  various  charges 
and  counter-charges  since  the  armistice.  Press  dis- 
patches have  told  of  massacres  and  persecutions  of 
Jews  in  Poland,  of  deportations  of  Slavs,  of  the  sup- 
pression by  the  Italians  of  South  Slav  schools  and 
religious  freedom  in  Istria  and  Dalmatia,  of  discrimi- 
nations against  Italians  by  the  South  Slavs,  of  the 
repression  of  Magyar  schools  and  the  persecution  of 
Protestants  by  the  Rumanians  in  Transylvania. 
Denials  have  been  made,  and  the  reports  are  prob- 
ably in  some  cases  partisan  and  exaggerated.  Never- 
theless there  is  all  too  much  likelihood  that  they 
have  some  foundation. 

Criticism  has  been  expressed  of  the  failure  to 
require  Italy  to  give  guarantees  to  protect  the  minority 
rights  of  the  Germans  of  the  Tyrol  and  the  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  South  Slavs  acquired  along  with 
the  Italians  who  are  at  last  "redeemed."  Logically 
there  is  no  reason  for  this  omission,  and  theoretically 
Italy  could  and  should  have  been  asked  to  give  these 
binding  assurances.  Italy,  however,  takes  the  lofty 
ground  that  all  Italian  subjects  are  equally  protected 
by  the  law,  that  the  Itahan  government  never  treats 
anyone  unjustly,  and  that  the  mere  suggestion  of 
additional  guarantees  imposed  from  without  is  little 
less  than  an  insult.    Being  a  "great  power"  Italy  is 


The  Austrian  Settlement  219 

able  to  maintain  this  position.  Exactly  the  same 
arguments  advanced  by  the  smaller  nations  were 
overruled. 

One  other  article  in  this  third  part  of  the  Treaty 
is  of  great  importance.  It  provides  that  ''the  An. 88 
independence  of  Austria  is  inahenable  otherwise  than 
with  the  consent  of  the  League  of  Nations,"  and 
binds  Austria  to  do  nothing  which  might  compromise 
this  independence.  This  of  course  is  designed  to 
prevent  the  union  of  German  Austria  with  the  Ger- 
man Empire.  It  is  an  absolute  denial  of  the  right  of 
self-determination.  Economically  it  is  indefensible, 
for  the  fragment  of  the  old  empire  which  is  left  is  not 
capable  of  self-support.  Vienna,  the  eighth  largest 
city  in  the  world,  with  a  third  of  the  population  of  the 
repubhc,  cannot  be  supported  by  the  reduced  area 
of  which  it  will  be  the  capital.  The  only  reason  for 
the  provision  is  fear  of  a  revived  Germany.  It  is  to 
be  hoped  that  before  long  the  great  powers,  particu- 
larly France,  will  feel  it  safe  to  relax  their  opposition 
to  the  reunion  of  the  German  people,  if  they  desire  to 
accomphsh  it. 

The  fourth  part  of  the  Treaty  deals  with  Austrian 
interests  outside  Europe.  They  are  not  extensive, 
but  they  are  aboHshed  in  the  same  sweeping  terms 
that  are  used  with  respect  to  the  German  interests  in 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  Part  V  provides  for  the 
reduction  of  the  Austrian  army  to  a  maximum  of 
30,000,  Universal  service  is  aboHshed,  recruiting 
must  be  for  long  terms,  the  stock  and  manufacture  of 


220       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

munitions  is  limited,  and  the  scheme  of  army  organi- 
zation is  fixed.  The  entire  navy  is  surrendered,  and 
for  the  future  will  consist  of  three  police  boats  on  the 
Danube.  The  provisions  as  to  prisoners  and  graves 
are  the  same  as  in  the  German  Treaty.  So  also  are 
the  clauses  providing  for  the  surrender  and  trial  of 
persons  for  violations  of  the  laws  and  customs  of  war. 
Serbia  in  particular  was  the  victim  of  atrocities  the 
authors  of  which  should  be  brought  to  justice.  There 
is  no  demand  for  the  extradition  of  the  ex-Emperor 
Charles,  who  came  to  the  throne  during  the  war. 
Part  vm  Reparation  is  demanded  from  Austria  in  the  same 
terms  as  from  Germany.  The  same  admission  of 
responsibility  for  all  loss  and  damage  caused  the 
AlHes  is  exacted.  In  view  of  Austria's  inability  to 
pay  all,  the  obUgation  to  pay  for  damage  to  civiHans 
is  to  be  recognized  under  the  same  ten  categories  as 
in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles.  The  Reparation  Com- 
mission created  under  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  is  to 
act  also  for  Austria.  Austria  is  required  to  pay  a 
first  instalment  before  May,  192 1,  the  amount  to  be 
*'a  reasonable  sum  which  shall  be  determined  by  the 
Commission."  At  that  time  the  Commission  will  fix 
the  amount  to  be  paid  by  Austria,  fixing  also  a 
schedule  of  payments  running  over  tliirty  years. 
While  differing  in  a  few  dkails,  the  provisions  are 
substantially  the  same  as  for  Germany.  A  number 
of  jewels,  works  of  art,  and  manuscripts  which  have 
in  one  way  or  another  been  taken  to  Austria  are  to 
be  restored  to  the  countries  originally  entitled  to  them. 


The  Austrian  Settlement  221 

In  drawing  the  financial  clauses  several  difficult  Partix 
problems  had  to  be  considered.  The  Dual  Monarchy 
had  ceased  to  exist.  The  Empire  of  Austria  was  a 
mere  fragment.  Four-fifths  of  its  population  had 
now  been  incorporated  in  the  territory  of  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers.  The  representatives  of  the  Vienna 
government  urged  that  they  were  not  the  heirs  of  the 
Hapsburgs,  and  they  declared  that  there  was  no 
justice  in  visiting  on  them  the  penalties  for  the  sins  of 
the  old  regime.  The  Allies  pointed  out  that  the  Ger-  \ 
man  element  in  Austria  had  been  entirely  responsible 
for  the  policy  of  repression  and  aggrandizement;  that 
it  had  made  no  effort  to  repudiate  its  leaders  until 
the  moment  of  military  disaster;  and  that  it  must 
therefore  to  the  limit  of  its  abihty  make  reparation 
for  the  damage  done  in  the  war  which  it  so  largely 
precipitated. 

There  was  at  first  some  disposition  on  the  part  of 
the  Conference  to  balance  the  gains  of  territory,  par- 
ticularly of  Serbia,  against  claims  for  reparation. 
The  plan  was  not  adopted.  The  states,  however, 
which  contained  territory  of  the  former  empire  were 
required  to  assume  a  proportional  amount  of  the 
pre-war  national  debt.  Austria  remains  saddled  An.  203 
with  the  entire  war  debt,  but  no  state  to  which 
former  Austrian  territory  is  ceded,  or  its  nationals, 
"shall  have  recourse  under  any  circumstances  what- 
ever against  any  other  states,  including  Austria,  in 
respect  of  the  war  bonds  of  which  they  or  their 
nationals    are    the    beneficiary    owners."    This    of  An.  205 


222        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

course  makes  a  large  part  of  the  Austrian  war  debt 
worthless. 

Art.  206  Austria  and  Hungary  and  the  states  to  which 
parts  of  Austria  and  Hungary  are  ceded  are  to  call  in 
the  Austro-Hungarian  state  banknotes  current  in 
their  territory,  and  turn  them  over  to  the  Reparation 
Commission.  The  Commission  is  to  Hquidate  the 
affairs  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  bank  and  divide  the 

Art.  208  assets  proportionately.  Austrian  state  property,  in- 
cluding crowi^  property  and  private  property  of  the 
royal  family,  is  transferred  to  the  states  acquiring 
the  territory.  Its  value  is  credited  to  Austria  in  the 
reparation  account. 

Partx  The  economic  clauses  follow  the  Treaty  of  Ver- 
sailles in  securing  to  Allied  and  Associated  govern- 
ments most-favored  nation  treatment  for  their  goods 
and  their  subjects  resident  in  Austria.  There  are 
added,  however,  provisions  to  insure  that  Austria 
will  be  able  to  secure  coal  and  raw  materials  from 
Poland  and  Czecho-Slovakia.  After  three  years, 
unless  the  Council  of  the  League  decides  otherwise, 
AUied  and  Associated  Powers  cannot  claim  most- 
favored  nation  treatment  unless  they  accord  it  to 
Austria. 

The  remaining  sections,  dealing  with  the  revival 
of  treaties,  and  with  debts,  property,  and  contracts, 
are  much  the  same  as  in  the  German  Treaty.  The 
most  damaging  result  is  the  resulting  Hquidation  of 
all  property  owned  by  subjects  of  German  Austria 
in  regions  transferred  to  other  states.     An  Austrian 


The  Austrian  Settlement  223 

estimate  puts  this  at  a  billion  dollars.  The  fact  that 
Austria  is  to  reimburse  its  nationals  for  their  losses 
is  cold  comfort  for  the  losers. 

The  remaining  parts  of  the  Treaty,  dealing  with 
aerial  navigation,  ports,  waterways  and  railways, 
labor,  and  the  miscellaneous  provisions,  differ  from 
the  Treaty  of  Versailles  only  in  minor  details. 

In  some  ways  the  Allies  were  disposed  to  treat 
Austria  a  trifle  more  leniently  than  Germany.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  transfer  to  Austria  of  the  tre- 
mendous machinery  designed  to  punish  and  control 
Germany  seems  to  many  unjust,  or  at  least  highly 
inexpedient. 

The  three  aspects  of  the  Treaty  most  generally 
criticized  are  the  transfer  of  Germans  to  Italy  and 
Bohemia,  the  veto  on  union  with  Germany,  and  the 
impossible  burden  of  reparation.  Since  the  armistice 
Austria  has  been  in  a  condition  of  impotent  despair. 
The  republican  government  has  just  managed  to  main- 
tain itself.  Economically  the  situation  has  been 
extremely  grave.  Food  is  scarce,  industry  at  a 
standstill.  The  Alhes  have  extended  what  Lloyd 
George  calls  "soup-kitchen  relief"  to  prevent  Kteral 
starvation,  but  this  cannot  go  on  indefinitely.  In 
part  the  problem  of  Austria  must  be  solved  in  con- 
nection with  the  economic  rehabilitation  of  all 
Europe.  In  part  probably  it  must  be  met  by  a 
relaxation  of  the  Treaty  terms. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  BUI.GARIAN  SETTLEMENT 

Bulgaria  had  been  the  first  of  the  Central  Powers 
to  surrender,  but  the  terms  of  peace  were  not  handed 
to  the  Bulgar  delegates  until  September  19,  1919. 
The  Conference  had  felt  that  the  peace  with  Ger- 
many was  the  most  pressing  matter,  and  that  when 
it  was  settled  a  model  would  be  at  hand  for  drafting 
the  settlements  with  the  lesser  enemies.  There 
were  moreover  a  number  of  points  on  which  the 
Alhes  could  not  reach  an  agreement  among  them- 
selves. 

For  generations  the  Balkans  have  been  a  storm 
center  in  European  poUtics.  It  was  a  Balkan  quar- 
rel which  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the  Great 
War,  and  on  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  Balkan 
situation  the  future  peace  of  the  world  in  no  small 
measure  depends. 

In  attempting  to  understand  the  Balkan  problem, 
there  are  several  fundamental  considerations  which 
must  be  kept  in  mind.  In  itself  the  Ballcan  Penin- 
sula is  not  an  enormously  rich  prize,  although  the 
possibiHties  of  economic  development  are  consider- 
able. Its  wider  significance  lies  in  the  fact  that 
with  Asia  Minor  it  forms  a  great  natural  bridge 
between  Europe  and  Asia.  For  centuries  its  valleys 
have  been  the  highways  for  commerce,  conquest,  and 

224 


The  Bulgarian  Settlement  225 

migration  between  Central  and  Western  Europe  and 
the  Near  East.  During  these  centuries  of  invasion 
and  migration  and  shifting  poHtical  control  the  popu- 
lation has  become  tremendously  mixed  in  language, 
rehgion,  race,  and  national  consciousness.  The 
mountain  barriers  have  helped  to  prevent  the  growth 
of  any  feeling  of  Balkan  solidarity.  For  two  cen- 
turies and  more  the  history  of  the  Balkans  has  been 
dominated  by  three  facts. 

1.  The  Ottoman  Empire,  which  once  extended 
nearly  to  the  gates  of  Vienna  and  into  Southern 
Russia,  has  been  steadily  declining  in  power. 

2.  Russia  and  Austria,  each  ambitious  to  domi- 
nate the  Balkan  Peninsula,  have  advanced  at  the 
expense  of  Turkey.  Behind  Russian  expansion  was 
the  desire  to  redeem  Slavic  and  Greek  Orthodox 
brethren,  and  most  of  all  to  realize  the  supreme 
ambition  of  reaching  the  open  Mediterranean.  The 
Hapsburgs  wished  to  push  down  the  Danube  to  the 
Black  Sea  and  through  Serbia  down  the  Vardar  to 
the  Aegean.  Particularly  since  they  were  expelled 
from  German  and  Italian  affairs,  they  have  turned 
their  attention  eastward.  These  two  lines  of  imperial 
expansion  crossed  in  the  Balkans,  and  Austria  and 
Russia  were  naturally  and  inevitably  rivals.  With 
the  growth  of  German  ambition,  with  the  rise  of  the 
Middle  Europe  idea,  and  in  connection  with  the 
dream  of  domination  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Per- 
sian Gulf,  Germany  too  became  vitally  interested  in 
the  Balkan  Peninsula.     For  Britain  the  question  of 


226       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Constantinople  was  connected  with  the  protection  of 
the  route  to  India;  and  for  Europe  as  a  whole  the 
Balkan  situation  was  intimately  related  to  the  balance 
of  power. 

3.  In  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
peoples  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  awoke  to  a  conscious- 
ness of  nationality  and  struck  for  independence. 
Under  the  earher  Turkish  rule  the  spirit  of  national- 
ism was  dormant,  surviving  only  in  the  language  and 
traditions  of  the  peasantry,  and  in  connection  with 
reHgion  and  the  church  organization.  Some  of  the 
population  turned  Moslem  to  continue  their  economic 
hold  on  the  peasants,  and  to  share  in  the  political 
privileges  of  the  ruling  group.  Through  control  of 
the  leadership  of  the  Orthodox  church  the  Greeks 
remained  the  dominant  element  among  the  subject 
peoples.  Oppressive  taxes,  the  tribute  of  children, 
and  humiliating  restrictions  of  all  kinds  made  the  Hfe 
of  the  Christian  "cattle"  very  miserable,  but  failed 
to  crush  all  possibility  of  national  consciousness.  In 
the  nineteenth  century  Greeks,  Serbs,  Bulgars,  and 
Rumanians  rose  against  their  oppressors  and  with 
some  help  from  outside  achieved  first  autonomy  and 
finally  independence.  The  development  of  these 
vigorous  types  of  national  consciousness  in  the  dumb, 
undifferentiated  mass  of  the  ''Greek"  peasantry  of 
the  Balkans  was  a  surprise  and  a  disappoint- 
ment to  Russia  and  Austria,  who  had  expected 
to  absorb  them  without  opposition  as  soon  as  the 
European  situation  permitted  the  final  partition  of 


The  Bulgarian  Settlement  227 

"urkey.  Both  empires  entered  a  diplomatic  struggle 
for  control  of  the  new  states. 

No  one  of  the  Balkan  states  was  originally  given 
all  the  territory  which  it  claimed  on  Knguistic,  racial, 
and  historical  grounds.  Each  hoped  and  planned  for 
enlargement,  at  the  expense  of  Turkey,  of  Russia,  of 
Austria-Hungary,  and  of  the  other  Balkan  states. 
There  developed  therefore  within  the  Balkan  Penin- 
sula an  internal  struggle  and  the  idea  of  a  local 
balance  of  power.  In  the  background  Russia, 
Austria-Hungary,  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Ger- 
many watched,  intrigued,  and  occasionally  inter- 
vened. Since  1878  the  most  acute  problems  arose 
in  connection  with  the  fate  of  the  Christians  still  sub- 
ject to  Turkey  in  Macedonia  and  Thrace  and  Crete. 
When  the  Young  Turks  attempted  after  1908  to 
Ottomanize  the  Empire,  the  Balkan  powers  at  last 
united  to  drive  the  Turks  from  Europe.  The  war 
which  resulted  when  they  themselves  quarreled  over 
the  division  of  the  spoils  left  Bulgaria  with  a  grievance 
against  Greece  and  Serbia  which  was  an  important 
factor  in  the  decision  to  join  the  Central  Powers  in 
the  Great  War. 

With  the  conquest  of  Serbia  in  191 5  Bulgarian 
ambitions  were  satisfied,  though  the  opportunity  to 
seize  the  Dobrudja  from  Rumania  was  welcomed. 
When  the  war  dragged  on  the  strain  became  too 
great  for  Bulgaria,  and  at  last  army  and  people 
together  collapsed  and  sued  for  peace.  The  dis- 
credited  Czar   Ferdinand   abdicated,   and   the  new 


228       Aft  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

government  prepared  to  rescue  as  much  as  possible 
from  the  ruins  of  the  national  hopes. 

For  some  time  students  of  Balkan  affairs  have 
agreed  on  several  general  principles  as  essential  to  a 
sound  settlement.  As  usual  the  difficulty  has  been 
in  reconciling  the  principles  with  each  other  and  in 
applying  them.  Again  there  have  been  difficulties 
where  the  ambitions  of  the  victors  conflicted  with 
these  principles,  or  with  each  other.  In  essentials 
these  principles  did  not  differ  from  those  for  a  general 
European  settlement.  It  was  clear  that  no  bound- 
aries could  be  drawn  which  would  not  leave  some 
detached  minorities,  particularly  if  any  weight  was 
given  to  geographic  and  strategic  considerations. 
But  it  was  evident  that  peace  would  be  promoted  by 
leaving  as  few  and  as  small  minorities  as  possible. 
This  impHed  that  Bulgaria,  even  though  defeated, 
should  receive  all  territory  that  was  incontestably 
Bulgarian.  It  was  also  obvious  that  access  to  the 
Aegean  in  some  form  ought  to  be  secured.  The 
minorities  everywhere  should  be  given  equal  rights, 
civil  and  rehgious,  and  should  not  be  forced  to  adopt 
the  language  and  religion  of  the  majority.  Every 
facihty  should  be  given  those  who  so  desire  to  move 
to  the  state  which  they  prefer.  If  the  different 
governments  would  cordially  co-operate  in  an  ex- 
change of  minorities,  giving  assistance  in  the  sale  of 
the  old  lands  and  the  purchase  of  new  homes,  much 
good  might  be  accomphshed.  Finally  every  encour- 
agement should  be  given  to  the  Balkan  states  to  sink 


The  Bulgariatt  Settlement  229 

their  old  antagonisms,  forget  past  grievances,  and 
co-operate  in  dealing  with  the  many  interests  which 
they  have  in  common.  In  view  of  the  bitterness 
which  has  been  developed  between  the  Bulgars  and 
their  neighbors  in  the  wars  since  19 13  this  will  be  no 
easy  matter.  However,  if  the  League  of  Nations 
amounts  to  anything,  it  should  exert  its  influence 
along  these  lines. 

President  Wilson  had  declared^  that  the  relations 
of  the  Balkan  states  to  each  other  should  be  deter- 
mined by  friendly  counsel  along  historically  estab- 
lished lines  of  allegiance  and  nationahty,  with 
international  guarantees  of  the  poHtical,  economic,  and 
territorial  integrity  of  each  state.  Unfortunately 
few  were  in  a  mood  for  friendly  counsel,  and  there 
were  no  Hnes  of  allegiance  and  nationality  that  were 
generally  recognized. 

The  terms  presented  to  Bulgaria  follow  closely 
the  lines  laid  down  in  the  treaties  with  Germany  and 
Austria.^  The  parts  containing  the  League  of 
Nations  Covenant  and  those  dealing  with  aerial 
navigation,  trial  of  offenders  against  the  laws  of  war, 
labor,  prisoners,  and  graves  are  the  same  in  all 
important  respects.  Safeguards  for  minorities  are 
included  as  in  the  PoHsh  and  Austrian  treaties.  The 
army  is  to  be  reduced  to  20,000  within  three 
months,  and  the  gendarmerie  is  limited  to  10,000. 

'  Point  XI  of  the  Fourteen. 

^New  York  Times'  Current  History,  October,  1919,  p.  40; 
January,  1920,  p.  8. 


230       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Voluntary  enlistment  for  long  terms  replaces  univer- 
sal military  service.  Details  of  military  organization 
are  fixed,  the  amount  of  munitions  limited,  and 
trade  in  munitions  is  prohibited.  There  may  be 
only  one  military  academy  and  one  munitions  fac- 
tory. The  navy,  which  never  amounted  to  much,  is 
surrendered.  Like  Germany  and  Austria,  Bulgaria 
is  asked  to  admit  responsibility  for  all  losses  and 
expenses  of  her  enemies,  but  in  view  of  the  inade- 
quacy of  her  resources,  a  lump  sum  of  2,250,000,000 
francs  (gold)  is  named  as  the  total  reparation  to  be 
demanded.  An  Interalhed  Commission  is  to  super- 
vise the  working  out  a  plan  of  half-yearly  payments 
beginning  in  1920. 

In  the  matter  of  national  territory  Bulgaria  loses 
comparatively  little.  Toward  Rumania  the  boundary- 
is  to  be  that  of  19 14.  This  leaves  to  Rumania  the 
2,969  square  miles  of  the  Dobrudja  seized  for  strategic 
purposes  in  the  Second  Balkan  War,  1913.  During 
the  Great  War  Bulgaria  had  occupied  all  of  the  Do- 
brudja to  the  Danube.  The  whole  of  the  district  is 
claimed  by  the  Bulgars  on  historical  and  nationaHstic 
grounds.  Since  Rumania  is  making  large  gains  in 
other  directions,  the  Alhed  and  Associated  Powers 
promise  that  they  will  try  to  persuade  Rumania  to 
return  to  Bulgaria  the  purely  Bulgarian  portions  of 
the  Dobrudja.  If  the  difficulties  of  the  AlHes  in  per- 
suading Rumania  to  withdraw  in  Hungary  are  any 
indication,  they  will  have  a  hard  time  in  securing  any 
very  material  concessions  for  Bulgaria. 


The  Bulgarian  Settlement  231 

On  the  west  Bulgaria  must  cede  three  small  areas 
to  Serbia,  including  the  projection  around  Strumnitza 
and  two  border  strips  farther  north.  The  chief  con- 
siderations here  are  strategic,  in  order  to  give  Serbia 
control  of  mountain  passes,  thus  preventing  a  repeti- 
tion of  the  flank  attack  by  which  in  191 5  the  Bulgarian 
army  cut  the  Nish-Saloniki  railway  down  the  Vardar 
Valley.  It  is  unfortunate  that  in  this  instance,  as 
in  the  Tyrol,  the  Conference  followed  the  much- 
condemned  policy  of  Austria-Hungary  in  annexing 
the  Carpathian  passes  into  Rumania.  The  old 
boundary  between  Greece  and  Bulgaria  is  retained, 
with  a  slight  change  to  protect  the  Greek  town  of 
Buk.  A  small  area  northwest  of  Adrianople  is  also 
ceded.  The  most  serious  loss  to  Bulgaria  is  western 
Thrace,  gained  from  Turkey  in  1913,  important  as 
giving  Bulgaria  direct  access  to  the  Aegean. 

The  dispositon  of  this  area  was  one  of  the  most 
disturbing  questions  which  came  before  the  Confer- 
ence. The  Greeks  claimed  the  entire  area  of  Thrace 
to  the  Black  Sea,  including  the  portion  left  to  Turkey 
in  1913,  and  even  Constantinople  itself.  Their  argu- 
ments were  clearly  and  temperately  set  forth  in  a 
memorandum  submitted  by  Premier  Venizelos  to  the 
Peace  Conference.^  He  insisted  that  the  attitude  of 
Greece  toward  Bulgaria  had  always  been  concihatory; 
but  the  pretensions  of  Bulgaria  to  a  Balkan  hegemony 
had  been  a  constant  source  of  trouble.    By  attacking 

^Greece  before  the  Peace  Congress,  American-Hellenic  Society 
Publications,  No.  7. 


232        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

her  allies  in  191 3,  by  joining  the  Central  Powers  in 
191 5,  by  persistent  and  systematic  persecutions  and 
deportations  of  Greeks  in  territory  under  her  control, 
and  by  atrocious  methods  of  warfare/  Bulgaria  has 
forfeited  all  claims  to  lenient  or  generous  treatment. 
Bulgaria  had  a  seacoast  on  the  Black  Sea,  which, 
with  the  neutralization  of  the  Straits,  would  give  a 
free  passage  to  the  Mediterranean.  Furthermore, 
Greece  was  wilUng  to  grant  economic  access  to  the 
Mediterranean  across  Greek  territory  in  a  manner  to 
be  guaranteed  by  the  League  of  Nations.  For  the 
rest,  the  principle  of  nationahty  should  govern,  and 
on  that  basis  the  Premier  declared  that  the  Greeks 
had  the  best  claim.  The  Greeks  are  much  more 
numerous  in  Thrace  than  the  Bulgars,  and  they  con- 
stitute the  most  progressive  and  intelligent  element 
in  the  population.^  "There  is  therefore  no  reason," 
concludes  Venizelos,  ''why  a  benevolent  disposition 
should  be  shown  to  Bulgaria.  She  should  content 
herself  with  the  strict  justice  of  the  Allies,  and 
nothing  more.  It  would  be  a  flagrant  injustice  to 
sacrifice  to  her  the  legitimate  interests  of  other 
peoples.  ....  Above  all,  this  would  be  an  act  of 

bad   policy Bulgaria   seeks   to   play   in   the 

Balkan  Peninsula  the  part  that  Prussia  has  played 
on  the  vast  European  stage." 

'  Established  by  an  Allied  commission.  Report  in  New  York 
Times'  Current  History,  September,  1919,  p.  524. 

*  Before  the  war  Turkish  figures  for  Thrace  outside  the  Vilayet 
of  Constantinople  showed  366,363  Greeks,  508,311  Turks,  107,843 
Bulgars,  out  of  a  total  of  1,026,973. 


The  Bulgarian  Settlement  233 

On  the  other  hand  the  Bulgarians,  who  were 
allowed  a  much  greater  freedom  in  carrying  on 
propaganda  than  had  been  accorded  Germany  or 
Austria,  pleaded  to  be  allowed  to  keep  western 
Thrace.  On  nationalistic  grounds  they  even  asked 
for  parts  of  Macedonia  held  by  Serbia  and  Greece, 
and  for  the  Dobrudja,  held  by  Rumania.  They 
questioned  the  accuracy  of  the  figures  cited  by  the 
Greeks,  and  the  conclusions  drawn  from  them  by 
the  Greeks.  They  claimed  as  really  Bulgarian  in 
nationahty  the  Pomaks,  who  had  become  Moslems 
in  the  seventeenth  century.  By  transferring  these 
"Moslem  Bulgarians"  from  the  Turkish  to  the  Bul- 
garian column,  and  considering  only  western  Thrace, 
the  Bulgar  delegates  proved  to  their  own  satisfaction 
that  there  were  in  the  contested  district  177,925 
Bulgarians  as  against  107,780  Greeks.  They  there- 
fore invoked  the  principle  of  self-determination,  and 
at  the  very  least  demanded  a  plebiscite.  The  need 
of  Bulgaria  for  an  economic  outlet  on  the  Aegean  was 
also  strongly  urged. 

In  the  midst  of  the  usual  snowstorm  of  pamphlets, 
treatises,  ethnographic  maps,  and  petitions,  the  com- 
mission of  experts  appointed  by  the  Conference  delib- 
erated as  to  the  disposition  of  Thrace.  Finally  a 
report  was  drawn  up,  concurred  in  by  the  American, 
French,  British,  and  Japanese  representatives,  favor- 
able to  the  Greek  claims.  Although  the  leaders  of 
the  Conference  decided  to  compel  Bulgaria  to  relin- 
quish western  Thrace,  the  ultimate  disposal  of  this 


234       ^^^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

region  is  still  in  doubt.  Several  factors  have  com- 
bined to  cause  the  delay.  For  one  thing,  the  question 
is  related  to  the  problem  of  Turkey  in  Europe,  and 
indeed  with  the  whole  Near  Eastern  settlement.  This 
in  turn  has  been  delayed,  in  large  measure,  waiting  to 
see  what  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  may  be, 
particularly  with  regard  to  accepting  any  mandates. 
The  Italians,  again,  long  opposed  all  the  Greek  claims 
because  of  conflicts  of  interest  in  Southern  Albania, 
the  Dodekanese  Islands,  and  Asia  Minor.  When 
these  differences  were  adjusted,  the  American  atti- 
tude on  the  Bulgarian  settlement  caused  difficulty. 
The  United  States  had  not  declared  war  on  Bul- 
garia, or  even  severed  diplomatic  relations,  and  the 
Germans  credited  our  consular  representative  with 
ha\dng  taken  a  prominent  part  in  arranging  for  the 
Bulgarian  surrender.  The  American  representatives 
at  the  Conference  exerted  their  influence  in  favor  of 
moderation  and  of  recognition  of  the  reasonable 
aspirations  of  the  Bulgarians.  This  has  been  attrib- 
uted" in  part  to  the  influence  of  Robert  College  at 
Constantinople,  which  has  for  years  been  in  close 
touch  with  Bulgarian  leaders  and  friendly  to  them. 
Through  these  and  other  missionary  channels,  and 
through  influential  friends  in  America,  it  was  thought 
that  the  Bulgarian  case  was  brought  directly  to  the 
sympathetic  attention  of  the  President.  It  has  been 
reported  that  the  United  States  favored  gi\ang  Greece 

'  Christian  Science  Monitor,  January  8,  1920;   The  New  Europe, 
July  4,  1918,  pp.  266-71. 


The  Bulgarian  Settlement  235 

the  eastern  part  of  Thrace,  and  making  the  western 
part  autonomous  under  the  protection  of  the  League, 
with  Bulgarian  access  to  the  port  of  Dede-Agatch 
guaranteed.  Recent  dispatches  indicate  that  it  has 
been  decided  to  give  the  debated  territory  to  Greece, 
to  which  President  Wilson  may  object.  The  Senate 
of  the  United  States  on  January  21,  1920,  passed  a 
resolution  favoring  the  incorporation  of  all  of  Thrace 
up  to  the  Chatalja  lines  at  Constantinople  in  the 
Greek  Kingdom. 

The  efforts  of  the  Bulgarians  to  obtain  a  modifi- 
cation of  the  terms  were  largely  in  vain,  and  Novem- 
ber 27,  19 1 9,  the  Treaty  was  signed  at  Neuilly,  near 
Paris.  Rumania  finally  consented  to  sign,  but  the 
South  Slavs  still  delayed.  Bulgaria  feels  very  bitter 
at  the  size  of  the  reparation  demanded,  at  the  loss  of 
territory,  and  at  the  failure  to  secure  any  of  the 
"unredeemed  brethren"  in  Macedonia  and  the 
Dobrudja.  On  the  other  hand  it  should  be  noted 
that  Bulgaria  is  allowed  to  retain  something  like  half 
of  the  territory  gained  from  Turkey  in  191 3,  and 
that  the  right  of  using  the  Greek  ports  of  Kavalla 
and  Saloniki  and  of  continuing  to  use  Dede-Agatch 
is  practically  more  valuable  than  the  political  posses- 
sion of  Dede-Agatch  alone,  since  the  latter  is  a  very 
poor  harbor. 

The  settlement  is  not  entirely  satisfactory,  but 
no  arrangement  could  please  all  concerned.  It  is 
earnestly  to  be  hoped  that  the  new  Bulgarian  govern- 
ment will  give  up  all  plans  of  conquest.     For  the 


236        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

present  of  course  Bulgaria  is  helpless,  but  if  the 
neighbors  feel  that  the  Bulgarians  are  simply  waiting 
for  an  opportunity  to  secure  revenge,  peace  will  be 
insecure.  If  all  the  Balkan  states  deal  fairly  by  the 
minorities  under  their  control,  if  they  avoid  tariff 
wars,  preferably  by  a  customs  union,  then  better 
days  for  the  troubled  peninsula  may  come.  Other- 
wise the  Treaty  of  Neuilly,  like  the  Treaty  of  Bucha- 
rest in  1 9 13,  may  prove  only  a  truce. 


CHAPTER  IX 

HUNGARY 

The  Magyars  of  Hungary  share  with  the  Pan- 
Germans  the  distinction  of  having  contributed  more 
largely  than  any  other  group  to  bringing  on  the  Great 
War.  During  the  thousand  years  since  they  left  their 
Asiatic  home  and  burst  into  Central  Europe  they 
have  played  a  prominent  part  in  many  epochs  of  his- 
tory. Settled  in  a  compact  mass  in  the  plain  of  the 
upper  Danube  they  have  maintained  political  control 
over  numerous  Slavic  and  Rumanian  groups.  After 
1867  Hungary  was  an  equal  partner  with  Austria  in 
the  peculiar  Dual  Monarchy.  Though  always  rest- 
less and  insistent  on  their  own  independence  the 
Magyars  maintained  a  working  agreement  with  the 
Germans  of  Austria.  Together  the  two  groups  could 
keep  an  ascendancy  over  the  minorities,  and  united 
they  ruled  one  of  the  great  powers  of  Europe.  Both 
dominant  groups  knew  that  the  break-up  of  the  Dual 
Monarchy  would  reduce  them  to  insignificance. 

Within  the  historic  limits  of  the  Hungarian  King- 
dom, the  Magyars  even  by  their  own  exaggerated 
statistics  constituted  just  over  half  of  the  total  popu- 
lation. Nevertheless  by  various  suffrage  limitations, 
by  the  gerrymandering  of  electoral  districts,  supple- 
mented by  intimidation,  force,  and  fraud,  they  main- 
tained an  absolute  political  mastery.    Transylvania, 

237 


238       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

with  its  large  Rumanian  population,  was  deprived 
of  the  autonomy  which  it  had  enjoyed  in  earUer 
periods,  and  Croatia,  although  it  retained  some 
local  self-government,  was  kept  under  the  closest 
possible  control.  For  fifty  years  all  the  resources 
of  the  government  have  been  devoted  to  Mag- 
y arizing  the  minorities.  This  process,  accompanied 
by  the  usual  attempts  to  force  the  use  of  the 
Magyar  language  in  all  the  schools  and  courts,  to 
keep  down  the  number  of  non-Magyars  in  the  state 
service,  and  in  general  to  stamp  out  the  separatist 
nationalistic  consciousness  in  the  minority  groups, 
had  the  usual  result.  The  minorities  more  and  more 
despaired  of  securing  political,  religious,  or  cultural 
equality,  and  turned  increasingly  to  the  ideas  of 
freedom  and  of  union  with  kindred  groups  outside  of 
Hungary. 

The  Magyars  were  aided  in  maintaining  their 
ascendancy  by  the  fact  that  the  minority  groups 
were  scattered  geographically  and  had  little  in  com- 
mon except  resistance  to  the  policy  of  denational- 
ization. On  the  east  the  Transylvanian  district 
within  the  curve  of  the  Carpathians  contains  a  large 
number  of  Rumanians,  though  there  are  compact 
islands  of  Magyars  (Czecklers)  and  Germans.  On  the 
north  are  the  Slovaks,  a  people  closely  related  to  the 
Czechs  and  Moravians,  though  somewhat  more 
backward.  A  small  group  of  Ruthenians,  detached 
from  their  kinsmen  by  the  barrier  of  the  Carpathians, 
have  chosen  to  become  an  autonomous  part  of  the 


Hungary  239 

new  Czecho-Slovak  State.  On  the  west  adjoining 
Austria  is  a  narrow  strip,  the  German  population  of 
which  was  added  to  Austria  by  the  Treaty  of  St. 
Germain.  In  the  southern  province  of  the  Banat  of 
Temesvar  the  Rumanians,  Serbs,  and  Germans  all 
outnumber  the  Magyars.  The  city  of  Fiume,  which 
was  Hungary's  port  on  the  Adriatic,  has  an  Italian 
plurality.  Throughout  the  war  all  these  subject 
groups  fought  without  much  enthusiasm,  and  with 
the  collapse  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  they  hastened  to 
throw  off  the  control  of  the  Magyars. 

In  October,  1918,  a  revolutionary  government  in 
Budapest  proclaimed  a  people's  republic  and  severed 
all  connection  with  Austria.  By  the  terms  of  the 
armistice  which  they  concluded  with  the  Allies  the 
Hungarian  troops  were  withdrawn  from  certain 
border  areas.  It  was  expected  that  English,  French, 
Italian,  and  American  troops  would  occupy  these 
regions  until  the  final  settlement.  This  plan  was 
carried  out  only  in  part,  and  instead  the  Czechs, 
Rumanians,  and  South  Slavs  pushed  in  to  secure 
long-coveted  territory,  and  presently  only  the  Mag- 
yar center  of  the  old  kingdom  remained  under  the 
control  of  the  capital.  The  occupation  of  the  border 
districts  made  the  economic  situation  increasingly 
distressing,  and  bolshevistic  agitation  made  the  posi- 
tion of  the  provisional  government  precarious.  An 
attempted  uprising  in  February,  1919,  was  crushed, 
but  when  in  March  the  AlUes  ordered  the  Hungarians 
to  withdraw  their  troops  from  a  strip  in  the  east  in 


/ 


240       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

order  to  leave  a  neutral  zone,  Count  Karolyi  made 
this  an  excuse  for  turning  over  the  government  to  the 
Communists.  The  neighboring  states,  fearing  the 
spread  of  bolshevism,  and  in  particular  the  linking  up 
of  the  Magyar  forces  with  the  Russian  soviet  army, 
began  to  close  in  on  Budapest.  The  Red  Army 
resisted  and  at  some  points  gained  victories.  The 
Council  at  Paris  had  been  waiting  for  the  estabHsh- 
ment  of  a  stable  government  in  Hungary,  represen- 
tative of  the  popular  will,  with  which  peace  might  be 
concluded.  Being  unable  to  come  to  any  under- 
standing with  the  Communists,  the  AlUes  appealed 
to  the  Hungarians  to  overthrow  Bela  Kun,  promising 
to  raise  the  blockade,  make  peace,  and  evacuate 
strictly  Hungarian  territory.  The  Rumanians  ad- 
vanced on  the  capital,  and  occupied  it  August  4.  A 
few  days  earlier  a  moderate  Socialist  government  had 
replaced  the  Communists.  The  Rumanians  issued  a 
drastic  ultimatum  to  the  Hungarian  government, 
demanding  30  per  cent  of  the  available  farm  animals 
and  farm  machinery,  half  the  railway  supplies,  and 
large  amounts  of  munitions  and  river  shipping. 
The  Rumanians  explained  this  breach  of  the  armistice 
terms  as  necessary  in  order  to  crush  the  menace  of 
bolshevism;  the  requisitions,  they  said,  were  merely 
the  recovery  of  part  of  the  losses  they  themselves 
had  suffered  under  the  Austro-Hungarian  occupation. 
The  leaders  of  the  Peace  Conference  vigorously 
protested  against  the  action  of  the  Rumanians, 
insisting    that    the    whole    question    of    reparation 


Hungary  241 

should  be  left  to  the  Conference.  The  Rumanians 
returned  evasive  answers,  and  in  defiance  of  the 
orders  from  Paris  proceeded  to  strip  the  country  of 
food,  farm  animals,  rolling  stock,  and  machinery, 
destroying  much  that  they  could  not  carry  off. 

A  provisional  government  under  the  Archduke 
Joseph  was  set  up  with  Rumanian  approval,  but  it 
was  not  recognized  by  the  Allies,  and  at  their  demand 
it  finally  resigned.  The  Rumanians  at  last  agreed  to 
withdraw  their  troops,  and  to  list  the  goods  taken 
from  Hungary  to  be  deducted  from  their  share  of  the 
reparation.  For  months,  however,  Rumanian  troops 
remained  some  distance  to  the  west  of  the  line  fixed 
by  the  Conference,  in  spite  of  seventeen  Allied 
"ultimatums."^ 

The  governments  which  have  succeeded  the  Com- 
munists have  all  been  conservative,  even  reactionary, 
and  strongly  nationalist.  They  have  proceeded  to 
punish  the  Communists,  a  number  having  been 
executed  and  many  imprisoned.  Some  observers 
report  that  the  conservative  White  Terror  is  worse 
than  the  Red  Terror,  though  this  is  energetically 
denied.^  While  economic  conditions  were  going  from 
bad  to  worse,  and  while  the  Allies  were  waiting  for 
some  government  to  be  established  with  which  they 
could  negotiate,  a  national  assembly  was  elected. 
Its  membership  indicates  a  desire  for  a  constitutional 
monarchy,  though  the  Allies  announced  that  they 

^  New  York  Times'  Current  History,  March,  1920,  p.  448. 
'  Ibid.,  February,  1920,  p.  269;   March,  p.  450. 


242        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

would  not  tolerate  the  restoration  of  the  Hapsburgs. 
On  March  i  Admiral  Horthy  was  chosen  regent. 
Internally  one  of  the  most  pressing  problems  is  land 
reform,  for  the  Magyar  peasantry  have  been  exploited 
by  the  ruling  classes  and  excluded  from  political  power 
almost  as  much  as  the  Slavs  and  Rumanians.  The 
city  proletariat  is  not  so  numerous  as  in  the  states 
with  a  greater  industrial  development,  but  all  danger 
of  revolutionary  disturbances  is  not  ended. 

Externally  the  problem  is  to  make  peace  and 
resume  economic  relations.  The  AlUes  had  agreed 
on  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  in  September,  but  it  was 
not  until  January,  1920,  that  Count  Apponyi  was 
summoned  to  Paris  to  receive  them.  In  general  the 
Treaty  follows  very  closely  the  German,  Austrian, 
and  Bulgarian  treaties.  The  Hungarian  army  is 
limited  to  35,000.  Responsibility  for  reparations  is 
to  be  admitted,  the  amount  to  be  fixed  by  the 
Commission.  In  particular  Hungary  is  to  furnish 
coal  to  the  Jugo-Slav  State  for  five  years.  On  all 
sides  territory  is  surrendered  to  neighboring  states. 
The  states  to  which  this  territory  is  added  are  to 
assume  a  proportional  share  of  the  pre-war  Hunga- 
rian debt. 

The  Allies  extended  the  time  for  considering 
the  terms,  and  in  February  the  Hungarian  delegates 
submitted  their  criticisms  and  counter-proposals.' 
Objections   centered    around    the   provisions    as    to 

'  Springfield  Weekly  Republican,  February  26,  1920;  New  York 
Times'  Current  History,  March,  1920,  p.  448. 


Hungary  243 

reparations  and  boundaries,  though  complaint  is 
made  that  the  army  allowed  would  be  too  small  for 
safety.  How  could  Hungary,  which  was  being 
deprived  of  wood  and  ore  and  coal,  be  expected  to 
furnish  them  by  way  of  reparation,  especially  after 
the  country  had  been  despoiled  by  the  Rumanians  ? 
To  the  Magyars  the  new  boundaries  seemed  to  have 
been  drawn  in  order  to  furnish  strategic  and  economic 
advantages  to  Rumania,  Czecho-Slovakia,  and  the 
South  Slav  Kingdom.  Everywhere,  it  was  asserted, 
a  strip  of  purely  Magyar  territory  from  thirty-five  to 
forty  miles  wide  was  being  taken  from  them.  The 
new  political  boundaries  crossed  and  recrossed  railway 
lines  in  a  most  impractical  fashion.  The  Magyars 
denied  that  the  border  districts,  which  had  been 
under  their  control  for  nearly  a  thousand  years, 
were  in  favor  of  separation.  The  principle  of  self- 
determination  was  invoked,  and  a  plebiscite  was 
demanded.  In  Transylvania  the  Rumanians,  though 
the  largest  group,  made  up  only  43  per  cent  of  the 
total.  Many  of  them,  it  was  alleged,  were  recon- 
ciled to  Hungarian  rule,  and  others  asked  no  more 
than  the  autonomy  which  Hungary  was  willing  to 
grant.  At  least,  they  should  be  allowed  to  express 
their  choice. 

Press  dispatches  in  March  indicated  that  some  of 
the  Allies  favored  a  modification  of  the  boundaries  in 
favor  of  the  Magyars,  but  that  the  French  opposed 
reopening  the  question.  In  any  event  the  Magyars 
will  find  themselves  disarmed,  reduced  to  less  than 


244       -4w  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

half  their  former  size,  and  burdened  with  heavy 
reparations.  "Hungary's  coffin  is  being  built," 
said  Premier  Huzar;  and  for  a  proud,  ambitious,  and 
intensely  nationahstic  group  the  outlook  is  indeed 
gloomy,  but,  like  the  Prussian  Junkers,  the  Hunga- 
rian ruling  caste  have  only  themselves  to  blame. 

When  Rumania  entered  the  war  in  1916  the  Allies 
promised  that  in  the  event  of  victory  they  would 
allow  the  annexation  of  Hungarian  territory  up  to  a 
line  which  was  fixed  in  considerable  detail.     This  was 
done  without  the  consent  of  Serbia,  whose  claims  in 
the  Banat  of  Temesvar  conflicted  sharply  with  those 
of   Rumania.     In    this   instance,    as   in    the   secret 
treaty  with  Italy,  the  South  Slavs  felt  that  their 
interests  were  being  sacrificed.     The  Allies  beheved 
that  the  military  necessities  justified  the  concessions. 
The  Magyar   census   of   1900   showed   that   the 
Banat  contained  578,789  Rimianians,  362,487  Ger- 
mans, 351,938  Serbs,  and  170,124  Magyars.    After 
the  armistice  some  difficulty  was  experienced  in  pre- 
venting the  Rumanians  and  South  Slavs  from  com- 
ing to  blows  in  Temesvar.     The  South  Slavs  asked 
the  Peace  Conference  to  give  them  the  territory  west 
of  a  line  drawn  southward  from  Arad,  including  the 
city  of  Temesvar.     This  territory  they  claimed  had 
more   Slavs    than   Rumanians.     A   frontier   farther 
west  was  strategically  untenable.     The  Rumanians 
on  the  other  hand  claimed  the  whole  Banat.     The 
compromise    line    rather    favors    the    Rumanians. 
The  western  portion  (the  county  of  Torontal)  is  to 


Hungary  245 

be  assigned  to  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State  and  the 
larger  eastern  portion  to  Rumania.  The  boundary- 
proposed  cuts  across  the  railway  lines  in  an  unsatis- 
factory manner,  and  neither  side  is  particularly 
pleased.  Perhaps  it  will  be  modified  by  further 
direct  negotiations  between  the  interested  states. 


CHAPTER  X 

ELEMENTS  OF  THE  NEAR-EASTERN 
SETTLEMENT 

A  year  and  a  half  after  the  armistice  the  fate  of 
the  different  portions  of  the  Turkish  Empire  was  still 
undecided.  This  is  in  many  respects  unfortunate. 
In  1918  the  war- weary  population  would  have  been 
glad  to  accept  almost  any  reasonable  settlement  that 
promised  them  peace  and  food.  But  while  the  Con- 
ference debated  other  matters,  while  the  United 
States  hesitated  about  accepting  any  responsibihty 
for  the  future  of  the  Near  East,  and  while  the  Allied 
nations  negotiated  with  each  other  over  annexations 
and  protectorates  and  spheres  of  influence  and  man- 
dates, unrest  among  the  native  populations  has 
increased.  In  particular  the  nationalistic  spirit  of 
the  Turks  has  revived  and  other  groups  have  enlarged 
their  ambitions,  until  now  the  prospects  of  an  ami- 
cable settlement  are  not  bright. 

Two  general  principles  for  the  new  order  have  been 
agreed  upon.  First  it  is  understood  that  the  rule  of 
Turks  over  non-Turks  must  be  ended.  Second,  the 
signatories  of  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant  recog- 
nize that  the  welfare  of  these  formerly  subject  groups 
is  a  collective  responsibility  of  civilization.  The 
League  of  Nations,  through  mandatories  who  so  far 
as  possible  shall  be  agreeable  to  the  different  groups, 

246 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  247 

is  to  help  them  toward  complete  independence  as 
rapidly  as  possible.  In  carrying  out  these  principles 
there  are  the  usual  fundamental  difficulties.  For  one 
thing,  the  subject  races  are  so  mixed  together  that  it 
is  impossible  to  draw  boundaries  that  will  even 
approximately  group  persons  of  the  same  language 
and  religion  together.  The  problem  is  still  further 
complicated  if  attention  is  paid  to  defensible  fron- 
tiers, natural  resources,  or  access  to  the  sea.  For 
another  thing,  the  European  nations,  England, 
France,  Italy,  and  Greece  in  particular,  cannot  agree 
on  the  terms  and  the  distribution  of  the  mandates. 
The  four  powers  have  ambitions  which  clash  with 
each  other  and  with  the  wishes  of  important  elements 
of  the  native  population. 

During  the  course  of  the  war  a  number  of  secret 
agreements  were  made  as  to  the  future  of  Turkish 
territory.  The  late  entrance  of  Greece  into  the  war, 
the  collapse  of  Russia,  the  recognition  of  the  Arab 
Kingdom  of  the  Hedjaz,  and  other  developments 
have  caused  a  progressive  modification  of  plans. 
Finally  the  adoption  of  the  scheme  of  mandatories 
has  necessitated  a  complete  revision.  The  settle- 
ment of  the  boundaries  of  the  reduced  Turkish  State 
will  be  only  a  first  step  to  a  final  adjustment.^  Bol- 
shevism in  Central  Asia,  Young  Turk  nationaHsm  in 
Anatolia,  Arab  nationalism  in  Syria,  Zionism  in 
Palestine,  and  other  complicating  forces  threaten  to 
reopen  war  in  the  Near  East,  or  at  least  to  keep 

'  As  this  is  written  the  Turkish  Treaty  has  not  been  made  public. 


248        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

conditions  disturbed.  Much  will  depend  on  whether 
the  mandatory  scheme  is  carried  out  in  an  unselfish 
and  effective  manner,  or  whether,  as  many  fear,  it 
will  prove  indistinguishable  from  the  old  order  of 
protectorates  and  spheres  of  influence.  It  seems 
clear  that  in  distributing  the  mandates  the  agree- 
ments made  during  the  war  will  form  the  basis. 

As  a  result  largely  of  bolshevistic  revelations  from 
the  archives  at  Petrograd  a  part  of  the  negotiations 
between  the  AlHes  has  become  known.  The  details 
are  compKcated,  earher  arrangements  have  been 
modified  or  superseded,  and  only  a  summary  of  their 
principal  features  need  be  given  in  this  connection. 
By  the  Treaty  of  London,  April  26,  191 5,  Italian 
claims  in  Asia  Minor  were  recognized,  but  not  in 
detail.  Early  in  1916,  England,  France,  and  Russia 
parceled  out  Palestine,  Syria,  Mesopotamia,  and 
most  of  Asia  Minor.  Some  territory  was  to  be 
annexed,  some  was  to  be  left  to  native  governments 
under  foreign  "protection,"  still  other  territory  was 
to  be  within  the  sphere  of  influence  of  one  or  another 
power.  France  received  the  right  to  administer 
''after  agreement  with  the  State  or  Confederation  of 
Arab  States"  the  coast  of  Syria  from  Tyre  north  to 
Mersina  and  into  Asia  Minor  past  Sivas,  Harput, 
and  Mardin.  The  British  were  similarly  to  adminis- 
ter Mesopotamia  up  to  a  line  somewhat  north  of 
Bagdad.  Palestine  was  to  be  under  an  international 
administration  to  be  determined  later.  By  a  later 
agreement  at  St.  Jean  de  Maurienne,  and  in  subse- 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  249 

quent  conferences  (19 16-17),  Italy  was  assigned  a 
zone  in  Southern  Asia  Minor,  including  Smyrna  and 
Konia.  Meanwhile  the  Arab  chiefs  were  being 
promised  an  independent  state  or  confederation  in 
the  interior  to  include  Damascus,  Horns,  Hamath, 
Aleppo,  and  Mosul.  The  northern  portion  of  this 
Arab  region  was  to  be  in  the  French  sphere,  that  is 
France  had  a  "right  of  priority  in  regard  to  enter- 
prises and  local  loans  [and]  the  exclusive  right  to 
provide  advisers  or  foreign  officials  at  the  request  of 
the  Arab  State  or  Confederation."  In  the  southern 
zone,  extending  from  Egypt  to  Mesopotamia,  Britain 
had  similar  rights.  The  ports  of  Haifa  and  Acre 
were  to  go  to  England,  who  granted  freedom  to 
French  commerce.  British  commerce  had  similar 
rights  at  Alexandretta  in  the  French  area. 

There  has  been  difficulty  in  reconciling  the 
promises  made  by  Britain  to  the  French  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  Arabs  on  the  other.  One  section 
of  French  opinion  has  felt  that  the  claims  of  the 
Repubhc  were  not  being  adequately  recognized,  and 
that  Britain  was  backing  the  Arabs  with  the  hope  of 
dominating  the  entire  situation.  Not  until  Sep- 
tember, 1 91 9,  were  British  troops  withdrawn  from 
Syria  and  replaced  in  part  by  French  troops.  The 
interior  is  under  Arab  rule,  but  the  French  are  sup- 
posed to  be  consulted  on  political  matters.  On 
November  9,  1918,  a  joint  British-French  declaration 
spoke  of  encouraging  and  protecting  native  govern- 
ments in  Syria  and  Mesopotamia.     Greek  claims  to 


250       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Smyrna  have  made  it  necessary  to  modify  the  agree- 
ment with  Italy.  Since  the  armistice  Greek  and 
Italian  troops  have  been  landed  at  Smyrna  and 
Adalia.  The  British  control  Mesopotamia  as  far  as 
Mosul,  and  presumably  their  mandate  will  extend  as 
far  as  the  borders  of  Armenia.  The  Anglo-Persian 
agreement  (August  9,  191 9),  while  it  does  not  estab- 
lish a  technical  protectorate,  leaves  Great  Britain 
dominant  in  Persian  affairs. 

The  new  arrangements  create  a  broad  belt  of 
territory  from  Eg}^pt  to  India  in  which  British  influ- 
ence will  be  supreme.  This  will  protect  the  Suez 
Canal  and  the  approaches  to  India;  but  it  will  in 
turn  need  protection,  and  some  observers  in  England 
are  wondering  whether  the  new  extended  frontiers 
will  be  as  strong  as  the  old.  To  what  extent  the 
British  wish  to  take  the  place  of  Russia  in  Central 
Asia  is  hard  to  determine.  Their  cardinal  policy,  as 
always,  is  to  safeguard  India  and  the  Canal.  The 
present  menace  lies  in  bolshevistic  agitation,  which 
seems  inclined  to  join  forces  with  Turkish  nationalism 
in  an  attempt  to  rouse  the  Turanians  of  Central  Asia 
against  England. 

Before  attempting  to  describe  some  of  the  specific 
problems  of  the  Turkish  settlement,  it  is  well  to  recaU 
briefly  the  historical  background,  and  some  of  the 
fundamental  factors  in  the  situation.  The  Near 
East — the  region  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Red  Sea 
and  the  Persian  Gulf,  including  Asia  Minor,  Syria, 
Palestine,  Mesopotamia,  and  Arabia — has  been  and 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  251 

is  and  must  continue  to  be  important  for  three  prin- 
cipal reasons.  In  the  first  place  its  geographical 
situation  has  made  it  the  historic  meeting-place  of 
Eastern  and  Western  civilization  through  uncounted 
centuries.  The  great  land  highways  between  Asia, 
Europe,  and  Africa  cross  it.  From  the  days  when 
Joseph's  brethren  lifted  up  their  eyes  and  beheld  the 
camels  of  the  Ishmaelite  traders  bearing  spices  to  the 
land  of  Egypt  until  the  present,  the  commerce  of 
three  continents  has  flowed  to  it  and  from  it.  It  was 
with  a  sure  instinct  and  a  grasp  of  world-conditions 
that  the  Germans  centered  their  hopes  of  expansion  in 
the  Bagdad  railway.  At  the  Dardanelles  and  the 
Isthmus  of  Suez  the  Near  East  dominates  two  of  the 
most  important  lines  of  world-communication.  In 
the  very  nature  of  things,  then,  this  region  is  of  the 
greatest  strategic  and  economic  importance. 

But  the  Near  East  is  more  than  a  gateway;  it  is 
in  itself  a  region  of  no  small  importance.  It  contains 
important  natural  resources,  as  yet  largely  unde- 
veloped. With  proper  cultivation  it  can  support  a 
much  larger  population  than  it  now  has,  and  its 
favorable  climate  makes  it  a  not  impossible  field  for 
European  settlement.  In  any  event  it  is  a  tempting 
area  for  exploitation  by  European  capital. 

Finally,  besides  possessing  numerous  other  cul- 
tural and  historical  associations,  this  region  has  been 
the  birthplace  of  three  of  the  world's  greatest 
religions,  Judaism,  Christianity,  and  Mohammedan- 
ism.    It  contains  sacred  places  dear  to  560,000,000 


252        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Christians,  12,000,000  Jews,  and  220,000,000  Moslems, 
in  all  nearly  half  the  human  race.  That  part  of  the 
world  which  contains  Santa  Sophia  at  Constantinople, 
Nazareth  and  GaHlee,  the  site  of  the  Temple  at  Jeru- 
salem, Calvary,  the  manger  at  Bethlehem,  the  River 
Jordan,  the  tomb  of  Abraham,  the  Prophet's  second 
home  at  Medinah,  and  the  Kaaba  at  Mecca,  with 
countless  other  sites  only  less  holy,  has  a  sentimental 
value  which  can  scarcely  be  overestimated.  Nor  has 
the  world  outgrown  the  possibihties  of  religious 
jealousies,  misunderstandings,  and  conflicts. 

For  six  centuries  the  poKtically  dominant  group 
in  this  critically  important  area  has  been  the  Otto- 
man Turks,  but  for  the  last  two  hundred  years  they 
have  been  steadily  losing  power.  Their  territory  has 
passed  in  part  to  Russia,  Austria-Hungary,  Britain, 
France,  and  Italy.  In  part  subject  nationahties, 
Greeks,  Rumanians,  Bulgars,  Serbs,  have  won  inde- 
pendence. For  a  century  and  more  the  Turks  have 
remained  in  power  for  four  main  reasons. 

I.  The  Turks  are  good  fighters  themselves,  and 
they  have  prevented  the  subject  groups  from  organ- 
izing and  arming.  Nevertheless  the  Turks  have 
utilized  the  ablest  men  from  the  non-Turkish  elements 
in  the  army  and  government  to  supplement  their  own 
officials.  The  ruling  caste  in  Turkey,  including  the 
royal  family,  has  a  neghgible  amount  of  genuinely 
Turkish  blood  in  its  veins.  From  any  Western  point 
of  view  the  old  Turkish  government  was  hopelessly 
corrupt  and  inefficient,  but  somehow  it  did  govern. 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  253 

2.  So  long  as  non-Turkish  elements  kept  quiet 
they  were  allowed  a  considerable  degree  of  local  self- 
government.  The  Christians  paid  heavy  taxes,  and 
were  subject  to  various  disabihties ;  but  in  compensa- 
tion they  were  not  allowed  (until  after  1908)  to  serve 
in  the  army.  As  a  rule  they  were  treated  with  a  kind 
of  contemptuous  tolerance,  and  within  their  own 
"communities"  were  permitted  to  manage  their 
own  churches,  their  education,  and  many  of  their  own 
local  affairs.  Persecutions  and  massacres  of  Chris- 
tians have  been  more  political  and  economic  than 
genuinely  religious,  although  the  government  has 
not  scrupled  to  arouse  religious  fanaticism  against 
them  when  it  served  its  purposes.  The  Armenians, 
Bulgars,  and  Greeks  have  been  murdered,  robbed, 
and  deported  as  potential  rebels  and  as  easy  victims 
rather  than  as  Christians.  Before  Turkey  began  to 
fear  the  separatist  movement  among  the  subject 
races  there  was  remarkably  little  religious  persecu- 
tion, less  in  fact  than  in  many  Christian  countries  of 
the  same  period.  In  many  regions  the  Moslem 
peasantry  has  suffered  nearly  as  much  at  the  hands 
of  the  Turkish  government  as  the  Christians.  How- 
ever, the  Turks  knew  enough  not  to  interfere  too  much 
with  the  local  independence  of  such  refractory  fellow- 
Moslems  as  the  Albanians,  the  Kurds,  and  the  Arabs. 

3.  The  Turks,  though  a  minority,  kept  in  power 
by  fostering  dissension  among  their  subject  groups. 
No  rulers  have  more  steadily  followed  the  old  maxim 
"Divide  and  Conquer." 


254       ^^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

4.  It  has  been  the  same  principle  in  foreign  poHcy 
that  has  really  been  their  salvation.  For  a  century 
and  a  half  nothing  has  prevented  the  conquest  of 
Turkey  by  Russia  and  Austria,  and  more  recently  by 
France,  England,  Germany,  Italy,  and  the  Balkan 
states  except  the  impossibility  of  agreeing  on  the 
division  of  the  spoils.  It  was  by  playing  England 
against  Russia,  and  France  against  England,  and 
Bulgaria  against  Greece,  and  Germany  against  Eng- 
land, and  so  on,  that  the  Sultans  have  kept  them- 
selves in  Stamboul. 

When  in  1908  it  seemed  that  the  European 
powers  at  last  were  about  to  agree  on  a  Turkish 
policy  the  Young  Turk  revolution  took  place.  This 
was  in  no  small  measure  a  desperate  attempt  to  save 
Turkey  from  partition  by  reorganizing  and  modern- 
izing the  Turkish  State.  Although  it  started  with 
high  hopes,  the  new  regime  failed  tragically,  and  in 
its  failure  directly  contributed  to  the  chain  of  events 
which  led  to  the  Great  War.  In  some  respects  the 
situation  in  Turkey  was  Uke  that  in  the  Dual  Mon- 
archy, and  the  leaders  had  the  same  choice  between 
granting  local  autonomy  to  the  subject  nationahties 
and  reorganizing  as  a  federal  state,  and  a  policy  of 
forcible  unification.  The  minorities  in  Turkey  ex- 
pected the  revolution  to  bring  them  more  freedom. 
Instead  they  found  themselves  the  victims  of  an 
attempt  to  Ottomanize  the  whole  Empire.  The 
Young  Turk  leaders  took  the  position  that  all  Otto- 
man subjects  should  share  in  a  common  patriotic 


The  Near- Eastern  Settlement  255 

devotion  to  their  country.     To  this  end  the  use  of 
the    Turkish    language    was    made    compulsory    in 
schools  and  government  business.     Military  service 
was  made  universal,  and  the  special  privileges  of  the 
Christian  communities  were  to  be  abolished.     The 
disillusioned  Christian  groups  gave  up  hope  of  free- 
dom within  the  Empire,  and  thought  again  of  inde- 
pendence.    The  success  of  the  Young  Turk  policies 
would  have  meant   that  the  Balkan  states  would 
have  found  it  impossible  to  reahze  their  ambitions, 
and  they  therefore  joined  in  191 2  for  a  concerted 
attack  to  liberate  their  oppressed  fellows  in  European 
Turkey.     Meanwhile   the  attempt  to   collect   taxes 
from  and  impose  military  service  on  the  Albanians 
and  the  Arabs  led  to  revolts.     The  effort  to  suppress 
these  uprisings  cost  the  government  men  and  money 
which  it  could  ill  afford.     The  ambitious  program  of 
reforms  which  the  new  regime  attempted  called  for 
even  heavier  taxes  than  under  the  old  Sultan.     Many 
of  the  old  officials  held  on,  and  there  was  no  real 
improvement  in  the  honesty  or  general  efficiency  of 
the  public  service.     The  people   as   a  whole  were 
entirely  unused  to  the  machinery  of  representative 
government,  and  the  unofficial  Committee  of  Union 
and  Progress  dominated  the  elections  in  a  fashion 
which  left  the  Young  Turks  masters  of  the  situation 
and  the  minorities  hopelessly  out  of  power. 

Besides  their  internal  difficulties  the  new  leaders 
had  to  face  a  suspicious  and  even  hostile  Europe. 
While  liberal  opinion  professed   sympathy  for  the 


2s6       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

constitutional  order,  practical  men  realized  that  a 
rejuvenated  Ottoman  Empire  would  probably  attempt 
to  reassert  genuine  control  over  Bulgaria,  which  was 
practically  independent,  and  over  Cyprus,  Crete, 
Egypt,  and  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  which  though  nomi- 
nally parts  of  the  Empire  had  long  been  in  fact 
controlled  by  England,  Greece,  and  Austria-Hungary. 
Furthermore  if  the  Sick  Man  recovered,  his  long- 
coveted  estate  could  not  be  divided  up.  Conse- 
quently Austria-Hungary  declared  the  provinces  of 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  annexed,  Bulgaria  pro- 
claimed its  complete  independence,  Italy  attacked 
Turkey  and  annexed  Tripoli,  and  the  Balkan  states 
united  and  all  but  drove  the  Turks  from  Europe. 

Such  was  the  situation  when  the  Great  War 
burst.  At  once  Turkey  pledged  support  to  Ger- 
many, though  the  agreement  was  kept  secret  for 
some  months.  This  was  in  part  because  Germany 
had  for  years  been  building  up  a  position  of  influence 
at  Constantinople.  More  particularly,  however,  the 
decision  was  due  to  the  fear  of  Russia,  the  hereditary 
enemy,  known  to  be  inflexible  in  its  determination  to 
control  the  Straits.  The  prospect  of  driving  Eng- 
land from  Egypt  and  of  rebuilding  a  renewed  and 
greater  Turkish  Empire  in  the  Near  East  was  also 
attractive.  Turkish  leaders  recognized  the  danger  of 
vassalage  to  Germany,  but  they  counted  it  a  lesser 
menace  than  the  advance  of  the  Czar.  The  Entente 
powers  offered  in  return  for  Turkish  neutrahty  to 
give  the  most  solemn  assurances  that  the  Turkish 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  257 

Empire  would  not  be  broken  up,  but  the  pro-German 
faction  in  the  government  forced  the  issue,  and  war 
with  Russia  was  made  inevitable  by  the  use  of  the 
navy  in  the  Black  Sea. 

During  the  war  the  Turks  attempted  to  kill  off  as 
many  as  possible  of  the  Armenian,  Greek,  and  Syrian 
Christians  in  the  interest  of  national  unification. 
Hundreds  of  thousands  were  massacred  or  allowed  to 
starve.  This  of  course  weakened  the  military  and 
economic  forces,  and  when  the  Arabs  began  to  revolt 
the  situation  became  desperate,  and  finally  hopeless. 
Crushed  by  the  British  in  Palestine  and  Mesopo- 
tamia, with  Arabia  lost,  with  the  Central  Powers 
collapsing,  Turkey  surrendered  unconditionally.  The 
great  gamble  had  been  lost. 

In  considering  the  future  of  the  Ottoman  Empire 
a  number  of  regions  and  nationalistic  groups  must  be 
considered  separately. 

I.  The  Turks  and  Constantinople. — The  central 
portion  of  the  Anatolian  Plateau  in  Asia  Minor  is  the 
real  home  of  the  great  body  of  Ottoman  Turks,  a 
sturdy,  simple  peasantry  with  many  excellent  quali- 
ties. They  suffer,  however,  because  of  the  faults 
and  ambitions  of  the  old  ruHng  caste,  with  which 
they  have  little  in  common.  There  has  never  been 
any  question  that  the  genuinely  Turkish  parts  of 
Asia  Minor  are  to  remain  independent,  with  per- 
haps temporary  assistance  from  a  mandatory  power. 
The  difficulties  have  arisen  over  the  future  of  Con- 
stantinople  and  in  fixing  the   boundaries   in   Asia 


258       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Minor.  In  the  course  of  the  war  the  Allies  agreed, 
probably  with  some  secret  reluctance,  to  allow 
Russia  to  annex  Constantinople  and  the  Straits, 
together  with  Armenian  territory  in  the  eastern  part 
of  Asia  Minor.  After  the  Russian  collapse  Lloyd 
George  indicated  that  England  would  allow  the 
Turks  to  remain  in  the  capital,  although  the  Straits 
must  be  placed  under  some  form  of  international 
control.  At  a  later  time  the  indications  were  that 
the  fragment  of  European  Turkey  from  Adrianople 
to  Constantinople,  together  with  the  opposite  side  of 
the  Dardanelles  and  the  Bosphorus,  would  be  placed 
under  international  control,  preferably  with  the 
United  States  as  mandatory.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  peace  in  the  Near  East  this  is  probably  the 
best  possible  solution,  but  pubhc  opinion  in  this 
country  apparently  does  not  favor  assuming  the 
responsibility.  The  claims  of  Greece  to  Constan- 
tinople were  not  pressed  with  much  hope  of  success, 
nor  have  they  been  very  seriously  considered.  Still 
more  recently  the  idea  of  leaving  the  Sultan  in  pos- 
session of  the  capital,  with  the  freedom  of  the  Straits 
guaranteed  by  the  League  of  Nations,  has  been 
revived,  and  a  semi-official  announcement  to  that 
effect  has  been  made.  All  of  Thrace  is  apparently 
to  be  assigned  to  Greece,  though  the  Turks  are  to 
retain  some  sort  of  control  over  the  sacred  places  in 
Adrianople.  This  settlement  of  the  problem  of 
Constantinople  has  been  strongly  urged  by  the 
Moslems    of    British    India.     On    the    other    hand 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  259 

liberal  opinion  in  England  and  the  United  States 
has  been  aroused  at  the  prospect  of  leaving  the 
"unspeakable  Turk"  in  possession  of  one  of  the 
world's  most  important  cities,  after  all  he  has  done  to 
forfeit  any  shadow  of  a  claim  to  it.  Indignation  is 
increased  by  the  reports  of  new  massacres  of  Arme- 
nians. One  fundamental  trouble  is  that  neither  Eng- 
land nor  France  will  permit  the  other  to  control  the 
Straits,  as  mandatory;  Russia  is  out  of  the  question; 
America  holds  back;  Greece  is  at  once  too  weak  and 
too  ambitious.  The  most  reasonable  alternative 
would  seem  to  be  control  by  the  League  of  Nations; 
but  international  administration  has  not  proved  a 
success.  The  problem  of  Constantinople  is  still 
further  complicated  by  the  revival  of  Arab  independ- 
ence, with  control  of  the  Mohammedan  holy  places 
of  Medinah  and  Mecca  transferred  to  the  King- 
dom of  the  Hedjaz.  The  question  is  raised  whether 
the  Cahphate,  the  headship,  that  is,  of  the  Moslem 
world,  now  held  by  the  Ottoman  Sultan,  is  to  pass 
from  him  to  the  King  of  the  Hedjaz.  There  is  no 
doubt  that  the  possession  of  Constantinople  could 
strengthen  the  Sultan,  and  that  its  loss  would  be 
felt  by  all  Islam  as  a  serious  blow.  The  Arabs,  how- 
ever, have  no  love  for  the  Turks,  and  feel  that  the 
leadership  of  Islam  belongs  properly  to  them.  For 
Great  Britain,  which  rules  over  nearly  half  of  the 
Moslems  in  the  world,  the  whole  question  is  of  vital 
importance,  for  a  wrong  decision  might  have  disas- 
trous consequences. 


26o       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

At  present  the  Allies  control  Constantinople,  and 
the  Turkish  government  there  is  helpless.  A  dis- 
quieting feature  is  the  re\dval  of  Turkish  nationalism. 
This  appears  in  the  Turkish  Parliament  and  Cabinet, 
but  more  seriously  in  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor. 
Here  there  seems  to  be  a  definite  preparation  to  resist 
the  detachment  of  parts  of  Asia  Minor  for  transfer  to 
Greece,  Italy,  France,  or  Armenia.  Whatever  deci- 
sions are  finally  made  will  probably  have  to  be  backed 
by  troops. 

2.  The  Armenians: — For  at  least  three  thousand 
years  the  Armenians  have  maintained  their  separate 
identity  in  Eastern  and  Southern  Asia  Minor.  It  is 
their  boast  that  they  were  the  first  people  to  adopt 
Christianity  as  an  organized  group.  In  the  course  of 
their  checkered  career  this  remarkable  people  have 
been  at  times  independent,  or  semi-independent,  with 
varying  boundaries,  but  since  the  Middle  Ages  they 
have  been  subject  to  SeljuJi  Turks,  Crusaders,  and 
Ottoman  Turks.  In  the  nineteenth  century  the 
Russian  advance  brought  some  of  them  under  the 
Czar,  but  they  found  their  religious  independence 
threatened,  and  the  attempt  was  made  to  assimilate 
them  to  the  Orthodox  church. 

The  Armenians  have  always  lived  interspersed 
with  other  groups,  Turks  and  Kurds  and  Georgians. 
When  after  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  there  seemed  to  be 
danger  that  the  powers  would  interfere  in  favor  of 
Armenian  autonomy  or  independence  the  Turkish 
government  set  to  work  to  massacre  and  deport  the 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  261 

Armenians  so  that  no  district  could  be  called  "pre- 
dominantly Armenian."  The  massacres  and  depor- 
tations during  the  Great  War  were  deliberately 
planned  to  settle  the  Armenian  question  forever  by 
settling  the  Armenians.  In  all  the  outrages,  besides 
this  poHtical  motive,  plunder  has  been  more  important 
than  religious  fanaticism,  though  this  has  been 
present.  But  the  Armenians  have  been  much  more 
thrifty  and  prosperous  on  the  average  than  the 
Turks  and  Kurds,  and  the  infidels  have  been  attacked 
for  their  property  quite  as  much  as  for  the  glory  of 
Allah.  While  accurate  figures  are  impossible,  it  is 
probable  that  800,000  Armenians,  at  least,  perished 
in  the  course  of  the  war.  There  are  left  perhaps  a 
million  or  more,  but  so  well  have  the  Turks  succeeded 
in  their  outrageous  program  that  no  considerable  area 
is  left  where  the  Armenians  make  up  the  bulk  of  the 
population.  But,  as  Venizelos,  for  one,  points  out, 
"it  is  obvious  that  Turkey  should  not  be  allowed  to 
profit  by  the  systematic  annihilation  of  the  Armenian 
nation,"  and  the  powers  are  committed  to  an  Arme- 
nian repubhc.  If  the  district  from  Russian  Armenia 
to  Armenia  Minor  on  the  Mediterranean,  with  the 
port  of  Alexandretta,  should  be  set  apart  it  would 
contain  most  of  the  Armenians  who  survive,  but  it 
would  contain  even  more  Turks,  Kurds,  and  Greeks.' 
These  boundaries  would  also  encroach  on  the  area 
reserved  for  France.     On  the  north  and  east  there  is 

'There  are  350,000  Greeks  in  the  Black  Sea  province  of 
Trebizond  and  70,000  around  Adams  that  Venizelos  is  willing  to  see 
included  in  Armenia  {Greece  before  the  Peace  Congress,  p.  20). 


262        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

difficulty  in  fixing  the  boundary  between  Armenia 
and  the  small  states  of  Georgia  and  Azerbaijan, 
which  extend  south  of  the  Caucasus  from  the  Black 
Sea  to  the  Caspian.  Because  of  British  oil  interests 
in  the  Baku  field,  and  as  a  barrier  to  the  spread  of 
bolshevism,  England  seems  inclined  to  recognize 
and  support  these  Httle  republics. 

With  the  possible  exception  of  the  Greeks,  the 
Armenians  are  the  most  prosperous  and  intelHgent 
element  in  Eastern  and  Southern  Asia  Minor.  As 
a  people  they  have  many  admirable  quahties,  and 
their  indomitable  spirit  in  clinging  to  reUgion, 
language,  and  national  consciousness  through  the 
most  terrible  trials  deserves  the  most  cordial  appre- 
ciation. And  yet  in  self-protection  they  have  been 
forced  to  develop  less  admirable  traits,  and  even  their 
friends  sometimes  become  exasperated  with  them.  In 
order  to  survive  at  all  they  have  been  compelled 
to  outwit  and  deceive  their  oppressors.  They  have 
had  very  Uttle  chance  to  practice  self-government 
on  any  large  scale,  and  when  suddenly  placed  in 
a  position  of  superiority  to  their  former  masters 
have  shown  a  tendency  to  be  overbearing  and  tact- 
less. The  Kurds,  who  Hve  intenningled  with  them, 
have  been  among  their  most  bitter  persecutors. 
Many  of  the  Kurds  are  still  semi-nomadic  freebooters, 
only  half-converted  to  Islam,  and  they  will  be  a 
difficult  element  to  control.  Whatever  boundaries 
are  fixed  for  Armenia  the  new  republic  will  for  some 
time  need  the  help  of  a  strong  and  disinterested 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  263 

mandatory  to  see  that  equal  rights  are  secured  for 
all  the  elements.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Arme- 
nians would  prefer  the  United  States,  with  England  as 
second  choice.  England,  however,  does  not  desire  the 
task,  and  France  is  interested  only  in  the  district  to 
the  west.  The  whole  outlook  is  distinctly  unpromising. 
3.  The  Greeks. — From  very  early  times  the  western 
coast  of  Asia  Minor  has  had  a  large  Greek  population, 
and  at  many  periods  its  cities  have  been  among  the 
principal  centers  of  Hellenic  culture.  Greeks  are 
found  also  along  the  Black  Sea  coast  and  in  the 
interior,  chiefly  as  merchants  in  the  towns,  forming 
everywhere  an  enterprising,  thrifty,  and  relatively 
well-educated  element.  Since  the  Greeks  of  Hellas 
secured  their  independence  they  have  desired  to  bring 
all  those  who  speak  their  language  into  one  poUtical 
organization.  In  recent  years  the  Greek  subjects  of 
Turkey  have  felt  the  stir  of  this  irredentist  movement, 
and  have  increasingly  regarded  Athens  and  not  Con- 
stantinople as  their  national  capital.  The  Turkish 
government  has  reacted  somewhat  as  in  the  case  of 
the  Armenians.  Particularly  after  the  Balkan  Wars 
a  policy  of  persecution  and  deportation  began  which 
drove  450,000  Greeks  to  seek  refuge  in  Greece.  Dur- 
ing the  war  several  hundred  thousand  more  were  sent 
into  the  interior  of  Asia  Minor,  where  many  if  not  most 
of  them  perished. 

For  geographical  reasons  some  83,000  Greeks 
must  be  included  in  the  Turkish  State,  and  360,000 
must  share  the  fate  of  Constantinople  and  its  environs. 


264       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

In  Western  Asia  Minor,  however,  and  in  the  islands  of 
the  Aegean,  there  is  a  fairly  compact  Greek  population 
numbering  about  1,200,000.  The  islands  certainly 
and  the  coast  probably  will  be  assigned  to  Greece, 
either  as  a  part  of  the  kingdom,  or  under  a  mandate. 
Some  of  the  islands,  the  Dodekanese,  have  been 
occupied  by  Italy  ever  since  the  war  of  1911-12,  and 
they  were  claimed  under  the  treaty  of  191 5.  On 
nationalist  grounds,  however,  Italy  has  agreed  to  let 
them  go  to  Greece,  retaining  one  island  as  a  naval 
base.  It  is  true  that  on  the  mainland  there  are  also 
a  million  Moslems,  and  there  is  some  objection  to 
detaching  them  from  the  Turkish  State.  Venizelos 
makes  the  interesting  suggestion,  which  is  applicable 
also  to  other  mixed  areas,  that  by  arrangements 
between  the  governments,  supervised  perhaps  by  an 
international  commission,  there  might  be  an  exchange 
of  populations.  The  Greeks  of  the  interior  and  the 
Moslems  of  the  coast  would  sell  their  property  and 
receive  an  equivalent  in  their  new  homes.  The 
Turks  who  left  European  areas  lost  to  Christian 
powers  have  been  taken  care  of  after  a  fashion  by 
the  old  Turkish  government,  and  a  systematic 
extension  of  the  scheme  is  well  worth  considering.  In 
addition  there  should  be  reciprocal  guarantees  that 
those  who  do  not  care  to  move  should  be  protected 
in  their  language  and  religious  rights.  The  Greeks 
are  wilHng  to  guarantee  that  Smyrna  shall  continue 
to  be  available  as  the  port  for  commerce  to  and  from 
the  interior. 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  265 

Since  the  armistice  the  Allies  have  allowed  Greece 
to  occupy  Smyrna  and  the  adjoining  region.  There 
has  been  minor  fighting  with  the  Turks,  and  the 
occupation  is  proving  a  costly  burden. 

4.  The  Italian  sphere. — For  many  years  Italy  has 
been  attempting  by  the  method  of  economic  penetra- 
tion to  create  a  "sphere  of  interest"  in  Asia  Minor 
centering  in  AdaHa.  By  the  Treaty  of  London, 
confirmed  by  the  later  agreements,  the  Allies  promised 
that  in  the  event  of  the  partition  of  Turkey  ItaUan 
claims  in  this  region  would  be  recognized.  The  sub- 
stitution of  the  mandatory  scheme  has  somewhat 
changed  the  situation.  ItaHan  troops  have  been 
landed  at  AdaUa,  and  presumably  Italy  will  have  to 
receive  a  mandate  for  the  region.  The  Itahans  have 
no  claims  on  nationalistic  grounds,  there  is  no  evidence 
that  the  population  cares  for  Italian  guardianship, 
and  the  only  justification  apparently  is  that  everyone 
else  is  getting  a  section  and  Italy  must  not  be  left  out. 

5.  Syria. — For  years,  in  fact  ever  since  the 
Crusades,  the  French  have  taken  a  sentimental 
interest  in  the  Near  East.  French  culture  and  the 
French  language  have  made  a  considerable  impres- 
sion on  the  upper  classes.  The  French  government 
has  been  active  in  protecting  Catholics,  and  in  sup- 
porting CathoHc  missionary  and  educational  enter- 
prises. French  investors  hold  60  per  cent  of  the 
Ottoman  pubHc  debt,  and  they  have  furnished  half 
the  foreign  capital  invested  in  private  enterprises. 
French  opinion  was  somewhat  reluctant  to  see  Egypt 


266       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

pass  wholly  under  British  control,  and  it  is  not 
enthusiastic  at  the  prospect  of  a  British  mandate  for 
Palestine.  All  the  more  France  is  insisting  on  pre- 
dominance in  Syria,  which  has  long  been  recognized 
as  in  the  French  "sphere."  Back  of  the  Lebanon 
Mountains  is  the  new  Arab  Kingdom  of  the  Hedjaz, 
controlling  the  important  cities  of  Damascus  and 
Aleppo.  Although  it  was  reported  that  the  Emir 
Feisal,  son  of  the  King  of  the  Hedjaz,  had  agreed  to 
accept  the  French  as  mandatories,  it  is  a  question 
whether  the  population  will  be  satisfied.  It  con- 
tains considerable  Christian  elements,  particularly  in 
the  Lebanon  above  Beirut,  but  there  are  many 
Moslems.  There  is  a  distinct  movement  in  favor  of 
a  united  Syria  as  an  independent  state,  although 
France  and  England  refuse  to  recognize  the  action  of 
a  Congress  at  Damascus  making  Syria  a  kingdom 
under  the  Emir  Feisal.  Since  the  French  troops 
replaced  the  British  forces  there  have  been  several 
clashes. 

6.  Palestine. — ^A  peculiarly  difficult  problem  is 
furnished  by  Palestine.  The  British  are  interested 
because  of  the  need  of  defending  the  Suez  Canal  and 
Egypt.  Most  of  the  population  are  Arabic-speaking 
Moslems;  some  are  native  Christians,  a  few  are 
Jews.  By  the  agreement  of  1916  the  status  of 
Palestine  was  to  be  fixed  later.  The  powers  are  com- 
mitted to  making  Palestine  in  some  sense  a  home  for 
the  Jews,  but  the  details  are  hard  to  work  out. 
Zionists  themselves  are  not  agreed  as  to  what  they 


The  Near -Eastern  Settlement  267 

want.  It  is  clear  that  the  Jews  cannot  be  made 
politically  dominant  over  the  Moslem  majority,  nor 
can  they  be  given  land  at  the  expense  of  those  already 
in  the  country.  The  leaders  of  the  Arab  Kingdom 
profess  friendship  toward  the  Jews,  and  express  a 
willingness  to  see  them  come  in  with  equal  political 
rights.  If  the  Jews  develop  an  industrial  Hfe  and  by 
scientific  methods  reclaim  land  at  present  unused 
they  can  find  homes  in  Palestine  in  large  numbers. 
The  Moslems  and  Christians,  however,  would 
undoubtedly  unite  to  resist  the  creation  of  a  purely 
Jewish  state.  For  the  present  some  mandatory, 
presumably  Great  Britain,  will  have  to  maintain 
order  and  work  out  some  scheme  by  which  the 
rights  of  the  different  elements  can  be  secured  and 
an  increasing  degree  of  self-government  allowed. 

7.  Mesopotamia. — The  valley  of  the  Tigris  and 
Euphrates  rivers,  the  traditional  site  of  the  Garden 
of  Eden,  once  one  of  the  world's  most  prosperous 
and  civiHzed  areas,  was  one  of  the  great  world-prizes 
sought  by  Germany.  With  an  orderly  government 
and  with  scientific  irrigation,  this  region  can  become 
again  populous  and  productive.  There  are  under- 
stood to  be  immense  untouched  natural  resources, 
notably  of  oil.  Conquered  by  Great  Britain  in  the 
war,  Mesopotamia  will  naturally  fall  under  a  Brit- 
ish protectorate.  The  population  is  mostly  Arabic- 
speaking  and  Moslem,  and  outside  of  a  few  cities 
leads  a  very  primitive  existence.  The  British  have 
already  done  a  great  deal  to  improve  conditions.     A 


268        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

railroad  has  been  built  from  the  Gulf  to  Bagdad. 
The  region  north  of  Bagdad  to  the  mountains  of 
Asia  Minor  was  supposed  to  fall  to  the  Arab  Con- 
federation, being  within  the  French  sphere  of  influ- 
ence. The  British,  however,  continue  in  control. 
Geographically  the  region  should  be  administered  as 
a  whole,  particularly  in  connection  with  irrigation 

projects. 

8.  Arabia.— The  Kingdom  of  the  Hedjaz  is  the 
last  of  the  divisions  into  which  the  former  Turkish 
Empire  will  probably  fall.  Arabia  is  the  birthplace 
of  Mohammedanism,  and  for  centuries  the  Arabs 
regarded  themselves  as  the  leaders  of  Islam.  They 
have  never  been  reconciled  to  the  rule  of  the  Turks. 
Indeed  it  has  been  only  for  short  periods  and  in  an 
incomplete  fashion  that  the  rulers  of  Constantinople 
have  controlled  the  holy  cities  of  Medinah  and 
Mecca,  to  say  nothing  of  the  nomadic  tribes  of  the 
interior.  Soon  after  the  Great  War  broke  out  the 
Arabs  began  to  revolt  against  the  Turks,  and  with 
active  British  assistance  a  new  kingdom  was  set  up 
under  the  Sherif  of  Mecca,  a  descendant  of  the 
Prophet.  In  the  conquest  of  Palestine  the  Arab  forces 
gave  important  assistance.  Great  Britain  is  pledged 
to  an  independent  Arabia,  with  boundaries  reaching 
far  north  into  the  back  country  of  Syria.  Without 
perhaps  being  a  mandatory.  Great  Britain  will  un- 
doubtedly attempt  to  continue  close  and  friendly 
relations  with  the  Arabs.  The  difficulty  of  reconcil- 
ing the  French  and  Arab  claims  in  Syria  has  already 


The  Near-Eastern  Settlement  269 

proved  something  of  an  embarrassment.  There  may 
also  be  trouble  over  the  manner  of  satisfying  the 
Zionists  in  Palestine.  The  natives  seem  to  prefer  a 
united  and  independent  Arab  state  to  the  arrange- 
ments provided  by  the  French  and  EngUsh  diplomats. 


CHAPTER  XI 

ITALY,  THE  SOUTH  SLAVS,  AND  THE 
ADRIATIC 

Each  time  that  one  begins  a  discussion  of  a  new 
topic  connected  with  the  peace  settlement,  one  is 
tempted  to  say  that  "among  the  many  perplexing 
problems  which  threatened  to  disrupt  the  Conference 
and  cause  serious  misunderstanding  between  the  vic- 
tors, none  is  more  significant,"  and  so  forth.  The 
world  has  become  so  hardened  to  crises  and  deadlocks 
and  ultimatums  that  a  few  more  or  less  seem  to  make 
little  difference.  For  all  that,  truisms  however  boring 
remain  true,  and  it  is  an  unescapable  fact  that  until 
a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  conflicting  claims  of 
Italy  and  the  new  Serb-Croat-Slovene  Kingdom  is 
reached  there  is  grave  danger  of  another  war. 

The  areas  involved  in  the  dispute  are  not  large 
compared  with  other  regions  which  have  been  reas- 
signed, nor  are  they  particularly  fertile  or  wealthy. 
They  are,  however,  so  situated  as  to  be  of  considerable 
importance  strategically  and  economically;  and  the 
question  of  their  control  and  of  the  allegiance  of  their 
inhabitants  has  become  a  matter  of  national  honor 
and  prestige.  Questions  of  this  type  are  especially 
deUcate.  Concretely  the  clash  is  over  the  poHtical 
future  of  the  eastern  part  of  the  Istrian  Peninsula,  the 
town  and  district  of  Fiume,  northern  Dalmatia,  and 

270 


Italy,  the  South  Slavs,  and  the  Adriatic      271 

a  number  of  the  islands  of  the  eastern  Adriatic. 
Closely  linked  with  these  is  the  future  of  part  of 
Albania.  With  the  exception  of  the  city  of  Fiume, 
which  enjoyed  a  degree  of  local  self-government  under 
the  Hungarian  crown,  the  disputed  areas  formed  part 
of  the  former  Austrian  Empire.  The  population  is 
predominantly  South  Slav,  but  in  the  towns,  and 
notably  in  Fiume  and  Zara,  there  is  an  important 
Italian  element.  By  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  signed 
by  Austria,  and  that  presented  to  Hungary,  the 
Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  are  to  dispose 
of  these  territories.  Italy  has  therefore  the  advan- 
tage of  being  both  a  judge  and  a  claimant. 

The  great  mass  of  arguments,  maps,  statistics, 
and  rhetoric  emanating  from  the  rival  camps  may  be 
roughly  grouped  as  geographic,  including  strategic 
considerations  and  economic  outlet  to  the  sea;  his- 
torical, cultural,  and  nationalistic;  and  political, 
diplomatic,  and  practical.  Perhaps  the  best  way  to 
secure  some  idea  of  the  opposing  points  of  view  is 
through  a  summary  of  the  claims  and  counter-claims, 
arguments  and  refutations,  under  these  general  head- 
ings. 

The  Italians  assert,  with  a  wealth  of  handsome 
rehef  maps,  that  the  "natural"  frontier  of  Italy 
follows  the  watershed  of  the  Alps  around  the  north- 
east curve  of  the  Adriatic  and  down  the  mountain 
crests  into  Dalmatia  and  Albania.  They  are  invin- 
cibly persuaded  that  Nature  intended  the  Adriatic 
to  be  an  Italian  lake.     Their  military  and  naval 


272        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

experts  point  out  that  the  eastern  coast  of  Italy 
possesses  very  few  good  harbors  or  naval  bases,  while 
the  opposite  coast  of  the  Adriatic  contains  many.  In 
order  to  end  forever  the  possibility  of  a  hostile  navy 
in  the  Adriatic,  Italy  must  control  all  points  of 
strategic  value  on  the  farther  shore.  Otherwise  one 
of  the  principal  objects  of  the  war  would  be  lost. 
From  the  military  point  of  view  the  defensible  moun- 
tain barrier  of  Dalmatia  is  a  necessary  precaution 
against  a  possible  Balkan  Confederation  or  a  revived 
Pan-Slavism. 

The  South  Slavs  and  their  sympathizers  reply 
that  they  have  no  navy,  that  they  could  not  possibly 
afford  to  build  one,  that  they  are  willing  to  agree  to 
disarmament  under  the  League  of  Nations,  to  demili- 
tarization of  the  eastern  coast,  and  to  the  possession 
by  Italy  of  a  number  of  islands.  They  point  out 
that  from  the  miUtary  point  of  view  the  defense  of  a 
narrow  strip  of  difficult  country,  with  poor  communi- 
cations and  across  a  body  of  water,  would  call  for  a 
large  army,  and  would  in  an  emergency  prove  a 
weakness  rather  than  a  source  of  strength,  particu- 
larly if  it  were  purchased  at  the  cost  of  the  friendship 
of  the  South  Slavs. 

The  ItaHans  have  had  some  hopes  of  using  the 
Dalmatian  base  for  commercial  penetration  of  the 
Balkans.  Again  the  South  Slavs  warn  of  the  bad 
psychology  of  making  enemies  of  potential  customers. 
But  vigorously  and  affirmatively  the  South  Slavs 
claim  the  entire  coast  north  of  Albania  as  necessary 


Italy,  the  South  Slavs,  and  the  Adriatic      273 

to  that  "free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea"  which  is 
guaranteed  them  by  the  eleventh  of  the  Fourteen 
Points.  To  the  ItaHan  assertion  that  ample  sea- 
coast  is  left  to  them  without  northern  Dalmatia  and 
Fiume  they  retort  that  the  closeness  of  the  mountains 
to  the  sea  makes  it  impossible  to  make  extensive  use 
of  any  port  but  Fiume  except  at  prohibitive  cost  for 
construction  and  hauling.  Only  at  Fiume  is  there  a 
standard-gauge  railroad  to  the  interior,  and  nowhere 
else  is  it  practicable  to  build  one.  The  ItaHans  keep 
insisting  that  something  ''just  as  good"  might  be 
improvised  elsewhere,  but  neutral  geographers  seem  to 
agree  with  the  Jugo-Slavs.  It  is  admitted  that  Fiume 
is  the  natural  outlet  for  the  great  hinterland  of 
Hungary,  for  much  of  the  South  Slav  territory,  and 
in  part  for  Czecho-Slovakia  and  Rumania.  The 
Italians  insist  that  under  their  control  it  would  con- 
tinue to  be  available  for  this  purpose.  Some  critics, 
however,  express  the  suspicion  that  in  practice 
Trieste  would  be  favored.  When  the  Italians  point 
out  that  only  a  relatively  small  part  of  South  Slav 
commerce  used  to  go  through  Fiume  the  obvious 
answer  is  that  the  new  situation  would  be  entirely 
different  from  that  of  the  Magyar  regime. 

Historically  neither  state  has  claims  of  any  par- 
ticular force.  The  Italians  go  back  to  the  days  of  the 
Roman  Empire,  and  the  time  when  the  Republic  of 
Venice  held  a  part  of  Dalmatia.  They  point  to  the 
Roman  ruins;  they  speak  feelingly  of  the  impress  of 
Italian  culture  on  the  whole  eastern  shore  of  the 


274       ^^  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

Adriatic.  More  stress  is  laid  upon  nationalistic  argu- 
ments, and  much  emotion  has  been  roused  in  favor  of 
redeeming  the  Italian-speaking  communities  at  Fiume, 
Zara,  and  other  scattered  centers.  The  South  Slavs 
are  equally  vigorous  in  their  nationalistic  claims. 
They  deny  that  the  culture  of  the  region  is  pre- 
dominantly Italian.  The  language  statistics  show 
that  about  97  per  cent  of  Dalmatia  is  Slavic.  Even 
granting  the  most  extreme  Italian  corrections  of  the 
Austrian  census,  not  over  10  per  cent  of  the  popula- 
tion is  Italian.  To  the  argument  that  this  minority  is 
the  educated,  progressive,  civilized,  capable,  and  hence 
politically  dominant  element,  the  South  Slavs  indig- 
nantly reply  that  the  principle  of  self-determination 
precludes  the  surrender  of  overwhelming  majorities 
to  any  alien  rule.  They  offer  the  most  solemn  guar- 
antees that  the  Italian  minority  will  be  protected  in 
its  Hnguistic,  religious,  educational,  and  cultural 
rights;  but  an  arrangement  which  would  sacrifice 
nine  or  ten  Slavs  for  the  sake  of  "redeeming"  one 
Italian  they  denounce  as  a  travesty,  not  a  vindication, 
of  the  principle  of  nationalism. 

From  the  practical  point  of  view,  both  sides  speak 
of  the  sacrifices  made  during  the  war,  and  the  right 
to  demand  compensation.  Officially  they  point  out 
the  advantages  of  concessions  for  the  sake  of  future 
friendship;  unofficially  they  accuse  each  other  of 
imperialism.  The  Italians  keep  referring  to  the 
Treaty  of  London;  the  Slavs  retort  that  they  have 
never  been  officially  informed  that  such  a  treaty 


Italy,  the  South  Slavs,  and  the  Adriatic      275 

exists;  that  they  never  agreed  to  it;  and  that  in  any 
case  it  has  been  rendered  inoperative  by  the  accept- 
ance of  the  Fourteen  Points. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  by 
which  Italy  was  promised  Istria  and  Dalmatia  soon 
became  known  to  the  South  Slavs  both  in  Serbia  and 
Austria-Hungary.  The  Serbians  regarded  themselves 
as  rather  badly  treated,  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
authorities  used  the  news  to  stimulate  their  Croatian 
and  Slovene  recruits  to  hatred  of  Italy. 

In  the  spring  of  191 8  there  was  held  in  Rome  a 
Congress  of  Oppressed  Nationalities  attended  by 
representatives  of  the  groups  subject  to  the  Dual 
Monarchy.  Part  of  its  work  was  the  drawing  up  of 
an  agreement  between  semi-official  spokesmen  for 
the  Italian  government  and  representatives  of  the 
Croats,  Serbs,  and  Slovenes.  Each  people  expressed 
itself  as  vitally  interested  in  seeing  the  completion 
of  the  other's  national  unity.  The  Hberation  of  the 
Adriatic  and  its  defense  against  future  enemies  were 
declared  to  be  important  common  interests.  Both 
sides  pledged  themselves  "to  solve  amicably  the 
various  territorial  controversies  on  the  basis  of  the 
principles  of  nationality  and  of  the  right  of  people  to 
decide  their  own  fate,  and  in  such  a  way  as  not  to 
injure  the  vital  interests  of  the  two  nations."  Each 
guaranteed  the  rights  of  minorities.^ 

The  Austrian  armistice  required  the  evacuation 
of  the  territory  assigned  to  Italy  by  the  pact  of 

'  The  New  Europe,  May  2,  1918,  p.  54. 


276       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

London,  and  it  was  occupied  by  Italian  troops. 
Just  before  the  armistice,  in  the  confused  days  when 
Austria-Hungary  was  falling  to  pieces,  the  city  of 
Fiume  had  proclaimed  its  desire  to  be  united  with 
Italy.  The  Croatians  attempted  to  gain  possession  of 
the  town  for  the  new  South  Slav  State  which  was  form- 
ing, but  ItaUan  and  later  other  Allied  troops  occupied 
it.  Throughout  the  negotiations  at  Paris  the  question 
of  the  disposition  of  Fiume  caused  grave  difhculties. 
The  ItaHans  seemed  willing  to  modify  their  claims  to 
Dalmatia  if  Fiume,  to  which  they  had  no  claim  under 
the  Treaty  of  London,  were  given  to  them  instead. 
The  South  Slavs  insisted  on  having  both  Dalmatia 
and  Fiume  and  a  large  part  of  eastern  Istria,  enough, 
that  is,  to  control  the  main  railroad  to  Fiume.  Presi- 
dent Wilson  distinctly  favored  the  Jugo-Slav  claims, 
and  his  public  explanation  of  his  position  gave  great 
offense  to  the  Italian  delegates  and  caused  them  to 
leave  Paris  for  a  time. 

In  the  city  of  Fiume  the  Italians  have  a  plurality, 
though  not  a  majority;  but  if  the  adjacent  suburbs 
are  included  there  is  a  Slav  majority,  and  the  sur- 
rounding region  is  solidly  South  Slav.  As  things 
stand  the  port  of  Fiume,  with  its  connecting  railway, 
is  the  natural  and  in  fact  the  only  adequate  economic 
outlet  for  the  Serb-Croat-Slovene  State  and  the 
regions  farther  north.  The  situation  in  many  ways 
resembles  the  PoHsh  outlet  at  Dantzig,  and  the  pro- 
posal to  make  Fiume  a  free  city  under  the  protection 
of  the  League   of  Nations  was  soon  put  forward. 


Italy,  the  South  Slavs,  and  the  Adriatic      277 

Dijfficulties  then  arose  as  to  the  customs  regime  to 
which  the  town  should  belong,  and  as  to  the  nation 
which  should  look  after  its  diplomatic  interests  in 
other  countries.  England  and  France,  though  they 
felt  bound  to  carry  out  the  Treaty  of  London  if 
Italy  insisted,  were  anxious  to  see  a  compromise 
which  should  satisfy  both  sides. 

It  is  understood  that  an  arrangement  had  almost 
been  reached  when  a  dramatic  stroke  threw  every- 
thing into  confusion  once  more.  On  September  17, 
1919,  Gabriele  D'Annunzio,  the  Italian  poet  and 
soldier,  who  had  been  fervently  pressing  the  extreme 
nationalistic  claims,  persuaded  some  Italian  troops 
to  seize  Fiume  in  the  name  of  the  annexationist 
cause.  No  one  dared  to  put  a  forcible  end  to  his 
comic-opera  adventure  for  fear  of  causing  a  popular 
uprising  in  Italy. 

On  December  9  an  agreement  was  reached 
between  the  English,  French,  and  American  repre- 
sentatives in  Paris  on  the  general  principles  which 
should  determine  the  Adriatic  settlement.  President 
Wilson  had  long  before  indicated  the  boundary  line  in 
Istria  which  seemed  to  him  satisfactory.  In  general 
the  South  Slavs  were  willing  to  accept  it,  but  the 
ItaHans  did  not  regard  it  as  strategically  adequate. 
The  creation  of  a  separate  buffer  state  of  Fiume  was 
now  proposed.    Dalmatia  was  to  go  to  the  South  Slavs. 

In  their  conferences  at  London  early  in  1920  the 
Italian,  French,  and  British  premiers  drew  up  a  some- 
what different  settlement,  and  attempted  to  force 


278       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

the  South  Slav  Kmgdom  to  accept  it  on  penalty  of 
having  the  Treaty  of  London  put  in  force.  President 
Wilson  with  unexpected  vigor  denounced  this  pro- 
posal, and  insisted  that  the  principles  of  December  9 
should  not  be  modified.  The  compensation  of  the 
South  Slavs  at  the  expense  of  Albania,  which  was  part 
of  the  suggested  settlement,  he  refused  to  counte- 
nance for  a  moment.  All  concerned  then  urged 
Italians  and  South  Slavs  to  attempt  to  reach  a  set- 
tlement by  direct  negotiation. 


CHAPTER  XII 
PUBLIC  OPINION  AND  THE  SETTLEMENT 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  volume  to  give  a 
critical  discussion  of  the  merits  or  defects  of  the  peace 
settlement,  but  a  review  of  the  more  important  reac- 
tions to  the  work  of  the  Conference  is  not  out  of  place. 

As  is  perfectly  natural,  many  persons  and  groups 
have  been  disappointed  and  angry.  In  all  the  Allied 
countries  there  have  been  a  number  of  hard-shelled 
anti-Germans  who  regretted  that  the  armistice  saved 
Germany  from  invasion.  To  them  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  seems  entirely  too  mild.  The  prospect  of 
Germany's  recovering  any  degree  of  prosperity  or 
occupying  a  position  of  independent  influence  in  the 
world  distresses  them.  They  would  be  glad  to  see 
every  German  farmer,  miner,  and  factory  hand  work- 
ing for  the  rest  of  his  Hfe  to  pay  the  entire  war  debt 
of  the  Allies.  This  group,  however,  is  not  very  large, 
and  it  seems  to  be  growing  less  vindictive. 

From  quite  an  opposite  angle  many  who  had  been 
pro-German,  or  inclined  to  a  somewhat  sentimental 
type  of  pacifism,  have  expressed  sympathy  for  the 
pUght  of  the  poor,  dear,  misguided  German  people. 
The  earher  remarks  of  Allied  leaders  distinguishing 
between  the  German  people  and  their  wicked  mili- 
taristic rulers  were  quoted,  the  German  revolution 
was  recalled,  and  the  thoroughly  democratic  nature  of 

279 


28o       An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

the  new  German  government  emphasized.  Now  that 
the  Germans  had  seen  the  Hght  and  repudiated  their 
false  guides  forever,  were  they  to  obtain  no  benefit  ? 
Were  they  to  be  doomed  to  the  outer  darkness  of 
exclusion  from  the  society  of  nations,  condemned  to 
economic  serfdom,  national  humiliation,  and  despair, 
and  to  destruction  as  a  great  civiHzed  and  civilizing 
power  ?  Did  not  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  prove  that 
England  had  indeed  been  bent  on  the  destruction  of 
the  fleet,  commerce,  industry,  and  colonial  empire  of 
her  most  dangerous  rival  ? 

Another  somewhat  different  group,  including 
many  whose  anti-Teutonic  record  was  unimpeach- 
able, admitted  that  the  Germans  deserved  any  con- 
ceivable punishment,  but  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  Treaty  went  far  beyond  the  armistice  terms. 
Germany  surrendered  on  the  promise  of  a  Wilsonian 
peace.  If  the  armistice  saved  Germany  from  inva- 
sion, it  also  saved  countless  thousands  of  Allied  hves. 
By  every  consideration  of  honor  the  Allies  were 
bound  to  the  most  scrupulous  observance  of  the 
Fourteen  Points.  Instead  of  this  they  proceeded  to 
stretch  and  twist  and  interpret  them  to  justify  what- 
ever they  desired.  Instead  of  a  heahng  peace,  based 
on  great  fundamental  principles  of  justice,  they 
made  one  which  in  many  respects  was  an  old-fashioned 
settlement  of  grab  and  barter,  based  on  might. 
Instead  of  laying  the  foundation  for  a  new  era  of 
international  harmony  they  had  sowed  the  seeds  of 
new  wars.     They  had  betrayed  those  who  had  died 


Public  Opinion  and  the  Settlement  281 

to  make  possible  a  new  order  of  things;  they  had 
missed  the  supreme  opportunity  of  modern  times. 

Still  others  held  that  although  the  Treaty  was  in 
essentials  just  it  was  impracticably  severe.  Its  terms 
could  not  be  carried  out  literally,  and  to  make  the 
attempt  would  drive  the  Germans  to  bolshevism. 
Self-interest  should  lead  to  a  modification  of  the 
terms.  Germany  was  an  industrial  nation,  drawing 
an  annual  surplus  from  manufacturing.  Without 
manufacturing  millions  would  be  forced  to  emigrate 
or  starve.  But  to  destroy  the  productive  capacity  of 
Germany  is  to  destroy  the  prospect  of  recovering  any 
reparation  whatever.  The  wisdom  of  the  ages  is 
against  the  policy  of  killing  a  goose  which  is  expected 
to  lay  golden  eggs.^ 

The  various  Treaties  are  not  without  their  de- 
fenders. A  few  regard  them  as  sound  in  all  particu- 
lars. They  are  stern,  but  just.  They  conform  to 
the  Fourteen  Points,  properly  interpreted.  As  to 
their  terms  being  impracticable,  it  is  too  early  to  tell. 
The  first  thing  to  do  is  to  try  them.  When  they 
prove  unworkable,  but  not  before,  they  may  be 
modified.  Others  admit  that  the  Treaties  contain 
serious  defects.  This  is  natural,  since  they  are  the 
result  of  the  compromise  of  many  conflicting  interests 
and  principles,  applied  to  situations  of  the  greatest 
complexity  and  inherent  difficulty.  But  the  wrongs 
of   Alsace-Lorraine   and   Poland    are   righted.     The 

'  These  and  other  arguments  are  developed  with  force  and  skill 
by  J.  M.  Keynes  in  his  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace,  a  book 
which  has  had  a  considerable  influence  on  public  opinion. 


282        An  Introduction  to  tJte  Peace  Treaties 

long-thwarted  national  aspirations  of  the  Czecho- 
slovaks and  South  Slavs  are  satisfied.  The  Rumani- 
ans of  Hungary  are  freed.  The  Greeks  regain  mil- 
lions of  their  enslaved  brethren.  The  Armenians  and 
other  groups  are  freed  from  the  tyranny  of  the  Turks. 
The  Germans  are  called  on  to  repair  the  damage 
they  have  done  up  to  the  limit  of  their  capacity. 
The  punishment  of  war  criminals  is  demanded. 
Prussian  mihtarism  is  destroyed.  The  League  of 
Nations  is  founded,  pointing  the  way  to  a  new  and 
better  international  order.  The  Germans  and  other 
former  enemy  groups  are  invited  to  demonstrate 
their  fitness  to  join  it.  If  the  settlement  is  defective, 
as  perhaps  in  the  matter  of  the  Shantung  award,  the 
League  will  be  able  from  time  to  time  to  make  the 
proper  readjustments  and  modifications.  Still  others 
who  do  not  particularly  Hke  the  details  of  the  settle- 
ment defend  it  as  better  than  nothing  and  urge  its 
acceptance.  Perhaps  the  most  striking  exposition  of 
this  point  of  view  is  the  memorandum  of  General 
Smuts,  of  South  Africa,  which  he  issued  at  the  time 
he  signed  the  Treaty  of  Versailles: 

I  signed  the  Peace  Treaty,  not  because  I  consider  it  a  satis- 
factory document,  but  because  it  is  imperatively  necessary  to 

close  the  war The  promise  of  the  new  life,  the  victory 

of  the  great  human  ideals  for  which  the  people  have  shed  their 
blood  and  their  treasure  without  stint,  the  fulfilment  of  their 
aspiration  toward  a  new  international  order  and  a  fairer  and 

better  world  are  not  written  in  the  treaty A  new 

heart  must  be  given,  not  only  to  our  enemies  but  also  to  us 
— a  spirit  of  pity,  mercy,  and  forgiveness  for  the  sins  and  wrong 


Public  Opinion  and  the  Settlement  283 

which  we  have  suffered There  are  territorial  settle- 
ments which  in  my  humble  opinion  will  need  revision.  There 
are  guarantees  laid  down  which  we  all  hope  will  soon  be  found 
out  of  harmony  with  the  new  peaceful  temper  and  unarmed 
state  of  our  former  enemies.  There  are  punishments  fore- 
shadowed over  most  of  which  a  calmer  mood  may  yet  prefer 
to  pass  the  sponge  of  obUvion.  There  are  indemnities  stipu- 
lated which  cannot  be  exacted  without  grave  injury  to  the 
industrial  revival  of  Europe,  and  which  it  will  be  in  the  interest 
of  all  to  render  more  tolerable  and  moderate.  The  real  peace 
of  peoples  ought  to  follow  to  complete  and  amend  the  peace  of 
the  statesmen. 

Since  the  Treaty  with  Germany  was  signed  a 
number  of  modifications  of  its  terms  have  already 
been  made.  The  coal  deliveries  to  France  are  for  the 
time  reduced.  The  German  army,  in  view  of  the 
danger  of  internal  disorder,  remains  above  the  figures 
fixed.  The  Kaiser  is  to  continue  under  guard  in 
Holland  instead  of  being  tried.  The  German  war 
criminals  are  to  be  tried  first  by  their  own  govern- 
ment, and  only  in  case  the  Allies  feel  that  justice  is 
not  done  will  they  demand  their  surrender.  It  is 
not  improbable  that  further  changes  will  be  made. 

In  the  United  States  the  acceptance  of  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles  has  become  a  domestic  political  issue. 
In  the  November  elections  of  191 8  the  Democrats 
lost  control  of  Congress.  The  Senate  resented  the 
fact  that  it  was  not  consulted  in  the  course  of  the 
negotiations  at  Paris,  and  when  the  Treaty  was 
finally  submitted  to  it  the  atmosphere  was  somewhat 
unfriendly.  Opposition  developed  along  three  lines. 
Some  of  it  was  partisan,  based  on  a  desire  to  discredit 


284       -An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 

the  Democratic  administration  on  the  eve  of  another 
election,  or  growing  out  of  personal  dislike  for  the 
President.  This  latter  feeling  was  shared  by  some  of 
the  Democratic  Senators.  Other  Senators  were  quite 
sincerely  desirous  of  protecting  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  as  they  understood  them.  For  this 
purpose  they  desired  to  quahfy  our  acceptance  of  the 
League  of  Nations  Covenant.  Others  opposed  the 
Treaty  because  of  its  defects.  Reservations  accept- 
able to  a  majority  of  the  Senate  were  finally  adopted, 
but  they  twice  failed  to  secure  the  two-thirds  vote 
necessary  for  ratification.  The  President  has  opposed 
the  reservations  largely  because  they  seem  to  him  to 
show  a  spirit  of  suspicion  which  would  "chill"  our 
relations  with  the  other  members  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  issue  can  be  placed 
before  the  people  in  a  clear-cut  fashion.  The  country 
probably  wants  the  Treaty  ratified;  it  is  tired  of 
delay;  it  resents  the  failure  of  the  Senate  to  reach 
some  sort  of  a  compromise,  and  it  is  incUned  to  criti- 
cize the  President  for  his  unyielding  attitude.  Both 
parties  will  probably  declare  for  a  ratification  of  the 
Treaty  ''with  such  reservations  as  are  necessary  to 
protect  the  vital  interests  of  the  United  States."  A 
Resolution  of  Congress  declaring  the  state  of  war 
with  Germany  at  an  end  is  of  doubtful  constitution- 
ality and  would  have  an  uncertain  status  in  inter- 
national law.  Meanwhile,  we  cry  Peace!  Peace!  but 
there  is  no  peace. 


REFERENCES    FOR  ADDITIONAL  READING 

The  text  of  the  first  draft  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
is  printed  in  the  Congressional  Record,  June  9,  1919.  The 
Treaties  with  Germany  and  Austria  as  signed  are  printed 
in  the  Congressional  Record,  July  10  and  September  15, 

1919,  and  separately  as  Senate  Documents.  They  are 
reprinted  in  the  New  York  Times^  Current  History,  August 
and  October,  1919,  in  the  Chicago  Daily  News  Almanac, 

1920,  the  New  York  World  Almanac,  1920,  and  elsewhere. 

Current  History:  A  Monthly  Magazine  of  the  New  York 
Times  has  printed  most  of  the  more  important  offi- 
cial documents  connected  with  the  making  of  peace, 
together  with  numerous  valuable  articles,  maps,  etc. 

Documents  and  Statements  Relating  to  Peace  Proposals 
and  War  Aims  {December,  igi6 — November,  igi8) 
(Macmillan) 

Treaty  of  Peace  with  Germany:  Hearings  before  the  Com- 
mittee on  Foreign  Relations  United  States  Senate, 
66th  Congress,  ist  Session,  Senate  Document  No.  106 

R.  S.  Baker,  What  Wilson  Did  at  Paris  (Doubleday) 

E.  J.  Dillon,  Inside  Story  of  the  Peace  Conference  (Harper) 
W.  E.  Dodd,  Woodrow  Wilson  (Doubleday) 

S.  P.  Duggan  (editor)  The  League  of  Nations  (Atlantic 

Monthly  Press) 
H.  A.  Gibbons,  The  New  Map  of  Asia  (Century) 
H.    Hansen,     The    Adventures    of   the    Fourteen    Points 

(Century) 
S.  Huddleston,  Peace-making  at  Paris  (London:  Fisher 

Unwin) 
J.  M.  Keynes,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the  Peace 

(Harcourt,  Brace  &  Howe) 

F.  B.  Sayre,  Experiments  in  International  Administration 

(Harper) 

28s 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Adalia,  i8,  265 
Adriatic,  13,  36,  73,  271-72 
Aerial  navigation,  1 79 
Air  craft,  German,  149 
Albania,  18,  271 

Alliances,     Franco-British     and 

Franco-American,  208-10 
Alsace-Lorraine,  4,  7,  11,  20,  23, 

28,  32,  36,  37,  38,  53,  76,  115- 
18,  172 

Arabia,  19,  168 

Arbitration,  82,  97 

Armenia,  11,  19,  260 

Armistice,  48 

Assembly,    League,    powers    of, 
106-7 

Austria,  108;    treaty  with,  211- 

23 
Austria-Hungary,  4,  32,  36,  38; 

war  aims,  10,  40,  42 

Bagdad  railway,  10,  129,  133 

Balkans,  11,  224-29 

Baltic  provinces,  10,  60,  192 

Banat  of  Temesvar,  239,  244 

Belgium,  10;  war  aims,  12;  41, 
60,  74,  no,  164,  172 

Big  Five,  58,  65,  104 
Bolivia,  15 

Bolshevism,  ^^,  66;  in  Hungary, 
240 

Bonds,  issued  by  Germany,  164, 
170 

Brazil,  15 

Brest-Litovsk,  Treaty  of,  34-35, 
128,^161 


Bulgaria,  36,  44;  war  aims,  11; 
treaty  with,  224-36 

Cables,  submarine,  168 

Capitalism,  4,  85 

Charles,  Emperor,  ^6,  37,  220 

China,    14,  18,  59,  74,  79,  132, 
141-43,  212 

Clemenceau,  39,  50,  53-54,  65, 
69,  162 

Coal,  76,  1 1 2-13,  167,  283 

Conciliation,  98 

Constantinople,  11,  14,  19,  257 

Contracts,  pre-war,  177 

Council,  League,  powers  of,  105 

Cuba,  15,  106 

Czecho-Slovakia,   64,   119,    182, 
199,  213,  216,  222 

Czecho-Slovaks,  27,  45,  59 

Czemin,  34 

Dalmatia,  18,  73,  270-78 

Dantzig,  63,  120,  122-24,  276 

Danube  Commission,  183-84 

Debts,  pre-war,  172,  175-76,  221 

Disarmament,   77,  83,  95,   112, 
146,  219,  230 

Dobrudja,     11,    35,     227,    230, 

233 
Dominions,  British,  55,  64,  92, 

106,  194,  210 

Dyes,  option  on  German,  168 

East  Prussia,  63,  120,  125 

Economic  clauses,  173-78,  222; 
criticized,  281 


289 


290       An  Introdiiction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 


Ecuador,  15 
Egypt,  II,  61,  133 

Financial  clauses,  171-73 
Fiume,  63,  73,  239,  273,  276-77 

Fourteen  Points,  37,  44,  47,  75, 

77,  124,  280 

France,  6;    war  aims,  11;  115; 

in  Near  East,  265 
Freedom  of  the  seas,  37,  39,  45 

Galicia,  120,  216 
German  colonies,  21,  34,  38,  43, 
SI,  60,  67,  76, 103,  130-32,  193 
German  fleet,  69,  147,  195 
Germany,  6,  8,  10,  51,  73,  75-76, 

78,  109-10,  134-37,  170 
Graves,  149 

Great  Britain,  7,  12,  54-55,  194, 
266-69 

Great  War,  causes,  1-9;  respon- 
sibility for,  9,  24,  25,  128,  152, 
164-65,  211 

Greece,  14,  231 

Greeks,  in  Asia  Minor,  263 

Grey,  Sir  Edward,  quoted,  87 

Guarantees,  192 

Guatemala,  15 

Haiti,  15,  106 

Hedjaz,  20,  64,  169,  268 

Heligoland,  128 

Hertling,  39,  41 

Holland,  12,  60,  155 

Honduras,  15 

House,  Col.  E.  H.,  48 

Hungary,  Treaty  with,  237-45 

Imperialism,  4 
India,  61,  64,  106 
Internationalism,  84 


Istria,  18,  270,  275,  277 
Italy,  13,  38,  56,  73,  218,  249, 
265,  270-78. 

Japan, 12, 20, 57,  74, 133, 134-43 
Jews,  in  Poland,  205-7,  218 

Kiau-chow,  13,  136-45 
Kiel  Canal,  184 
Kuehlmann,  32,  43 

Labor,  67,  73,  99,  185-91 

Lansdowne,  letter,  42 

League   Covenant,    73,   80-109, 

212 
League  of  Nations,  26,  27,  28, 

29,  39,  49,  51-52,  68-70,  78, 

80-109,  184,  196,  212 

Liberals,  39,  42,  51,  52,  166 
Liberia,  15,  106,  132 
Lithuania,  126,  199 
Lloyd  George,  23,  25,  37,  39,  41, 

47,  162,  199 
London,  Treaty  of,  18,  213,  274 
Lou  vain,  169 
Luxemburg,  60,  11 1 

Macedonia,  11,  227 
Magyars,  237-38 
Mandatory  plan,  68,  100-104 
Mesopotamia,  19,  250,  267 
Mexico,  92,  93 
Militarism,  5,  42 
Minorities,  63,  202-8,  216 
Monroe  Doctrine,  94 
Montenegro,  11,  38,  59,  64 
Morocco,  132 

Nationalism,  2,  84 
Near  East,  251-52 
Nicaragua,  15,  106 


Index 


291 


Odenburg,  213 

Open  diplomacy,  37,  39,  65,  72 

Palestine,  20,  44,  266-67 
Panama,  15,  106 
Pan-Germanism,  8,  30 

Peace,  attempts  to  secure,  22- 
44;  general  principles  of, 
25-27,  28,_  30,  40-41,  50-51, 
62-63;  societies,  86 

Peace  Conference,  48,  64-79; 
diflaiculties  of,  63,  67;  criticism 
of,  71-72 

Pensions,  166 
Persia,  19,  250 
Peru,  15 

Plebiscite,  34,  76,  77,  114,  124, 
125,  215,  233,  243 

^Poland,  II,  19,  27,  119-22,  172, 

197-208,  222 
Pope,  peace  note  of,  31-32 
Ports,  free  zones  in,  179,  182 
Portugal,  13 
Prisoners,  149 
Prize  courts,  194 
Property,  German,  116,  176-78; 

Austrian,  222 

Racial  equality,  57,  91 

Railway  traflBc,  184 

Reichstag  resolution,  31,  44,  161 

Reparation,  2>3,  35,  69,  72,  76, 

78,  160-71,  220 
Reparation  Commission,  75,  169, 

172,  220 
Reservations     to    Treaty,    284. 

See  Senate 
Restoration,  45,  62 
Rhine,  183-84 
Rhine  boundary,  20,  54,  72,  112, 

160,  209 
Rivers,  international  control  of, 

180-84 


Rtimania,  14,  20,  35,  38,  212, 
217,  2i8,  235,  240,  244 

Ruthenians,  216-17 

Russia,  6,  11,  30731,.  33-35,  60, 
64,  67;  revolution  in,  20 

Saar  Valley,  20,  72,  76,  112-15 

St.  Germain,  Treaty  of,  211-23 

Scheldt  River,  1 2 

Schleswig,  126-28 

Secret   treaties,    17-21,   47,   63, 

248 
Self-determination,  62,  77,  213- 

14,  219 
Senate,  United  States,  93,  95,  96, 

108,  109,  191,  195,  283-84 

Serb  -  Croat  -  Slovene  Kingdom, 
64,  212,  215,  217,  245,  270-78 

Serbia,  2,  10,  11,  36,  38,  64, 
221 

Shantung,  57,  74,  133-45 

Shipping,  76,  166 

Siam,  14,  132 

Silesia,  Upper,  77,  no,  124 

Smuts,  General,  68,  79,  90, 
282 

Smyrna,  20,  249 
South  Africa,  21 
South  Slavs,  270-78 
Strategic  frontiers,  62,  231,  272 
Submarines,  29,  36,  139 
Supreme  Council,  67,  70 
Switzerland,  36,  193 
Syria,  19,  249,  265 

Tariffs,  174 
Teschen,  199 
Thrace,  231-35 
Transylvania,  242 
Treaties,   to  be  registered,    99; 
renewal  of,  175 


292        An  Introduction  to  the  Peace  Treaties 


Turkey,  10,  16,  36,  38,  44,  67, 
102,  133,  246-69 

Tyrol,  18,  63,  213,  218 

Ukraine,  35,  215 

United  States,  war  aims,  14;  58, 

139-40,  234-35 
Uruguay,  15 

Venizelos,  19,  231 

Versailles,  Treaty  of,  74,  75,  76, 

194-96,  283 
Vienna,  Congress  of,  16,  182,  183 


War  aims,  22-44 
War  criminals,  76,  151-58,  283 
War  debts  of  Allies,  55 
W^illiam  II,  Kaiser,  76,  150,  154- 

56,  283 
Wilson,    President,    25,    28-30 

49,  58,  68-73,  88-89,  109^  2IO» 

277-78,  284 

Young  Turks,  254-55 
Zionists,  3,  20,  266 


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